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ABSTRACT 
This thesis quantitatively examines the extent to which UK corporate governance (CG) 
reforms have been effective in constraining excessive executive pay (EP) and enhancing CG 
compliance and corporate performance/valuation for 100 UK non-financial listed companies 
over the period 2008-2013 (i.e., 600 observations). In particular, this study aims to: (i) examine 
compliance and disclosure levels of CG rules contained in the 2010 UK Combined Code; (ii) 
examine factors that determine compliance and disclosure levels of CG recommendations 
contained in the 2010 UK Combined Code; (iii) investigate CG’s influence, using both the 
composite-CG-index and the individual-CG-variable models, on corporate 
performance/valuation; (iv) analyse the interaction effect of ownership structure variables on 
the UK CG index (UKCGI)-Performance nexus; (v) examine the impact of firm-level CG 
quality on executive pay (EP), using both models; and (vi) investigate that the interaction effect 
of ownership structure variables on the UKCGI-EP relationship. 
Firstly, this study employs one the most extensive hand-collected datasets on CG 
compliance and disclosure practices comprising 120 CG provisions extracted mainly from 2010 
Combined Code to examine the level and the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure. 
The results suggest that there is still substantial variation in CG practices among the UK firms. 
The study also finds that firm-level voluntary CG disclosure is significantly influenced by 
ownership structure and board characteristics. 
Secondly, and with regard to the third and fourth objectives, the findings indicate that firm-
level CG quality, proxied by the UKCGI, is positively linked with both Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) and 
return on assets (ROA), but has no significant link with total shareholder return (SR). 
Additionally, the findings obtained from the individual-CG-variable model are mixed. For 
example, and briefly, board size and board independence are statistically significant and 
positively related to Q-ratio, whereas other variables are either insignificantly or natively 
related to Q-ratio. The findings also suggest that, ownership structure variables moderate the 
association among the UKCGI, Q-ratio and ROA, but have no moderating effect on the UKCGI-
SR nexus. 
Finally, and in terms of the final two objectives, the findings indicate that UKCGI is 
negatively related to executive pay (EP). Similarly, and using the individual-CG-variable 
model, the results are mixed. For example, and briefly, board size, board independence and 
board diversity are negatively related to EP, whilst other mechanisms are either insignificantly 
or positively related to EP. The findings also suggesting that ownership structure variables 
moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 
1. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter presents the essential background of this research and it is divided into five 
main sections.  The first section below provides a concise summary of recent CG developments 
pursued in the context of the UK. Section 1.2 sheds lights on the motivations for conducting 
this study. Section 1.3 sets out the study questions. Section 1.4 briefly discusses the research 
contributions. The final section (1.5) outlines the organisation of the entire thesis. 
1.1 BACKGROUND – RECENT CG REFORMS IN THE UK 
The occurrence of a series of major corporate failures at the end of 1980s, including the 
bankruptcy of the Barings Bank increased the need to improve and reform CG practices in the 
UK (Sheridan et al., 2006; Waweru, 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 2016). This period was 
characterised by poor performance and weak disclosure and transparency about CG systems, as 
well as excessive executive pay (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Pye, 2000). Consequently, since the 
early 1990s several reports and pieces of legislation have been introduced, aiming to restore the 
confidence of investors by improving accountability and transparency among UK publicly 
listed companies. For instance, and as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two, in May 1991, 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the accountancy profession and the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, set up the Cadbury Committee. This committee 
issued its final report in December 1992, with the aim of enhancing CG practices among UK 
listed firms and stemming future financial scandals. This report, which was adopted by the LSE 
in 1993, has been considered an influential driver for governance reforms pursued in several 
countries around the world (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Ntim et al., 2015a, b). However, 
the Cadbury Report was criticised for focusing mainly on the financial aspects of CG and 
ignoring other equally important aspects, such as executive directors’ pay and risk management 
(Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012b, 2016). 
To overcome such limitations, the Cadbury Report was reviewed and expanded by a number 
of further reports, including the 1995 Greenbury Report, 1998 Hampel Report, 1999 Turnbull 
Report, and the 2003 Higgs and Smith Reports. As will be discussed further in Chapter Two, the 
Greenbury Report was issued in 1995 and aimed at addressing issues related to executive pay 
practices among UK listed firms, with specific emphasis on enhancing the link among executive 
pay and performance through increased disclosure of aspects related to executive pay. The 
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Cadbury and Greenbury Reports’ recommendations were then consolidated in the 1998 Hampel 
Report, allowing its committee to issue the first UK Combined Code in 1998. In 1999, the 
Turnbull Report was issued, aimed at enhancing risk management and internal controls among 
UK listed firms. In 2003, the Higgs Report was issued; this report sought to enhance board 
independence by reviewing the function and performance of outside directors. In the same year, 
the Smith Report was published; it focused on improving the role of board committees, with 
specific focus on the function and performance of audit committees. The second version of the 
Combined Code was issued in 2003, and it further consolidated the recommendations contained 
in the Turnbull, Higgs and Smith Reports. In 2006 and 2008, the UK Combined Code was revised 
again. However, the 2007/08 financial crisis has increased current debate about the effectiveness 
of CG mechanisms in monitoring the opportunistic behaviours of management and protecting 
shareholder wealth (Aebi et al., 2012; FRC, 2010, 2012). As a result, the UK Combined Code 
was revised in 2010, 2012 and 2014. Similarly, and in order to improve shareholder activism, the 
Stewardship Code was issued in 2010 and 2012, with specific focus on enhancing the role and 
effectiveness of institutional shareholders. 
The recommendations contained in the Combined and Stewardship Codes cover five CG 
areas, including: (i) board leadership; (ii) board effectiveness; (iii) board accountability; (iv) 
executive pay; and (v) relations with shareholders. CG rules relating to the first two areas (i.e., 
leadership and effectiveness) seek to improve board monitoring and board independence through 
requiring greater transparency about board practices, including separating CEO and chairperson 
positions and requiring the majority of corporate board members to be independent outside 
directors. The area relating to accountability aims to enhance risk management and control by 
calling for greater disclosure and transparency about the existence of sufficient internal controls 
and audit systems, risk management techniques and risk evaluation. Remuneration CG provisions 
seek to improve monitoring and control over executive pay by requiring greater transparency 
regarding the pay of executive directors, including remuneration policy and the components of 
executives’ pay. CG provisions relating to relations with shareholders aim to ensure that 
shareholders’ views are communicated to the top management by strengthening communication, 
engagement and dialogue between major shareholders and corporate boards regarding issues 
relating to executive pay, strategy and governance. 
Apart from the focus of the above CG codes on preventing executives from expropriating 
the wealth of shareholders, there are other CG regulations that aim to encourage executives to 
take stakeholders’ interests into account; namely, the 2002 Hermes Principle and the 2006 
Companies Act. These regulations require providing detailed information about CG practices 
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relating to stakeholders. Additionally, and consistent with Cadbury Report, the recommendations 
contained in the above mentioned reports and codes have been appended to the listing rules of 
the LSE, thus making it necessary for firms to either comply or explain cases of non-compliance 
(Shrives & Brennan, 2015).  
1.2 MOTIVATIONS OF THE STUDY  
There are several factors motivated this study to be conducted. First, the UK offers an 
interesting setting in which to investigate issues related to voluntary CG disclosure, firm 
financial performance and executive pay, because it has been at the forefront of pursuing 
arguably the most influential global CG reforms since 1992 (e.g., 1992 Cadbury Report; 1995 
Greenbury Report; 1998 Hampel Report; 1999 Turnbull Report; 2003 Higgs & Smith Report; 
2010, 2012, 2014 Combined Code). For example, the influential Cadbury Report of 1992, 
which promoted the concept of a “comply or explain” CG compliance regime, has been adopted 
by almost every country, with the exception of the US, which uses a mandatory CG compliance 
regime through the issuance of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As discussed further in Chapter 
Two, since the issuance of the Cadbury Report in 1992, over 30 CG codes and reports have 
been issued and consolidated to form the UK Combined Code with five sections dealing 
explicitly with CG practices relating to: (i) board leadership; (ii) board effectiveness; (iii) board 
accountability; (iv) executive pay; and (v) relations with shareholders. Therefore, studying 
whether CG mechanisms influence CG compliance and disclosure, corporate 
performance/valuation and executive pay can have important implications not just for the UK, 
but also for CG reforms around the world. 
Additionally, the UK offers an interesting context to conduct the current study because UK 
firms tend to have a relatively diffused ownership structure, where institutional shareholders 
have an active role in preventing management from expropriating the wealth of shareholders 
(Andriosopoulos & Yang, 2015; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). Dispersed ownership structure 
coupled with strong shareholder activism and a good record of enforcing and implementing 
corporate regulations can help improve the market for corporate, managerial, product, service 
and capital control in the UK (Filatotchev & Dotsenko, 2015; Melis et al., 2015). This may help 
reduce agency problems by (i) encouraging voluntary CG disclosure and (ii) constraining 
excessive executive pay to protect the wealth of shareholders (Ntim, 2012a, b; Mallin et al., 
2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Newton, 2015). 
Second, as discussed, the global financial crisis of 2007/08 was partly attributed to poor 
CG, transparency and disclosure practices. In addition, there seems to be a general lack of 
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adequate, serious academic reflection and empirical evidence on the impacts of the 2007/08 
financial crisis on CG compliance and disclosure behaviours (Ntim et al., 2013; Elshandidy & 
Neri, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), firm financial performance 
(Dharmadasa et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015) and executive pay (Baixauli-Soler & 
Sanchez-Marin, 2015; Chen et al., 2015). This motivates the current study to investigate the 
association among CG mechanisms, CG compliance and disclosure, corporate financial 
performance and executive pay for periods following the 2007/08 global financial crisis.  
Third, because there are a variety of reasons underlying corporate disclosure behaviour, 
and the impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation and executive pay, 
previous studies have strived to investigate their determinants (Barako et al., 2006; Core et al., 
1999; Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Lee & Isa, 2015; Newton, 2015; 
Ntim, 2015). However, the existing literature suffers from a number of observable limitations. 
Existing voluntary disclosure literature is mainly focused on examining risk disclosures 
(Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), 
social and environmental disclosures (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Ghazali, 2007; Gray et al., 
1995; Orij, 2010; Patten, 1992; Reverte, 2009; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 20013; Ntim, 2016), 
earnings management (Elghuweel et al., 2016), and general financial disclosures (Adelopo, 
2011; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Samaha et al., 2015; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 
2016). By contrast, and notwithstanding the increasing importance of good CG practices and 
the considerable amount of CG reforms that have been pursued worldwide (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Soobaroyen et al., 2014), studies investigating why and how listed firms 
voluntary comply with and disclose information about their CG practices are rare (Arcot et al., 
2010; Conyon, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Pass, 2006; Samaha et al., 2012; Shrives & Brennan, 2015; 
Al-Bassam et al., 2016).  
In particular, prior UK studies investigating CG compliance and disclosure suffer from a 
number of observable limitations. For example, Conyon (1994) and Conyon and Mallin (1997) 
measure compliance indirectly through surveys. Similarly, Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) 
employ a subjective analysts’ rankings to examine CG disclosure practices among UK listed 
firms. Additionally, Arcot et al. (2010) and Pass (2006) examine a small number of governance 
provisions (i.e., eight and five CG provisions, respectively). Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) only 
explore the compliance level with good CG practices among small and medium size firms listed 
on the alternative investment market, whilst Shrives and Brennan (2015) only analyse the 
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quality of CG explanations for non-compliance with the recommendations of 2003 and 2010 
Codes among the largest UK listed firms. Therefore, and distinct from prior studies, the current 
study constructs the UK Corporate Governance Index (UKCGI), comprising of 120 CG 
provisions. This study also includes both large and small companies in the final sample in order 
to improve the generalisability of its findings. 
Additionally, and in terms of prior UK studies that examine the association between firm-
level CG quality and corporate performance/valuation (Arcot & Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al., 
2008; Dahya et al., 2008; Dahya et al., 1996; Davies et al., 2005; Guest, 2009b; Padgett & 
Shabbir, 2005), these studies either examine the association using the composite-CG index 
model or the individual-CG-variable model; hence, this study extends the extant literature by 
examining the relationships among individual CG mechanisms, the level of compliance with 
UK good CG practices and firm financial performance. Additionally, as will be explained 
further in Chapter Four, despite controlling for endogeneity and omitted variables problems, 
prior studies offer mixed findings on the link between CG quality and corporate 
performance/valuation, when using the composite-CG index model (Bauer et al., 2010; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Connelly et al., 2012; Daines et al., 
2010; Farag et al., 2014; Giroud & Mueller, 2011; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Given that firms may 
use alignment and monitoring mechanisms together to reduce agency problems and protect the 
wealth of shareholders, these mechanisms need to be interrelated so that to be effective in 
practice (Ntim, 2013a, b, c; Ntim, 2015). This study extends previous literature by examining 
whether ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-Performance nexus. 
Existing studies examining the determinants of executive pay (Amzaleg et al., 2014; Core 
et al., 1999; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Guest, 2009a; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Lee & Isa, 2015; 
Newton, 2015; Sapp, 2008) also suffer from a number of observable limitations. For example, 
despite the importance of good CG practices and the considerable number of CG reforms that 
have been pursued worldwide (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), existing studies have 
focused excessively on examining whether and how executive pay is linked to firm performance 
(Amzaleg et al., 2014; Balafas & Florackis, 2014; Basu et al., 2007; Brick et al., 2006; Chen et 
al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Conyon & He, 2011; Guest, 2009a; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Lee & 
Isa, 2015; Ozkan, 2011). Firm performance is arguably only one possible determinant of 
executive pay. By contrast, studies investigating whether and how firm-level CG quality may 
influence executive pay are scarce (Andreas et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 2012; Cheung et al., 
2005; Conyon, 1997; Ozkan, 2007, 2011). This arguably limits the current understanding of the 
influence of firm-level CG quality on executive pay. 
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In addition, notwithstanding increasing evidence which suggests that considering the pay 
packages of other executive directors below the CEOs (e.g., CFOs) is equally important (Duong 
& Evans, 2015; Hoitash et al., 2012; Hsu & Liao, 2012; Ntim et al., 2015a; Ntim et al., 2017; 
Victoravich et al., 2012), existing studies have focused excessively on the CEO pay (Al-Najjar 
et al., 2016; Chalmers et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2005; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 
2015). Arguably, this may limit existing knowledge about the determinants of other executive 
directors’ pay. Additionally, and as will be further explained in Chapter Four, existing studies 
examining the determinants of executive pay either use the composite-CG-index model or 
individual-CG-variable model. Therefore, the current study extends previous work by 
employing both approaches to examine this association. However, as explained further in 
Section 4.3.1 of Chapter Four, existing studies that employ the composite-CG index model to 
examine the influence of firm-level CG quality on executive pay are rare (e.g., Brown & Lee, 
2010; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015). A major weakness of these 
few studies is that they do not sufficiently control for possible endogeneity issues that can be 
caused by employing both alignment (pay and ownership) and monitoring mechanisms (CG) to 
resolve agency problems (Chen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Ntim et al., 2017; Reddy et al., 
2015). As a firm may use both mechanisms together to reduce agency problems, these 
mechanisms arguably need to be interrelated so that to be efficient in practice (Ntim et al., 
2015a). The current study extends previous research by investigating whether ownership 
structure variables moderate the link among firm-level CG quality and executive pay (UKCGI-
EP).  
The final motivation for this study is that despite increasing theoretical and empirical 
suggestions that relying on a multi-theoretical framework can help explain the antecedents of 
CG compliance and disclosure and the effect of firm-level CG quality on corporate 
performance/valuation (Christopher, 2010; Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2013), existing 
studies have mainly relied on agency theory to examine such associations (Clacher et al., 2008; 
Farag et al., 2014; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Kamardin, 2014; Waweru, 2014). Arguably, 
this may impede the ability to fully understand and explain different elements that motivate 
executives to voluntarily disclose CG information and the CG’s impact on corporate 
performance/valuation.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The current study aims to empirically examine the subsequent questions: 
 What is the CG compliance and disclosure level among the UK sampled firms?  
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 What are the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure?  
 What is the association between firm-level CG quality, using both the composite-CG-
index and individual-CG-variable models, and firm performance/valuation? 
 Do ownership structure variables moderate the UKCGI-Performance nexus?  
 What is the effect of firm-level CG quality, using both the composite-CG-index and 
individual-CG-variable models, on executive pay?  
 Do ownership structure variables moderate the UKCGI-EP relationship? 
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
By addressing the above research questions, this study seeks to extend, as well as contribute 
to previous CG work in various ways. First, using one the most extensive hand-collected 
datasets on CG compliance and disclosure (600 firm-year observations), the study offers new 
detailed evidence on the compliance levels with the 2010 UK Combined Code. This is done by 
constructing the most comprehensive CG index to date, comprising 120 CG provisions. Second, 
unlike several prior UK studies, the sample in this study features a balance between large and 
small listed companies in order to enhance the generalisability of the findings, as well as reduce 
potential sample selection bias.  
Third, the study aims to contribute, as well as extend previous CG studies by offering 
evidence on the extent to which nine CG mechanisms can explain observable differences in 
voluntary CG disclosures. Importantly, this study investigates various factors which have not 
been widely examined in the existing literature, such as board gender and ethnic diversity and 
the existence of a separate CG committee. In doing so, the current study seeks to improve the 
current understanding of the factors that may have a major impact on CG compliance and 
disclosure among UK listed firms. Fourth, the study seeks to contribute, as well as extend 
previous work by offering empirical evidence on the relationships among firm-level CG quality, 
corporate performance/valuation and executive pay. As explained further in Chapter Four, 
existing studies that investigate these associations have used either the composite-CG-index 
model or the individual-CG-variable model. However, this study employs both models, thereby 
allowing it to investigate the differences in the findings from using the two approaches and their 
implications for future studies. 
Fifth, unlike prior studies that restrict their analyses to a few internal CG mechanisms, this 
study provides evidence on the extent to which board characteristics can explain differences in 
firm financial performance and executive pay. Importantly, this study investigates various 
factors which have not been widely examined in the previous CG literature, such as 
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remuneration committee meeting, remuneration committee independence and board gender and 
ethnic diversity, along with other board characteristics. Conducting such empirical study is 
important to enhancing the current understanding of the factors that may have a major influence 
on firm financial performance and executive pay. Sixth, unlike most prior studies those only 
examine the direct links among CG quality, firm performance and executive directors’ pay, this 
study analyses the interaction effect of ownership structure variables on the associations among 
CG quality, corporate performance and executive pay. In doing so, this study seeks to improve 
the current understanding of whether firms use alignment and monitoring mechanisms together 
to reduce agency problems and protect the wealth of shareholders. 
Seventh, as explained further in Section 4.3.1 of Chapter Four, existing empirical literature 
examining the impact of CG quality, using the composite-CG-index model, on executive pay 
is scarce, offering opportunities to make original contributions to the literature. Eighth, distinct 
from most past studies that primarily examine the antecedents of CEO total pay (e.g., Boyd, 
1994; Brick et al., 2006; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Conyon, 2014; Conyon & Murphy, 
2000), this study contributes, as well as extends previous research by offering new detailed 
evidence on how firm-level CG quality can impact the annual cash (i.e., salary, cash-bonus and 
other reported cash remuneration), and non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other 
reported LTIPs) pay of CEOs, CFOs and all executive directors (AEDs). Conducting such an 
empirical study is crucial to improving the existing knowledge of the antecedents of the 
components of pay packages of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. 
Ninth, unlike most prior studies, which adopt only agency theory (Clacher et al., 2008; 
Farag et al., 2014; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Kamardin, 2014; Waweru, 2014), this study 
contributes, as well as extends previous CG work by offering insights from agency, stakeholder, 
legitimacy, resource dependence and stewardship theoretical perspectives to understand CG 
compliance and disclosure behaviour and interpret empirical results relating to the association 
between CG quality and corporate performance/valuation. Thus, the study contributes to 
attempts directed towards developing a uniform theoretical framework, which can be used to 
explain CG disclosure behaviour and the impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate 
performance/valuation. Finally, notwithstanding increasing suggestions that weak CG practices 
partially contributed to the 2007/08 global financial crisis (FRC, 2010; Walker-Review, 2009), 
there seems to be a lack of empirical evidence and academic reflection on the crisis’s effect on: 
(i) voluntary CG disclosure practices (Ntim et al., 2013; Shrives & Brennan, 2015); (ii) firm 
financial performance (Chang et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015); and (iii) executive pay (Gregory-Smith 
et al., 2014a; Wells, 2015). Therefore, this study contributes, as well as extends previous CG 
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research by offering new evidence relating to the influence of CG structures on CG compliance 
and disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay following the global 
financial crisis of 2007/08. 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The rest of the thesis is organised into eight chapters examining CG reforms that have been 
pursued in the UK and their impact on CG compliance and disclosure behaviour, corporate 
performance/valuation and executive pay. Specifically, the second chapter of the thesis briefly 
presents the external and internal CG frameworks and their weaknesses. A review of theoretical 
literature that attempts to link internal CG structures to CG compliance and disclosure, 
corporate performance and executive pay is provided in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Four reviews empirical studies investigating the antecedents of CG compliance 
and disclosure, as well as studies analysing the effect of firm-level CG quality on corporate 
performance and executive pay. A description of the research design is provided in Chapter 
Five, including sample selection procedures and sources of data. Chapter Five also discusses 
CG models employed to examine the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure, as well as 
models used to investigate the influence of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance and 
executive pay. Additionally, this chapter discusses the models employed to investigate the 
interaction effect of ownership structure variables on the links among the UK CG index 
(UKCGI), firm financial performance and executive pay. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight provide discussions of the descriptive statistics and 
empirical findings related to CG compliance and disclosure, firm financial performance and 
executive pay models, respectively. More precisely, each chapter is divided into six parts, and 
these chapters follow the same structure. The first three parts present the statistical analysis of 
the dependent, independent and control variables employed to develop models related to CG 
compliance and disclosure, corporate performance and executive pay. In the fourth part, the 
assumptions of OLS are tested. The fifth part presents the empirical findings. The final part 
checks the robustness and sensitivity of the findings to alternative specifications and measures.  
The final chapter presents a summary of the study’s results, as well as discusses the policy 
recommendations and implications of the findings. Additionally, the chapter discusses the 
study’s contributions and weaknesses, as well as recommendations for further research.   
  
 
 
25 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
2. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
A discussion about the UK CG legal and regulatory framework is provided in this chapter 
by reviewing the internal and external CG frameworks in the UK. The subsections below 
provide a brief discussion about the two CG regulatory frameworks. Specifically, the first 
section provides a general overview of the UK’s CG system. Section 2.2 briefly discusses the 
UK external CG system. A brief discussion about the UK internal CG system is provided in 
Section 2.3. The final section (2.4) summarises all the previous sections.  
2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM 
The UK CG regulatory system can be classified into two main components, namely, 
external and internal CG systems. Briefly, the external CG framework refers to the monitoring 
and control that is performed from outside the company/organisation. In the UK, the external 
CG framework includes key enforcement and financial regulatory bodies that are responsible 
for developing, implementing and enforcing mandatory and voluntary corporate regulations 
(Weir et al., 2002). These consist of Her Majesty's Treasury (HM Treasury), the Financial 
Service Authority (FSA), the Companies House (CsH) and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), the Bank of England (BoE), the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), and the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). By contrast, the internal CG framework refers to how 
corporations are governed and controlled from inside (Cadbury-Report, 1992). The internal CG 
framework includes laws and codes of conduct that UK firms need to comply with, including 
UK CG codes, insider trading laws and the listing rules, amongst others. The next sections 
outline the external and internal CG framework in the UK. 
2.2 THE UK EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK  
The subsection blow briefly discusses the structure of the external CG regulatory 
framework in the UK. Specifically, Subsection 2.2.1 briefly discusses the CG regulatory bodies, 
whilst Subsection 2.2.2 presents the challenges facing the UK external CG framework.  
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2.2.1 External Regulatory System 
As discussed, the external governance framework refers to the exercise of control over 
firms by regulatory and enforcement bodies. In the UK, as shown in Figure 1, the regulatory 
and enforcement bodies include: (i) HM Treasury; (ii) the FSA; (iii) the BoE; (iv) the CsH and 
the DTI; (v) the FRC; and (vi) the LSE. HM Treasury is mainly responsible for developing, 
implementing and supervising the financial CG superstructure in the UK (Baker, 1999). The 
treasury conducts its functions through the FSA, the DTI, the BoE, the FRC and the LSE.  
The FSA was responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with CG codes over 
the period from 2001 to 2013. As of 1st April 2013, the responsibilities of the FSA were split 
between the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee (BEFPC), the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). The BEFPC is responsible 
for monitoring the macro economic and financial issues that may expose the long-term 
economy growth of the UK to threat (Bank-of-England, 2015). The FCA is responsible for 
regulating the financial services industry in the UK in order to protect consumers and ensure 
that market integrity is maintained, whereas the PRA regulates and supervises financial 
institutions, including banks, major investment firms and credit unions (FSA, 2014). 
The FRC is responsible for promoting and developing good standards of accounting and 
CG in the UK. There are six operating bodies that help the FRC to conduct its functions, namely, 
the “Accounting Standards Board, the Board for Actuarial Standards, the Accountancy and 
Actuarial Discipline Board, the Professional Oversight Board, the Audit Practices Board and 
the Financial Reporting Review Panel” (Mallin, 2013, p. 34). Additionally, there are three 
committees that support the FRC board, namely: the “executive committee, the conduct 
committee and the codes and standards committee” (Mallin, 2013, p. 34). These committees 
advise the FRC in order to maintain and promote the widespread application of its accounting 
and CG standards (FRC, 2015).  
Another major regulator that shapes the external governance framework in the UK is the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). It provides rules for listing and trading of shares for all firms. 
Specifically, the LSE appends the CG provisions issued by the FRC to its listing rules (FSA, 
2002; LSE, 2013). UK publicly listed corporations are expected to comply with the 
recommendations contained in CG codes issued by the FRC, including the 2010 Combined 
Code, or explain their reason(s) for non-compliance. Additionally, the Companies Act 2006, as 
explained further below, emphasises the crucial role of shareholders, stakeholders, directors 
and auditors in enhancing CG practices among all UK firms. 
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Figure 1: The External CG System of the UK. Source: Constructed by the Researcher  
2.2.2 Challenges Facing the External Regulatory System 
There are a number of challenges that face the financial regulatory system in the UK. For 
example, the FCA and the PRA are entirely financed by financial services firms that they 
regulate through collecting regulatory fees and levies, with no contribution from the UK 
government (FCA, 2015). This may raise concerns about the independence of the financial 
services industry regulators (i.e., FCA and PRA) from the market participants that they regulate. 
The regulators’ lack of independence may impair their ability to monitor and enforce 
compliance with corporate regulations (Dewing & Russell, 2004). Additionally, the UK 
financial regulatory system faces the challenge of being unable to adapt to global competitive 
pressure. According to Coglianese et al. (2004), legal frameworks that rely heavily on self-
regulation can put domestic firms at a serious disadvantage if foreign markets do not operate 
under similar regulations. Finally, and as will be in Section 2.3, there are too many CG 
reports/codes that have been issued in the UK; this may increase non-compliance and/or laxity 
in enforcement. 
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2.3 THE UK INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK  
The internal CG framework in the UK consists of voluntary and statutory corporate laws 
and regulations, including the 1992 Cadbury Report, the 1999 Turnbull Report, the 2006 
Companies Act, the 2010 Combined Code and insider trading law, amongst others. The internal 
CG provisions included in these regulations are discussed below.  
2.3.1 Internal CG System’s Evolution  
Policy-makers and shareholders became more concern about the need to improve and 
reform CG practices in the UK at the end of 1980s, when a number of serious financial scandals 
and corporate collapses occurred, such as the collapse of the Barings Bank (Mallin, 2013; 
Waweru, 2014). This period was characterised by a weak link between corporate performance 
and executive remuneration, a limited role of auditors and the ability of opportunistic directors 
to expropriate shareholders’ funds with some ease (Pye, 2000; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). This 
significantly impaired investors’ confidence in the accountability and transparency of senior 
corporate executives (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Pass, 2006). Consequently, since the early 1990s 
various reports and pieces of legislation have been issued, with the aim of enhancing high CG 
standards by promoting accountability and transparency among UK listed firms. Specifically, 
in May 1991, the Cadbury Committee was established by the FSA, the LSE and the accountancy 
profession.  
The Cadbury Committee introduced its final report in December 1992. This report has been 
considered as the basis for all subsequent CG reforms that have been pursued worldwide, and 
especially in the UK (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). The Cadbury Report suggests several 
recommendations covering various areas, including: (i) the establishment, composition and 
function of board committees (i.e., audit, remuneration and nomination); (ii) separation of CEO 
and chairperson positions; and (iii) corporate boards should comprise a satisfactory number of 
outside directors. All listed firms on the LSE are required to comply with the recommendations 
of the Cadbury Report or explain their reasons for non-compliance (Mallin, 2013). However, a 
major limitation of the Cadbury Report is that it primarily focuses on the financial aspects of 
CG and neglects other equally important aspects, such as risk management, internal controls 
and executive pay (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
Following the concerns of the public and shareholders about the size of executives’ pay 
packages and their inadequate disclosure in firms’ annual reports, the Greenbury Committee 
was established with the purpose of promoting accountability and enhancing the board 
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performance and effectiveness (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Mallin, 2013). The Greenbury 
Committee published its report in July 1995, covering areas related to executive pay, by 
requiring from listed firms to (i) establish remuneration committees, which should be made up 
mostly of independent outside directors; (ii) disclose more information about the general 
remuneration philosophy and the elements of individual directors’ pay; and (iii) ensure that 
remunerations are linked to both individual directors and firms’ performance. Although the 
Greenbury Report introduced some important governance structures that were not covered in 
the Cadbury Report, it was heavily criticised for not restraining executives from paying 
themselves excessively (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). 
To review compliance with CG provisions contained in the Cadbury and Greenbury 
Reports, the Hampel Committee was founded in 1995, and published its final report in 1998. 
The report paid more attention to how much firms should be accountable to various stakeholder 
groups (e.g., suppliers, customers, employees and the wider community), in addition to their 
shareholders. The report asserts that “the directors as a board are responsible for relations with 
stakeholders; but they are accountable to the shareholders” (Hampel-Report, 1998, p. 12). 
Similarly, the report recommended that directors should develop and sustain good relationships 
with stakeholders to improve the long-term value for shareholders.  
The recommendations contained in the 1992 Cadbury Report, 1995 Greenbury Report and 
1998 Hampel Report, were then consolidated in the first UK Combined Code, published in 
1998. Similar to previous CG reports (e.g., Cadbury and Greenbury), the 1998 Code is based 
on the “comply or explain” approach, which means that listed firms should illustrate in their 
annual reports whether they adhere to the recommendations contained in the code, and explain 
the reason(s) for any non-compliance. In relation to internal control systems, the code 
recommends reviewing the effectiveness of internal control systems (i.e., financial, operational, 
risk management and compliance controls) at least once a year (Combined-Code, 1998, D.2.1). 
However, the Combined Code does not specify how directors can conduct a review of internal 
controls. Therefore, the Turnbull Report was issued in 1999, giving directors guidelines 
regarding the review of internal controls and reporting on them. The Turnbull Report asserts 
that it is the responsibility of a corporate board to maintain sufficient internal control systems. 
Following the issuance of the 1998 CG code and after the collapse of many companies in 
the US in late 2001 (e.g., Enron and WorldCom), there was increased concern about the 
effectiveness of auditing, accounting and CG practices (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Waweru, 
2014). In the UK, in response to this failure and in order to restore investor confidence in the 
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financial market, two committees were established in 2002, namely the Higgs and Smith 
Committees. These two committees issued their reports in 2003.  
Higgs Report added some additional recommendations to the 1998 Combined Code, 
including that (i) outside directors should have annual meeting without the presence of inside 
directors and annual reports should state whether such meeting occurred; (ii) annual evaluation 
of corporate board as a whole, its committee and individual members’ performance should be 
conducted and the annual report should indicate whether and how such evaluation was 
conducted; (iii) an appropriate induction training need to be provided to new board members 
and disclosure in annual reports should be made on that; (iv) senior independent director should 
be appointed; and (v) that disclosure should be made about a corporate board/committees 
meetings, as well as individual attendance of those meetings. 
Additionally, the Smith Report focused on the function of the external auditors and the 
audit committees, indicating that they should act independently from executives to make sure 
that shareholders’ interests are safeguarded. Specifically, the recommendations of the Smith 
Report include: (i) that the corporate board should set up an independent audit committee, 
which should have at least one member with recent and relevant experience in auditing, finance 
or accounting; (ii) that the committee should meet more frequently (not less than three annual 
meetings); and (iii) that the audit committee should ensure that sufficient internal controls are 
in place to protect shareholder interests. 
Based on the suggestions of the Smith and Higgs Reports, the FRC revised the 1998 Code 
and published the revised Combined Code in 2003. Some key recommendations of the 2003 
Code include the following: (i) the chairperson should be independent from the firms at the 
time of appointment; (ii) the majority of a corporate board members should be independent 
outside directors; and (iii) directors should continually update their relevant knowledge and 
skills. However, it should be acknowledged that this code relaxed some of the recommendations 
contained in the 2003 Higgs Report. For instance, the 2003 Combined Code recommends that 
the boards of smaller corporations should constitute at least two outside (unaffiliated) directors. 
As a result of the development of the UK corporate environment, as well as changes in 
global governance codes/guidelines, the Combined Code has been revised by the FRC almost 
every two years, particularly in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. All of these editions are 
based on the “comply or explain” approach. The main differences between the 2003 and 2006 
editions of the Combined Code are that: (i) the chairperson is allowed to set on a remuneration 
committee, if the chairperson was deemed independent director at the time of appointment; and 
(ii) shareholders are allowed to vote by proxy, and can also withhold their vote. The main 
31 
 
difference between the 2008 and 2006 editions is that in 2008 version of the code chairperson 
in smaller companies is allowed to set on the remuneration committee, however, the chairperson 
cannot chair the committee.  
The Combined Code of 2010, as will be explained further, aims to enhance the board’s 
effectiveness and accountability to shareholders by emphasising the chairperson’s 
responsibility in leading the board. Additionally, the code focuses the role of independent 
directors in developing proposals on strategy and enhancing board effectiveness. The code also 
recommends that the benefits of diversity (in terms of e.g., skills, experience and gender) should 
be considered when appointing board members. The latest editions of the Combined Code were 
published in 2012 and 2014, respectively. The main differences among the 2012, 2014 and 2010 
versions are as follows: (i) corporate annual reports should contain a section that describes the 
policy of the corporate board towards diversity (e.g., gender), and the measures employed for 
implementing such policy; and (ii) FTSE 350 listed companies are recommended to submit a 
tender for external auditor appointment at least every ten years. 
Additional to the focus of CG practices contained in the Combined Codes on encouraging 
dialogue between shareholders and board/management, there are other CG regulations that seek 
to enhance shareholder activism (e.g., Directors’ Remuneration Report, 2002; Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee Principles, 2002; Myners Report, 2001, 2008; Stewardship Code, 
2010, 2012). For example, the Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) aims at encouraging 
shareholder activism by mandating that they vote on executive pay. Similarly, the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee Principles (ISCP) encourages institutional investors to ensure that the 
corporate board/committees are efficient and that outside directors adequately monitor the 
activities of the board/committees. Additionally, the ISCP, the Myners Report and Stewardship 
Codes stress that institutional investors have the right to intervene when they have concerns 
about a firm’s strategy, performance, social and environmental responsibilities, internal control 
systems and executive pay, and in the case of unjustified failure to comply with CG 
codes/reports. 
There are other governance regulations that aim to protect the interests of stakeholders 
(e.g., Hermes Principles, 2002; Companies Act, 2006). The Hermes Principles, for example, 
recommend that firms manage their relationships with stakeholders effectively by disclosing 
their policies on relevant issues (e.g., environment, health and safety). Similarly, Article 172 of 
the Companies Act stipulates that executives must act in the stakeholders’ best interests (e.g., 
employees, customers and suppliers) by considering the effect of the firm’s operation on the 
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environment and local community. The Companies Act also requires directors to disclose 
information on issues related to the environment, society, community and employees. 
There are other CG reforms that regulate internal governance systems in the UK, including 
the LSE Listing Rules, the Insider Dealing Law of 1993, and the Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules. The relevant CG provisions contained in the Combined Codes, Insider Dealing Law, 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules and 2006 Companies Act were added to the LSE’s listing 
rules. For example, Article 461 of the 2006 Companies Act and part “V” of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1993, which, as is briefly discussed below, relates to prohibiting insider share dealings, is 
covered under Section 12 of the Listing Rules. Similarly, Subsection 9.8.6 deals with issues 
related board’s reporting on the “going concern” status of a company, as discussed in 
Subsection C.1.3 of the 2010 Combined Code.  
Additionally, Section 7.2 of the Disclosure and Transparency Rules and Subsection 9.8.6 
of the Listing Rules deal with issues related to disclosure about compliance with CG 
recommendations contained in the Combined Code. Subsection 9.8.4 of the Listing Rules 
requires listed companies to disclose information about the interests of directors and changes 
in their interests over time; this is similar to the requirement of the 2006 Companies Act (i.e., 
Article 793) and the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (i.e., Subsection 3.1.4).  
The Insider Trading Law, part “V” of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, prohibits individuals 
from dealing in particular kinds of securities and financial instruments in the UK based on 
inside information.1 The 1993 Act indicates the legal penalties for any individual convicted of 
insider dealing. Specifically, Article 61 of the Act stipulates that anyone convicted of insider 
trading is liable to seven years’ imprisonment, or financial penalty not greater than the statutory 
maximum, or both of them. 
The next subsection reviews and presents the provisions of the 2010 Combined Code, as 
the provisions included in the composite CG index (UKCGI) employed in this study are mainly 
extracted from this code.  
2.3.2 The 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code 
As explained in Chapter One, the 2007/08 global financial crisis raised concerns about the 
effectiveness of CG in protecting shareholder wealth (Aebi et al., 2012; FRC, 2010, 2012; 
Elmghaamez & Ntim, 2016; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). As a result, the Combined Code was revised 
                                               
1Inside information has been defined in Article 56 of the Act as: (i) specific information related to particular securities or particular issuer/s of 
securities, (ii) which is not available to the general public, and (iii) which would have a considerable impact on any securities’ price or value 
if it were available to the general public.    
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in 2010 and it aims to enhance the effectiveness and accountability of corporate boards. 
Therefore, in order to provide empirical evidence on the association among CG mechanisms, 
CG compliance and disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay following 
the 2007/08 global financial crisis, the current study uses the 2010 Combined Code as the main 
source for constructing the index. As shown in Table 1, great number of the CG 
recommendations incorporated in the UK CG reports and codes (e.g., Cadbury Report, 
Greenbury Report and 2010 CG code) aim to protect shareholders and enhance public 
confidence. These CG recommendations focus on five issues: (i) board leadership; (ii) board 
effectiveness; (iii) accountability; (iv) executive pay; and (v) relations with shareholders. The 
following subsections discuss these five areas. 
2.3.2.1 Board Leadership and Effectiveness  
As shown in Table 1, the first two areas of 2010 CG rules aim to enhance the monitoring 
power and the independence of corporate boards by calling for higher disclosure and 
transparency about corporate boards’ practices. Specifically, the governance rules recommend 
that every firm should have an effective governing board which is jointly and severally 
accountable to shareholders. Consistent with the 1992 Cadbury and 2003 Smith/Higgs reports, 
the 2010 Combined Code recommends adopting a unitary board structure, where both inside 
and outside directors are responsible for controlling and directing their companies. The code 
also requires disclosure about how frequently the board and its main committees meet, together 
with individual directors’ attendance. 
Further, the 2010 Combined Code emphasises the crucial responsibility of the chairperson 
in improving CG practices. In order to ensure that the firm chairperson performs his/her duties 
effectively, the code recommends that the chairperson should meet the independence criteria 
on appointment, such as that the chairperson should not have served on a corporate board for 
the past nine years. Additionally, and to enhance the governing board effectiveness and 
minimise the possibility that board decisions are dominated by one group, the 2010 Combined 
Code indicates that the corporate board should be of a sufficient size and should comprise an 
adequate combination of inside and outside executives (and especially independent executives). 
Unlike 1992 Cadbury report, which recommends the governing board should comprise at least 
two independent members, the 2010 code indicates that the corporate board should be made up 
of mostly outside (unaffiliated) directors. 
Unlike the Cadbury report, the 2010 Combined Code recommends that corporate board 
should comprise an appropriate mix of skill. Similarly, the 2010 code suggests that the benefits 
board diversity (including gender) should be taken into consideration when appointing 
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managers. Additionally, and to enhance board/committees effectiveness, the 2010 code 
indicates that there should be an annual evaluation of the board/committees/individuals’ 
effectiveness to identify its strengths and weaknesses in its committees, among its individual 
directors and overall, and to ensure non-performing directors are not re-elected. 
2.3.2.2 Accountability  
The CG provisions relating to accountability seek to enhance risk management and control 
systems by encouraging greater transparency and disclosure about; (i) risk management 
evaluation; and (ii) the existence of sufficient internal controls and audit units aimed at detecting 
and minimising the incidence of managerial fraud. Similar to the 2003 Smith Report, the 2010 
Code recommends that company board needs to maintain effective control and risk 
management systems. Similarly, it suggests that the internal controls/risk management systems 
should be evaluated and reviewed at least once a year and disclosure should be made to 
shareholders about the results of such review. 
Similar to the Cadbury, Turnbull and Smith Reports, Subsection C.3.5 of the 2010 
Combined Code suggests that internal audit functions are complementary to external audit 
functions. Thus, it encourages firms to establish internal audit functions that can monitor 
procedures and key controls. Additionally, in order to maintain an internal auditor’s 
independence and objectivity, the 2003 Smith Report suggests that internal auditors should have 
access to the resources and information that allow them to fulfil their mandates. Further, the 
report recommended that internal auditors should be granted full access to top management and 
audit committee. 
With regard to the role of directors, and similar to the 1992 Cadbury Report, the 2010 Code 
(i.e., Section C.1) recognises the significant role of the board by suggesting that directors are 
responsible for preparing statutory annual accounts and reports which should give a fair 
representation of a firm’s current financial performance/position. Under the same section of the 
2010 Code, it is suggested that directors should disclose information about the going concern 
status of the firm. Additionally, and to improve the efficiency and adequacy of a firm’s risk 
management and internal control systems, Section C.3 of the 2010 Combined Code 
recommends that UK listed firms should establish audit committees comprising not less than 
three independent members. Similar to the Higgs and Smith reports, the 2010 Code also seeks 
to enhance the effectiveness of board audit committees by suggesting that members have to 
meet not less than three times each financial year, and annual reports should note individual 
directors’ attendance. 
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Table 1: The UK Corporate Governance Codes/Reports Since 1992 
CG  provisions 1992 Cadbury Report 1995 Greenbury Report 2003 Smith Report 2010 Combined Code Other Relevant Codes/Reports 
Board Leadership      
Board meetings Frequently/ Regularly  No No   Frequently/ Regularly 2003-2014 CG Codes  
Individual attendance  No   No   Required for audit 
committee 
Required for board / 
committees 
2003-2014 CG Codes; 2003 Higgs 
Report 
Board structure Unitary board structure No   Unitary board structure Unitary board structure  2003 Higgs Report 
Role duality Split Chairperson and CEO No  No  Split Chairperson and CEO 2003-2014 CG Codes 
Chairperson independence Outside director No  No  Independent outside directors 2003-2014 CG Codes 
      
Board Effectiveness      
Board size  Sufficient in size No  No  Sufficient in size 2003 Higgs Report 
Outside directors 3, at least  No  No  Majority of board members 2003-2014 CG Codes; 2003 Higgs 
Report 
Independent outside directors 2, at least No  No  Half of the board at a 
minimum 
2003-2014 CG Codes; 2003 Higgs 
Report 
Nomination committee 
composition 
Mostly of outside directors  No  No  Mostly of outside 
(unaffiliated) directors  
2003-2014 CG Codes; 2003 Higgs 
Report 
Board, committees & individual 
evaluation 
No  No  No  At least once a year  2003-2014 CG Codes; 2003 Higgs 
Report 
Directors’ training  Required, especially for new 
directors   
No  Required, especially for 
new directors  
Required, especially for new 
directors   
2003-2014 CG Codes; 2003 Higgs 
Report 
Accountability      
Audit committee composition  At least 3 outside directors  No  At least 3 outside  
(unaffiliated) directors 
At least 3 outside 
(unaffiliated) directors 
2003 Higgs Report; 2003-2014 CG 
Codes 
Audit committee meetings  At least 2 times a year No  At least 3 times a year No  No  
Recent/relevant financial 
experience of audit committee 
members 
No  No  At least one member At least one member  2003-2014 CG Codes 
Risk committee No  No  Separate risk committee Separate risk committee  2003-2014 CG Codes 
Reviewing Internal controls  No  No  At least annually   At least annually   2003-2014 CG Codes 
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Table 1 (Continued): The UK Corporate Governance Codes/Reports Since 1992 
 
CG  provisions 1992 Cadbury Report 1995 Greenbury Report 2003 Smith Report 2010 Combined Code Other Relevant Codes/Reports 
Remuneration      
Remuneration committee 
composition 
Wholly or mainly outside 
directors 
Majority outside 
(unaffiliated) 
directors 
No  Majority outside 
(unaffiliated) directors 
2003-2014 CG Codes 
Disclosing Remuneration 
policy   
No  Required   No  Required  2003-2014 CG Codes 
Disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration 
Only for chairperson and 
highest-paid director 
For all directors No  For all directors 2003-2014 CG Codes 
Remuneration consultant  No  Appointed by the 
remuneration 
committee 
No  Appointed by the 
remuneration committee 
2003-2014 CG Codes 
Say on pay No  Invite shareholders 
to approve all long-
term incentive 
schemes 
No  Invite shareholders to 
approve all long-term 
incentive schemes 
2002 DRR; 2003-2014 CG 
Codes 
Relations with shareholders      
Shareholder activism Should be active  No  No  Enter dialogue with all 
directors 
2002 DRR; 2010, 2012 
Stewardship Code 
Policy of proxy voting  No  No  No  Shareholders allowed to 
vote by proxy  
2003-2014 CG Codes 
Environment  No  No  No  No  2006 Companies Act; 2002 
Hermes Principles 
Social disclosures No  No  No  No  2006 Companies Act; 2002 
Hermes Principles 
Health and safety  No  No  No  No  2006 Companies Act; 2002 
Hermes Principles 
Compliance Voluntary  Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary 2003 Higgs Report; 2003-2014 
CG Codes 
Notes: collected from the Cadbury Report (1992), the Combined Code of 2010 and the other named codes & reports. 
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2.3.2.3 Executive Pay  
The CG provisions relating to remuneration aim to enhance monitoring and control over 
executive pay among UK listed firms, with specific focus on enhancing the link between the 
directors’ pay and corporate performance. They call for more disclosure surrounding executive 
pay. Unlike Cadbury Report, but similar to Greenbury Report, the 2010 Combined Code (i.e., 
Subsection D.2.1) recommends setting up a remuneration committee comprising mostly 
independent members; and the committee chairperson should also be independent outside 
director. The remit/terms of reference of the remuneration committee should be made available 
to public. Additionally, Section D.2 of the 2010 Code suggests that chief executive officers may 
be invited to attend the remuneration committee’s meetings and may be involved in advising 
the committee in determining the remuneration of other executives, but should not participate 
in setting their own remuneration. 
Further, Section D.1 of the 2010 Code recommends that executive pay should be designed 
in such a way that promotes the firm’s success. Specifically, the code suggests that a large 
percentage of directors’ remuneration should be tightly linked to both individual directors’ and 
firms’ performance, so as to avoid paying excessively for poorly performing executives and to 
align management and shareholder interests. Additionally, similar to the Greenbury Report, the 
2010 Code suggests that the corporate board, as a whole, is responsible for determining the pay 
of outside directors, who should not play any role in setting their own pay. The pay packages 
of outside directors should be designed in a way that reflects their responsibilities and time 
commitments, and should not include performance-related elements or share options 
(Subsection D.1.3).  
Similar to the Greenbury and Higgs reports, the 2010 Code suggests that firms’ annual 
reports should include information about the philosophy and rationale underlying executive pay 
packages (i.e., Section D.2). Further, the 2010 Code recommends that UK listed firms should 
make significant disclosures about the pay packages of individual directors, by providing 
information in their annual reports about each executive director’s fees, base salary, annual 
bonus, pension contribution, benefit in-kind, options, long-term incentive plans and any other 
benefit. Similarly, and in line with the Greenbury Report and the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report, the 2010 Code requires that UK listed firms disclose detailed information relating to 
remuneration consultants and director service contracts. Additionally, the code emphasises the 
need for shareholders, particularly institutional ones, to actively involved in determining 
executive remuneration (‘say-on-pay’). 
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2.3.2.4 Relations with Shareholders 
CG provisions relating to relations with shareholders seek to make sure that the views of 
major shareholders, especially institutional ones, are shared among board members by 
encouraging continuous dialogue, communication and engagement with major shareholders on 
issues relating to executive pay, strategy and CG. The 2010 Code suggests that all directors 
should attend sufficient meetings with major shareholders (i.e., Subsection E.1.1). Further, 
Subsection E.1.2 requires UK listed firms to disclose, in their annual reports, steps taken by 
boards (e.g., survey or face-to-face contact) to ensure that all directors, especially non-executive 
ones, develop a balanced understanding of shareholders’ views about the firm.  
Further, similar to the Cadbury, Greenbury and Higgs reports, the 2010 Code emphasises 
the crucial role of institutional shareholders in enhancing compliance with good CG standards 
by suggesting that institutional shareholders should carefully consider all relevant factors when 
evaluating the governance arrangements of their firms, and start a dialogue if they are not 
satisfied with their firms’ position. Similarly, the code requires that institutional shareholders 
satisfy themselves that existing governance arrangements, especially those related to the 
corporate board/committees’ structure, are effective, and that adequate oversight is provided by 
independent directors. 
Consistent with the Cadbury and Higgs reports, Section E.2 recognises annual general 
meetings as an important opportunity for shareholders to access their boards. In particular, the 
code encourages shareholders to attend annual general meetings and engage in direct dialogue 
with all directors to influence board policies/decisions. In order to encourage shareholders to 
participate in annual general meetings, firms should inform them at least twenty working days 
before the meeting. In addition to the recommendations of the 2010 Code, the 2006 Companies 
Act and the 2002 Hermes Principles require UK listed firms to be accountable to stakeholders 
in addition to shareholders. Particularly, Hermes Principle 9 and Article 172 of the Companies 
Act encourage UK firms to effectively manage relationships with stakeholders by disclosing 
the effect of the firms’ operation on the environment and local community, as well as by 
requiring firms to behave ethically.  
2.3.2.5 Compliance and Enforcement of the Combined Code 
Similar to the influential report of 1992 and many other CG reforms that followed the 
Cadbury Report, the 2010 Combined Code promotes the concept of a voluntary CG compliance 
regime (“comply or explain”). Specifically, the code suggests that it is the responsibility of 
directors, auditors and shareholders to encourage compliance with its provisions. As such, the 
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2010 Code points out that corporate board, through its committees, is responsible for ensuring 
that their firms comply with its recommendations and explain potential non-compliance. 
 The recommendations of 2010 Code were appended to the LSE’s Listing Rules (i.e., 
Subsection 9.8.6) by requiring directors to state whether the listed firm adopted all CG 
provisions recommended by the 2010 Code, or provided explanations for any non-compliance. 
Similarly, the 2010 Combined Code encourages external auditors to provide their views on the 
extent to which the firm has applied its provisions. Additionally, the code recognises the crucial 
role of shareholders, especially institutional ones, by encouraging continuous dialogue, 
communication and engagement with major shareholders. 
2.3.3 Major Achievements and Weaknesses of the Internal Corporate Governance 
Framework  
As discussed above, the UK has been at the leading edge of pursuing global CG reforms 
since 1992. For example, the influential Cadbury Report promotes the concept of voluntary CG 
compliance regime. This concept has almost been adopted by every country around the world, 
with the exception of the US, where the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act promotes the concept of 
mandatory CG compliance (‘comply or else’). Therefore, the CG framework in the UK 
contributes to promoting a voluntary compliance and disclosure culture among firms by 
recommending that firms should comply with the recommendations of CG codes/reports or 
explain reasons for non-compliance. 
The UK internal CG framework also recognises the importance of shareholders, especially 
institutional ones, by encouraging them to enter into continuous dialogue and communication 
with corporate boards to discuss issues related to strategy and CG. The governance framework 
also emphasises the crucial role of institutional shareholders in determining executive pay by 
mandating that they vote on executive pay (‘say-on-pay’). Additionally, the CG framework 
recognises the importance of improving the monitoring role, independence and accountability 
of corporate boards by requiring greater disclosure and transparency about board practices and 
the existence of efficient risk management and internal control systems; this aims to identify 
and minimise instances of managerial fraud. 
Despite these achievements, the UK internal governance framework suffers from a number 
of weaknesses. First, it emphasises the need for firms to be primarily accountable to 
shareholders. However, the internal governance framework does not clearly address the 
important issues related to other stakeholders by not identifying different types of stakeholders 
that firms need to report to. Second, the framework does not clearly specify the size of corporate 
boards, only suggesting that corporate board should be of sufficient size. This can lead to 
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misinterpretation by practitioners and firms. Finally, complying with UK CG standards may 
present a challenge for non-UK listed firms whose home countries’ governance systems are less 
developed, because they may find it difficult and time-consuming to improve their governance 
practices to the level of the UK governance standards (Rejchrt & Higgs, 2014). 
However, notwithstanding the UK corporate context and given that the UK internal CG 
framework focuses primarily on protecting the interests of shareholders, the initial theoretical 
prediction is that compliance with good CG standards, in the form of the 2010 Combined Code, 
can improve CG compliance and disclosure practices and corporate performance, as well as 
preventing opportunistic executives from awarding themselves high remuneration. Therefore, 
this study seeks to empirically examine whether the UK listed firms that adhere to the CG 
recommendations contained in the 2010 Code tend to be associated with more disclosure about 
their governance practices, better financial performance and lower executive pay.  
The next chapter reviews theoretical studies examining the antecedents of CG compliance 
and disclosure and the link among CG structures, corporate performance and executive pay 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL APPROACH 
3. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter presents the justifications for using a multi-theoretical approach and reviews 
the relevant extant theories that aim to explain the antecedents of CG compliance and 
disclosure, as well as theories that aim to explain the influence of firm-level CG quality on 
corporate performance/valuation and executive pay. Specifically, Section 3.1 discusses the 
rationale underlying the use of a multi-theoretical framework. Section 3.2 briefly review 
theories employed in the current study to investigate the association among CG structure, CG 
compliance and disclosure and corporate performance/valuation, whilst Section 3.3 briefly 
discusses theories employed in the current study to investigate CG’s influence on executive 
pay. 
3.1 RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE USE OF A MULTI-
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The justifications and the basis for selecting the theories used in the study are briefly 
outlined in this section. In particular, Subsection 3.1.1 presents the reasons for using a multi-
theoretical framework in this study, whilst Subsection 3.1.2 discusses the basis for selecting the 
theories used to investigate the associations among CG structures, CG compliance and 
disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay.  
3.1.1 Reasons for Using a Multi-Theoretical Framework 
Corporate governance literature suggests that there is no agreement on the theoretical 
perspectives in CG research (Zattoni et al., 2013). Prior studies have adopted different 
theoretical perspectives, such as agency, stakeholder, stewardship, legitimacy, resource 
dependence, optimal contracting, managerial power, transaction cost economies, political, and 
institutional theories (Liao et al., 2015; Low et al., 2015; Mallin, 2013; Ntim et al., 2015a; 
Zattoni et al., 2013). Following prior studies, the current research adopts a multi-theoretical 
framework for the following reasons. 
First, this research aims to address three CG issues: the drivers of compliance and CG 
disclosure, the impact of internal CG mechanisms on firm financial performance, and whether 
internal CG mechanisms affect executive directors’ pay. A multi-theoretical framework may 
help better understand and explain these three different issues. Second, although agency theory 
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has been the dominant theory in CG research (Zattoni et al., 2013, p. 119), CG is a complex 
and dynamic phenomenon which cannot be explained using a single theory, since it is related 
to a variety of disciplines, such as economics, finance, law, ethics, politics and management 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Christopher, 2012; Letza et al., 2008), and is therefore multi-
theoretically oriented.  
Third, individual theories have been limited in their ability to fully explain the relationship 
among CG mechanisms, voluntary disclosure and financial performance (Christopher, 2010; 
Low et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Pugliese et al., 2014; Zattoni et al., 2013). Therefore, 
different theories should be used to complement each other in order to enhance their predictive 
power (L’Huillier, 2014, p. 311; Mallin et al., 2015, p. 176). Fourth, the current study uses 
legitimacy, stakeholder, resource dependence and stewardship theories because these theories 
are related to agency theory and may help shed more theoretical light onto the relationship 
between agents and principals (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a, p. 123). 
Fifth, existing studies have adopted a multi-theoretical framework in order to set their 
hypotheses as well as interpret their findings (e.g., Jackling & Johl, 2009; Liao et al., 2015; 
Low et al., 2015; Mallin et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a). Therefore, the current study uses a 
multi-theoretical framework in order to be consistent with prior studies and facilitate 
comparisons with the results of these studies. Finally, there have been several recent calls to 
adopt a multi-theoretical framework in CG research in order to enhance theoretical diversity 
(Brown et al., 2011; Christopher, 2010; Zattoni et al., 2013). Adopting a multi-theoretical 
framework in this study is a direct response to these calls. 
This research uses agency theory as the primary theoretical framework. However, due to 
the complexity of CG phenomenon, agency theory is supplemented with resource dependence 
theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory when examining the 
relationships among CG mechanisms, CG compliance and disclosure and corporate 
performance/valuation. Managerial power and optimal contracting perspectives are also used 
to explain the association between CG mechanisms and executive directors’ pay. The following 
subsections provide detailed discussion about the basis for selecting theories (agency, 
stewardship, stakeholder, legitimacy, resource dependence, managerial power and optimal 
contracting), along with detailed review of these theories. 
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3.1.2 Basis for Selecting Theories 
3.1.2.1 Theories Selected to Explain the Antecedents of CG Compliance and Disclosure 
and CG’s Effect on Corporate Performance/Valuation 
Agency theory (AT) can be regarded as the most popular theory in CG research 
(Christopher, 2010; L’Huillier, 2014; Zattoni et al., 2013). Mallin (2013), in a discussion about 
the theories used in CG research, suggests that agency theory has affected the development of 
the UK governance framework the most. It is also the most suitable theory to explain CG codes 
in the UK. Agency theory, however, has been criticised for its focus on limited aspects of CG, 
because it suggests that firms should be accountable exclusively to their shareholders 
(Christopher, 2010; L’Huillier, 2014). Therefore, agency theory fails to consider the social 
context surrounding the relationship between the principal and the agent (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003). In order for firms to gain the support of powerful stakeholders, they need to operate 
according to social norms and values, thus legitimising their activities (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Suchman, 1995). 
Legitimacy theory (LT) has been criticised for not clearly identifying firms’ stakeholders, 
as well as prioritising financial stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995; Parker, 2005). Therefore, in 
order to recognise the wider influence of multiple stakeholders and take their multiple and even 
divergent interests into consideration, stakeholder theory (SHT) is used in this research as a 
complement to agency and legitimacy theories, which is similar to past CG studies (e.g., Gaur 
et al., 2015; Martínez‐Ferrero et al., 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). Recognising that firms 
need to be accountable to a wider group of stakeholders, and in order to manage the increased 
complexities arising from a wider stakeholder base and also to bridge the limitations of agency 
theory (Christopher, 2010; L’Huillier, 2014), this study also uses resource dependence theory 
(RDT). It indicates that the effectiveness of corporate board impacts firms’ ability to manage 
the environments in which they operate (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). This theory also 
suggests that the increasingly competitive and complex environment in which today’s firms 
operate has increased the need for experienced and skilled directors (Boyd, 1990; Dalton et al., 
1999), in order to reduce uncertainty and allow firms to access critical resources (Daily et al., 
2003). 
Finally, the development and implementation of monitoring controls, as suggested by 
agency theory, may not be appropriate, since managers can be trustworthy and good stewards 
of investors’ resources, rendering monitoring unnecessary (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1994). Stewardship theory (SWT) suggests that managers should be given full authority 
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and empowered rather than monitored and controlled (Davis et al., 1997). Therefore, 
stewardship theory is also used to provide a more holistic view of CG. 
3.1.2.2 Theories Selected to Explain the Antecedents of Executive Pay 
 The review of the literature shows that prior studies have mainly relied on agency 
theoretical insights drawn from managerial power hypothesis (MPH) and optimal contracting 
theory2 (OCT) to examine the influence of firm-level CG quality on executive pay (e.g., 
Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Luo, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Ntim et al., 2017; Sur et 
al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015). Although the MPH is different from OCT, these two 
perspectives are complementary in explaining executive remuneration contracts (Fahlenbrach, 
2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015). For example, managerial power theory can 
illustrate why/when optimal contracting theory might be incorrect (Conyon, 2006). The 
following sections discuss the selected theories, their use in this research and their limitations. 
3.2 THEORIES USED TO EXPLAIN CG VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
As discussed, agency theory (AT) is considered the dominant theory within CG research. 
However, given that CG is a complex and dynamic phenomenon which cannot be explained 
using a single theory, here it is supplemented with resource dependence theory (RDT), 
stewardship theory (SWT), stakeholder theory (SHT) and legitimacy theory (LT) when 
examining the relationships among CG mechanisms, CG compliance and disclosure and 
corporate performance/valuation. The assumptions, limitations and applicability of each of the 
above theories to the UK context are discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2.1 Agency Theory  
The development of agency theory (AT) can be traced back to 1932, when Berle and Means 
published their paper on the separation between ownership and control in large firms (Berle & 
Means, 1932). Additionally, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
                                               
2There are other theories underlying executive pay, including the Lake Wobegon Effect, tournament theory, the managerial talent hypothesis 
and the equity fairness hypothesis. The Lake Wobegon Effect is based on the notion that no firm allows its CEO or executives to be paid below 
the industry average (Betts et al., 2011; Hayes & Schaefer, 2009). Tournament theory suggests that CEOs’ pay packages are much larger than 
other executives’ in order to motivate them to work harder (Conyon et al., 2001; Eriksson, 1999). The managerial talent hypothesis suggests 
that talented executives have special skills and are few in number, and therefore must be well paid in order to be attracted and retained (Gabaix 
& Landier, 2008; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004). Finally, the equity fairness hypothesis suggests that large pay dispersion leads to increased 
conflict and dysfunctional behaviour among board members, which can adversely impact corporate performance (Ezzamel & Watson, 2002; 
Lee et al., 2008). This study relies on agency theoretical insights drawn from optimal contracting theory and the managerial power hypothesis 
because these two perspectives work together to explain executive pay (Mallin et al., 2015, p. 176), as well as because these two perspectives 
have been adopted by most existing CG studies (e.g. Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Luo, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015; Sur et al., 2015; Van-
Essen et al., 2015). 
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published the most cited papers about AT; in them they suggest that AT originated as an attempt 
to solve the problem of conflict of interest between managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principals). AT views the company as a series of contracts between agents and principals, 
arguing that this may reduce the opportunistic behaviour of management and encourage 
management to work in the best interest of shareholders. 
AT relies on the contractual relationships between principals and agents, where agents are 
committed to represent and take care of the interests of principals (Chan et al., 2014; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). In this view, a firm can be seen as a coalition of a number of agency relationships, 
such as the relationship between management and owners, the relationship between 
management and employees, and the relationship between shareholders and external auditors 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Prencipe et al., 2014; Waweru, 2014). As shown in Figure 
2, the agency relationship is considered as a contract under which one or more persons 
(principals) authorise one or more other persons (agents) to accomplish certain tasks. This 
includes the authority to make some decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; L’Huillier, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Shows firm as a network of contracts (John & Senbet, 1998, p. 376). 
AT assumes that agents are motivated by their self-interests rather than by maximising 
principals’ wealth. From this perspective, the agency problem occurs when there is a lack of 
integration between agents and principles (Eisenhardt, 1989; Wright et al., 2001). The basis of 
AT is to resolve agency problems by ensuring that the interests of agents are aligned with those 
Management  
Other stakeholders 
(Product and Factor Markets) 
 
Firm 
Outside (New) 
Equity-holders  
Government/ 
Society  
Debt-holders  
Classes of agency 
Executive Perquisites                                           Management  
Underinvestment                                                  Debt-holders, Stakeholders 
Overinvestment                                                    Government/Society 
 Risk-shifting                                                        Debt-holders, Government 
 Asymmetric information                                      New Equity-holders 
 Bankruptcy and Financial Distress                       Debt-holders, Stakeholders 
 
46 
 
of principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Prencipe et al., 2014). Additionally, and in order to 
mitigate agency problems and make sure that management and shareholder interests are 
aligned, there are some agency costs which might incur, including monitoring, bounding and 
residual costs (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide 
definitions for these costs: (i) monitoring cost is the cost paid by the principals in order to 
monitor and control agents’ behaviours. This includes the cost of audits, firing managers, and 
writing executive pay contracts; (ii) bonding costs are defined as expenditure paid by agents in 
order to set up structures and adhere to systems that encourage them to act in the best interest 
of shareholders, including the cost of disclosing additional information to shareholders; and (iii) 
residual loss is the cost that incur because the interests of agents and shareholders cannot be 
perfectly aligned. 
In order to mitigate agency problems and reduce agency costs, AT suggests that CG 
mechanisms can be introduced to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of management and align 
the interests of agents with those of principals (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2005). 
Specifically, AT calls for establishing appropriate CG structures in order to align shareholder 
and management interests; for instance, increasing the number of outside (unaffiliated) 
executives can reduce agency problems by enhancing board independence and effectiveness 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Similarly, board diversity can reduce information asymmetry by 
increasing the monitoring of management activities (Walt & Ingley, 2003). Setting up board 
committees (e.g., CG and remuneration committees), may reduce agency problems by 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate boards (Klein, 1998). Also, separting 
CEO and chairperson positions is argued to lead to reduced agency problems by encouraging 
managers to make decisions and follow strategies in the best interests of shareholders (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002; Jensen, 1993). 
To conclude, AT assumes that the establishment of effective CG mechanisms helps 
mitigate agency problems and reduce agency costs, thereby leading to enhanced CG compliance 
and disclosure and corporate performance/valuation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, despite being useful in explaining the motivation and impact of CG 
mechanisms on CG compliance and disclosure and corporate performance/valuation, AT has a 
number of limitations. First, the theory’s main assumption is that managers behave 
opportunistically and focus mainly on maximising their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders. However, this is not generally accepted, because some researchers claim that 
managers are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them, and there is no conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1994). 
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AT has also been criticised for its narrow definition of firms’ stakeholders, as well as for 
ignoring firms’ moral, ethical and social responsibilities (Mitchell et al., 1997). It is argued that 
AT fails to consider the social context surrounding the relationship between principal and agent 
(Bruce et al., 2005; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2005). Finally, AT focus mainly on maximising 
shareholders’ interest while it ignores the interest of other stakeholders, and that can ultimately 
affect the long-term success of firms (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Hummels, 1998). 
3.2.1.1 Applicability of Agency Theory to the UK Corporate Context 
The latest reform actions in the UK (e.g., the Combined Codes of 2008, 2010, 2012 and 
2014) support AT’s view that CG structures are important for monitoring the opportunistic 
behaviours of management and protecting shareholders’ wealth (FRC, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014). 
For example, the codes suggest that: (i) the majority of board members should be outside 
(unaffiliated) executives; (ii) there should be separation between CEO and chairperson 
positions; and (iii) the board of directors should establish independent committees and 
compromising mainly or wholly outside (unaffiliated) directors. Mallin (2013) suggests that 
AT has affected the development of the UK governance framework the most. Additionally, 
Mallin (2013) argues that AT is the most suitable theory to explain CG codes in the UK. 
3.2.2 Legitimacy Theory  
Another theory used in CG literature is legitimacy theory (LT). Legitimacy is defined by 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) as: “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate with some socially constructed systems of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions”. Based on this definition, LT suggests that firms will gain the 
support of key stakeholders and continue in existence as long as their activities are considered 
to be beneficial  or at least acceptable to society (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). LT is based on the 
notion that there is a social contract between a firm and society. Firms are authorised to work 
by the wider society, and are responsible to the society (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Patten, 1992). 
Therefore, LT suggests that the survival of a firm depends on the legitimacy of its operations 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). To legitimise its operations the firm needs to work within the 
framework of its society’s values and norms, and needs to consider the rights of the wider 
public, not only those of shareholders (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Ramanathan, 1976). Failure to 
conform to societal expectations can threaten the legitimacy and ultimately the survival of the 
firm (Bansal, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
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In line with this view, a CG system is seen as a tool to ensure that firms operate for the 
good of stakeholders (Judge et al., 2008). The argument underlying LT is that the major way 
for organisations to legitimise their operations and survive is through increased disclosure of 
governance practices that seek to protect the interests of stakeholders, including suppliers, the 
government and employees (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). 
Therefore, when the legitimacy of a firm is threatened, the firm needs to adopt a number of 
strategies, including increased CG disclosure, in order to change stakeholders’ perceptions and 
ensure them that the actions of the firm are seen as proper and desirable (Reverte, 2009). LT 
seems to be powerful in explaining the associations among CG mechanisms, CG compliance 
and disclosure, and corporate performance/valuation. According to Deegan et al. (2000, p. 101), 
“organizations utilize their annual report as a means of influencing society's perception of their 
operations, and as a means of legitimizing their on-going existence”. Several studies have used 
LT and examined its explanatory power. These studies find that the main driver for firms’ 
disclosure practices is improving their reputation and image, and thereby enhancing legitimacy 
(e.g., Clarke & Gibson‐Sweet, 1999; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Melis et al., 2015). 
LT also suggests that providing more information on CG practices can influence a firm’s 
value in a number of ways. Branco and Rodrigues (2008) argue that disclosing more 
information on governance practices can contribute to firm value by facilitating conformance 
to social norms and expectations, thus allowing firms access to critical resources needed for 
their success and growth. Moreover, disclosing more information on governance practices can 
signal to the market and investors that firms are accountable to them (Certo et al., 2001); this 
can positively influence a firm’s value. LT suggests that compliance with and disclosure of CG 
practices is a means for firms to enhance their legitimacy, by addressing the concerns of the 
public and improving their reputation and image (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005). Enhancing legitimacy is expected to allow firms to win the support of powerful 
stakeholders to access critical resources, thereby improving firms’ performance/valuation 
(Francoeur et al., 2008; Liao et al., 2015; Low et al., 2015). 
Despite being helpful in explaining the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure, as 
well as the influence of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation, LT has a 
number of limitations; for example, it does not explicitly consider differences in the power of 
different stakeholder groups, and it considers financial stakeholders as the most important 
stakeholders to firms (Gray et al., 1995; Parker, 2005). Additionally, Guthrie and Parker (1989) 
suggest that LT does not fully explain the drivers of CG compliance and disclosure and the 
effect of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation. To overcome these 
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limitations, stakeholder theory is also used in the current study; this theory is explained in the 
next subsection. 
3.2.2.1 Applicability of Legitimacy Theory to the UK Corporate Context 
 In the UK, listed firms are required to adhere to the UK codes, such as by using 
remuneration reports to explain the rationale behind directors’ payment, and seeking advice 
from independent remuneration consultants. This provides legitimacy to such payments, and 
assures stakeholders that their interests are protected (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Melis et 
al., 2015). Moreover, UK listed firms are required to disclose information about whether they 
have complied with the recommendations of CG codes, and explain any cases of non-
compliance. This may encourage firms to either comply or explain reason/s for non-compliance 
in order to enhance their legitimacy and improve their reputation. 
3.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholders include anyone who has either a direct or an indirect stake in a firm (Freeman 
& Reed, 1983; Phillips et al., 2003). According to Polonsky (1996) and Schilling (2000), direct 
stakeholders include anyone directly affected by or affecting the firm, such as creditors, 
suppliers, employees and shareholders, while indirect stakeholders refer to anyone indirectly 
affected by or affecting the firm, such as the government and the wider community. Stakeholder 
theory (SHT) defines organisations as many-sided agreements between multiple stakeholders 
and firms, because each group of stakeholders provides a firm with necessary critical resources, 
and in return, stakeholders expect their interests to be met. For example, creditors provide the 
firm with loans, and in return they expect their loans to be paid back on time. Employees and 
directors provide the firm with their skills and time, and in return they expect to receive a 
sustainable income. Shareholders provide the firm with the capital, and in return they expect to 
maximise their return on investment (Hill & Jones, 1992; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
SHT shares some assumptions with AT, for example,  the separation between ownership 
and control creates governance problems. It also assumes that governance problems can be 
reduced through a series of contracts between the various parties in the company, which can 
reduce the opportunistic behaviour of management and encourage management to consider the 
interests of different stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). However, SHT rejects AT’s assumption 
that governance problems can only be reduced by aligning management and shareholder 
interests, because managers need to be accountable to a wider group of stakeholders 
(Shankman, 1999). 
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SHT can be considered an extension of AT, where managers are expected to accommodate 
the full range of stakeholders’ interests by establishing and maintaining a beneficial power 
balance among all stakeholders (Christopher, 2012; Parker, 2007). That can minimise agency 
costs (Hill & Jones, 1992) and thereby improve firm financial performance. With respect to CG 
compliance and disclosure, SHT indicates that companies are motivated to disclose additional 
CG information in order to win the support of powerful stakeholders (Chan et al., 2014; 
Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). Also, voluntary CG disclosure may allow stakeholders to 
ensure that their interests are protected (Liao et al., 2015). Similarly, meeting the demands of 
multiple stakeholders can improve firms’ financial performance, because firms are dependent 
on the critical resources provided by stakeholders (Berman et al., 1999; Ruf et al., 2001). In 
this regard, stakeholders are seen as suppliers of critical resources, whose interests need to be 
met to enhance firms’ financial performance (Ayuso et al., 2014; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
In summary, SHT has been considered an extension of AT’s view that firms should 
consider the interests of different groups of stakeholders rather than only focusing on meeting 
shareholders’ interests (Freeman & Reed, 1983). This theory suggests that governance 
problems occur because stakeholders do not participate in running the firm (Freeman & Reed, 
1983; Letza et al., 2004). Therefore, firms that consider the interests of powerful stakeholders 
are expected to win their support (Hill & Jones, 1992; Letza et al., 2008). 
Although SHT is useful in explaining the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure 
and the influence of firm-level CG quality on performance/valuation, it has been criticised for 
its inability to explain how to align the interests of different groups of stakeholders, because 
stakeholder can be anyone or anything (Sternberg, 1997). SHT has also been criticised for not 
adequately explaining the dynamics which link the firm to the stakeholders (Key, 1999). 
Finally, stakeholder theory has also been criticised by those who suggest that it is not justifiable 
and practicable to represent all stakeholders in governance recommendations, as that may 
negatively affect the welfare of the firm (Etzioni, 1998). To overcome these limitations, 
resource dependence theory is also used in this research; it is explained below. 
3.2.3.1 Applicability of Stakeholder Theory to the UK Corporate Context 
Listed firms are required to adhere to the UK codes such as; (i) providing detailed 
disclosure about the pay package of each director and (ii) linking executive pay to 
corporate/individual performance. That provides the legitimacy to the payment of directors and 
also ensures that executives are motivated to protect stakeholders’ interests. Additionally, the 
Companies Act of 2006 includes some provisions related to the social responsibility of firms 
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and how they can protect stakeholders’ rights (Section, 417). Therefore, UK listed firms are 
expected to not only focus on protecting shareholders’ rights but also to take the interest of 
other stakeholders into consideration. 
3.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
This theory suggests that internal governance structures, such as boards of directors and 
committees, are not only necessary for ensuring effective monitoring of managers, but also 
serve to connect firms to the critical resources needed to survive and maximise firm 
performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972). Specifically, resource dependence 
theory (RDT) suggests that boards of directors allow firms to gain access to resources in a 
number of ways. First, the board of directors, and outside directors in particular, provide the 
firm with necessary resources, such as knowledge and expertise (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Second, the presence of outside directors on a board can improve firm value, through providing 
the firm with a necessary business network (Borgatti & Foster, 2003), as well as improving the 
firm’s reputation (Udayasankar, 2008). Finally, CG can lead to reduced environmental 
uncertainty, as directors bring different resources and skills to firms, increasing the firms’ 
legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2000) and thereby improving firm financial performance (Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2007). In general, RDT suggests that various elements of CG can help firms generate, 
acquire or maintain resources (Chen & Roberts, 2010), which can improve firm financial 
performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
RDT suggests that corporations are encouraged to voluntarily disclose more information 
regarding their CG practices in order to obtain access to critical resources (Amran et al., 2014; 
Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). Additionally, Castanias and Helfat (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) argue that engaging in increased compliance and disclosure of CG may help reduce the 
concerns of external actors regarding the abilities of managers to adopt suitable strategies. It 
should be acknowledged that RDT is considered to be complementary to AT, because it 
recognises the need for directors, who have far-reaching networks and who are skilled and 
experienced, to manage the impact of external and internal environmental influences on the 
governance paradigm of firms. This is ignored by AT, which mainly focuses on the monitoring 
role of boards of directors (Arena et al., 2015). According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003, p. 
388), “the integration of monitoring and the provision of resources will not only more 
accurately reflect the real world but also may overcome theoretical weaknesses in choosing 
one approach over another”. 
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RDT is also considered complementary to SHT, since it takes into consideration the 
complexities arising from wider influencing forces through a wider stakeholder base. RDT 
suggests that the ability of firms to operate in today’s complex and competitive environment, 
which is associated with their independence on the critical resources provided by stakeholders, 
is directly related to the effectiveness of the members of the board of directors (Bouwman, 
2011; Christopher, 2010). In this regard, the role of the board of directors is to help firms 
respond to external changes and maintain good relations with key stakeholders, in order to 
ensure that they can access critical resources (Cornforth, 2004). 
To sum up, RDT suggests that increased compliance and disclosure of CG practices allows 
firms to address the concerns of external actors regarding the abilities of managers to adopt 
suitable strategies (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Addressing the concerns 
of external actors is expected to allow firms to win their support and access critical resources, 
thereby enhancing firm financial performance (Ntim, 2015). Although RDT is useful in 
explaining the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure, as well as the influence of firm-
level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation, it is criticised for its inability to identify 
factors other than board characteristics that can impact firms’ success, such as the political 
environment (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Christopher, 2010). Additionally, Christopher (2010) 
emphasises that RDT cannot fully explain the motivation for and impact of different governance 
structures, and thus should be used to complement stakeholder and agency theories. This is 
because the existence of multiple stakeholders may increase the complexity of firms’ operating 
environment, which can in turn increase the importance of controlling and managing resources 
more efficiently (Christopher, 2010). 
3.2.4.1 Applicability of Resource Dependence Theory to the UK Corporate Context 
The UK CG codes call for establishing appropriate CG structures to reduce the concerns 
of various groups of stakeholders regarding the abilities of managers to adopt suitable strategies. 
For example, the UK code of 2010 recommends that boards have an appropriate mixture of 
inside and outside executives (B.1). Additionally, the code emphasises the importance of 
separating CEO and chairperson positions (A.2.1). Complying with the recommendations may 
lead to an increased diversity of directors, where boards will compromise directors with 
different skills, experience and networks, which may help firms to access critical resources.  
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3.2.5 Stewardship Theory 
 Contrary to AT, stewardship theory (SWH) suggests that there is no conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders, and their interests are aligned (Daily et al., 2003; Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990). This theory assumes that managers are trustworthy people that are 
good stewards of investors’ resources, making monitoring unnecessary; the theory suggests that 
managers should be given full authority and empowered rather than monitored and controlled 
(Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). SWH also suggests that 
managers have access to information about their firms’ operations, and tend to have better 
knowledge about their working environment (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). This may encourage 
them to act in shareholders’ best interests to maximise their firms’ performance/value 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Additionally, SWH suggests that 
managers’ interests are aligned with those of shareholders, and managers focus primarily on 
achieving the organisational objectives (Davis et al., 1997). 
Past studies indicate that companies should appropriately balance the need for monitoring 
and stewardship (Christopher, 2010; Dedman, 2000). Small companies, for example, require 
more stewardship and less monitoring (Christensen et al., 2015). This implies that some 
recommendations from CG codes may not be appropriate for some companies. Specifically, 
from the perspective of SWT, some companies may prefer to have more internal directors on 
their boards, as such directors generally have greater knowledge about their firms and industries 
(Boyd, 1995; Muth & Donaldson, 1998); this may allow internal directors to make better 
decisions (Donaldson & Davis, 1994). SWH also suggests that combining CEO and chairperson 
positions may be considered a good CG practice, because it may lead to unified and clear 
leadership (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). This may help reduce the 
potential for conflict between CEO and chairperson, thereby allowing for better decision-
making (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). 
SWH can be integrated with legitimacy, stakeholder and resource dependence theories 
(Christopher, 2010). It is argued that the complexities arising from wider influencing forces 
through a wider stakeholder base require skilled and experienced staff from various levels of 
management, supported by effective internal CG structures that empower managers to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth (Albrecht et al., 2004; Christopher, 2010). To sum up, SWH 
stands in opposition to AT, because it assumes that managers are good stewards of the resources 
entrusted to them, and there is no conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Additionally, SWH suggests that managers work 
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diligently to improve firm performance and shareholder return (Muth & Donaldson, 1998; 
Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). 
 Although SWH is useful in explaining the motivations for voluntary CG disclosure and 
the impact of CG mechanisms on corporate performance/valuation, it has been criticised, in that 
managers do not always align their interests with owners’, as managers may be motivated to 
commit fraud and focus on achieving their own interests at the expense of other stakeholders 
(Choo & Tan, 2007). Nevertheless, SWH “needs to be incorporated in any governance model 
to provide a more holistic view of governance” (Christopher, 2010, p. 690). 
3.2.5.1 Applicability of Stewardship Theory to the UK Corporate Context 
The UK governance codes recommend that half of all board members should be outside 
(unaffiliated) directors (e.g., 2010 Combined Code, section B.1.2). The codes also require 
separating CEO and chairperson positions (e.g., 2010 Combined Code, section A.2.1). The 
codes aim to encourage boards to be more accountable to their stakeholders by increasing 
monitoring and control over management. This is in contrast to SWH, which assumes that 
directors may not need excessive monitoring because they are trustworthy people. However, it 
should be mentioned that there are arguments suggesting that in countries with sophisticated 
levels of CG regulations and strong ethical and professional guidelines, firms need the 
flexibility to develop and implement more intrinsic and empowering processes (a feature of 
SWH), in order to reduce costs (Christopher, 2010, p. 689). This is because the costs of 
monitoring and controlling mechanisms will be lower in those countries compared with 
countries that have less sophisticated CG regulations and weaker ethical and professional 
standards (Christopher, 2010, p. 689). This suggests that SWH likely to be applicable to the UK 
corporate context, because the UK has a fairly active market for managerial and corporate 
control, a strong record of enforcing the implementation of corporate regulations (Ferri & 
Maber, 2013; Melis et al., 2015), and a high level of shareholder activism (Hussainey & Al‐
Najjar, 2012). 
3.3 THEORIES USED TO EXPLAIN THE ANTECEDENTS OF 
EXECUTIVE PAY  
The review of theoretical literature on the influence of firm-level CG quality on executive 
pay shows that past CG studies have mainly relied on agency theoretical insights drawn from 
managerial power hypothesis (MPH) and optimal contracting theory (OCT) (e.g., Andreas et 
al., 2012; Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014a; Luo, 2015; Ntim 
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et al., 2015a; Sur et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015). The MPH suggests that executives have 
the power to influence the level and structure of their own pay, and they take advantage of this 
power to maximise their own interests at the expense of other stakeholders. Therefore, 
executive directors’ pay, based on this perspective, increases the agency conflicts (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003; Finkelstein, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). By contrast, OCT suggests that 
shareholders, through the board of directors, agree on incentive schemes that reduce agency 
costs and maximise principal value. Therefore, the board of directors have more control over 
executive directors’ pay, helping to reduce agency problems (Core & Guay, 2010; Edmans & 
Gabaix, 2009; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).       
Although the MPH is different from OCT, these two perspectives work together to explain 
how executive pay contracts happen in practice (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Van-
Essen et al., 2015). Additionally, integrating both approaches helps to “deepen agency theory 
by complementing the economic approach provided by the optimal contracting view with a 
managerial power perspective” (Mallin et al., 2015, p. 178). Therefore, the current study relies 
on both the MPH and OCT to investigate the influence of firm-level CG quality on executive 
pay. A review of the two complementary perspectives is provided in the following subsections.  
3.3.1 Managerial Power Hypothesis   
The managerial power hypothesis (MPH) suggests that executives have control over 
internal governance structures and use their power to maximise their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989; Lambert et al., 1993). Therefore, based on this view, executive pay might not 
help to mitigate agency problems, because it can lead to incurring extra costs (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003). Further, the MPH attempts to explain the relationship between executives and 
shareholders through the degree of power that executives have over the level and structure of 
their own pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Luo, 2015; Mallin et al., 2015). It assumes that 
executive pay arrangements lead to increased agency problems in accordance with the extent 
of power that the executive have (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Van-Essen et al., 2015). 
The MPH suggests that there are several ways that may allow executives to obtain more 
power. Board composition has been considered to have a great influence on the degree of 
executives’ power and board independence (Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2015; Van-
Essen et al., 2015). For example, combining CEO and chairperson positions may lead to a 
CEO’s increased effect over board’s decisions, including setting remuneration, while splitting 
the roles may enhance board independence in setting remuneration (Finkelstein & D'aveni, 
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1994; Van-Essen et al., 2015). Similarly, firms with long-standing CEOs are expected to pay 
high remuneration to their executives, because CEOs in such firms tend to have developed 
strong networks and relationships with board members, making it more likely that proposals 
favoured by the CEOs will be accepted (Hill & Phan, 1991; Kalyta & Magnan, 2008). Another 
important source of managerial power is share ownership. Finkelstein (1992) and Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1989) argue that higher managerial ownership can increase managers’ power 
over internal CG structures, such as appointing and reappointing board members; thus, they can 
influence the level and structure of their own pay (Byrd et al., 2010; Holderness & Sheehan, 
1988). 
Despite being useful in explaining the influence of firm-level CG quality on executive pay, 
the MPH is criticised in that it “is designed to be descriptive, it cannot directly help guide policy, 
because it makes no normative statements” (Gümbel, 2006, p. 226). To overcome this 
limitation, and to be consistent with previous CG studies (e.g., Cambini et al., 2015; Carver et 
al., 2013; Luo, 2015; Mallin et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a), the current study adopts both 
managerial power and optimal contracting perspectives to investigate CG’s effect on executive 
pay. 
3.3.1.1 Applicability of the Managerial Power Hypothesis to the UK Corporate Context 
The latest CG reform actions in the UK (e.g., the Combined Codes of 2010, 2012 and 2014) 
support the MPH’s view that some aspects of internal CG structures can increase executives’ 
power over board decisions. To reduce executives’ power, UK governance codes implemented 
some measures, including: (i) corporate board should consist of a greater number of outside 
(unaffiliated) directors; (ii) separating CEO and chairperson positions; and (iii) the corporate 
board should establish an independent remuneration committee. The codes also recommend 
that, when appointing remuneration consultants, these consultants should be independent. Such 
practices can prevent executives from awarding themselves overly generous pay packages 
(Ding et al., 2014; Jian & Lee, 2015). 
3.3.2 Optimal Contracting Theory   
Optimal contracting approach (OCT) sees boards of directors as acting solely in the best 
interests of shareholders by negotiating the best possible executive pay contracts (Edmans & 
Gabaix, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Murphy, 2012). Therefore, executives have less influence on 
the level and structure of their own pay (Conyon, 2014; Core & Guay, 2010). Additionally, 
OCT suggests that firms attempt to attract and retain talented managers, and motivate them to 
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conduct their duties effectively by setting up appropriate incentive schemes, which can reduce 
agency problems (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Holmstrom, 2005). Therefore, OCT suggests that in 
order to align management and shareholder interests and thus reduce agency problems, 
incentive contracts can be used by paying executives based on their performance (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; John et al., 2010; Sapp, 2008). 
Further, OCT indicates that executive pay is determined by the benefits firms can obtain 
from hiring a particular executive (Edmans et al., 2009). To clarify, large firms, for example, 
require talented directors, who need to be financially motivated to attract and retain them 
(Custódio et al., 2013; Edmans et al., 2009; Gabaix & Landier, 2008). Therefore, OCT suggests 
that pay packages should be based on directors’ skills and experience, and should not vary with 
the degree of power that directors have over the board (Cordeiro et al., 2016). 
OCT suggests that executive directors are believed to be risk-averse. Therefore, in order to 
motivate directors to involve in more high-risk strategies and make better decisions that 
maximise shareholders’ wealth, firms have to financially motivate them by paying them 
appropriately (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). Additionally, OCT suggests that executives should 
not involve in determining their own pay, and that shareholders should agree on payment 
through board discussion/decisions (Holmstrom, 2005; Murphy, 2012). Specifically, OCT 
assumes that executive pay is determined by arms-length negotiations between an independent 
corporate board and executive directors, leading to the creation of incentives schemes that are 
able to reduce agency costs and maximise shareholder wealth (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009, p. 489; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990, p. 226). 
Although OCT is useful in explaining CG’s influence on executive pay, this theory suffers 
from a number of limitations. First, it assumes that shareholders agree to an optimal contract 
with board of directors, however, and because shareholders do not contract directly with the 
executives, contracts might differ from those predicted by an optimal contacting model 
(Weisbach, 2007). Second, the OCT suggests that shareholders have the right to reject a 
remuneration committee’s proposals that are not optimal from their point of view (Gregory-
Smith et al., 2014a). However, in practice, shareholders rarely vote against proposals provided 
by a remuneration committee because that would harm shareholders’ value and firm reputation, 
as rejecting remuneration committee proposals can indicate some aspects of corruption within 
the firm (Dignam, 2007). Finally, the negotiated pay contracts between the board and executive 
directors may not be those that improve shareholder wealth because executive directors may 
have more power over their own pay (Holmstrom, 2005; Weisbach, 2007). For example, CEOs 
may have more power over the appointment or reappointment of other directors, setting agendas 
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and controlling board meetings (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Main et al., 1995; Walsh & Seward, 
1990). This may grant CEOs power over their own pay (Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Van-Essen 
et al., 2015). 
Given the above limitations, relying merely on OCT to examine CG’s impact on executive 
pay may be inadequate; therefore, following past CG studies (e.g., Cambini et al., 2015; Carver 
et al., 2013; Luo, 2015; Mallin et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a), the current study relies on the 
MPH and OCT to develop the hypotheses and explain the findings related to executive pay. 
3.3.2.1 Applicability of Optimal Contracting Theory to the UK Corporate Context 
The latest reform activities support the view of the OCT that internal CG structures play 
an important role in determining executive pays that are optimal to shareholders. For instance, 
the UK CG codes recommend that: (i) UK listed firms should set up a remuneration committee, 
chaired by an outside (unaffiliated) executive; (ii) at least three members of the remuneration 
committee, in the case of large firms, should be independent directors; (iii) large proportions of 
executives’ pay should be linked to their performance and firm performance; and (iv) 
shareholders should approve remuneration proposals provided by remuneration committees,  in 
order to ensure that executive pay is optimal. Following the recommendations of the UK CG 
codes is expected to help reduce agency costs and determine optimal contracts that help align 
management and shareholder interests (Conyon & Peck, 1998a; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014a; 
Ozkan, 2011). 
3.4 REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE  
Studies examined the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure and CG’s effect on 
corporate performance have used several individual theories, including agency, resource 
dependence, legitimacy, stakeholder and stewardship (e.g., Christopher, 2010; Gaur et al., 
2015; Martínez‐Ferrero et al., 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). However, since each 
individual theory is not able to fully explain the relationship among CG mechanisms, voluntary 
disclosure and financial performance (Christopher, 2010; Low et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; 
Pugliese et al., 2014; Zattoni et al., 2013); and because CG is related to a variety of disciplines, 
such as economics, finance, law, ethics, politics and management (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; 
Christopher, 2012; Letza et al., 2008), the current research adopts a multi-theoretical 
framework. In doing so, this study contributes to attempts directed towards developing a 
uniform theoretical framework, which can be used to explain CG disclosure behaviour and the 
impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation. Additionally, and 
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consistent with existing literature (e.g., Andreas et al., 2012; Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 
2014; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014a; Luo, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sur et al., 2015; Van-Essen 
et al., 2015), this study relies on agency theoretical insights drawn from managerial power 
hypothesis and optimal contracting theory to explain findings relate to CG’s effect on executive 
pay, because the two perspectives work together to explain the practice of determining  pay 
contracts (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Mallin et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015). 
The next chapter reviews and discusses relevant empirical literature and develops 
hypotheses related to the associations among CG mechanisms, CG compliance and disclosure, 
corporate performance/valuation and executive pay. Specifically, the first section in the fourth 
chapter reviews studies examining the antecdents of CG compliance and disclosure. The second 
section present studies investigating CG’s influence on corporate performance/valuation. The 
final section reviews studies investigating the effect of firm-level CG quality on executive pay. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESES 
4. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter reviews the relevant extant empirical studies that investigate the antecedents 
of CG compliance and disclosure, as well as studies that examine CG’s effect on corporate 
performance/valuation and executive pay. In particular, Section 4.1 reviews the literature and 
develops hypotheses related to the antecedents of CG disclosure. Section 4.2 reviews past CG 
studies that examine CG’s influence on corporate performance/valuation, and based on that the 
hypotheses are developed. Section 4.3 reviews literature and develops hypotheses related to the 
influence of firm-level CG quality on executive pay. The final section (4.4) summaries main 
points covered in this chapter. 
4.1 ANTECEDENTS OF VOLUNTARY CG COMPLIANCE AND 
DISCLOSURE 
 The current study is motivated to examine voluntary CG compliance and disclosure among 
UK listed firms, because of the small number of past studies on this topic (e.g., Arcot et al., 
2010; Conyon, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012; Pass, 2006; Shrives & Brennan, 2015). These few studies suffer from several 
limitations. For instance, Arcot et al. (2010) and Pass (2006) focus on a small number of CG 
provisions. Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) employ subjective analysts’ rankings to examine 
CG disclosure among UK firms, and Conyon (1994) employs a survey to examine CG 
disclosure behaviour among UK firms. Shrives and Brennan (2015) only analyse the content of 
CG explanations given for non-compliance with the recommendations of 2003 and 2010 Codes 
among the largest UK listed firms, whilst Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) only examine CG 
disclosure behaviour among UK listed firms on the alternative investment market (AIM). Thus, 
this study aims to contribute as well as extend CG research by offering new detailed evidence 
on the compliance levels with the recommendations of 2010 Combined Code. Different from 
the extant literature, this study employs the most comprehensive self-constructed CG index, 
comprising 120 CG provisions, as a measure for CG compliance and disclosure levels among 
UK listed firms. 
Additionally, existing empirical literature has widely investigated the effect of general firm 
characteristics (e.g., leverage and size) on CG compliance and disclosure (Cooke, 1992; 
Waweru, 2014), despite increasing suggestions and evidence that top management and 
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ownership structure have a significant influence on many of corporate decisions, including CG 
disclosure (Ntim et al., 2012a). hence, this study extends, as well as contributes to the existing 
research by examining the impact of board and ownership mechanisms on CG compliance and 
disclosure. Drawing on prior studies (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Eng 
& Mak, 2003; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b) and the UK corporate context, the current study identifies the 
main antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. Specifically, this study 
examines whether board, audit, firm and ownership mechanisms can explain the observed 
differences in CG compliance and disclosure behaviour. A brief review of studies related to the 
selected factors is provided in the following subsections. 
4.1.1 Board, Firm and Audit Characteristics  
Unlike several prior studies that limit their examination to a few CG mechanisms, the 
current study investigates the influence of a large number of CG variables on CG disclosure. 
These CG variables include board size, board gender and ethnic diversity, board independence, 
existence of a separate CG committee, audit firm size and cross-listing. The following 
subsections briefly set out the central theoretical arguments and empirical literature related to 
each variable and its association with voluntary CG disclosure.  
4.1.1.1 Board Size (BSE)  
Corporate board has been considered an effective CG tool to mentor/control management 
behaviour and reduce agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Past CG 
studies indicate that there are several aspects, including the size of a corporate board, that 
influence board independence and effectiveness (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Guest, 2009b; 
Yermack, 1996). Theoretically, the extant literature on whether corporate boards should be 
small or large in order to perform effectively is mixed. On the one hand, John and Senbet 
(1998), and Yermack (1996) suggest that larger boards are not efficient in monitoring and 
controlling the opportunistic managerial behaviour compared with smaller boards. This is 
because larger boards are associated with more communication and co-ordination problems that 
diminish their monitoring effectiveness (Beasley, 1996; Yermack, 1996). Additionally, Jensen 
(1993) and Vafeas (1999a) suggest that as board size increases, monitoring of management 
activities is more likely to decrease, because powerful managers are more able to dominate the 
board. Therefore, it is expected that small boards are associated with greater firm voluntary 
disclosure, including disclosure of CG practices. 
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In contrast, large boards are considered to be more efficient compared with smaller 
counterparts in detecting managers’ opportunistic behaviours and reducing agency conflict. 
Goodstein et al. (1994) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) argues that larger boards can enjoy better 
diversity in skills, knowledge, experience and stakeholders’ representation, and thereby they 
are better able to solve problems (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). 
The increased diversity provided by larger boards may increase the monitoring role of the board 
on executives, which positively influencing firms’ CG disclosure. 
Although theoretical literature provides conflicting views with respect to whether board 
size influences its effectiveness, several past studies document a statistically positive link 
among CG disclosure and board size (e.g., Chapple & Truong, 2015; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et 
al., 2015; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hyun et al., 2014; Jizi et al., 2014; Liao et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2012b; Samaha et al., 2015). Al-Janadi et al. (2013), for instance,  report empirical evidence 
that disclosure level is associated positively with board size among 87 Saudi listed firms during 
the period from 2006-2007. Similarly, Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) find that corporate 
social responsibility disclosure among 575 international listed firms is statistically significant 
and positively associated with board size. However, some other studies find either a negative 
(e.g., Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Samaha et al., 2012) or no association (e.g., Arcay & 
Vazquez, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Lakhal, 2005) among board size and CG disclosure.  
In the UK corporate context, Liao et al. (2015), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) and Wang 
and Hussainey (2013) find that corporate disclosure is statistically significant and positively 
linked with board size. Additionally, UK CG codes indicate that boards of listed firms should 
be big enough to allow them to function effectively (e.g., FRC, 2008, 2010, 2012). The 
flexibility in CG codes’ recommendations allows firms to structure boards of a suitable size; 
hence it is expected that board size influences CG voluntary compliance and disclosure 
behaviour. Thus, hypothesis one is:  
H1: There is a positive link among BSE and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.1.2 Board Independence (IOE)  
IOE can be considered as an important CG mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts by 
monitoring and preventing management from expropriating the wealth of shareholders (Kesner 
& Johnson, 1990; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Pincus 
et al. (1989) argue that outside independent directors exert more pressure and monitoring over 
management activities to ensure the alignment between the interests of management and 
shareholder. The presence of independent outside directors not only mitigates agency problems, 
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but can also enhance corporate legitimacy by increasing the representation of outside 
stakeholders (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, independent outside 
directors are also argued to have more incentive to encourage voluntary disclosure and 
strengthen CG structures in order to enhance their social prestige and standing (Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2012). Additionally, independent outside directors can increase board diversity in 
terms of skills, knowledge, experience and business contracts (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). 
Therefore, the appointment of independent outside directors can enhance voluntary CG 
disclosure by exerting more pressure on management to disclosure more information about CG 
practices.  
Empirically, the findings of empirical literature largely suggest that firm-level CG 
disclosure is statistically significant and positively influenced by board independence (e.g., 
Barako & Brown, 2008; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Donnelly & 
Mulcahy, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013; Samaha et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2015). For instance, 
Samaha et al. (2012) report empirical evidence that board independence is statistically 
significantly linked with CG disclosure among 100 Egyptian listed firms in 2009. Similarly, 
Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a) report empirical evidence that firms listed on Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange improve their CG disclosure by appointing more independent outside directors 
on their boards. However, some past studies document negative relationship among CG 
disclosure and board independence (e.g., Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2012; Barako et al., 2006; 
Eng & Mak, 2003). 
In the UK corporate context, Elshandidy et al. (2013), Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) and 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) report empirical evidence that levels of CG and risk disclosure are 
linked to independent boards. From policy and regulatory perspective, the UK CG codes (e.g., 
FRC, 2008, 2010, 2012) suggest that a large number of UK boards’ members should outside 
(unaffiliated) executives. This may suggest that UK governance codes consider increasing the 
percentage of outside directors to be a positive CG development. Therefore, hypothesis two in 
this study is: 
H2: There is a positive link among IOE and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.1.3 Board Gender and Ethnic Diversity (BD)  
Board diversity can act as an important tool that enhances board efficiency and 
effectiveness (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2003; Walt & Ingley, 2003). Board diversity in 
general refers to a collection of differences that may be present among board members, 
including differences in skills, experience, knowledge, gender, religion, educational 
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background and ethnicity (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). However, in line 
with existing CG literature (e.g., Barako & Brown, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012a), and given that gender and ethnic aspects 
of board diversity are easily noticeable and measured (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2003; 
Ntim, 2015), the current study focuses on gender and ethnic diversity aspects.  
Board gender and ethnic diversity, from an AT perspective, can enhance board 
effectiveness, including preventing managers from expropriating the wealth of shareholders by 
enhancing board independence from management (Barako & Brown, 2008; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012). Similarly, from a RDT perspective, diverse boards can provide a better link 
between firms and their external environment, and thus attract critical resources (Hillman et al., 
2000; Pfeffer, 1972). SHT indicates that boards featuring diverse ethnic and gender 
backgrounds have better relationships with influential stakeholders (Bear et al., 2010; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Estélyi & Nisar, 2016), and also improve corporate legitimacy 
(LT) and board trustworthiness (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Perrault, 2015). 
Empirically, few studies have investigated whether board diversity influences CG 
disclosure practices (e.g., Barako & Brown, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012a), and thus the current study constitutes a timely 
contribution to previous CG research. The findings of these few studies generally imply that 
firm-level CG disclosure is statistically positively influenced by board gender and ethnic 
diversity. Barako and Brown (2008), for example, document empirical evidence that gender-
diverse boards provide additional corporate social responsibility information for 40 Kenyan 
banks. Similarly, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a) report that voluntary disclosure on black 
economic empowerment is positively influenced by board gender and ethnic diversity among 
South African listed companies. 
Within the UK corporate context in particular, there has been an increased awareness of 
the crucial role of gender and ethnic diversity in enhancing board effectiveness. Specifically, 
the Combined Code of 2010 (Section B.2), recommends that corporate boards should be 
sufficiently diverse in several aspects (e.g., age, gender, qualifications and ethnicity) in order 
to improve board effectiveness, and thus board diversity is viewed as a positive development. 
Given that CG disclosure is primarily determined by managers (Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013a), diverse boards are anticipated to positively impact on CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. Accordingly, the next hypothesis proposed is: 
H3: There is a positive link among BD and CG compliance and disclosure. 
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4.1.1.4 Existence of a Separate CG Committee (PCGC)  
The establishment of independent board committees has been considered an important 
mechanism to improve governance practices (Hearn, 2011; Vafeas, 1999a). One such 
committee is a CG committee, which may help monitor compliance with recommendations 
contained in CG codes (Ntim et al., 2012b). From agency and stakeholder theoretical 
perspectives, the role of CG is to reduce agency problems and protect shareholders and 
stakeholders’ interests (Fama, 1980; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, 
the existence of a separate CG committee can improve board independence and effectiveness 
by enhancing managerial monitoring and encouraging firms to engage in greater CG disclosure 
behaviour (Core, 2001; Ntim et al., 2012b). This, in turn, is expected to allow firms win the 
support of powerful stakeholders and access critical resources by enhancing corporate 
reputation and image.  
The empirical research on the relationship among CG disclosure practices and CG 
committees is rare, and this makes it an attractive area for investigation. The only study 
examining this association is conducted by Ntim et al. (2012b); they report empirical evidence 
that firms listed on Johannesburg Stock Exchange improve their CG practices by establishing 
separate CG committees. In the UK corporate context, the Combined Code of 2010 does not 
require UK listed firms to set up separate CG committees. However, given that firms that 
voluntarily set-up separate CG committees are found to disclose and comply more with good 
CG practices than those without such committees (Ntim et al., 2012b), the next hypothesis 
proposed is: 
 H4: There is a positive link among the PCGC and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.1.5 Cross-listing (CL)  
Cross-listed firms usually have to adhere to the requirements of foreign stock exchanges, 
such as accounting and governance regulations. They will also be subject to more monitoring 
by international investors (Cooke, 1989; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). 
Additionally, firms with dual-listing are more likely need to be accountable to public by 
increasing compliance and disclosure of CG practices, because these firms face more rigorous 
examination by international stakeholders/investors (Doidge et al., 2004; Eaton et al., 2007; 
Ntim et al., 2012b); that may help reduce agency and financing costs (Bailey et al., 2006; Sami 
& Zhou, 2008). Similarly, voluntary CG compliance and disclosure can enhance firm 
legitimacy (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a; Watts & Zimmerman, 1979) by satisfying the 
influential stakeholders and by encouraging them to provide resources, including money and 
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materials (Coffee, 2002; Cooke, 1989; Eaton et al., 2007; Klapper & Love, 2004; Robb & 
Zarzeski, 2001).  
Empirical findings from prior studies (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Lin et al., 2015; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ntim et al., 2012b) suggest that cross-listed companies provide additional 
information about their CG practices because they are subject to more requirements from 
foreign stock exchanges, such as additional accounting, disclosure and CG rules. Collett and 
Hrasky (2005), for instance, report empirical evidence that firm-level CG disclosure is 
statistically significantly influenced by listing status among 75 Australian companies in 1994. 
Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) and Ntim et al. (2012b) report a positive relationship among the 
two variables. In the UK, existing CG research (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Mangena & 
Pike, 2005; Meek et al., 1995) indicates a positive link among cross-listing and voluntary 
disclosure behaviour; hence, the next hypothesis proposed is: 
H5: There is a positive link among CL and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.1.6 Audit Firm Size (AFS)  
Audit firm size, as a CG mechanism, is suggested to play an important function in terms 
of enhancing audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981b) and CG voluntary compliance and disclosure 
(Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012a; Waweru, 2014). This is because larger audit firms are 
thought to have more experience, knowledge and expertise and greater financial strength 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Wallace et al., 1994). Additionally, big auditing firms have a greater 
incentive to provide high-quality audit services in order to improve their reputation and avoid 
losing customers (DeAngelo, 1981b; Lennox, 1999). Similarly, auditors from large audit firms 
often have more independence and a greater ability to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of 
management (DeAngelo, 1981a; Ntim et al., 2012b), which can indicate to stakeholders that 
high-quality CG information is being disclosed (Titman & Trueman, 1986). 
Mixed results are reported by prior studies examining the relationship among audit firm 
size and CG disclosure. On the one hand, the findings of empirical literature largely indicate 
that firms audited by one of the big 4 international audit firms provide more information on CG 
compliance than companies audited by smaller audit firms (e.g., Kent & Stewart, 2008; Ntim 
et al., 2012a; Ntim et al., 2012b; Omar & Simon, 2011; Satta et al., 2014; Waweru, 2014). For 
example, using a sample of 283 listed firm on Australian Securities Exchange, Bassett et al. 
(2007) report empirical evidence that voluntary CG reporting is positively influenced by the 
size of the auditing firm. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012b) report empirical evidence that big audit 
firms enhance CG disclosure practices. 
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In contrast, other studies find no association among firm-level CG disclosure and audit 
firm size (e.g., Aly et al., 2010; Barako et al., 2006; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hossain et al., 1995; 
Wallace et al., 1994). For instance, Hossain et al. (1995) consider 55 listed firms on New 
Zealand Securities Exchange and provide empirical evidence that big audit firms have no 
influence on CG disclosure practices. Similarly, Barako et al. (2006) report empirical evidence 
that corporate voluntary disclosure is not influenced by audit firm size for 43 firms listed on 
Nairobi Securities Exchange. In the UK corporate context, Archambault and Archambault 
(2003) examine the antecedents of corporate voluntary disclosure in 33 countries (including 68 
firms from the UK) over the period 1985-1994 and find a positive relationship between audit 
firm size and corporate voluntary disclosure. The 2010 Combined Code sees auditors as key 
players in making firms comply with its recommendations (Section C.3); thus, hypothesis six 
is proposed: 
H6: There is a positive link among AFS and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.2 Ownership Structures Variables 
Corporate ownership structure is deemed to be an important tool that influences CG 
compliance and disclosure practices (Barako et al., 2006; Eng & Mak, 2003; Khan et al., 2013). 
While most past CG studies focus only on few types of ownership, the UK context provide this 
study a great opportunity to investigate the influence of block, managerial and institutional 
ownership on CG compliance and disclosure. A brief review of the extant literature examining 
the association among each type and CG compliance and disclosure is offered in the following 
subsections. 
4.1.2.1 Managerial Ownership (MANO) 
Managerial ownership is considered an important antecedent of voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
There are mixed theoretical explanations as to the influence of managerial ownership on CG 
voluntary compliance and disclosure. From AT perspective, the alignment of management and 
shareholder interests can increase along with an increase in directors ownership (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Samaha et al., 2012), and that may limit the need to engage in good CG 
practices. Similarly, from LT perspective, firms with high managerial ownership have less need 
to be accountable to the general public, because outsiders (shareholders) in those firms tend to 
have relatively small interests (Eng & Mak, 2003; Khan et al., 2013). Therefore, higher 
managerial ownership may not encourage managers to engage in desirable CG disclosure 
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behaviour. In contrast, managerial ownership may not lead to aligned interests of management 
and shareholders; since managers may focus on increasing their benefits by exploiting insider 
information (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). Therefore, greater levels of ownership by managers 
may reduce monitoring of management activities, which may negatively impact CG voluntary 
compliance and disclosure practices.  
 Most prior studies provide empirical support for the suggestion that greater levels of 
managerial ownership negatively impact corporate voluntary disclosures (e.g., Baek et al., 
2009; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003; Khan et 
al., 2013; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010). For example, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) report 
empirical evidence that managerial ownership, among other examined variables, has a 
significant negative relationship with Malaysian listed firms’ voluntary disclosure. Similarly, 
Baek et al. (2009) report empirical evidence that voluntary CG disclosure is linked negatively 
with managerial ownership for 374 US publicly traded firms. In the UK corporate context, 
Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) report empirical evidence that managerial ownership is 
associated negatively with voluntary CG disclosure behaviour among 130 non-financial listed 
companies during the period from 2003-2009. Similarly, Hassanein and Hussainey (2015) 
report empirical evidence that forward-looking financial disclosure is influenced negatively by 
managerial ownership for UK listed firms over the period 2005-2011. Accordingly, the next 
hypothesis proposed is: 
H7: There is a negative link among MANO and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.2.2 Institutional Ownership (ISTO) 
AT suggests that institutional owners play an important role in mitigating agency problems, 
because they tend to have a greater incentive to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of 
management and strengthen the CG structures of their firms (Barako et al., 2006; Dong & 
Ozkan, 2008). Hence,  managers are expected to disclose detailed information to attract 
institutional investors, who are powerful stakeholders, and satisfy their expectations (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010; Orij, 2010). Additionally, institutional investors, who tend to hold  relatively 
many shares, enjoy several advantages over individual shareholders, including skills, 
knowledge, expertise and financial advantages, and this allows them to exert more influence 
over a number of strategic decisions, such as appointing directors and determining the amount 
of disclosure (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). Therefore, the presence of 
institutional investors can improve firms’ CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
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Empirically, the findings of empirical literature largely indicate that voluntary CG 
disclosure is influenced significantly and positively by institutional ownership (e.g., Aggarwal 
et al., 2011; Barako et al., 2006; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b). For example, 
Barako et al. (2006) report empirical evidence that firm-level disclosure is significantly and 
positively influenced by institutional ownership for 43 firms listed on Nairobi Securities 
Exchange during the period from 1992-2001. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012b) report empirical 
evidence of a statistically positive link among institutional ownership and CG compliance and 
disclosure for South African listed companies. 
In the UK corporate context, Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012) report empirical evidence 
that CG quality is influenced significantly and positively by institutional ownership for 130 
non-financial listed firms. However, other studies provide empirical evidence of no significant 
relationship among CG disclosure behaviour and institutional ownership. Specifically, studies 
conducted by Cosh and Hughes (1997), Dong and Ozkan (2008), Filatotchev and Dotsenko 
(2015), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) and Wang and Hussainey (2013) suggest that institutional 
shareholder do not actively involved in enhancing CG practices. Nevertheless, much of the UK 
CG reforms (i.e., from 1992 Cadbury Report to 2014 Combined Code) is underpinned by an 
expectation that institutional shareholders will play an active role in improving CG practices, 
including improving CG compliance and disclosure, and thus, the next hypothesis proposed is: 
H8: There is a positive link among ISTO and CG compliance and disclosure. 
4.1.2.3 Block Ownership (BLKO) 
It is argued that firms with concentrated ownership are less likely to voluntarily engage in 
compliance with CG rules (Ismail & Sinnadurai, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a), because 
block holders act as owner-managers and have unrestricted access to information (Samaha et 
al., 2012). Therefore, firms with concentrated ownership tend to be associated with less 
information asymmetry, which can reduce agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Reverte, 
2009) and, in turn, the need for voluntary CG disclosure (Samaha et al., 2012). In essence, block 
ownership is considered a CG mechanism that replaces the need for voluntary CG disclosure 
(Bozec & Bozec, 2007). Additionally, LT suggests that firms owned by large shareholders have 
less of a need to demonstrate their accountability to the public (Ghazali, 2007; Samaha et al., 
2012), and that can impact negatively on CG disclosure. By contrast, it has been suggested 
agency problems in firms with dispersed ownership is relatively high than in firms with 
concentrated ownership (Reverte, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012). This can increase pressure on 
managers, in widely-held firms, to provide additional CG information so as to alleviate agency 
70 
 
conflicts. The theoretical prediction, therefore, is that corporations with concentrated ownership 
structures are potentially engage in low CG compliance and disclosure. 
Empirically, the existing studies offer evidence that firm-level CG disclosure is influenced 
negatively by ownership concentration (e.g., Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Chapple & Truong, 2015; 
Marston & Polei, 2004; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012). Barako et al. (2006), for 
instance, provide empirical evidence that block ownership, among other examined variables, is 
negatively associated with Kenyan listed firms’ voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Samaha et al. 
(2012) report empirical evidence that block ownership, among other examined variables, is 
negatively associated with Egyptian listed firms’  CG disclosure. Within the UK corporate 
context, the findings of Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) and Melis et 
al. (2015) indicate that firm-level CG disclosure is negativity linked with block ownership. 
Accordingly, the ninth hypothesis proposed is: 
H9: There is a negative link among BLKO and CG compliance and disclosure. 
The previous section outlined studies related to antecedents of voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure, referencing studies conducted in the UK corporate context. These determinants 
include board size, board independence, board diversity, existence of a separate CG committee, 
cross-listing, audit firm size, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and block 
ownership. The next section will outline studies examining CG’s influence of corporate 
performance/valuation. Previous studies examining this association adopt one of two models: 
the composite-CG-index model or the individual-CG-variable model. 
4.2 THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-PERFORMANCE NEXUS 
As explained in Chapter Three (Section 3.2), CG theories adopt the view that complying 
with good CG standards helps align management and stakeholder interest by encouraging 
managers to work towards stakeholders’ best interest. Prior empirical literature examining CG’s 
effect on corporate performance/valuation use either the composite-CG-index model (e.g., 
Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Bauer et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec et al., 2010; Chang 
et al., 2015; Connelly et al., 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Mouselli 
& Hussainey, 2014) or the individual-CG-variable model (e.g., Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Guest, 
2009b; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Low et al., 2015; Mangena et al., 2012; Reguera-Alvarado et 
al., 2016; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002). The composite-CG-index model helps 
examining CG’s influence, using a broad CG index, on corporate performance/valuation, whilst 
the individual-CG-variable model helps examine CG’s impact, using a set of individual CG 
variables, on corporate performance/valuation. Studies examining CG’s effect on corporate 
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performance/valuation are presented in the following paragraphs. In particular, Subsection 
4.2.1 reviews literature related to the composite-CG-index model, while Subsection 4.2.2 
reviews literature related to the individual-CG-variable model.  
4.2.1 Corporate Governance and Performance (Composite-CG-Index Model) 
AT indicates that compliance with good CG practices can help align agents’ interests with 
those of principals’ interests by encouraging managers to work towards shareholders’ best 
interest and wealth maximisation (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Similarly, 
from a legitimisation (LT) perspective, compliance with good CG standards can enhance 
corporate image and reputation by indicating to the market that the corporation is willing to 
protect shareholders’/stakeholders’ interests (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013a; Suchman, 1995). This compliance can enhance firm financial performance by 
encouraging stakeholders to provide the critical resources (RDT) to the firm (Freeman & Reed, 
1983; Ntim, 2015; Pfeffer, 1972). Therefore, the theoretical expectation is that firms with strong 
CG quality, in the form of complying with good CG rules, are anticipated to be highly profitable 
compared with their counterparts with poor CG quality. 
Most prior empirical studies are conducted in the US corporate context; these studies offer 
mixed results. For instance, Bauer et al. (2010), Brown and Caylor (2006), Cremers and Nair 
(2005), and Gompers et al. (2003) report empirical evidence that well-governed US companies 
are inclined to have better financial performance. Gompers et al. (2003) design a composite CG 
index, named the GIM-index, comprising 24 provisions related to shareholders’ rights and 
takeover defences. They report a positive association among their CG index, sales growth, firm 
profitability and valuation among 1,500 large US listed corporations. Similarly, Bauer et al. 
(2010) used a CG constructed index by Institutional Shareholder Services and report empirical 
evidence that corporate performance is significantly positively influenced by quality of CG 
practices among US real estate investment trusts. However, other studies conducted in the US 
provide different results. For example, Bebchuk et al. (2009), Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007) and Giroud and Mueller (2011) report that US firms with good CG practices tend to 
have poor financial performance and market valuation. By contrast, studies of Daines et al. 
(2010) and (Lehn et al., 2007) report an insignificant link among CG quality and US firms’ 
financial performance and valuation. 
Studies conducted on developed countries other than the US also report that firms with 
good CG practices tend to have better financial performance. For example, Drobetz et al. (2004) 
report empirical evidence that CG quality, using a composite CG index, impacts positively on 
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corporate financial performance among 91 German listed companies. Similarly, Bauer et al. 
(2008), Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008) report empirical evidence that corporate financial 
performance is statistically positively influenced by CG quality among listed firms in Japan, 
Switzerland and Australia, respectively. The positive findings lends support to previous CG 
studies conducted in developing and emerging economies (e.g., Balasubramanian et al., 2010; 
Black, 2001; Cheung et al., 2007; Connelly et al., 2012; Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Ntim, 2013b; 
Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Therefore, the findings of most prior studies imply that well-governed 
firms tend to have better financial performance. 
In the UK corporate context, Padgett and Shabbir (2005) find an inverse relationship 
between their non-compliance index (comprising 12 provisions based on the 1998 code) and 
financial performance for 487 UK listed firms over the period 2000-2003. Similarly, Clacher et 
al. (2008) and Farag et al. (2014) document that well-governed UK companies tend to have 
better financial performance. In contrast, Arcot and Bruno (2007) find no association between 
their CG quality index and the financial performance of 245 UK non-financial listed firms. 
However, prior UK empirical studies are limited in that they consider few CG provisions. For 
example, Padgett and Shabbir (2005) include only 12 CG provisions in their index, while 
Clacher et al. (2008) include only 22. Thus, this study aims to extend, as well as contribute to 
the extant literature by using a broader measure for CG quality, consisting of 120 CG provisions 
(UKCGI). In line with past studies with positive results, the tenth hypothesis is that: 
H10: There is a positive link among CG quality (UKCGI) and corporate 
performance/valuation, proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
To sum up, the previous subsection reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature related 
to examining CG’s influence, using the composite-CG-index model, on corporate 
performance/valuation. Overall, the literature suggests that firm performance/valuation is 
statistically significantly determined by the quality of CG practices. The following subsection 
reviews studies examining the relationship between individual CG variables and corporate 
performance. 
4.2.2 Corporate Governance and Performance (Individual-CG-Variable Model) 
This subsection reviews studies examining the extent to which firm-level CG quality, using 
the individual-CG-variable model, influences corporate performance/valuation. The current 
study investigates whether board characteristics influence corporate financial performance, 
because prior studies indicate that corporate boards significantly affect corporate 
performance/valuation (e.g., Guest, 2009b; Müller, 2014; Ntim, 2015). Six board characteristics 
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have been selected in the current study to examine this relationship. These are: frequency of 
board meetings (FMs), board gender and ethnic diversity (BD), board independence (IOE), 
separating CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT), board size (BSE) and the existence of 
board committees (PSC). These characteristics have been selected because they are suggested 
to have a significant influence on board effectiveness (e.g., Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; 
Nguyen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). Additionally, UK CG codes emphasise these characteristics. 
The following subsection provides a review of studies related to each variable; based on that, 
hypotheses are developed. 
4.2.2.1 Board Size (BSE) 
Theoretically, the extant literature on the link among firm valuation/performance and board 
size is inconclusive. Large boards are suggested to have a significant influence on corporate 
performance/valuation, because large boards are characterised by greater diversity in 
experience, skills and knowledge, which provide firms with necessary business networks, in 
addition to ensuring easy access to needed resources (Goodstein et al., 1994; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). Similarly, large boards are associated with more monitoring of 
management activities and thus fewer agency problems, because they tend to consist of a large 
number of people with different levels of expertise, and that can increase monitoring over 
managers’ decisions (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Large boards not only help reduce agency 
problems, but can also enhance corporate legitimacy by increasing the representation of outside 
stakeholders (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Pfeffer, 1972). However, there are other studies 
suggest that poor governance (e.g., more communication and co-ordination problems) 
associated with larger boards can diminish their monitoring effectiveness (Beasley, 1996; 
Yermack, 1996), which can negatively influence corporate performance (Vafeas, 1999a). 
A positive relationship has been supported by several past studies (e.g., Adams & Mehran, 
2005; García-Meca et al., 2015; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim, 2013a; 
Pandey et al., 2015). Kiel and Nicholson (2003), for example, report empirical evidence that 
Australian listed companies with large boards have better financial performance. Similarly, 
Nguyen et al. (2015) report empirical evidence that firms’ market valuation is statistically 
positively influenced by board size for Singaporean companies. In contrast to the positive 
findings observed in past studies, there are studies report a negative link among corporate 
performance/valuation and board size. Eisenberg et al. (1998), Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), 
Sanda et al. (2010) and Upadhyay et al. (2014), for example, report empirical evidence of a 
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negative link among board size and the financial performance of listed firms in Finland, Iran, 
Nigeria and the US, respectively. 
Within the UK corporate context, Conyon and Peck (1998b) report a negative relationship 
among board size and financial performance, measured by return on equity, for firms listed in 
five European countries, including the UK. Similarly, Dahya et al. (2008), Guest (2009b) and 
Lasfer (2004) report empirical evidence that UK companies with large boards are associated 
with poor financial performance. By contrast, Müller (2014) provides empirical evidence that 
board size impacts significantly and positively on the ROA for FTSE 100 UK listed firms. 
Additionally, UK CG codes indicate that the boards of listed firms should be sufficient in size 
in order to function effectively (e.g., FRC, 2008, 2010, 2012), which seems to suggest that 
board size may be seen as an important mechanism of CG. Accordingly, the eleventh hypothesis 
proposed is: 
 H11: There is a positive link among BSE and corporate valuation/performance, 
proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
4.2.2.2 Board Independence (IOE) 
The appointment of outside (unaffiliated) executives is considered an important 
mechanism that can improve corporate control by enhancing the monitoring of management 
(Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993). Outside executives are suggested to having indirect financial 
incentive to monitor and prevent opportunistic executives from expropriating corporate 
resources, so as to enhance their current and future labour market image/reputation (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983, p. 315). Similarly, outside executives can play an important role in enhancing 
board effectiveness by brining various resources to firms, in the form of business contacts, 
experience, knowledge and expertise (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). Similarly, from a legitimisation perspective (LT), the presence of independent outside 
directors can improve firms’ reputation by increasing stakeholder representation on boards 
(Deegan, 2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Peng, 2004). Therefore, board independence may 
positively affect firm financial performance by reducing agency conflict, enhancing corporate 
reputation and bringing resources to firms. By contrast, SWH indicates that the presence of 
independent outside executives may negatively impact corporate financial performance (Bozec, 
2005; Weir & Laing, 2000). Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), Bozec (2005) and Weir and 
Laing (2000) suggest that outside executives may have limited time to devote to their advising 
and monitoring roles, as they may serve on the boards of several companies, and that can 
negatively influence corporate performance. 
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Prior studies related to examining the extent to which board independence influences 
corporate performance provide inconsistent results. A number of empirical studies (e.g., Bertoni 
et al., 2014; Dharmadasa et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Leung et al., 2014; Li et al., 
2015; Liu et al., 2014; Upadhyay et al., 2014) report empirical evidence that corporate 
performance is positively influenced by board independence. El-Mehdi (2007), for instance, 
report empirical evidence that board independence is positively linked with Tunisian firms’ 
market valuation. Similarly, Li et al. (2015) report empirical evidence that performance is 
statistically positively influenced by board independence among Chinese listed companies 
during the period from 2003-2008. 
By contrast, other studies have reported a negative link among corporate performance and 
board independence (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bozec, 2005; Yermack, 1996). Yermack 
(1996) report empirical evidence that US firms’ market valuation is negatively influenced by 
board independence. Bozec (2005), also, documents that the performance of firms dominated 
by independent directors is low compared with firms with fewer independent directors on their 
boards. The negative findings suggest that outside executive have no power/incentive to 
monitor management because they tend to have less knowledge about the firms and operations 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Weir & Laing, 2000). 
In the UK, Weir et al. (2002) document a positive link among board independence and 
firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio). Similarly, Dahya et al. (2008) and Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) report empirical evidence that corporate performance is statistically positively 
influenced by board independence. However, Weir and Laing (2000) document a statistically 
negative link among board independence and corporate performance (ROA). Nevertheless, CG 
reforms pursued over the last 20 years in the UK, such as the 2010 UK Combined Code (Section 
B.1.2) recommend increasing the proportions of outside executives on corporate boards. This 
may suggest that UK governance codes consider the increase of independent outside directors 
to be a positive CG development, and hence, the twelfth hypothesis is: 
H12: There is a positive link among IOE and corporate valuation/performance, 
proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
4.2.2.3 Board Gender and Ethnic Diversity (BD) 
As discussed above, the current study focuses on gender and ethnic aspects of board 
diversity because: (i) they can easily be observed and measured (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et 
al., 2003; Ntim, 2015); and (ii) these two aspects of board diversity have been widely 
investigated in prior studies (Erhardt et al., 2003; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Liu et al., 2014; 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 2015; Peni, 2014; Schwab et al., 2016; Terjesen et al., 2015). 
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The extant theoretical literature on whether corporate boards should be diversified in order to 
perform effectively is inconclusive. On the one hand, it is suggest that board diversity may 
increase innovation through bringing diverse ideas, experience, knowledge and business 
contracts (Goodstein et al., 1994), which can improve decision-making (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 
2009; Ntim, 2015). Similarly, board diversity can improve boards’ ability to adequately monitor 
management activities and decrease misalignments by enhancing board independence (Jurkus 
et al., 2011; Walt & Ingley, 2003). Board diversity can also enhance corporate reputation and 
image by providing a better link with influential stakeholders (Carter et al., 2003; Estélyi & 
Nisar, 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Shrader et al., 1997). 
In contrast, board diversity may not necessarily lead to enhanced monitoring of 
management activities, because firms may appoint more women and ethnic minorities  for 
symbolic reasons, and these individuals may make little contribution to boardroom activity 
(Low et al., 2015, p. 5; Ntim, 2015, p. 173). Similarly, Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) suggest 
that the greater the board diversity, the greater the possibility for conflicts to occur between 
board members, which can constrain the board from conducting its duties effectively 
(Goodstein et al., 1994). 
Most prior empirical studies report that board diversity impacts positively on corporate 
performance/valuation (e.g., Erhardt et al., 2003; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Liu et al., 2014; 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Ntim, 2015; Peni, 2014; Perryman et al., 2016; Terjesen et al., 2015). 
Erhardt et al. (2003), for instance, report a positive association among board gender and ethnic 
diversity and the performance of 127 large US listed firms between 1993 and 1998. Similarly, 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013) investigates a sample of 99 Dutch listed companies throughout years 
2005-2007, and finds that gender-diverse boards may provide better monitoring over 
management and improve firms’ financial performance, proxied by return on equity. Ntim 
(2015) reports that board ethnic and gender diversity is significantly and positively associated 
with firms’ market valuation for 169 firms listed on Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Within the UK corporate context, there are relatively few studies examining whether board 
diversity influences its effectiveness in general and firm financial performance in particular. 
For example, Singh et al. (2008) examine whether there is a difference in the human capital of 
newly appointed directors in FTSE 100 UK listed firms. They find that new women directors 
tend to have good reputations, more board and career experience, and more education than male 
directors. This suggests that board diversity can bring diverse ideas, experience, knowledge and 
business contracts, which may enhance firm financial performance. Similarly, Arun et al. 
(2015) report that greater gender diversity can promote the implementation of restrained earning 
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management practices among FTSE 350 UK listed firms. However, Gregory‐Smith et al. 
(2014b) find no relationship between board gender diversity and financial performance for all 
FTSE 350 firms. Nevertheless, UK CG codes encourage the involvement of ethnic minorities 
and females in top management teams (Davies-Report (2011). Similarly, Section B.2 of the 
2010 Combined Code recommends that listed firms should pay close attention to diversity in 
order to improve the effectiveness of their boards. This seems to imply that board diversity may 
be considered as an influential CG mechanism. Accordingly, the thirteenth hypothesis proposed 
is: 
H13: There is a positive link among BD and corporate performance/valuation, 
proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
4.2.2.4 Existence of Board Committees (PSC) 
Splitting control from ownership can degrade trust among managers and owners, because 
managers are opportunistic and tend to focus on increasing their own benefits, and that can 
damage shareholders’ interests (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Klein (1998), Main 
and Johnston (1993) and Jiraporn et al. (2009) suggest that a major way to reduce agency 
problems is by establishing independent board committees that help, support and/or monitor 
management actions. Additionally, it is suggested that, setting up board committees may 
enhance board efficiency by allowing each committee to focus on specific areas of interest 
(Harrison, 1987; Weir et al., 2002). Vafeas (1999b) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) suggest 
that a nomination committee can enhance firm financial performance by improving the quality 
of appointed directors and increasing board independence. Similarly, Weir and Laing (2000) 
suggest that the existence of compensation committees may improve firm financial 
performance by increasing the monitoring of managerial pay and ensuring that executives are 
paid based on their performance. Additionally, the presence of board committees can provide 
the firms with necessary business networks (Harrison, 1987), which may impact positively on 
corporate financial performance.  
By contrary, the establishment of board committees can increase monitoring of 
management actions, which can constrain executives from conducting their roles effectively, 
and thus negatively impact firm performance (Conger et al., 1998). Additionally, setting up 
board committees can also result in duplicating boardroom responsibilities, which may increase 
agency costs (e.g., remuneration of board committees’ members), which negatively affecting 
firm financial performance (Vafeas, 1999a, 1999b). 
Prior studies empirically examining the extent to which board committees influence 
corporate financial performance offer mixed results. There are studies which lend support to 
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the view that board committees are associated with enhanced board efficiency and thus 
corporate performance. Wild (1994), for instance, reports that the establishment of audit 
committees positively influence share returns among 260 US listed firms for the years 1966-
1980. Similarly, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Vafeas 
(1999b) report empirical evidence that the establishment of board committees in the US 
enhances CG practices by increasing monitoring of management actions, which impacts 
positively on corporate financial performance.  
By contrast, other studies report that board committees do not influence firm financial 
performance. For example, Bozec (2005) reports  empirical evidence of no association among 
board committees and the performance of 25 Canadian listed companies. Similarly, Klein 
(1998) provides empirical evidence that US corporate performance is not significantly 
influenced by the existence of board committees. Christensen et al. (2015) document no 
significant link among the existence of audit committees and Australian firms’ market valuation 
(Q-ratio). Other studies report a negative link among the existence of board committees and 
corporate performance. Vafeas (1999a), for instance, reports a negative link among the 
existence of board committees and the financial performance of 307 US listed firms between 
1990 and 1994.  
Within the UK corporate context, Main and Johnston (1993) provide empirical evidence 
that the existence of compensation committees increases executive pay for large UK listed 
corporations in 1990;  this may impact negatively on firm financial performance. However, 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) report no association among 
the existence of board committees and corporate performance. UK CG codes recommend the 
establishment of board committees in order to allow boards to conduct their responsibilities 
effectively. Thus, the fourteenth hypothesis is proposed: 
H14: There is a positive link among PSC (nomination, audit and remuneration) 
and corporate performance/valuation, proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
4.2.2.5 Separating CEO and Chairperson Positions (DSPLIT) 
Combining CEO and chairperson positions may lead to increased agency problems by 
allowing managers to make decisions and follow strategies for their own interests (Jensen, 
1993). Combining these positions can also reduce board independence by undermining board’s 
monitoring over management activities (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
Weak monitoring of management activities may offer opportunities for managers/CEOs to 
exploit firms’ resources (Barako et al., 2006) by, for instance, paying themselves excessively 
(Fahlenbrach, 2009). Therefore, combining CEO and chairperson positions may allow 
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managers to follow strategies that increase their own benefits, and that can damage shareholder 
wealth.  
By contrast, separating CEO and chairperson positions can increase conflict between board 
members, increase the costs of communicating information to others, and slow down decision-
making, which may impact negatively on firm financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). From a RDT perspective, a dual leadership structure allow firms 
to access critical resources in the form of executive knowledge, experience and talent, because 
CEOs are suggested to have better business networks than the chairperson, which can impact 
positively on firm financial performance (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Weir 
et al., 2002). Additionally, CEO duality gives autonomy to charismatic managers to maximise 
their firms’ value and thus their own benefits (Beiner et al., 2006; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Prior studies empirically examining the extent to which CEO duality influences corporate 
financial performance offer mixed findings. First, past studies document a positive link among 
dual leadership and corporate performance (e.g., Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997; Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991; Elsayed, 2007; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). For example, Boyd (1995) uses 192 
US listed firms to examine the impact of CEO duality on returns on investment (ROI), and finds 
that firms combining CEO and chairperson positions have higher ROI than firms splitting these 
positions. Similarly, Donaldson and Davis (1991) report empirical evidence that dual leadership 
structure is associated positively with return on equity for 321 US over the period 1985-1987.  
Other studies find that CEO duality impacts negatively on the board’s monitoring role over 
management activities, thus lowering firms’ performance/valuation (e.g., Christensen et al., 
2015; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Dey et al., 2011; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Dey et al. (2011) 
document that profitability is statistically negatively linked with CEO duality for 760 US listed 
firms. Similarly, Christensen et al. (2015) report empirical evidence that ROA of Australian 
firms is statistically negatively influenced by CEO duality. 
In the UK corporate context, Dahya et al. (1996) examine the response of the stock market 
to the splitting of CEO and chairperson positions among 124 UK listed firms during the period 
from 1989-1992. They document a positive link among position splitting and corporate 
performance. They also find that firm financial performance improves significantly in years 
after splitting the positions, which suggests that the stock market reacts favourably to this 
decision. Similarly, (Carapeto et al., 2005) report empirical evidence that profitability, 
measured by abnormal returns, is positively linked with separating CEO and chairperson 
positions. In contrast, other studies provide empirical evidence of no association among a dual 
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leadership structure and corporate profitability (e.g., Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir & Laing, 
2000; Weir et al., 2002). UK CG codes recommend splitting chairperson and CEO positions in 
order to enhance board independence and accountability (Section A.2.1, CG Code of 2010), 
and thus, the fifteenth hypothesis proposed is: 
H15: There is a positive link among DSPLIT and corporate 
performance/valuation, proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
4.2.2.6 Frequency of Board meetings (FMs) 
The theoretical argument is inconclusive regarding whether board meetings impact 
corporate financial performance. It is suggested that boards of directors should meet regularly 
in order to conduct their responsibilities effectively (Conger et al., 1998; Vafeas, 1999a). 
Regular meetings can enhance managerial monitoring by allowing directors more time to 
evaluate the performance of management (Vafeas, 1999a). Sonnenfeld (2002) argues that 
frequent attendance at board meetings is considered an indicator of directors’ diligence. 
Therefore, frequent board meetings may enhance corporate performance. By contrary, SWH 
suggests that frequent board meetings might not necessarily enhance corporate performance, 
because directors are trustworthy people and they should be empowered rather than monitored 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Additionally, frequent board meetings may impact negatively on 
corporate profitability, because they can increase agency costs in the form of travelling and 
meeting costs (Vafeas, 1999a). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that frequent board meetings 
may reduce the time that non-executive directors spend effectively monitoring insider directors. 
Prior empirical studies examining the extent to which regular meetings of boards influences 
corporate performance report mixed results; a number of past CG studies (e.g., Chen & Chen, 
2012; Hu et al., 2010; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) suggest a positive link among corporate 
performance/valuation and the frequency of board meetings. Hu et al. (2010), for example, 
document that the profitability of 304 Chinese firms is statistically positively influenced by the 
frequency of board meetings. Similarly, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) document that the 
periodic meetings of corporate board improves the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
In contrast, some studies document a negative link among corporate performance/valuation 
and board meetings. Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. (2014), for instance, report a statistically 
negative link among board meetings and the performance (ROE) of 121 Spanish listed firms in 
2009, which is consistent with the findings of Vafeas (1999a). Similarly, Christensen et al. 
(2015) report empirical evidence that the profitability (ROA) of Australian firms is negatively 
influenced by board meetings. Within the UK corporate context, Hahn and Lasfer (2007) report 
a negative association among board meetings and CEO pay among 150 UK listed companies 
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during the period from 1998-2004. Additionally, the 2010 Combined Code (Section A.1.1) 
recommends that boards should have regular meetings in order to conduct their duties 
effectively. Accordingly, the sixteenth hypothesis is that: 
H16: There is a positive link among FMs and corporate performance/valuation, 
proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR. 
4.2.3 The Interaction Effect of Ownership Variables on the CG-Performance Nexus 
As discussed in Subsection 4.2.1, past studies report mixed findings relating to the 
association among CG quality, using composite indices, and firm financial performance, 
(Black, 2001; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Drobetz et al., 2004; Gompers et al., 2003). Whilst these 
mixed results are attributed to methodological weaknesses, such as not controlling for 
endogeneity and omitted variables problems (Black et al., 2006b; Brown & Caylor, 2006), 
recent studies which control for such problems also offer mixed results (Bauer et al., 2010; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Connelly et al., 2012; Daines et al., 
2010; Farag et al., 2014; Giroud & Mueller, 2011; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). It argued by literature 
that ownership structure is an important mechanism influencing the shape of CG systems, 
because it defines the nature of agency problems (Konijn et al., 2011; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that ownership structure determines the level of monitoring 
over managers, and the thereby the quality of CG practices. Therefore, given that ownership 
structure variables may impact firm financial performance; this study proposes that ownership 
structure variables may influence the CG-Performance relationship.  
Empirically, and to the best of researcher knowledge, existing literature have mainly 
examined the direct link among CG and corporate performance without investigating the 
interaction role of ownership variables on this relationship. Prior studies suggest that ownership 
structure variables can moderate the CG-Performance nexus. For instance, it is suggested that 
managerial and block ownership can substitutes for good CG practices (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). 
This implies that corporations with higher managerial and block ownership are not expected to 
voluntarily engage in compliance with CG rules, because managers/block-holders act as owner-
managers and have unrestricted access to information (Eng & Mak, 2003; Samaha et al., 2012). 
This can increase their power over internal governance structures and enable them to extract 
private benefits (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), which can 
negatively impact firm financial performance (Davies et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2010). Therefore, 
managerial and block ownership can negatively impact firm financial performance, by 
undermining monitoring of management activities.  
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Prior studies also suggest that institutional ownership can enhance compliance with good 
CG standards (Barako et al., 2006; Dong & Ozkan, 2008). This implies that corporations with 
higher institutional ownership are expected to engage in increased compliance with good CG 
practices, because institutional investors enjoy several advantages in the form of knowledge, 
expertise and financial advantages, which allow them to exert more pressure on managers to 
comply with CG practices (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). Therefore, increased 
institutional shareholder activism may encourage executives to enhance CG practices, which 
can positively impact corporate performance/valuation (Navissi & Naiker, 2006; Tsai & Gu, 
2007). Thus, the seventeenth hypothesis is as follows: 
 H17: Managerial and block (institutional) ownership negatively (positively) moderate the 
association between the UKCGI and corporate performance/valuation, proxied by Q-ratio, 
ROA and SR. 
The previous section presented a review of the literature related to CG’s influence on 
corporate performance/valuation. As explained above, prior studies have either used the 
composite-CG-index model or the individual-CG-variable model to examine this relationship. 
The next section reviews literature related to the association between CG mechanisms and 
executive pay. Similar to studies examining the extent to which CG structures influence 
corporate performance, prior studies examining whether firm-level CG quality influence 
executive pay use either the composite-CG-index model or the individual-CG-variable model. 
4.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE PAY 
As discussed in Chapter Three (Section 3.3), the managerial power hypothesis (MPH) 
suggests that executives can influence the structure and level of their pay packages, whilst 
optimal contracting theory (OCT) suggests that executives’ pay results from arm’s-length 
negations between executive directors and independent corporate boards, leading to designing 
incentive schemes that help align management and shareholder interests. Prior empirical studies 
examining the association between CG mechanisms and executive pay have mainly used the 
individual-CG-variable model (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Guest, 2009a; 
Ntim et al., 2015a; Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Reddy et al., 2015; Wang & Xiao, 2011); few have used 
the composite-CG-index model (e.g., Brown & Lee, 2010; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Jouber & 
Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015). The individual-CG-variable model helps to examine CG’s 
influence, using a set of individual CG mechanisms, on executive pay, while the composite-
CG-index model helps examine the association between CG quality, using a broad measure (the 
UKCGI, consisting of 120 CG provisions), and executive pay. The reviewed literature is 
discussed in the following two subsections. Specifically, Subsection 4.3.1 reviews literature 
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related to the composite-CG-index model, while Subsection 4.3.2 reviews literature related to 
the individual-CG-variable model. 
4.3.1 Corporate Governance and Executive Pay (Composite-CG-Index Model) 
Executive pay literature has mainly relied on two agency theoretical insights drawn from 
OCT and the MPH (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2002; Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Luo, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sur et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015). OCT 
suggests that in firms with strong CG structures, executive pay results from negotiations 
between strong and independent corporate boards and executive directors. This type of 
negotiation leads to create executive pay packages that are able to optimise executive 
performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). By contrast, the MPH 
suggests that in firms with weak governance mechanisms, executives may expropriate corporate 
resources by having the power to determine their own pay packages (Bebchuk et al., 2010; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Empirically, there are few prior studies examining whether firm-level CG quality, using a 
broad CG index, influences executive pay, giving the current study the opportunity to contribute 
to the existing research. However, as discussed above (Subsection 4.2.1), prior studies indicate 
that well-governed firms generate higher performance than their poorly-governed counterparts 
(e.g., Connelly et al., 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Ntim, 2013b; Tariq & Abbas, 
2013). Given this suggestion, the current study expects that firms with high CG scores tend to 
constrain excessive executive pay. This proposition is supported by the findings of prior studies 
examining the impact of quality CG indices on executive pay (e.g., Brown & Lee, 2010; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015). For example, Fahlenbrach 
(2009) examines CG’s effect, using quality index, on executive pay, and reports that firms with 
poor CG structures pay their CEOs more and have weaker pay-to-performance sensitivity in 
their remuneration contracts than their better-governed counterparts. Similarly, Newton (2015) 
reports a negative association between his CG quality index and executive pay for 10,186 US 
firm-years.  
In the UK corporate context, Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) report empirical evidence of a 
staistically negative association among their CG quality index and CEO pay for 300 listed firms 
in the UK, France, the US and Canada over the period 2004-2008. They also report that 
companies with poor CG structures have weaker pay-to-performance sensitivity than their 
better-governed counterparts. In contrast, Al-Najjar et al. (2016) document that firm-level CG 
quality impacts positively on the CEO pay for 130 listed companies throughout the period from 
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2003-2009. However, the main problem with the existing studies is that they use a small number 
of provisions in their CG indices. For example, Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) include only six 
CG provisions in their CG index. Newton (2015) uses only 16 provisions. This can constrain 
the generalisability of the findings. Thus, the study seeks to contribute, as well as extend 
previous work by employing the most comprehensive self-constructed CG index, containing 
120 CG provisions, to measure firm-level CG quality and examine its impact on executive pay 
among UK listed firms. Additionally, existing study concentrate only on CEO total pay (e.g., 
Boyd, 1994; Brick et al., 2006; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Conyon, 2014; Conyon & 
Murphy, 2000). Hence, the current study offers empirical evidence on whether firm-level CG 
quality impacts on the annual cash (i.e., salary, cash-bonus and other reported cash 
remuneration), and non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) pay 
of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. Therefore, and for the purpose of providing reliable and valid 
results, the current study offers an extensive analysis of the antecedents of the components of 
executive directors’ pay packages. Consistent with the recommendations of UK CG codes (e.g., 
the 1995 Cadbury Report, the 1995 Greenbury Report and the 2010 CG Code) that firms should 
avoid paying excessive remuneration to executive directors, this study predicts that in firms 
with better CG structures, executives will have less influence on their pay. Thus, the eighteenth 
hypothesis is proposed:  
H18: There is a negative association between CG quality, as measured by the UK 
Corporate Governance Index (UKCGI), and executive pay. 
To sum up, the previous subsection provided a review of studies examining the influence 
of firm-level CG quality, using broad indices, on executive pay. Overall, the literature indicates 
that companies with better governance structures tend to be better at constraining excessive 
executive pay. The following subsection reviews studies examining the relationship between 
individual CG variables and executive pay.  
4.3.2 Corporate Governance and Executive Pay (Individual-CG-Variable Model) 
This subsection reviews literature examining the association between individual CG 
variables and executive pay. The current study examines the relationship among remuneration 
committee characteristics, board mechanisms and executive pay. The current study focus on 
board and remuneration committee characteristics because prior studies suggest that corporate 
boards and remuneration committees can significantly impact executive pay (e.g., 
Kanapathipillai et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Ozkan, 2011; Persons, 2006). Five board 
characteristics and two remuneration committee mechanisms have been selected to examine 
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this relationship. These are: board independence, frequency of remuneration committee 
meeting, remuneration committee independence, board size, separating CEO and chairperson 
positions, board gender and ethnic diversity and CEO tenure. These characteristics are selected 
because they are suggested to significantly impact board and remuneration committee 
effectiveness (Arun et al., 2015; Daily et al., 1998; Ntim et al., 2015a; Ozkan, 2007). UK CG 
codes also consider them as important mechanisms of CG. The next subsections reviews the 
theoretical and empirical studies of the selected CG mechanisms, and based on that the 
hypotheses of the study are set. 
4.3.2.1 Frequency of Remuneration Committee Meetings (RCMs) 
The MPH suggests that frequent meetings of the board and its committees may not 
necessarily be beneficial to firms, because it can reduce the time non-executive directors spend 
effectively monitoring management (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Decreased monitoring may lead 
to increased agency costs (Vafeas, 1999a), by allowing managers to influence not just the level, 
but also the structure of their pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Wang & Xiao, 2011). Therefore, 
more frequent remuneration committee meetings may allow executives to pay themselves 
excessively. In contrast, OCT suggests that more frequent board/committees meetings can 
improve monitoring of management activities by allowing directors more time to evaluate the 
performance of management (Conger et al., 1998; Vafeas, 1999a). This may prevent powerful 
managers from controlling the board and thus influencing their pay. 
Existing empirical studies examining the impact of the frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings on executive pay are rare; this provides a valuable opportunity to 
contribute to the existing literature. Prior CG studies report empirical evidence that firm 
performance/valuation is positively affected by the frequency of executives’ meetings (e.g., 
Chen & Chen, 2012; Hu et al., 2010; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). Given that corporate 
performance/valuation is impacted significantly by the frequency of executives’ meetings, this 
study expects that more frequent meetings of the remuneration committee will lead to increased 
monitoring of management, thus reducing the influence of executives on their pay. This 
proposition is supported by existing findings (e.g., Knott, 2015; Persons, 2006). For example, 
using 227 US firm-year observations, Persons (2006) reports that the frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings negatively impacts executives’ cash pay. Similarly, Knott (2015) reports 
empirical evidence that the frequency of remuneration committee meetings impacts 
significantly and negatively on  CEO total pay for 312 US listed firms in 2013. A notable 
limitation of existing empirical studies is that they are conducted in the US and focus only on 
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CEO pay, which can constrain the generalisability of their findings. Thus, the study aims to 
contribute to the existing CG and executive pay studies by examining the influence of 
remuneration committee meetings on UK executives’ pay (i.e., CEO, CFO and AED). In line 
with the UK CG codes’ recommendations that corporate boards and committees should meet 
frequently enough to conduct their duties effectively (2010 Combined Code, Sections A.1.1 
and A.1.2), it is predicted that more frequent remuneration committee meetings will reduce the 
influence of executives on their pay, and thus the next hypothesis proposed is: 
H19: There is a negative link among the RCMs and executive pay. 
4.3.2.2 Remuneration Committee Independence (RCI) 
Consistent with existing literature that examines the association between remuneration 
committee independence and the pay packages of executives (e.g., Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; 
Conyon & He, 2004; Conyon & Peck, 1998a; Newman & Mozes, 1999), remuneration 
committee independence points out to the ratio of independent executives who sit on the 
remuneration committees (RC). Theoretically, the MPH suggests that outside directors may 
have no incentive to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of management, because CEOs may 
select external directors who support their decisions rather than monitoring them (Lambert et 
al., 1993, p. 441). Thus, the presence of outside members of a RC may not help in determining 
executive remuneration that is optimal to shareholders (Vafeas, 2003). By contrast, OCT 
suggests that outside directors have more incentive to set executive pay in a way that aligns 
management and shareholder interests, as doing so may improve their image as decision-makers 
(Anderson et al., 2000).  
Empirically, a number of prior studies report an insignificant and positive link among RCI 
and executive pay. Anderson and Bizjak (2003), for instance, find an insignificant and positive 
link among the ratio of outside executives on a remuneration committee and CEO pay for 1,376 
US firm-year observations. Similarly, Chalmers et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that 
remuneration committee independence has no association with CEO pay for 532 Australian 
firm-year observations. By contrast, other studies provide empirical evidence that executive 
pay packages are negatively associated with remuneration committee independence. Anderson 
et al. (2000), for instance, report that cash pay of CEOs is associated negatively with the 
existence of outside executives on a RC for 199 US firms. Similarly, Daily et al. (1998) report 
a negative link among the ratio of outside executives on a RC and CEO pay for 194 US listed 
firms. 
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In the UK corporate context, Conyon and Peck (1998a) provide empirical evidence that 
top management pay has insignificant (positive) association with the ratio of outside executives 
on a RC and for 94 listed firms for the years from 1991 to 1994. Similarly, Gregory‐Smith 
(2012) reports an insignificant association between remuneration committee independence and 
CEO pay for large FTSE 350 UK listed firms over the years 1996-2008. Despite the 
insignificant findings, UK CG codes recommend that a large proportion of RC members should 
be independent outside directors (e.g., 2010 Combined Code, Section A.2.1). This seems to 
suggest that remuneration committee independence may be considred a positive CG 
development. Thus, hypothesis twenty is proposed: 
H20: There is a negative link among RCI and executive pay. 
4.3.2.3 Board Size (BSE) 
The corporate board is considered an influential CG mechanism that helps in monitoring 
and setting remuneration for executives to ensure the alignment between the interests of 
management and shareholder (Guest, 2009a; Jensen, 1993). From an OCT point of view, larger 
boards are suggested to be more efficient in determining executive pay than smaller boards 
because the latter can easily be controlled by powerful executives (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; 
Van-Essen et al., 2015). Larger boards are suggested to be associated with more expertise and 
experience (Goodstein et al., 1994; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), which can prevent opportunistic 
executives from awarding themselves excessive remuneration, thereby allowing corporate 
boards to design incentive packages that help align management and shareholder interests 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2010). By contrast, from a MPH view (Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Yermack, 1996), large board are not effective in mentoring and controlling 
the opportunistic behaviours of management (rewarding themselves with overly generous pay 
packages), because they suffer from more communication and coordination problems that can 
diminish their monitoring effectiveness. As weak governance is associated with larger boards, 
it can be expected that larger boards can increase managers’ power and influence over their pay 
(Guest, 2009a). 
Empirically, there seems to be a lack of studies examining the link among board size and 
executive pay; this offers a good opportunity to contribute to previous CG and executive pay 
studies. A number of past CG and executive pay studies (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Reddy et al., 
2015; Schultz et al., 2013; Yermack, 1996) report empirical evidence that executive pay is 
positively influenced by board size. Schultz et al. (2013), for instance, report empirical evidence 
that total pay of CEOs is statistically positively influenced by board size for 8,594 Australian 
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firm-year observations. Similarly, Reddy et al. (2015) detect a positive link among board size 
and the total pay of CEOs for 390 New Zealand’s firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010. 
Other studies report that larger boards are negatively associated with executive pay (e.g., Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Ding et al., 2014; Firth et al., 2007; Menozzi et al., 2014; Ryan & Wiggins, 
2004). Firth et al. (2007), for instance, document that CEO cash pay is statistically positively 
influenced by board size for 549 Chinese listed companies during the period from 1998-2000. 
Similarly, Menozzi et al. (2014) report a statistically negative association among board size and 
total board pay among 106 Itanlian firms.  
Within the UK corporate context, Main (1991) reports a positive link among board size 
and top executive pay for 241 large UK listed companies in 1985. Additionally, and consistent 
with the findings of prior studies (Guest, 2009a; Ozkan, 2007), Ozkan (2011) reports that board 
size impacts positively on cash and total pay of CEOs in 390 non-financial listed companies 
during the period from 1999-2005. However, Al-Najjar et al. (2016) document a negative link 
among board size and CEO pay for 130 listed companies during the period from 2003-2009. 
From a regulatory and policy point of view, UK CG codes (e.g., Cadbury Report, Higgs Report, 
the 2010 Combined Code) suggest that boards must be of a sufficient size to guarantee effective 
operation; this implies that board size is an influential CG mechanism. Therefore, hypothesis 
twenty one is proposed: 
H21: There is a negative link among BSE and executive pay. 
4.3.2.4 Board Independence (IOE) 
The MPH suggests that independent outside directors have no incentive to monitor the 
opportunistic behaviour of management and ensure that shareholders’ wealth is protected, 
because CEOs tend to appoint outside directors to endorse their decisions rather than monitor 
them (Feng et al., 2007; Fernandes, 2008; Lambert et al., 1993). Therefore, the existence of 
outside directors may not be considered an effective way to monitor and prevent executives 
from influencing the level and structure of their pay. By contrast, from an OCT point of view 
(Byrd et al., 2010; Mehran, 1995), the presence of independent outside directors has an 
important influence on corporate board effectiveness, because they tend to have greater 
incentive to mentor and prevent the opportunistic behaviours of management (rewarding 
themselves with overly generous pay packages). Additionally, Fama and Jensen (1983) argues 
that independent executives, who often sit on several boards, have more incentive to monitor 
and prevent management from expropriating the wealth of shareholders to improve their current 
and future reputation in the labour market. 
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Empirically, the evidence relating to the influence of IOE on executive pay is generally 
inconclusive. A number of past studies (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2012; Byrd et al., 2010; Ding et 
al., 2014; Jian & Lee, 2015; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2010) report empirical evidence that 
executive pay is negatively influenced by board independence. Armstrong et al. (2012), for 
instance, report empirical evidence that CEO total pay is statistically negatively influenced by 
board independence among 2,110 US listed firms in 2006. Similarly, Jian and Lee (2015) report 
that board independence, defined as the ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives, impacts 
negatively on CEO total pay for 1,680 US listed firms between 1992 and 2011.  
Other studies find that board independence impacts positively on executive pay (e.g., Boyd, 
1994; Conyon & He, 2011; Van-Essen et al., 2015; Wade et al., 1990). Conyon and He (2011), 
for instance, document a statistically positive link among board independence and executive 
cash pay for 1,342 Chinese listed firms throughout the period 2001-2005. Similarly, Van-Essen 
et al. (2015) report empirical evidence that the pay packages of US CEOs are positively 
influenced by board independence. 
A third group of empirical literature indicates no significant association among board 
independence and executive pay (e.g., Mangel & Singh, 1993; Sapp, 2008; Theeravanich, 
2013). Mangel and Singh (1993), for instance, report evidence of no link among the ratio of 
outsiders and the cash pay of US CEOs. Similarly, Theeravanich (2013) provide empirical 
evidence that the total executive cash pay is not significantly influenced by the ratio of 
independent outside executives among 363 listed firms in Thailand over the years from 2002 to 
2008. 
In the UK corporate context, Main (1991) document a positive link among top executive 
pay and the number of outsiders for 241 large UK listed firms in 1985. Similarly, and in the 
line with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Al-Najjar et al., 2016; Franks et al., 2001; 
Johnston, 2007; Ozkan, 2007), Ozkan (2011) reports that the ratio of ouside executives is 
statistically positively linked with CEO cash and total pay in 390 non-financial UK listed firms 
from 1999 to 2005. Nevertheless, UK governance codes (e.g., the 2010 Combined Code, 
Section B.1.2) suggest that a great number of UK’s boards members should be outside 
(unaffiliated) executives, suggesting that increasing the percentage of independent directors is 
an important CG mechanism. Therefore, hypothesis twenty-two is that: 
H22: There is a negative link among IOE and executive pay. 
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4.3.2.5 Board Gender and Ethnic Diversity (BD) 
As explained in Subsections 4.1.1.3 and 4.2.2.3, this study focuses on gender and ethnic 
diversity because: (i) it can easily be observed and measured (Carter et al., 2010; Carter et al., 
2003; Ntim, 2015); and (ii) it is widely examined in prior studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2010; Gregory‐Smith et al., 2014b; Vieito, 2012). From a MPH view, board 
diversity can constrain board’s ability to effectively control the opportunistic managerial 
behaviour, by recruiting a small number of females and member of ethnic  minorities for 
symbolic reasons (Ntim, 2015). By contrast, from an OCT point of view (Barako & Brown, 
2008; Carter et al., 2003; Dowling & Aribi, 2013), diversity can enhance a board’s ability to 
control and prevent managers from expropriating the wealth of shareholders by increasing 
board independence from management through bringing diverse perspectives, skills, experience 
and ideas into the board. 
Existing empirical studies examining the extent to which board diversity influences 
executive pay are rare; this offers a good opportunity to contribute to the extant CG and 
executive pay studies. Prior empirical studies indicate that ethnic and gender representation on 
boards impacts positively on corporate performance (Carter et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2014; Ntim, 
2015; Peni, 2014; Terjesen et al., 2015). Given that the results of existing studies indicate that 
diverse boards improve performance; it is expected that diverse boards tend to constrain 
excessive executive pay. This proposition is supported empirically by the evidence provided by 
prior literature (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Graham et al., 2012; Peng et al., 2015). Adams 
and Ferreira (2009), for instance, document that gender representation on boards is associated 
with better monitoring over management and less CEO pay for 1,939 firms listed in the US. 
Similarly, Peng et al. (2015) document a negative link among board gender diversity and the 
cash pay of CEOs among Chinese listed firms. 
Within the UK corporate context, Gregory‐Smith et al. (2014b) document a negative link 
among gender representation on boards and executive pay for all FTSE 350 firms. From a 
regulatory and policy perspective, UK CG codes (e.g., the 2010 Combined Code, Section B.2) 
recommend that corporations pay close attention to the benefits of diversity on board 
effectiveness, and thus board diversity can be viewed as a positive CG aspect. Therefore, 
hypothesis twenty-three is proposed: 
H23: There is a negative link among BD and executive pay. 
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4.3.2.6 Separating CEO and Chairperson Positions (DSPLIT) 
According to the MPH, combining CEO and chairperson positions can make corporate 
board less effective in monitoring the CEO, which may increase the CEO’s power and influence 
over board strategic decisions, including those relating to the level and structure of executive 
pay (Boyd, 1994; Jensen, 1993). As poor governance is often associated with combining these 
two positions, it can be predicted that boards chaired by the CEO may pay excessive 
remuneration to their executives than boards chaired by independent non-executive directors. 
By contrast, from an OCT perspective (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002), separating CEO and chairperson positions can improve board effectiveness, 
including preventing powerful CEOs from expropriating the wealth of shareholders by 
increasing board independence, as well as by providing effective monitoring over management 
activities. Therefore, splitting CEO and chairperson positions can allow corporate boards to 
design incentive packages that may help align management and shareholder interests. 
The empirical evidence of prior studies is largely consistent with the view that combining 
CEO and chairperson positions impacts positively on executive pay (Abraham et al., 2016; 
Boyd, 1994; Brick et al., 2006; Core et al., 1999; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Wade et al., 
2006). Core et al. (1999), for example, find that CEO duality impacts positively on salary and 
total pay for CEOs among 205 US listed companies during the period from 1982-1984. 
Similarly, Brick et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that CEO duality impacts positively 
on total executive pay among US listed firms. 
In the UK corporate context, Conyon (1997) finds an insignificant association among CEO 
duality and top executives’ cash pay for 213 large UK listed companies throughout the period 
1988-1993. Conyon and Peck (1998a) provide empirical evidence of no significant association 
between CEO duality and top management team cash pay among 94 firms listed for the period 
1991-1994. Similarly, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) report an insignificant association among 
CEO duality and CEO total cash pay for UK listed firms. Nevertheless, from a regulatory and 
policy perspective, UK CG Codes (e.g., the 1992 Cadbury Report and the 2010 Combined 
Code) recommend separating CEO and chairperson positions in order to enhance board 
independence and effectiveness. This suggests that combining CEO and chairperson positions 
is considered as a negative CG aspect. Therefore, hypothesis twenty-four is proposed: 
 H24: Separating CEO and chairperson positions is negatively associated with executive 
pay. 
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4.3.2.7 CEO Tenure (CEOT) 
OCT suggests that long-tenured CEOs tend to have better knowledge about the 
opportunities and challenges facing their firms; this allows them to provide high-quality 
monitoring (Vafeas, 2003). Additionally, long-tenured CEOs are suggested to be more critical 
towards proposals provided by management, including executive pay packages, compared with 
newly appointed directors (Bebchuk et al., 2002). By contrast, the MPH suggests that long-
tenured CEOs are more likely to form friendships with other board members over time, and as 
a result board members have less motivation to reject proposals provided by CEOs (Byrd et al., 
2010; Vafeas, 2003; Wong et al., 2015). This can increase the power and influence of CEOs 
over executive pay, as well as leading to excessive executive pay, at the expense of 
shareholders. 
Existing empirical literature largely suggests that CEO tenure impacts positively on 
executive pay (e.g., Basu et al., 2007; Bebchuk et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2015a; Sur et al., 2015). Conyon and He (2012), for instance, report empirical evidence of a 
statistically positive association among CEOs tenure and their total pay for 2,024 Chinese listed 
firms. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2015) report empirical evidence that CEO tenure is statistically 
positively linked with CEO total pay for 169 corporations listed in South Africa. Sur et al. 
(2015) find that CEO tenure impacts positively on CEO pay for 1,408 US listed firms between 
1997 and 2006. Other studies report no association between CEO tenure and executive pay. For 
example, Lin et al. (2013) find that CEO tenure has no significant association with both cash 
and total pay of CEOs among 903 US listed firms between 2007 and 2010. Similarly, Nourayi 
et al. (2008) report that CEO tenure does not impact CEO pay for 1,446 US listed firms for 
years 2001 and 2002. Ryan and Wiggins (2001) examine the impact of firm and manager 
characteristics on executive pay structure for 1,095 US listed firms in 1997. They report no 
relationship between CEO tenure and CEOs’ cash and restricted stock remuneration.  
Within the UK corporate context, a number of prior studies suggest that CEO tenure 
impacts positively on executive pay (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Conyon et al., 2009; Ozkan, 
2011; Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). Ozkan (2011), for example, examines the association among 
CEO pay and performance for 390 non-financial UK listed firms between 1999 and 2005. 
Ozkan reports that CEO tenure impacts positively on CEOs’ cash and total pay. Similarly, 
Renneboog and Zhao (2011) report empirical evidence of a statistically positive link among  
CEO tenure and CEO total pay for UK listed firms during the period 1996-2007. From a 
regulatory perspective, UK CG Codes recommend that executives should not serve on corporate 
boards more than nine years from the date of first elections (2010 Combined Code, Section 
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B.1.1). This seems to suggest that CEO tenure is considered to negatively affect CG practices. 
Therefore, hypothesis twenty-five is proposed: 
H25: There is a positive link among CEOT and executive pay. 
4.3.3 The Interaction Effect of Ownership Variables on the CG-EP Nexus 
As discussed in Subsection 4.3.1, there are few studies examined whether CG quality, using 
broad CG indices, impacts executive pay (e.g., Brown & Lee, 2010; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Jouber 
& Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015). These few studies are impaired in that they do not 
sufficiently consider possible endogeneity concerns that may result from simultaneously 
employing both the alignment (ownership) and monitoring (CG) mechanisms by corporations 
to resolve agency problems (Chen et al., 2015; Croci et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2015a; Reddy et 
al., 2015). As alignment (ownership) and monitoring (CG) mechanisms might be used together 
in order to reduce agency problems, these mechanisms should be interrelated to be effective in 
practice (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2015a). One way to consider such possible 
simultaneities is by creating an interaction variable between alignment mechanisms 
(ownership), monitoring mechanisms (CG) and executive pay. For example, greater monitoring 
over management activities, often associated with the presence of institutional investors, can 
prevent managers from expropriating the wealth of shareholders even if internal CG practices 
are weak (Jafarinejad et al., 2015; Reddy et al., 2015). This is because institutional shareholders 
tend to own relatively large equity stakes compared with individual shareholders, and therefore 
are inherently more motivated to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of managers than 
individual counterparts (Jafarinejad et al., 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Thus, greater 
activism by institutional shareholders can prevent managers from paying themselves 
excessively (Ning et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Van-Essen et al., 2015). 
Prior studies also suggest that higher levels of managerial and block ownership can increase 
managers/block-holders’ power/influence over decisions made by the board, because managers 
and block owners act as legal owners of their firms (Johnson et al., 2000; Morck et al., 1988). 
Acting as owner-managers can reduce the monitoring role of corporate boards and allow 
managers and block owners to collaborate to reap personal benefits at minority shareholders’ 
expense. This can increase the power/influence of executives over their pay (Conyon & He, 
2012; Cyert et al., 2002; Lee & Isa, 2015; Wang & Xiao, 2011). Therefore, higher managerial 
and block ownership can increase executive pay, by undermining monitoring on management 
activities.  
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Based on the above arguments, institutional ownership negatively moderates the 
association between CG and executive pay, whereas managerial and block ownership positively 
moderate the association between CG and executive pay. Therefore, hypothesis twenty-six is 
as follows: 
 H26: Managerial and block (institutional) ownership positively (negatively) 
moderate the association between the UKCGI and executive pay. 
4.4 REFLECTIONS ON THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The review of extant empirical literature reveals that existing studies on CG compliance 
and disclosure, corporate performance and executive pay suffer from several weaknesses. First, 
and in terms of CG compliance and disclosure, there are few studies examined CG compliance 
and disclosure in the UK context (e.g., Arcot et al., 2010; Conyon, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 
1997; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Pass, 2006; Shrives & Brennan, 
2015). These few studies have many weaknesses, such as focusing on a small number of 
provisions (Arcot et al., 2010; Pass, 2006), employing subjective analysts’ rankings (Hussainey 
and Al‐Najjar, 2012) and employing survey to examine CG disclosure behaviour (Conyon, 
1994; Conyon & Mallin, 1997). Therefore, this study extends as well as contributes to the extant 
research by employing the most comprehensive self-constructed CG index, comprising 120 CG 
provisions, as a measure for firm-level CG compliance and disclosure among UK listed firms. 
Additionally, studies examined the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure have mainly 
focused on general firm features (Cooke, 1992; Waweru, 2014). Therefore, this study extends 
and contributes to CG research by examining the impact of nine mechanisms (including board 
gender and ethnic diversity and the existence of a separate CG committee) on CG compliance 
and disclosure. 
Second, the review of the empirical studies examined the link between firm-level CG and 
corporate performance shows that existing studies have provided mixed results because they 
have either used the composite-CG-index model (e.g., Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Bauer et al., 
2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2015; Connelly et al., 2012; Gompers 
et al., 2003; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Mouselli & Hussainey, 2014) or the individual-CG-
variable model (e.g., Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Guest, 2009b; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Low et 
al., 2015; Mangena et al., 2012; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2016; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; 
Weir et al., 2002). Hence, this study uses both models, which allows investigating the 
differences between the two approaches and their implications for future studies. Additionally, 
this study is different from prior UK studies that include a small number of provisions in their 
CG indices when examining the relationship among firm-level CG quality and corporate 
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performance/valuation (Arcot & Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al., 2008; Farag et al., 2014; Padgett 
& Shabbir, 2005), this study uses a broader proxy for CG quality, consisting of 120 CG 
provisions. Similarly, the current study extends, as well as contributes to the extant literature 
by examining the moderating effect of ownership structure variables on the UKCGI-
Performance nexus. 
Finally, extant studies examined the link among CG and executive pay have mainly focused 
on CEO pay despite increasing suggestions that the pay packages of other executives (e.g., 
CFO) are becoming equally important (Ntim et al., 2015a). Hence, this study extends as well 
as contributes to CG research by examining the impact of firm-level CG quality on cash, non-
cash and total pay of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. Additionally, studies examining the relationship 
among firm-level CG quality and executive pay are rare (e.g., Brown & Lee, 2010; Fahlenbrach, 
2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015). The current study offers empirical evidence 
on the extent to which seven corporate board variables, in addition to a broad quality CG index, 
can explain differences in executive pay. This helps in filling a gap in CG research by providing 
evidence on the impact of remuneration committee independence, frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings and board gender and ethnic diversity on executive pay (which has not 
been widely investigated in the existing literature). The study also considers board size, board 
independence, splitting CEO and chairperson positions, and CEO tenure. Similarly, extant 
empirical studies have mainly examined the direct effect of CG on executive pay without 
considering the interaction role of ownership variables on this relationship. Thus, this study 
extends, as well as contributes to the existing studies by examining the moderating effect of 
ownership variables on the UKCGI-Executive Pay nexus. 
The next chapter outlines how the data was collected and how the study sample was 
selected. It also discusses the research methodology and the extent to which the obtained results 
are sensitive or robust to alternative estimations methods that sufficiently control for various 
types of CG, performance, executive pay and endogeneity problems. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH DESIGN 
5. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
Chapters Three and Four outlined central theoretical arguments and the extant empirical 
studies relevant to the selected variables respectively; this chapter discusses issues relating to 
the research design by describing sampling, data sources and the measurements of selected 
variables. In particular, Section 5.1 outlines the study’s philosophical approach. The selected 
sample and selection criteria are discussed in Section 5.2. A discussion about the research 
methodology and models developed to examine the relationships of interest is provided in 
Section 5.3. The final section (5.4) summarises the main issues covered in this chapter. 
5.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Determining and explaining the rationale for the selected research philosophy, is 
considered as an important step in conducting any social science research (Saunders et al., 
2012). The research philosophy points out to the assumptions of the research; this includes how 
research is carried out, what data need to be gathered and how results can be explained and 
analysed. There are mainly two research philosophy paradigms, which are positivism and 
interpretivism (Bernard, 2013; Bryman, 2012). The positivism approach suggests that reality is 
objective and independent from researchers, as observers are actually not part of the research 
they are performing. Positivist studies look for “regularities and causal relationships in data 
to create law-like generalisations like those produced by scientists” (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 
134). The positivist approach includes studying literature to determine relevant theory/theories, 
and using the selected theory/theories to develop hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested 
and either confirmed or rejected in order to advance the selected theory/theories (Bryman, 2012; 
Saunders et al., 2012). By contrary, interpretivism assumes that observers should not be 
independent from what is being observed. This philosophy suggests that in order to gain a better 
understanding of a social situation, researchers need to interact with what is being researched 
(Bryman, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012). 
This study adopts the positivism paradigm. This approach is appropriate because this study 
relies mainly on firms’ annual reports to examine CG practices in the UK; this may allow the 
observers to remain independent from the phenomena being examined. According to Saunders 
et al. (2012), positivism is more desirable and beneficial if the nature of the problem requires 
identifying and understanding factors influencing an outcome. Therefore, this study adopts 
positivism as it aims to examine: (i) voluntary CG compliance and disclosure; and (ii) the 
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impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance and executive pay, among firms 
listed on LSE. 
Regarding the methodological method adopted in this study, Clarke (1998) suggests that 
three methods are mainly used in CG research, which are quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
methods. For a number of reasons, this research uses quantitative data to answer the research 
questions. First, the quantitative method dominates CG research (Cai & Tylecote, 2008; 
McNulty et al., 2013). For example, studies examining the antecedents of CG compliance and 
disclosure practices (e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Hussainey 
& Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ntim et al., 2012b), the 
impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation (e.g., Connelly et al., 2012; 
Leung et al., 2014; Müller, 2014; Ntim, 2015; Pandey et al., 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015) and 
the impact of firm-level CG quality on executive pay (e.g., Menozzi et al., 2014; Newton, 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2015a; Reddy et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015; Wang & Xiao, 2011) rely mainly 
on quantitative data. 
Second, the research questions can also help determine the appropriate research method. 
As explained in the first chapter, the current study aims to empirically examine whether 
complying with the recommendations of the 2010 Combined Code has enhanced CG practices, 
and if so whether that has impacted firm financial performance and executive pay among UK 
listed corporations. This main question is broken down into a set of related sub-questions (i.e., 
eight sub-questions). The literature review shows that quantitative data is excessively used by 
prior studies to answer the research main questions. In order to answer these sub-questions and 
ensure that study’s results are reliable and valid (Collis & Hussey, 2014), statistical analysis 
techniques are used in this study. 
Finally, qualitative and mixed methods cannot be used in this study due to the difficulty of 
objectively collecting data about the effectiveness of CG structures and the influence of firm-
level CG quality on corporate performance and executive pay. Therefore, given that the most 
appropriate research method for positivist researchers is data-based surveys (Collis & Hussey, 
2014; Saunders et al., 2012), this study relies mainly on quantitative data to answer the current 
study’s questions.  
Another methodological challenge is the selection of a research approach. Saunders et al. 
(2012) suggest that researchers use either the deductive or inductive research approach. The 
first research approach is applied when a theory or set of theories are used first to form 
hypotheses, and then data are collected and analysed. The inductive approach works towards 
generating new theories by analysing the data. Therefore, the deductive approach aims to 
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validate already-existing theories, whilst the inductive approach leads to the generation of new 
theories. This study adopts a deductive approach, because positivist studies often adopt a 
deductive research approach (Collis & Hussey, 2014; Saunders et al., 2012). The current study 
relies on existing literature to develop its research hypotheses. Previous literature provides a 
strong background for the topics examined here, and allows this study to develop hypotheses 
and test existing theories.   
To sum up, this study adopts a positivist paradigm because it relies mainly on firms’ annual 
reports to examine CG practices in the UK, which may allow the observer to remain 
independent from the phenomena being examined. Accordingly, the deductive research 
approach is selected because hypotheses were developed first using previous studies, and data 
were gathered and analysed later so as to confirm or reject hypotheses. As a result, and to 
examine the research hypotheses, the quantitative research approach is employed in this study 
by relying on secondary data covering six years (balanced panel data).  
5.2 SAMPLING METHOD AND DATA SOURCES  
This section outlines how the data was collected and how the study sample was selected. 
In particular, Subsection 5.2.1 describes the procedure followed to select the sample. Subsection 
5.2.2 describes data sources and discusses the criteria used to select the final sample. Finally, 
Subsection 5.2.3 discusses the reasons for selecting the final sample.  
5.2.1 Sample Selection Procedure  
The sample used to examine the association among CG mechanisms, CG compliance and 
disclosure behaviour, corporate performance and executive pay was mainly selected from 
corporations listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). AIM-listed3 corporations excluded 
as they have different CG, financial reporting and listing requirements (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 
2012; Stringham & Chen, 2012). Panel A of Table 2 shows 1,297 companies listed on LSE main 
market at 31 Dec 2013, classified into ten industry groups,4 including oil & gas (OG), basic-
materials (BM), financial (FINS) utilities (UTIS), telecommunications (COMUN), consumer-
goods (CGODS), healthcare (HCARE), industrials (INDUSTR) , technology (TECH) and 
consumer-services (CSER). Panel A of Table 2 also suggests that financial industries 
predominate the market, as they account for about 52% of the entire population of listed firms. 
Other firms operating in basic material, consumer goods/services and industrials account for 
                                               
3Refers to Alternative Investment Market (AIM) corporations. 
4The listed firms are classified by relying on the LSE industrial classification, according to the nature of the activities and operations of the 
listed firms. 
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about 35% of the entire population of listed firms. The remaining 13% consists of oil & gas, 
technology, utilities, healthcare and telecommunications corporations. 
Both the financials (668 firms) and utilities (17 firms) industries, which together account 
for approximately 53% of the total listed corporations, are excluded in this study for the 
following reasons. First, financial and utility corporations tend to have unique industry 
regulations, and that may impact on CG structure, financial performance and executive pay 
differently (Chizema et al., 2015, p. 869; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015, p. 6; Guest, 2009a, p. 1083; 
Ntim, 2013b, p. 378). Banks, for example, are governed by the Banking Act 1979, and now by 
the Banking Act 2009,5 in addition to the Walker Report of 2009. 
Second, financial and utility companies were eliminated since they tend to have unique 
capital structure (Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 1424), which can impact on CG voluntary 
compliance and disclosure (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012, p. 369), firm financial performance 
(Guest, 2009b, p. 389) and executive pay (Bugeja et al., 2015, p. 13) differently. Finally, 
eliminating financial and utility firms can facilitate comparisons with the results of prior studies 
related to CG voluntary compliance and disclosure (e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar et 
al., 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015), firm financial performance (e.g., Dharmadasa et al., 
2014; Jermias & Gani, 2014; Leung et al., 2014; Ntim, 2015) and executive pay (Baixauli-Soler 
& Sanchez-Marin, 2015; Brandes et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2015; Chizema et al., 2015), which 
also eliminate such firms. The classification of the remaining 612 non-financial firms were 
divided into five main industries: basic material and oil & gas (BM & OG), consumer goods 
(CGODS), consumer services and health care (CSER & HCARE), industrial (INDUSTR), and 
technology and communication (TECH & COMUN). Panel C shows the final balanced sample 
of 100 firms from 2008 to 2013. 
                                               
5This link provides further details about 2009 Banking Act: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/contents. 
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Table 2: Procedures Used in Selecting the Study’s Sample 
  
Panel A: Classification of companies by industry as at 
31/12/2013 
  No. of 
Companies 
% 
Basic-materials (BM)  72 5.6 
Consumer-goods (CGODS)  76 5.8 
Consumer-services (CSER)  131 10.1 
Financials (FINS)  668 51.5 
Utilities (UTIS)  17 1.3 
Technology (TECH)  44 3.4 
Industrials (INSUSTR)  179 13.8 
Healthcare (HCARE)  28 2.2 
Telecommunications (COMUN)  26 2 
Oil & gas (OG)  56 4.3 
Total firms   1297 100.0 
          Less: Financials, and 
                   Utilities 
668 
17 
 
 
 
 
               Total excluded companies   685 52.8 
Total sampled companies  612 47.2 
Panel B:  Non-financial Companies as of 31/12/2013   No. of 
Companies 
% 
BM  72 11.8 
CGODS  76 12.4 
CSER  131 21.4 
TECH  44 7.2 
INDUSTR  179 29.2 
HCARE  28 4.6 
COMUN  26 4.2 
OG  56 9.2 
Total non-financial companies  612 100.0 
Less: companies with missing annual reports 66   
          Companies listed recently (2008-2013) 125   
          Companies with missing data 128   
Total excluded companies  319 52.1 
Total non-financial companies with all data  293 47.9 
Panel C: Distribution of non-financial companies 
with full data 
   No. of 
companies 
% 
BM  27 9.2 
CGODS  36 12.3 
CSER  68 23.2 
TECH  22 7.5 
INDUSTR  102 34.8 
HCARE  15 5.1 
COMUN  5 1.7 
OG  18 6.2 
Total sampled companies with all data  293 100.0 
Panel D: The final 100 sampled firms No. of 
companies 
No. of final 
sample 
Percentage of 
final sample 
BM & OG 45 20 40.0 
CGODS 36 20 50.0 
CSER & HCARE 83 20 24.1 
INDUSTR 102 20 19.6 
TECH & COMUN 27 20 74.0 
 293 100 34.13 
Source: London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
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The next subsection addresses the data sources utilised in the current study and the criteria 
for selecting the final sample, while Subsection 5.2.3 discusses the reasons for selecting the 
final sample. 
5.2.2 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
To examine the association among CG mechanisms, CG voluntary compliance and 
disclosure, firm financial performance and executive pay in UK listed firms, this study uses the 
following types of data: (i) CG variables; (ii) corporate performance/valuation variables; and 
(iii) executive pay variables. All CG and executive pay data were gathered manually using 
annual reports/accounts of the examined corporations. Those reports were acquired from each 
company’s websites and Perfect Information database. Distinct from most past studies which 
mainly focus on CEO pay (Bugeja et al., 2015; Chizema et al., 2015; Guest, 2009a; Ozkan, 
2007, 2011; Reddy et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015), in the current study data about cash, 
non-cash and total pay for CEOs, CFOs and all other executives were collected. DataStream 
was used to collect the financial and market in addition to the financial reports of the sampled 
firms. 
Four criteria were set to select the final sample: (i) the annual reports of the listed 
corporations need to be available/accessible for the years from 2008 to 2013; (ii) a firm’s 
financial and CG data must be available for all years from 2008 to 2013; (iii) executive pay data 
must be available for all years from 2008 to 2013; and (iv) listing on the LSE must be 
continuous over all six years from 2008 to 2013. A number of reasons encouraged the use of 
these specifications. First, they satisfied the requirement of a balanced panel analysis (Balafas 
& Florackis, 2014; Ntim, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a). Combining time-series and cross-section 
data helps in: (i) ascertaining whether any cross-sectional relationship among CG mechanisms, 
CG voluntary compliance and disclosure, firm financial performance and executive pay holds 
over time (Gujarati, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012b); (ii) providing more informative data, more 
efficiency and reducing collinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003); and (iii) controlling for any 
potential endogeneity problem that may emerge from unobserved heterogeneities over time 
(Guest, 2009b; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). 
Second, this study limits its sample to firms with consecutive-years data available, because 
CG and executive pay data were manually collected, which is a highly labour intensive activity 
(Beattie et al., 2004, p. 232; Hussainey et al., 2003, p. 276; Ntim et al., 2013, p. 369). Third, 
combining time-series and cross-section data may allow making direct comparisons with 
previous work on the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; 
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Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012), CG’s influence on corporate performance (Mangena et al., 
2012; Müller, 2014; Ntim, 2015), and the link between CG mechanisms and executive pay 
(Bugeja et al., 2015; Guest, 2009a; Ntim et al., 2015a). Fourth, the sample begins in 2008, 
because the 2007/08 global crisis has increased the discussion surrounding the efficiency of CG 
and disclosure practices, and the role of CG in enhancing firm financial performance and 
preventing executives from expropriating the wealth of shareholders. Finally, the sampling 
period ends in 2013 because reports/accounts of the examined companies were available until 
2013 when data collection started. 
As revealed in Table 2 (Panel B), the total number of sampled companies with full data is 
293 firms (47.9%), for the remaining eight industries. Of the excluded 319 firms, 128 have 
missing financial performance and executive pay data in some years, and 125 were listed on 
the LSE after 2008. The remaining 66 companies were excluded because they have missing 
annual reports, which could not be found in Perfect Information or the company websites. The 
total number of firms with full data is 293; this is still comparatively larger than samples used 
in prior UK studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Arcot & Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al., 2008; 
Conyon, 1997; Conyon et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2008; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Müller, 
2014). Clacher et al. (2008), for instance, relied on 63 listed companies during the period from 
2003-2005 to examine whether corporate performance/valuation is influenced by CG 
structures. Similarly, Conyon et al. (2001) include only 100 large firms listed in 1998 in their 
sample to examine the influence of CG structures on top executive pay. Hussainey and Al‐
Najjar (2012) investigate whether CG and firm mechanisms impact on CG quality for 130 firms. 
Müller (2014) focuses on FTSE 100 UK listed firms to examine whether corporate performance 
is influenced by board composition and structure.  
As presented in Table 2 (Panel C), the industrials and consumer services sectors are the 
largest, with 170 firms (58.0%) out of 293, whereas healthcare, oil and gas and 
telecommunications together account for about 13% of the 293 sampled firms. Due to the small 
number of observations, these latter three industries were added to the closest remaining five 
major industries, and this helps in avoiding effects from different size of these industries 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013, p. 325). As a result, the observations from these three industries were 
added to basic-material, consumer-goods, consumer-services, and technology industries. 
Specifically, oil & gas firms were merged with basic materials firms, telecommunications firms 
were merged with technology firms, while healthcare firms were merged with consumer 
services firms.  
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Panel D reports the breakdown of five industries after adding telecommunications, health 
care, and oil & gas firms to the closest remaining five major industries. Panel D also contains 
the breakdown of the final 100 stratified sampled corporations. The final 100 stratified 
corporations of the five industries form about 34% of the 293 corporations with available data. 
Finally, the final stratified sampled firms, consisting of 20 companies from each of the 
remaining five industries, were selected using their market capitalisation. Specifically, market 
capitalisation,6 as a proxy of corporate’s size, is employed to rank all the listed firms in each 
industry. The largest ten ranked firms and the smallest ten ranked firms from each of the 
remaining five industries are then selected, resulting in 20 firms from each industry. The 
motivations for selecting only 100 stratified firms are discussed below7.    
5.2.3 The Motivations for Selecting the Final Sample 
There are several reasons underlying the selection of the 100 corporations using both their 
size and industry type. Well-established theoretical and empirical accounting literature suggests 
that disclosure practices can be influenced by firm size and industry type (Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Beattie et al., 2004; Hassan & Marston, 2010; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2012b). Prior accounting disclosure literature suggests that firms’ disclosure behaviour is 
positively influenced by firms’ size (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 230; Botosan, 1997, p. 336), and 
this can be explained by the following factors. First, larger firms tend to have complex 
operations and activities, which can encourage them to disclose more information (Cooke, 
1989, p. 178). Second, agency problems tend to be higher in larger firms than in smaller 
counterparts, because they have more complex capital structure (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987, 
p. 539). This implies that larger firms need to enhance their disclosure practices so as to mitigate 
information asymmetry and agency problems. 
Third, larger firms tend to be cross-listed (Marston & Shrives, 1991, p. 206), and they tend 
to adhere to additional requirements of foreign stock exchanges, such as accounting and CG 
disclosure requirements (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002, p. 330; Ntim et al., 2012b, p. 127). This 
implies that larger corporations are encouraged to provide additional information on CG 
compliance and disclosure so as to satisfy international investors’ expectations (Botosan, 1997; 
Klapper & Love, 2004). Finally, prior literature suggests that larger firms can more easily afford 
the costs involved in complying with good CG practices than smaller counterparts (Cooke, 
1989, p. 179; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, p. 251).  
                                               
6Market capitalisation is considered as a relevant and objective measure of firm size (Grullon et al., 2015, p. 1741; Porta et al., 2002, p. 
1154). 
7See Appendix 1 for a full list of the 100 stratified firms. 
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Unlike prior UK studies, which mostly focus on one size (e.g., Clacher et al., 2008; 
Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Müller, 2014; Ozkan, 2007; Padgett 
& Shabbir, 2005), the current study aims to achieve a balance between large and small firms by 
selecting the largest ten and the smallest ten ranked firms from each industry based on market 
capitalisation. This may enhance the generalisability of study’s findings by achieving adequate 
variation in the levels of CG disclosure.  
With respect to the link between industry type and firms’ disclosure practices, prior 
accounting and CG disclosure literature suggests that different industries may have different 
CG disclosure practices (Botosan, 1997, p. 327; Cooke, 1992, p. 232; Raffournier, 1995, p. 
268). Botosan (1997), for example, suggests that the level of disclosure about research and 
development activities is higher in pharmaceutical firms compared with firms in other 
industries. Cooke (1992) examines the association among listing status, company size, 
industrial classification and Japanese listed corporations’ disclosures (i.e., voluntary and 
mandatory), and finds that manufacturing firms tend to engage in greater voluntary disclosure 
than non-manufacturing counterparts. 
Of particular interest to the current study, Farag et al. (2014) examine compliance with CG 
standards and its influence on the performance of 271 corporations listed on the LSE Alternative 
Investment Market. They document that the level compliance with CG recommendations 
differs from one industry sector to another. Specifically, they find that biotechnology firms 
scored the highest levels of compliance with CG standards, while electronics firm scored the 
lowest levels. Therefore, in order to avoid the domination of one industry in the sample, and to 
improve the generalisability of the findings, 20 corporations from each of the remaining five 
industries are included in the final stratified sample. 
The final sample is restricted to 100 firms due to the extensive nature of the CG, executive 
pay and financial data, in addition to the “labour-intensive nature of manual collection” (Beattie 
et al., 2004, p. 232; Hussainey et al., 2003, p. 276; Ntim et al., 2013, p. 369). The sample is 
also restricted to 100 firms from 2008 to 2013 (i.e., 600 firm-year observations), due to time, 
funding and effort constraints, as well as to ensure the study was completed within the 
timeframe of the PhD. Finally, the final 100 sampled firms from the five remaining industries 
represent about 34% of the 293 firms with full data available, which is suggested to be 
sufficiently large by statistical sampling theory (Bryman, 2012, pp. 192-198; Collis & Hussey, 
2014, pp. 198-201). 
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5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This subsection discusses the methodology implemented in this research to answer study’s 
questions. In particular, Subsection 5.3.1 provides the model that investigates the antecedents 
of CG compliance and disclosure. Subsection 5.3.2 presents the models (i.e., composite-CG-
index and individual-CG-variable models) related to examining the impact of CG mechanisms 
on corporate performance/valuation, while Subsection 5.3.3 investigates executive pay models 
(i.e., composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models) which analyse the association 
between CG mechanisms and executive pay. 
5.3.1 Antecedents of Voluntary CG Compliance and Disclosure 
This subsection discusses the variables employed in the model examining the antecedents 
of CG compliance and disclosure practices. Table 4 summarises all variables used in the model. 
Subsection 5.3.1.1 discusses the measurement of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure, 
which is the UK Corporate Governance Index (UKCGI). Subsections 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.3 will 
present and discuss the measurements of the explanatory and control variables, respectively.  
5.3.1.1 The Dependent Variable (UKCGI) 
As explained in the first Chapter, the current study seeks to investigate voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure among UK publicly listed corporations, and consequently ascertain 
whether CG mechanisms can explain observable differences in the extent to which listed firms 
voluntarily provide information about their CG practices. Hence, the constructed CG Index 
(UKCGI) is used as the predicted variable to examine the antecedents of CG compliance and 
disclosure among UK listed companies. Additionally, using the composite-CG-index model, 
the UKCGI is used to examine the association among CG mechanisms, firm financial 
performance and executive pay. As shown in Appendix 2, this study constructs the UKCGI, 
which contains a comprehensive set of 120 CG provisions covering five aspects: (i) board 
leadership; (ii) board effectiveness; (iii) board accountability; (iv) executive pay; and (v) 
relations with shareholders.8 
As explained previously (Chapter Two), these CG provisions were extracted mainly from 
the 2010 Combined Code. Other sources, including the 2006 Companies Act, the LSE Listing 
Rules, Insider Trading Rules and Disclosure and Transparency Rules, are also used. This study 
uses the national CG codes/rules to construct the UKCGI in order to be consistent with the 
                                               
8Definition and data sources for each CG provision of the UKCGI are presented in Appendix 2. 
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recent studies, which relied on national CG codes to investigate the levels and the antecedents 
of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure (e.g., Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Clacher et al., 2008; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Scholtz & Smit, 2015; Shrives & Brennan, 2015). 
The following subsections discuss the measurement of the dependent variable (UKCGI). 
Specifically, Subsection (i) discusses issues related to the UKCGI’s data sources. Subsection 
(ii) will provide a comparison between self-constructed and analysists’ rankings indices and the 
rationale underlying the adoption of a self-constructed index. A discussion about the scoring 
and weighting processes of the UKCGI is provided in Subsection (iii). Subsection (iv) addresses 
issues related to the UKCGI’s reliability and validity. Finally, Subsection (v) presents the 
limitations of the constructed index and sampling. 
(i) Data sources for the UKCGI information 
Although other sources can be used to collect information about firms’ CG practices 
(Hassan & Marston, 2010, p. 18), the current study relies only on firms’ annual reports, for 
many reasons. First, annual reports are considered the most comprehensive document on a 
firm’s activities, and other reports are supplementary/subsidiary to it (Botosan, 1997, p. 331). 
Second, the annual report is considered a means to communicate monetary and non-monetary 
information to investors and other users (Barako et al., 2006, p. 108). Third, it is suggested that 
disclosure through regulated reports/accounts is positively linked with “the amount of 
disclosure provided via other  types of media” (Lang & Lundholm, 1993, p. 258).  
Fourth, reliance on annual reports is consistent with existing literature (e.g., Al-Najjar & 
Abed, 2014; Barako et al., 2006; Clacher et al., 2008; Dedman, 2016; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; 
Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Padgett & 
Shabbir, 2005), which facilitates comparability. Finally, UK listed firms are required by the 
2006 Companies Act (Chapter 4),9 the Listing Rules (LR App 2.1),10 and the Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (DTR 4.1)11 to publish annual reports. This binding nature ensures a high 
degree of credibility in the published data (Lang & Lundholm, 1993, p. 267). 
                                               
9This link provides further details: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/15/chapter/4. 
10This link provides further details: http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/LR/App/2/1. 
11This link provides further details: http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/DTR/4/1. 
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(ii) Self-Constructed versus Subjective Analysts’ Rankings Indices 
Prior studies investigating CG disclosure practices have either used self-constructed or 
analysts’ rankings indices. The first approach, which is more popular, involves the use of 
researcher-constructed CG indices, where researchers directly extract information about CG 
from annual reports. The second approach involves using subjective CG ranking indices 
developed by independent professional organisations, such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (Beattie et al., 2004; Bhagat et al., 2008; Bozec & Bozec, 2012). Each approach has 
its strengths and weaknesses. 
Using analysts’ ranking indices has a number of advantages. First, unlike self-constructed 
indices, analysts’ ranking indices are provided by professionally experienced and 
knowledgeable people, whereas researcher-constructed quality indices are influenced by 
research judgement bias and error (Core, 2001; Hassan & Marston, 2010). Second, analysts’ 
CG indices rely on serval sources of information, such as quarterly reports, annual reports and 
firm websites, while self-constructed indices are mainly based on annual reports (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). Finally, self-constructed indices are more labour intensive and are only 
available for a small sample of firms compared with analysts’ ranking indices (Beattie et al., 
2004; Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
Despite the advantages of analysts’ ranking indices, the current study adopts the researcher-
based indices approach for several reasons. First, analysts’ ranking indices focus on only large-
sized companies which work in specific industries (Balasubramanian et al., 2010; Botosan, 
1997). By contrast, the use of self-constructed indices may help ensure that sufficient cross-
sectional variation in the sample is achieved, thus avoiding the possibility of sample bias (Omar 
& Simon, 2011). Second, subjective analysts’ ranking indices rely mainly on the judgement of 
analysts regarding the quality of CG disclosure, while the researcher-based indices are a 
measure of actual CG disclosure practices from firms’ annual reports. That arguably makes 
self-constructed indices a more reliable and accurate measure for actual CG disclosures (Bozec 
& Bozec, 2012; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). 
Third, subjective analysts’ ranking indices are considered to be a subjective and unreliable 
measure of CG disclosure quality, because the provisions included in them could be influenced 
by analysts’ judgement (Bhagat et al., 2008; Bozec & Bozec, 2012). By contrast, the current 
study relies on UK national CG codes to select provisions included in the UKCGI, making the 
index more objective and reliable (Lang & Lundholm, 1993). Fourth, subjective analysts’ 
ranking indices tend to be standardised for firms from all countries; thus, these indices do not 
consider contextual differences in CG practices and legal regimes within different nations 
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(Bauer et al., 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004). Using researcher-based indices allows considering 
such differences. 
Fifth, most analysts’ ranking indices cover specific CG provisions; for example, 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) focuses on attributes related to increasing minority 
shareholders’ power (Aggarwal et al., 2010). The UKCGI is designed to include different 
aspects of CG (i.e., 120 CG provisions), categorised into five broad sections,12 namely: (i) board 
leadership; (ii) board effectiveness; (iii) board accountability; (iv) executive pay; and (v) 
relations with shareholders. This may allow for better assessment of CG practices of UK listed 
firms.  
Sixth, most analysts’ ranking indices are not up-to-date due to the continuous changes and 
development in CG regulations internationally (Hassan & Marston, 2010). Finally, relying on 
national CG codes to construct CG indices is similar to past work that investigate the level and 
antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Clacher et al., 
2008; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b), which 
facilitates comparisons with their findings. The current study constructs the most 
comprehensive CG disclosure index to date, consisting of 120 CG provisions. These provisions 
are mainly contained in the 2010 Combined Code; some are from the 2006 Companies Act, 
Listing Rules, Insider Trading Rules and Disclosure and Transparency Rules. 
(iii) Scoring and Weighting Schemes 
As explained by Beattie et al. (2004) and Cooke (1989), two coding methods can be used 
for scoring CG disclosure indices, namely: (i) binary coding (un-weighted indices) and (ii) 
ordinal coding (weighted indices). The first method involves recording the presence or absence 
of CG provisions by assigning a value of one if a particular CG provision is present, and zero 
otherwise. The second method attempts to evaluate the quality of CG disclosure practices by 
using a graduated scale; for example, a sample firm receives ‘0’ if there is no disclosure about 
a specific CG provision, ‘1’ if only qualitative information is disclosed, and ‘2’ if quantified 
information is disclosed. Both coding methods have their strengths and shortcomings. 
Although the binary (un-weighted) coding scheme is criticised for not reflecting the 
relative importance attached to each CG provisions and not measuring the quality of specific 
CG disclosures (Beattie et al., 2004; Botosan, 1997; Gompers et al., 2003), the current study 
adopts this approach for the following reasons. First, un-weighted coding is preferable because 
it allows measuring voluntary disclosures, where differences in the level of disclosure are 
                                               
12The categorisation of the UKCGI is based on the suggestions of 2010 Combined Code. 
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expected (Botosan, 1997; Hassan & Marston, 2010). As shown in Appendix 2, the CG 
provisions included in the UKCGI are tested based on their presence or absence. Therefore, the 
use of un-weighted coding seems to be appropriate to investigate voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices among UK listed firms. 
Second, unlike weighted coding, binary coding improves the reliability and objectivity of 
the constructed index, because it avoids making judgement on the weight that need to be 
assigned to different CG provisions (Gompers et al., 2003; Hassan & Marston, 2010). Third, 
there is no agreed theoretical framework to accurately assign weights to different CG provisions 
(Bhagat et al., 2008). Thus, using un-weighted coding seems to be appropriate because it can 
limit the possibility that constructed indices are biased towards a specific governance provisions 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). 
Fourth, consistent with Ntim et al. (2012b), the CG disclosure score in the current study is 
developed in a way that allows for measuring the qualitative differences in CG disclosure 
among different firms. For example, a value of one is assigned to a firm if it has a separate 
remuneration committee. The firm receive one more point if all members of the remuneration 
committee members are outside (unaffiliated) executives. It receives one more point if 
individual members’ attendance records are disclosed.  
Fifth, well-established empirical accounting disclosure literature indicates that both 
weighted and un-weighted coding schemes provide similar results (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; 
Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Ntim et al., 2012b; Robbins & Austin, 1986). Finally, un-
weighted coding is adopted so as to facilitate direct comparison with the findings of existing 
CG studies (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2011; Barako & Brown, 2008; Clacher et al., 2008; Mallin 
& Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
(iv) Reliability and Validity of the UKCGI 
When it comes to using self-constructing indices, there are two important issues that should 
be taken into consideration, namely reliability and validity (Marston & Shrives, 1991; Omar & 
Simon, 2011). The constructed index (UKCGI) must be a reliable and valid instrument in order 
to ensure that it measures the quality of CG disclosure among UK listed firms. Reliability points 
to “whether an instrument can be interpreted consistently across different situations” (Field, 
2009, p. 11). Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 197) indicate that because the data used to construct 
the index is extracted from annual reports, this allows other researchers to achieve the same 
results over time. This implies that reliability is closely linked with two critical issues, namely 
“stability” and “consistency”. 
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Stability describes “the extent to which the same coder is consistent over time when coding 
the same content” (Beattie et al., 2004, p. 214). Three methods can be employed to achieve 
reliability, namely “inter-coder/inter-rater reliability”, “test-retest reliability” and “internal 
consistency/inter-item reliability” (Bryman, 2012; Hassan & Marston, 2010). Inter-rater 
reliability means the extent to which the coding provides similar results when the same content 
is coded by two or more independent coders (Hassan & Marston, 2010). Inter-rater reliability 
cannot be tested here because the UKCGI was coded by only one researcher. The other two 
methods of reliability used in this study were tested for.  
Following past CG studies (e.g., Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Omar & Simon, 2011; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998), a number of procedures were applied when measuring the test-retest 
reliability. First, the annual reports of the examined corporations were read fully before staring 
coding to allow the coder to become familiar with the activities and nature of firms’ businesses. 
This helped ensure that the CG provisions included in the index were applicable to all sampled 
firms (Omar & Simon, 2011). Second, the coding was performed for each firm for the entire 
period (i.e., six years). This helped the researcher to ensure consistency in reading corporate 
annual reports, which is thought to improve coding accuracy. Finally, the coding was done in 
two rounds. An initial sample of ten firms (i.e., two from each industry) over the whole sampled 
period (2008-2013) was coded in the first round. This round also involved several meetings 
with the researcher’s supervisors to discuss coding categories, the coding instrument and coded 
materials. In the second round, any mistakes or inconsistencies identified in the first round were 
discussed and corrected. The researcher also coded a further ten firms over the whole sample 
period. However, the supervisors did not identify any mistakes or inconsistencies with the 
coding procedure. This implies that stability of the coding procedure between the first and 
second stages was achieved. 
Internal consistency according to Beattie et al. (2004) and Beattie and Thomson (2007) 
points out to a situation where the same results of a study can be produced by another researcher. 
The commonly employed measure for internal consistency of disclosure indices is Cronbach’s 
alpha. Therefore, in line with prior studies (e.g., Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Botosan, 1997; 
Hassan et al., 2009; Sharma, 2014) this test is adopted here to examine the reliability of the 
UKCGI. It is suggested that a disclosure index is reliable if the coefficient value of Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.80 or higher (Allegrini & Greco, 2013, p. 198; Hassan et al., 2009, p. 91). As 
presented in Table 3, the of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha is 0.88, implying that the UKCGI is a 
reliable measure of CG voluntary compliance and disclosure. 
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Table 3: Reliability Statistic 
Cronbach’s Alpha Value No. of Items 
0.881 5 
The second issue that must be addressed in relation to the constructed indices is validity. 
Field (2009, p. 11) describes validity as “whether an instrument measures what it was designed 
to measure”. The following steps were applied in order to improve the validity (i.e., content 
and construct validity) of the constructed index. First, the UKCGI was constructed by the 
researcher and included a considerable number of CG provisions in order to ensure that the 
index reflects CG practices amongst the sampled firms. Additionally, UK CG reports and codes 
were used to develop the index so as to improve the content validity. Second, the construction 
of the index was guided by the researcher’s supervisors, which involved weekly meetings to 
discuss issues related to the items and categories of the index. The UKCGI was refined 
according to the supervisors’ comments and suggestions. 
Third, in order to improve the index’s construct validity, the UKCGI was developed to 
cover areas that have been examined in past studies. For example, consistent with prior studies 
that have paid close attention to provisions related to boards of directors (e.g., Barako et al., 
2006; Clacher et al., 2008; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2012b), about 38% of the provisions included in the UKCGI cover issues related to board 
structure and effectiveness. Finally, the construct validity was improved by presenting and 
discussing a draft of the UKCGI at annual doctoral conferences. The comments and suggestions 
received from academics and experienced researchers at those conferences were used to refine 
the index.  
(v) Limitations of Sampling and Index Construction 
Although great efforts were made to improve the UKCGI’s validity and reliability, some 
limitations in relation to the sampling and the construction of the index have been identified. 
First, the reliability of the UKCGI could be improved if coding was performed by a different 
coder (Hassan & Marston, 2010). As discussed above, inter-coder reliability could not be 
performed in the current study because the UKCGI was coded by a single researcher. Second, 
binary coding was employed in this study to assign weights to different provisions included in 
the UKCGI. As explained, this coding scheme assumes that different CG provisions have equal 
importance. Therefore, using a weighted index could have improved the validity of the 
constructed index.  
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Third, although a sample of 100 listed firms over six years is relatively large compared 
with previous UK studies (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Arcot & Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al., 
2008; Conyon, 1997; Conyon et al., 2001; Dahya et al., 2008; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; 
Müller, 2014), including all 293 listed firms with full data could have improved the 
generalisability of the results. However, as explained in Subsection 5.2.3, because of the labour-
intensive nature of manually collecting data, this could not be done. Finally, consistent with 
prior studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Barako et al., 2006; Botosan, 1997; Elshandidy & Neri, 
2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b), this study 
relied on annual reports to collect information about listed firms’ CG structures. Other sources, 
such as interim reports and meetings with firms’ management, could have been used to cross-
check the collected CG data.  
5.3.1.2 The Independent Variables: CG and Ownership Mechanisms  
As discussed in Section 4.1 of Chapter Four, two main sets of CG variables are employed 
to examine their impact on CG compliance and disclosure among UK listed firms. These 
variables include ownership structure variables and board/firm/audit characteristics. Table 4 
provides summary defection of predicted (UKCGI), explanatory and control (general) variables 
employed in the first model. 
In line with considerable number of prior studies, the explanatory variables included in the 
current study were measured as follows. In terms of board, audit and firm mechanisms, as 
shown in Table 4, board size (Elshandidy et al., 2013) was computed as the natural log (NL) of 
the number of inside and outside executives. Board diversity (Ntim, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013) 
was computed as the ratio of ethnic minorities and women on a boardroom. Board independence 
(Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015) was computed as the ratio of outside 
(unaffiliated) executives on a boardroom. The existence of a separate CG committee (Ntim et 
al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012b), cross-listing (Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012b) and audit 
firm size (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015), were measured as dummy 
variables. Managerial ownership (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003), institutional 
ownership (Barako et al., 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008) were computed as the percentages 
of each type of ownership to the total firm shareholdings. Finally, block ownership (Abdelsalam 
& Street, 2007; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014) was computed as proportion of block ownership (at 
least own 3% to total company ordinary shareholdings). 
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5.3.1.3 Justification and Measurement of Control Variables 
The current study controls for several variables in order to mitigate possible problems 
associated with omitted variables, including endogeneity problems (Ntim et al., 2013; 
Wooldridge, 2013). These variables include; company size (LTA), company age (AGE), capital 
expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), gearing (GR), profitability (Q-ratio), industry (IDU) and 
year (YDU) dummies. The choice of the control variables was based on past disclosure studies, 
theoretical predictions as well as data availability. The theoretical and empirical evidence 
related to the chosen control variables is discussed in the following subsections. 
(i) Firm size (LTA) 
Theoretically, it is argued that corporate voluntary disclosure is positively linked with firm 
size (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Barako et al., 2006). This positive link can be explained by 
several reasons. First, larger firms are expected to disclose detailed information about their CG 
practices compared with smaller firms, as large firms are often associated with higher political 
costs and greater agency problems (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). Second, large firms are of 
more need to engage in CG disclosure in order to attract external capital at low costs 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999, p. 364). In contrast, Klapper and Love (2004) argue that small 
corporations are more motivated to maintain good CG systems in order to be able to attract 
external capital at low costs. 
Empirically, several studies document that firm-level disclosure is positively linked with 
company size (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012b; 
Samaha et al., 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In contract, there are other empirical studies 
provide evidence that CG compliance and disclosure is negatively influenced by firm size 
(Campbell et al., 2014; Waweru, 2014). Following prior studies (e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012), firm size is labelled as LTA  and computed as the NL of total assets. 
(ii) Firm Age (AGE) 
Firm age is an important factor influencing voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
(Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Pandey et al., 2015). It is suggested that old firms may need to 
improve their CG practices in order to enhance their reputations and access critical resources 
(Clarkson et al., 2003). Similarly, it is argued that old firms have more time to enhance their 
CG systems in response to internal needs and pressure from investors (Black et al., 2006a). By 
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contrast, Coad et al. (2013) suggest that young firms have a greater need to engage in CG 
disclosure in order to be able to attract external capital. 
Prior empirical studies report evidence that firm age impacts significantly and positively 
disclosure behaviour (e.g., Biswas, 2013; Clarkson et al., 2003; Dharmadasa et al., 2014; 
Pandey et al., 2015). However, Alsaeed (2006) provide empirical evidence that firm age has 
insignificant association with  voluntary disclosure in annual reports among Saudi Arabian 
listed firms. Following Alsaeed (2006), firm age is labelled as AGE  and computed as the 
number of years since establishment. 
(iii) Capital Expenditure (CEX) 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) suggest that greater capital expenditure can allow firms to gain 
competitive advantages through providing new products and services. Based on this notion, 
firms need to increase their expenditure so as to increase their competitive advantages and 
growth. This requires a stronger CG system (i.e., more monitoring by boards) so as to protect 
the wealth of shareholders (Chen et al., 2014; Durnev & Kim, 2005). Therefore, firms with 
greater capital expenditure have a greater need to engage in CG disclosure. 
A number of past empirical literature (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Ntim et al., 2012b) provide evidence that CG disclosure is not significantly influenced by 
capital expenditure. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a), for example, find a weak association 
between capital expenditure and South African listed firms’ black economic empowerment 
disclosure. Capital expenditure, in the current study, is measured consistently with Ntim et al. 
(2012b) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a), labelled as CEX and computed as total capital 
expenditure scaled by total assets. 
(iv) Sales Growth (SG) 
Theoretically, firm growth is an important factor influencing CG disclosure. It is suggested 
that firms with higher growth and investment opportunities suffer from greater agency and 
information asymmetry problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensenm 1986). This may 
encourage such firms to disclose more information about their CG practices to mitigate the 
problem of asymmetric information (Beiner et al., 2006; Klapper & Love, 2004). Similarly, 
Chen (2011) and Collett and Hrasky (2005) suggest that engaging in an increased CG disclosure  
in fast-growing firms can attract more new investors and improve the ability of such firms to 
attract external capital at low costs. 
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Empirically, a number of prior studies support above arguments and find that firm growth 
impacts positively on voluntary CG disclosure (e.g., Chavent et al., 2006; Laidroo, 2009; 
O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Other studies document an insignificant link among firm growth 
opportunities and disclosure practices (Black et al., 2006a; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 
2012b; Scholtz & Smit, 2015). Following Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a), firm growth is 
labelled as SG and computed as the difference between sales of current and previous years 
scaled by sales of previous year.  
(v) Gearing (GR) 
Agency theory indicates that corporations with high debt in their capital stucture suffer 
considerably from agency costs assoiated with free-cash-flows available to managers (Jensen, 
1986). This can motivate debt-holders to provide extra monitoring in order to protect their 
interests from being exploited by management (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Williamson, 1988). 
Similarly, corporations with high debt are expected to be encourage to present additional CG 
information so as to legitimatise their actions to debt providers and reduce financing costs 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ross, 1977). 
Empricially, prior studies provide mixed results. Some past empirical studies (e.g., 
Abdallah et al., 2015; Barako et al., 2006; Omar & Simon, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013) 
provide evidence that gearing impacts significantly and positively on disclosure behaviour. By 
contrary, other studies provide empirical evidence of a negative (e.g., Adelopo, 2011; Mallin & 
Ow-Yong, 2012) or no link (e.g., Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012) between gearing 
and voluntary disclosure behaviour. In the current study, gearing is measured consistently with 
past CG studies (e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Barako et al., 2006), labelled as GR and computed 
as total debt scaled by total assets. 
(vi) Profitability (Q-ratio) 
Theoretically, profitable companies are expected to disclose additional information, 
because managers in such companies are encouraged to enhance disclosure so as to secure their 
position and legitimise their continued stewardship (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013a). However, Harris (1998) and Prencipe (2004) suggest that profitable 
companies tend to provide less detailed information so as to avoid attracting potential 
compeitiors. 
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Empirically, several past studies document that profitability impacts significantly and 
positively on CG disclosure (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Aly et al., 2010; Elshandidy et al., 
2015; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Ntim et al., 2012b; Omar & 
Simon, 2011). In contrast, other studies document that profitability has no significant influence 
on disclosure practices (e.g., Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012; Eng & Mak, 2003). In the current study, profitability is measured consistently 
with Ntim (2015), labelled as Q-ratio and computed as the book total assets minus equity’s 
market and book values scaled by book total assets. 
(vii) Industry Dummies  
It is suggested that CG structures can vary among industries because of the variations in 
business nature, ownership structure and capital structure, amongst others (Allegrini & Greco, 
2013; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Similarly, Omar and Simon (2011) suggest that companies 
operating in some sectors adhere to additional disclosure requirements. Manufacturing 
companies, for instance, are required to disclose further information compared with companies 
in the service industry, because the operations of manufacturing companies have the potential 
to damage the environment. Following past studies (e.g., Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et 
al., 2006; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ntim et al., 2012b), the 
industrial factor is predicted to influence CG compliance and disclosure among the UK listed 
companies. Hence, industry dummies are entered in all study’s models to handle any possible 
unobserved heterogeneity between industries. Four industry dummies out of five industries are 
included in all models used in the current study in order to avoid a dummy-variable trap. 
(viii) Year Dummies  
Theoretical evidence suggests that voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices 
across firms vary over time (Barako et al., 2006; Conyon, 1994; Ntim et al., 2012b; Padgett & 
Shabbir, 2005). Conyon (1994), for instance, provide evidence that compliance with CG 
standards has improved over time among firms listed on LSE. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012b) 
provide empirical evidence that CG compliance and disclosure levels have improved over time 
for 169 firms listed on Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Following existing literature  (e.g., 
Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2012b), the financial year factor is expected 
to influence CG compliance and disclosure practices. Therefore, financial year factors/dummies 
are added to all study’s models so as to control for any possible unobserved-heterogeneity 
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among firms over the six-year period from 2008 to 2013. Five years dummies out of six years 
are included in all models used in the current study in order to avoid a dummy-variable trap. 
5.3.1.4 Model Specification 
This study employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method by regressing the UKCGI on 
the control and independent variables to investigate the antecedents that drive voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure among UK firms. In line with past studies and assuming that all the 
predicted associations are linear, the first OLS equation is specified as follows: 
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Where: UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; BSE denotes board size; IOE 
denotes board independence; BD denotes board ethic and gender diversity; PCGC denotes the existence 
of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO denotes all 
directors ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; CONTS 
denotes control variables for corporations size (LTA), corporations age (AGE), capital expenditure 
(CEX), sales growth (SG), gearing (GR), profitability (Q-ratio), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) 
dummies. 
  Table 4: Variables Definition and Measurement. 
Dependent Variable 
UKCGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the 
Combined Code of 2010. Each CG provision of the constructed index is awarded a value 
of 1 if disclosure is made in firms’ accounts/reports and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to 
a value ranging between 0 to 100 percent. 
Independent Variables 
BSE NL of the number of inside and outside executives on a boardroom. 
IOE Ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives on a boardroom. 
BD Ratio of ethnic minorities and females on a boardroom. 
BDG Ratio of females on a boardroom. 
BDE Ratio of ethnic minorities on a boardroom. 
PCGC 1, if a corporation establish a separate CG committee, 0 if not. 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
MANO  Ratio of common shares owned by all inside and outside executives. 
ISTO  Ratio of common shares owned by institutional shareholders. 
BLKO Ratio of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary shareholdings). 
Control Variables 
LTA NL of book total assets. 
AGE Number of years since establishing. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
GR Book total debt scaled by total assets. 
Q Book total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled by book total assets. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
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The following section outlines all variables used to examine CG’s influence on corporate 
performance/valuation. The section also describes the variables employed to examine whether 
ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-Performance nexus.   
5.3.2 Corporate Governance and Performance Models  
This section provides a discussion about the models constructed to investigate the CG’s 
influence on the performance/valuation of UK corporations. As explained in the previous 
chapter, past studies adopt two models to examine this relationship: (i) the composite-CG-index 
model; and (ii) the individual-CG-variable model. Subsection 5.3.2.1 examines the composite-
CG-index model, whereas Subsection 5.3.2.2 describes the individual-CG-variable model. 
5.3.2.1 The Composite-CG-Index Model  
A comprehensive description of the dependent (i.e., Q-ratio, ROA and SR), explanatory 
(UKCGI) and control (general) variables included in the composite-CG-index model is 
provided in this subsection. 
(i) The Dependent Variable: Corporate Performance  
To investigate the influence of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation, 
Q (Q-ratio), as proxy for financial market valuation, is employed as the main predicted variable. 
Additionally, the study employs return on assets (ROA) and shareholder returns (SR) as 
additional proxies for corporate performance/valuation. These three measures of firm financial 
performance are adopted for the following reasons. First, there is no agreement in the existing 
studies regarding the best measurement of the financial performance of firms  (Ntim, 2015). 
Second, employing three different proxies of performance allows checking the robustness of 
the obtained findings (Christensen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2013b, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015). Third, 
the current study focuses on Q-ratio, ROA and SR because these measures are widely employed 
in the literature (e.g., Christensen et al., 2015; Guest, 2009b; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Jackling 
& Johl, 2009; Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Ntim, 2013b, 2015; Ntim et al., 2012a; Padgett & 
Shabbir, 2005; Terjesen et al., 2015), which may facilitate comparison with their findings. As 
explained below, each measure of firm financial performance has its strengths and weaknesses.    
Q-ratio is used to measure whether corporate management is efficient in using its assets to 
maximise the wealth of shareholders (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Similar to existing literature 
(Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Doidge et al., 2004; Ntim, 2013b, 2015), Q-ratio is defined as the 
book total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled by book total assets. Haniffa 
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and Hudaib (2006) suggest that high values of Q-ratio means that CG structures are effective 
at protecting shareholder wealth. Although the Q-ratio has extensively been used by prior CG 
literature (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim, 2013b, 2015; Yermack, 1996), it has faced a number of criticisims. 
First, Q-ratio is a more historically-based measure, and that makes it subject to managerial 
manipulation (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). Second, a higher Q value may not esstentially mean 
that managers are effective in using corporate assets to improve the wealth of shareholders 
(Beattie & Thomson, 2007). Finally, Lev and Sunder (1979) suggest that the calucation of Q-
ratio may be influenced by unfair evaluation of the value of assets. 
ROA is calculated in the current study as the operating profit divided by total assests 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Guest, 2009b; Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Ntim, 2013b; Yermack, 1996). 
ROA is considered to be a good proxy for corporate performance compared with other 
accounting-based performance metrics (i.e., ROE). This is because ROA “has more 
distributional properties, for instance, firms’ total assets are strictly positive, whereas their 
total equity can be zero or even negative” (Mangena et al. (2012, p. S31). Similarly, ROA is an 
effective proxy of a company performance as it is unlikely to be affected by the company’s loan 
and “extraordinary and other discretionary income items” (Core et al., 2006, p. 666). ROA has 
also been commonly used by previous CG studies (Christensen et al., 2015; Guest, 2009b; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Klapper & Love, 2004; Terjesen et al., 2015). However, like Tobin’s 
q, ROA has been criticised for being susceptible to mangement manipluation, because a firm’s 
assets value may be influenced by accounting methods, techniques and polices (Lev & Sunder, 
1979). 
SR is calculated as the ratio of total share return obtained by adding capital gain (closing 
share price mins opening share price divided by opening share price) and dividend yield 
(dividend per share divided by opening share price) (Ntim, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; 
Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). Although SR is employed as a proxy of financial performance in past 
CG literature (e.g., Ntim, 2013b; Ntim, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Padgett & Shabbir, 
2005), it has faced some criticism. First, it is more volatile and associated with more noise, 
making it a weak measure of firms’ market valuation (Burgman & Van-Clieaf, 2012; Zakaria, 
2012). Second, the market valuation of firms can be affected by several macroeconomic issues, 
such as general market conditions and government monetary policy (Burgman & Van-Clieaf, 
2012). 
Given that each of the above performance proxies has its strengths and weaknesses, and so 
as to reduce the possible impact of the limitations of these alternative proxies, this study uses 
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Q-ratio, ROA and SR. This can allow each proxy to compensate for the weaknesses of the two 
others. Additionally, the current study controls for several variables to determine the influence 
of time, industry, growth and capital expenditure on firm financial performance. Table 5 
provides the definitions of all variables included in the composite-CG-index model. 
(ii) The Independent Variables: UKCGI 
In line with considerable number of prior studies, the UKCGI is employed as the main 
explanatory variable in the composite-CG-index model. The composite-CG-index model, as 
explained in Chapter Four, helps to examine the extent to which firm-level CG quality affects 
corporate performance/valuation. The UKCGI consists of 120 CG provisions extracted mainly 
from the 2010 Combined Code. 
(iii) Justification and Measurement of Control Variables 
This study controls for several variables so as to mitigate possible problems that may arise 
from omitting variables, including endogeneity problems (Ntim et al., 2013; Wooldridge, 
2013). These variables include cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), CEO tenure (CEOT), 
capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. These 
variables were chosen based on data availability as well as on previous CG literature. The 
theoretical and empirical arguments related to the chosen variables are discussed in the 
following subsections.  
a) Cross-listing (CL) 
As explained in the literature review (i.e., Subsection 4.1.1.5), cross-listed firms tend to 
have strong CG systems, because such firms are subjected to further requirements from foreign 
stock exchanges, such as additional accounting, disclosure and CG rules (Cooke, 1989; Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Also, firms that seek foreign listing more likely need 
to be accountable to the public through the adoption of better disclosure, transparency and CG 
practices (Doidge et al., 2004; Eaton et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2012b). Engaging in better 
compliance and disclosure by cross-listed firms can lower their agency costs (Bailey et al., 
2006; Sami & Zhou, 2008) and enhance their legitimacy (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1979) by gaining the support of influential stakeholders to access critical 
resources, such as external financing (Coffee, 2002; Cooke, 1989; Eaton et al., 2007; Klapper 
& Love, 2004; Robb & Zarzeski, 2001). This can improve firm financial performance (Ghosh 
& He, 2015).  
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Empirically, a large number of prior studies document that cross-listed corporations tend 
to be more profitable compared with non-cross-listed counterparts (e.g., Cetorelli & Peristiani, 
2015; Charitou & Louca, 2009; Ntim, 2013b, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Shi et al., 
2014). In line with Ntim (2015) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013b), cross-listing is labelled as 
CL and measured as a dummy variable.      
b)  Audit firm size (AFS) 
Mixed theoretical explanations are provided by CG literature on the influence of the size 
of auditing firms on corporate performance/valuation. It is generally suggested that large audit 
firms are associated with higher costs of auditing (André et al., 2016; Palmrose, 1986), which 
can negatively influence corporate performance. In contrast, audit firm size is suggested to have 
a positive influence on audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981b). This is due to the advantages that 
larger audit firms enjoy over smaller counterparts, including experience, area expertise and 
financial strength (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Wallace et al., 1994). Similarly, auditors from large 
audit firms may be able to better monitor the opportunistic behaviours of management 
(DeAngelo, 1981a; Ntim et al., 2012b), which can enhance firm financial performance. 
Prior studies provide mixed empirical results; for example, Ntim (2015) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013b) document that AFS has a statistically positive influence on the 
performance (i.e., Q-ratio, ROA and SR) of 169 firms listed in South Africa stock market. 
However, Ntim (2013b) examines the same association and report that AFS has insignificant 
effect on the South African firms’ performance (Q-ratio). Consistent with existing literature 
(e.g., Ntim, 2013b; Ntim, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b), audit firm size is labelled as AFS 
and measured as a dummy variable. 
c) CEO tenure (CEOT) 
From an AT perspective, CEO tenure can lead to increased agency problems by allowing 
directors to make decisions and follow strategies for their own interests, at the expense of 
shareholders (Tsai et al., 2006). This is because long-tenured CEOs are more likely to form 
friendships with other board members over time, and as a result board members have less 
motivation to reject proposals/recommendations provided by CEOs (Byrd et al., 2010; Hill & 
Phan, 1991), which can impact negatively on firm financial performance. On the other hand, it 
is suggested that long-tenured CEOs tend to have better reputations than short-tenured 
counterparts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Similarly, from a legitimisation perspective, CEO power 
in the form of longer tenure can enhance firms’ reputation and image by providing them with 
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better business networks (Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). This can help 
firms to obtain resources from stakeholders (Geletkanycz et al., 2001). Therefore, it is expected 
that CEO tenure can increase CEOs’ knowledge about the opportunities and challenges facing 
their firms, allowing them to establish more effective strategies that improve their firms’ 
financial performance (Coles et al., 2001). 
Empirically, a number of prior studies report that CEO tenure impacts positively on firm 
financial performance (e.g., Brookman & Thistle, 2009; Coles et al., 2001; Hoque et al., 2013). 
Similar to Hoque et al. (2013) and Vafeas (2003), CEO tenure is labelled as CEOT and defined 
as the number of financial years a person remained in the CEO position within a firm. 
d)  Capital expenditure (CEX) 
Theoretically, as explained above, firms with greater capital expenditure can gain 
competitive advantages through providing new products and services (Lev & Sougiannis, 
1996). This can enhance firm financial performance and valuation because capital expenditure 
is associated with long-growth potential (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Empirically, the evidence 
provided by past CG studies is mixed. For example, several studies (e.g., Bozec et al., 2010; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Weir et al., 2002) document that corporate financial performance is 
positively influenced by capital expenditure. By contrary, other studies provide empirical 
evidence of a negative (e.g., Jackling & Johl, 2009; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015) or 
insignificant relationship (e.g., Ntim, 2013b; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b) between capital 
expenditure and corporate performance. In the current study, capital expenditure is measured 
consistently with prior CG studies (e.g., Bozec et al., 2010; Ntim, 2013b; Ntim, 2015), labelled 
as CEX and computed as total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
e) Sales growth (SG) 
CG literature indicates that corporations with higher investment and growth opportunities 
are expected to have strong CG systems than firms with lower growth opportunities so as to 
reduce financing costs (Beiner et al., 2006; Klapper & Love, 2004). Additionally, Chen (2011) 
and Collett and Hrasky (2005) suggest that fast-growing firms tend to have active boards that 
attract new investors. Therefore, fast-growing companies are proposed to have better financial 
performance, since they tend to be able to attract external capital at low costs (Klapper & Love, 
2004). 
Empirically, several prior studies support above arguments and report that corporate 
performance is influenced significantly and positively by growth opportunities (e.g., Beiner et 
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al., 2006; Black et al., 2006c; Clacher et al., 2008; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, 2015; Peni, 
2014; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). In this study, sales growth is measured consistently with Gompers 
et al. (2003) and Ntim (2015), labelled as SG and computed as the difference between sales of 
current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
f) Industry and year dummies (IDU & YDU) 
This study controls for industry and year dummies, because existing literature (e.g., 
Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Padgett & Shabbir, 
2005) indicates that CG structures can vary among industries and over time, which can have 
different effects on corporate performance/valuation. Therefore, industry and year dummies are 
added to all study’s model so as to control for any possible unobserved heterogeneity between 
firms over the six-year period from 2008 to 2013. 
  Table 5: Definition of Variables Employed in the Composite-CG-Index Model 
Dependent Variable 
Q Book total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled by book total assets. 
ROA Operating profit to total assets. 
SR Total share return obtained by adding capital gain (closing share price minus opening 
share price divided by opening share price) and dividend yield (dividend per share 
divided by opening share price). 
Independent Variables 
UKCGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the 
CG Code of 2010. Each CG provision of the constructed index is awarded a value of 1 if 
disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to 
a value ranging between 0 to 100 percent. 
Control Variables 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & 
Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
CEOT Total number of years an individual remained in the CEO position within a firm. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
 
(iv) Model Specification  
This study employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method by regressing the performance 
measures on the explanatory and control variables to investigate whether firm-level CG quality, 
using a broad measure (UKCGI), can influence corporate performance/valuation, proxied by 
Q-ratio, ROA and SR. In line with past studies and assuming that all the predicted associations 
are linear, the second OLS equation is specified as follows:  
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Where: FFP denotes firm financial performance, proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR; UKCGI 
denotes to the UK corporate governance index; CONTS denotes control variables for cross-listing (CL), 
audit firm size (AFS), CEO tenure (CEOT), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), industry 
(IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. The following subsection provides a description of the dependent 
(i.e., Q-ratio, ROA and SR), explanatory (board characteristics) and control (general) variables 
used to investigate whether firm-level CG quality, using individual-CG-variable approach, 
influences corporate performance/valuation. 
5.3.2.2 The Individual-CG-Variable Model 
The following subsections provide a description of variables included in the individual-
CG-variable model. 
(i) The Dependent Variable: Corporate Performance 
The measures employed for corporate performance/valuation in the individual-CG variable 
model are identical to those of the composite-CG-index model. Q-ratio, as a financial market 
valuation measure, is used as the main dependent variable. ROA and SR are also used as 
different accounting- and market valuation measures.  
(ii) The Independent Variables: Individual CG Variables  
Six board characteristics are employed to investigate the impact of firm-level CG, using 
individual-CG variable model, on corporate performance/valuation. These six characteristics 
are: frequency of board meetings (FMs), board independence (IOE), the existence of board 
committees (PSC), board diversity (BD), separating CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT) 
and board size (BSE). Table 6 provides the summary measurement of these variables, in 
addition to the measurement of other variables of interest. 
In line with considerable number of prior studies, the explanatory variables included in the 
current study were measured as follows. Board size (Nguyen et al., 2015; Upadhyay et al., 
2014) was computed as the natural log (NL) of the number of inside and outside executives. 
Board diversity (Ntim, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b) was computed as the ratio of ethnic 
minorities and women on a boardroom. Board independence (García-Meca et al., 2015; Nguyen 
et al., 2015) was computed as the ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives on a boardroom. 
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Presence of board committees (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) 
and separating CEO and chairperson positions (Boyd, 1995; Christensen et al., 2015) were 
measured as dummy variables. Finally, frequency of board meetings (Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005; Rodriguez-Fernandez et al., 2014) was computed as the number of a company’s board 
meetings.  
(iii) Justification and Measurement of Control Variables 
Variables controlled for in the individual-CG-variable model are identical those used in the 
composite-CG-index model (i.e., Model 2). These variables include cross-listing (CL), audit 
firm size (AFS), CEO tenure (CEOT), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), industry 
(IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. The definitions of these variables are outlined in Table 6. 
Additionally, subsections A-F of the composite-CG-index model provide the rationale for the 
chosen variables. 
  Table 6: Definition of Variables Employed in the Individual-CG-Variable Model 
Dependent Variable 
Q  Book total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled by book total assets. 
ROA Operating profit to total assets. 
SR Total share return obtained by adding capital gain (closing share price minus opening 
share price divided by opening share price) and dividend yield (dividend per share 
divided by opening share price). 
Independent Variables 
BSE NL of the number of inside and outside executives on a boardroom. 
IOE Ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives on a boardroom. 
BD Ratio of ethnic minorities and females on a boardroom. 
BDG Ratio of females on a boardroom. 
BDE Ratio of ethnic minorities on a boardroom. 
PSC 1, if a corporation has three committees (i.e., nomination, remuneration and audit), 0 
otherwise. 
DSPLIT 1 if CEO and chairperson positions are separated, 0 otherwise. 
FMs Number of a company’s board meetings. 
Control Variables 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & 
Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
CEOT Total number of years an individual remained in the CEO position within a firm. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
 
(iv) Model Specification 
Following past studies, the current study assumes that all the predicted associations are 
linear, the third OLS equation is specified as follows: 
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Where: FFP denotes firm financial performance, proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR; BSE denotes 
board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board ethnic and gender diversity; PSC 
denotes board committees; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; FMs denotes 
board meetings; CONTS denotes control variables for cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), CEO 
tenure (CEOT), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. 
The following subsection provides a description of all variables employed to examine whether 
ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-performance nexus. 
5.3.2.3 The Interaction Effect of Ownership Variables on the UKCGI-Performance Nexus 
As explained in Chapter Four (i.e., Section 4.2.3), most prior studies only examine the 
direct impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation, without considering 
the interaction effect of ownership variables on this association. This offer a valuable 
opportunity to extend and contribute to the extant CG literature by investigating whether 
ownership structure variables (i.e., managerial, institutional and block ownership) moderate the 
UKCGI-Performance nexus. The rationale for focusing only on examining whether ownership 
structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-performance relationship is that the UKCGI is the 
main interest of this study, because it constitutes a broad set of CG mechanisms, including those 
used in the individual CG variable model. 
A comprehensive description of the dependent (i.e., Q-ratio, ROA and SR), explanatory 
(UKCGI), moderating (ownership structure variables) and control (general) included in the 
moderating effect model is provided in the following subsections.  
(i) The Dependent Variable: Corporate Performance  
In this model, the measures used for firm financial performance are the same as those 
employed in the composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models. As explained, Q-
ratio, as a financial market valuation measure, is used as the main dependent variable, whereas 
ROA and SR are employed as alternative accounting- and market valuation proxies, 
respectively.  
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(ii) The Independent Variable (UKCGI) 
The UKCGI is employed as the main explanatory variable. As has been discussed, a self-
constructed index comprising 120 CG provisions has been developed in the current study to 
investigate whether firm-level CG quality influences corporate performance/valuation. Table 7 
provides the summary measurement of this variable, also the measurement of other variables 
of interest. 
(iii) The Moderating Variables: Ownership Structure Variables  
As discussed in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter Four, the study analyses the interaction role of 
ownership variables on the UKCGI-Performance nexus. These moderating variables are: 
managerial, institutional and block ownership. Following prior studies, managerial (Jermias & 
Gani, 2014; Samaha et al., 2012) and institutional ownership (Chung & Yang, 2015; Tsai & 
Gu, 2007) were measured as the percentages of each type of ownership to the total firm 
shareholdings. Block ownership (Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013) was computed as the 
proportion of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary shareholdings). 
(iv) Justification and Measurement of Control Variables  
Variables controlled for in the interaction effect model are identical those used in the 
composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models (i.e., Models 2 and 3). These variables 
include cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), CEO tenure (CEOT), capital expenditure 
(CEX), sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. The measurements of these 
variables are outlined in Table 7. Subsections A-F of the composite-CG-index model provides 
the rationale for choosing these variables. 
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Table 7: Summary of Variables Employed in the Moderating-Effect Model 
Dependent Variable 
Q Book total assets minus equity’s market and book values scaled by book total assets. 
ROA Operating profit to total assets. 
SR Total share return obtained by adding capital gain (closing share price minus opening 
share price divided by opening share price) and dividend yield (dividend per share 
divided by opening share price). 
Independent Variables 
UKCGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the 
CG Code of 2010. Each CG provision of the constructed index is awarded a value of 1 if 
disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to 
a value ranging between 0 to 100 percent. 
Moderating Variables 
MANO Ratio of common shares owned by all inside and outside executives. 
ISTO Ratio of common shares owned by institutional shareholders. 
BLKO Ratio of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary shareholdings). 
Control Variables 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & 
Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
CEOT Total number of years an individual remained in the CEO position within a firm. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
(v) Model Specification  
Assuming that ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-Performance 
relationship, the fourth model is specified as follows: 
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Where: FFP denotes firm financial performance, proxied by Q-ratio, ROA and SR; UKCGI 
denotes the UK corporate governance index; OWN denotes ownership structure variables, including 
managerial (MANO), institutional (ISTO) and block (BLKO) ownership; INT denotes the interaction 
variables, namely UKCGI*MANO, UKCGI*ISTO and UKCGI*BLKO; CONTS denotes control 
variables for cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), CEO tenure (CEOT), capital expenditure (CEX), 
sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. 
The following subsection provides a description of the dependent (i.e., Executive Pay - 
EP), explanatory (CG quality) and control (general) variables used to examine CG’s impact 
on EP. The section also describes the variables employed to examine whether ownership 
structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus.   
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5.3.3 Corporate Governance and Executive Pay Models 
As discussed in Section 4.3 of Chapter Four, two main models have been adopted by prior 
studies examining the impact of firm-level CG quality on EP: (i) the composite-CG-index 
model and (ii) the individual-CG-variable model. The current study follows prior literature and 
constructs two main models to examine such associations. Subsection 5.3.3.1 outlines variables 
included in the composite-CG-index model, while Subsection 5.3.3.2 provides a discussion 
about variables included in the individual-CG-variable model. 
5.3.3.1 The Composite-CG-Index Model 
A comprehensive description of the dependent (i.e., EP), explanatory (UKCGI) and control 
(general) variables included in the composite-CG-index model is provided in this subsection. 
(i) The Dependent Variable: Executive Pay 
A considerable number of existing studies focus mostly on cash-based EP (e.g., Benito & 
Conyon, 1999; Chizema et al., 2015; Chung et al., 2015; Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999; 
Guest, 2009a; Hearn, 2013; Lambert et al., 1993; Luo, 2015; Mangel & Singh, 1993; Peng et 
al., 2015; Theeravanich, 2013). Few studies examine the impact of CG mechanisms on cash, 
non-cash and total-based EP (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Luo, 
2015; Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Reddy et al., 2015). These few studies are limited in that they focus 
mainly on the pay packages of CEOs, and neglect to consider the pay packages of other 
executives, such as Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) and all other executive directors (AEDs). 
The current study seeks to offer new evidence on CG’s influence on cash, non-cash and total 
pay of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs.  
Following prior studies (Conyon & He, 2011; Duong & Evans, 2015; Lee & Isa, 2015; 
Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Price et al., 2015; Reddy et al., 2015), the main predicted variable is the 
total pay of the CEO (CEOP), the CFO (CFOP) and all other executive directors (AEDP). 
Additionally, this study follows well-established CG studies (Lippert & Porter, 1997; Ntim et 
al., 2015a; Ntim et al., 2017; Schaefer, 1998) by defining CEOP, CFOP and AEDP as the 
natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary, and other reported cash remuneration), and 
non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs)13 pay scaled by a firm’s 
total assets in order to eliminate any potential size effects. Information about cash- and non-
                                               
13Following prior literature, executive share options were calculated using the exercised price (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Henderson & Fredrickson, 
1996; Henderson et al., 2013; Lambert et al., 1993). Similarly, following existing CG literature (Core et al., 1999; Ntim et al., 2015), the 
market value of the shares at the date of grant is used to measure LTIPs. 
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cash-based EP is extracted from firms’ annual reports. Table 8 provides the definitions of all 
variables included in the composite-CG-index model. 
(ii) The Independent Variables: UKCGI 
In line with existing studies, the UKCGI is employed as the main explanatory variable in the 
composite-CG-index approach. As explained in Subsection 5.3.1.1 of this chapter, the UKCGI 
consists of 120 CG provisions extracted mainly from the 2010 Combined Code. 
(iii) Justification and Measurement of Control Variables 
Following prior studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Chizema et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014; 
Ntim et al., 2015a; Peng et al., 2015), the study controls for several variables, including the 
existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), board 
meetings (FMs), sales growth (SG), firm age (AGE), capital expenditure (CEX), industry (IDU) 
and year (YDU) dummies. The following subsections provide a discussion about the theoretical 
and empirical arguments related to the selected control variables. 
a) Existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) 
Theoretically, CG committees can improve monitoring over management activities by 
increasing board independence and strengthening CG systems (Core, 2001; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
This can prevent executives from paying themselves excessively at the expense of shareholders. 
Empirically, there are few studies investigating the link among the existence of a separate CG 
committee and EP. Ntim et al. (2012b), for example, provide empirical evidence that firms that 
establish separate CG committees tend to have stronger CG structures, which can enhance 
monitoring of the opportunistic behaviours of management among 169 firms listed on 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Therefore, it is expected that corporations that establish a 
separate CG committee are less likely to pay executives excessively. Following prior studies 
(Ntim et al., 2015a; Ntim et al., 2012b), the existence of a separate CG committee is labelled 
as PCGC and measured as a dummy variable. 
b) Cross-listing (CL) 
Theoretically, there are mixed perspectives as to the influence of cross-listing on EP. On 
the one hand, it is argued that cross-listed firms require highly talented and qualified directors, 
who need to be financially motivated in order to attract and maintain them (Chizema et al., 
2015; Ntim et al., 2015a). By contrast, Chi and Zhang (2010) and Doidge (2004) suggest that 
cross-listed firms are associated with increased managerial monitoring so as to prevent 
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executives from expropriating shareholder resources (awarding themselves overly generous pay 
packages). Empirically, several CG studies (e.g., Chi & Zhang, 2010; Chizema et al., 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2015a) document that cross-listing has a positive influence on EP. Following 
Chizema et al. (2015) and Ntim et al. (2015a), cross-listing is labelled as CL and measured as 
a dummy variable. 
c) Audit firm size (AFS) 
Theoretically, it is suggested that larger audit firms enjoy several advantages over smaller 
counterparts, such as experience, expertise and financial resources (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Wallace et al., 1994). These advantages can improve audit quality and auditor independence 
(DeAngelo, 1981b). Additionally, DeAngelo (1981a) suggests that hiring large audit firms can 
improve the auditor’s ability to monitor the opportunistic behaviour of management, which can 
impact negatively on EP. 
Empirically, prior studies provide inconsistent results on the influence of the size of 
auditing firms on EP. For example, Ntim et al. (2015a) document a positive link among AFS, 
CEO and all executive directors pay for South African listed firms. In contrast, Ding et al. 
(2014) provide empirical evidence that AFS has a negative influence on EP among Chinese 
listed firms. Following existing literature (Ding et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2015a), audit firm size 
is labelled as AFS and measured as a dummy variable. 
d) Frequency of board meetings (FMs) 
Theoretically, the arguments as to the effect of board meetings on EP are inconclusive. On 
the one hand, Conger et al. (1998) and Vafeas (1999a) indicate that regular board meetings can 
enhance board efficiency and independence by allowing executives more time to evaluate the 
performance of management. By contrary, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Vafeas (1999a) 
indicate that frequent board meetings can increase agency costs, in the form of high executive 
pay, by limiting the time that outside directors spend monitoring management effectively. 
Empirically, a considerable number of prior studies document that EP is positively influenced 
by the frequency of board meetings (Brick et al., 2006; Ding et al., 2010; Luo, 2015; Ntim et 
al., 2015a). Following Brick et al. (2006) and Ntim et al. (2015a), board meetings is identified 
as FMs and computed as the number of a company’s board meetings. 
e) Firm age (AGE) 
Theoretically, it is suggested that older corporations require highly talented and qualified 
directors, who need to be financially motivated in order to attract and maintain them (He, 2008). 
However, Brandes et al. (2016) and Peng et al. (2015) argue that older corporations tend to 
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have stronger CG structures, which can increase monitoring of opportunistic behaviours such 
as excessive executive pay; thereby, older corporations tend to pay executives less than younger 
counterparts. Empirically, some past empirical studies (Brandes et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2015) 
document that firm age is negatively linked with EP. Firm age is defined by following Brandes 
et al. (2016), labelled as AGE and calculated as the number of years since the year of 
establishment. 
f) Capital expenditure (CEX) 
Theoretically, it is suggested that executives have more of an incentive to reduce capital 
expenditure because they tend to focus on short-term profits (Cheng, 2004). To mitigate the 
opportunistic reduction in capital expenditure, pay packages may need to be designed in a way 
that aligns management and shareholder interests (Dechow & Sloan, 1991). Therefore, firms 
with greater capital expenditure are expected to pay high remuneration in order to encourage 
executives to serve in all shareholders’ best interests. Similarly, Beiner et al. (2006) and Jensen 
(1986) suggest that higher capital expenditure can help in mitigating agency problems (i.e., 
excessive executive pay) by reducing cash flow available to directors. 
 Prior studies provide mixed findings. For instance, some of past empirical studies (e.g., 
Cheng, 2004; Ryan & Wiggins, 2001) document that capital expenditure is positively associated 
with EP. However, Ntim et al. (2015a) find that capital expenditure impacts negatively on CEO 
and all executives’ pay among 169 South African listed firms. In line with Ntim et al. (2015a), 
capital expenditure is labelled as CEX and computed as total capital expenditure scaled by total 
assets. 
g) Sales growth (SG) 
Executives in fast-growing firms are suggested to be paid high remuneration as a result of 
their remarkable initiative to improve the cash-flow positions in their firms (Ntim et al., 2015a). 
This indicates that fast-growing corporations tend to pay higher remuneration than slower 
growing counterparts. Prior studies empirically support this theoretical perspective and indicate 
that firm growth impacts positively on EP (Bugeja et al., 2015; Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-
Fuster, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a). Following Ntim et al. (2015a), sales growth is labelled as SG 
and calculated as the difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of 
previous year. 
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h) Industry and year dummies (IDU & YDU) 
Past studies (e.g., Ding et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2010) 
suggests that executive pay can vary over time  and across industries. Therefore, consistent with 
these studies, industry and year dummies are added to all study’s model so as to control for any 
possible unobserved heterogeneity between firms over the six-year period from 2008 to 2013. 
  Table 8: Summary of Variables Employed in the Composite-CG-Index Model 
Dependent Variable 
CEOP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and 
total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) 
remuneration of CEOs scaled by a firm’s total assets. 
CFOP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and 
total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) 
remuneration of CFOs scaled by a firm’s total assets. 
AEDP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and 
total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) 
remuneration of AEDs scaled by a firm’s total assets. 
Explanatory Variable 
UKCGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from 
the CG Code of 2010. Each CG provision of the constructed index is awarded a value 
of 1 if disclosure is made in firms’ accounts/reports and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled 
to a value ranging between 0 to 100 percent. 
Control Variables 
PCGC 1, if a corporation establish a separate CG committee, 0 if not. 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & 
Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
FMs Number of a company’s board meetings. 
AGE Number of years since establishing. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
 
(iv) Model Specification  
Following past studies, the current study assumes that all the predicted associations are 
linear, the fifth OLS equation is specified as follows: 
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Where: CEOP, CFOP or AEDP denotes total pay of CEO (CEOP), CFO (CFOP) and AEDs 
(AEDP); UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; CONTS denotes control variables for the 
existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), board meetings 
(FMs), firm age (AGE), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) 
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dummies. The following subsection presents and discusses variables used to examine whether 
firm-level CG quality, using individual-CG variables approach, impacts on EP. 
5.3.3.2 The Individual-CG-Variable Model  
The following subsections provide description of variables included in the individual-CG-
variable model. 
(i) The Dependent Variable: Executive Pay 
In this model, the measure used for EP is the same as that employed in the composite-CG-
index model. As discussed, the main predicted variable is the total pay of the CEO (CEOP), the 
CFO (CFOP) and all other executive directors (AEDP). The definitions of the predicted (EP), 
explanatory (CG) and control (general) are outlined in Table 9. 
(ii) The Independent Variables: Individual CG Mechanisms  
Seven board and remuneration committee characteristics are employed to investigate the 
influence of CG structures, using individual-CG variable model, on EP. As discussed in Section 
4.3.2 of Chapter Four, these characteristics include frequency of remuneration committee 
meetings (RCMs), remuneration committee independence (RCI), board size (BSE), board 
independence (IOE), board diversity (BD), separating CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT) 
and CEO tenure (CEOT). 
This study follows existing literature to define and measure the explanatory variables 
considered in the individual-CG-variable model. As shown in Table 9, remuneration committee 
meetings (Kanapathipillai et al., 2015) was computed as the number of remuneration committee 
meetings. Remuneration committee independence (Anderson & Bizjak, 2003) was computed 
as the ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives on a firm’s remuneration committee. Board size 
(Guest, 2009a; Reddy et al., 2015) was computed as the natural log (NL) of the number of 
inside and outside executives. Board diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ntim, 2015) was 
computed as the ratio of ethnic minorities and women on a boardroom. Board independence 
(Byrd et al., 2010; Jian & Lee, 2015) was computed as the ratio of outside (unaffiliated) 
executives on a boardroom. Separating the CEO and chairperson positions (Ding et al., 2014; 
Ntim et al., 2015a) was measured as a dummy variable. Finally, CEO tenure (Jian & Lee, 2015; 
Kim et al., 2015) was defined as  the number of financial years a person remained in the CEO 
position within a firm. 
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  Table 9: Summary of Variables Employed in the Individual-CG-Variable Model 
Dependent Variable 
CEOP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and 
total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) 
remuneration of CEOs scaled by a firm’s total assets. 
CFOP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and 
total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) 
remuneration of CFOs scaled by a firm’s total assets. 
AEDP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and 
total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) 
remuneration of AEDs scaled by a firm’s total assets. 
Independent Variables 
RCMs Number of RC meetings 
RCI Ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives on a RC. 
BSE NL of the number of inside and outside executives on a boardroom. 
IOE Ratio of outside (unaffiliated) executives on a boardroom. 
BD Ratio of ethnic minorities and females on a boardroom. 
DSPLIT 1 if CEO and chairperson positions are separated, 0 if not. 
CEOT Total number of years an individual remained in the CEO position within a firm. 
Control Variables 
PCGC 1, if a corporation establish a separate CG committee, 0 if not. 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & 
Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
FMs Number of a company’s board meetings. 
AGE Number of years since establishing. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
(iii) Justification and Measurement of Control Variables  
Variables controlled for in the individual-CG-variable model are identical to those used in 
the composite-CG-index model (i.e., Model 5). As explained, this study controls for the 
existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), board 
meetings (FMs), firm age (AGE), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) 
and year (YDU) dummies. 
(iv) Model Specification  
Following past studies, the current study assumes that all the predicted associations are 
linear, the sixth OLS regression equation is specified as follows: 
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Where: Where: CEOP, CFOP or AEDP refers to total pay of CEO (CEOP), CFO (CFOP) and 
AEDs (AEDP); RCMs denotes remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee 
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independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board ethnic and 
gender diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO 
tenure; CONTS denotes control variables for the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), cross-
listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), board meetings (FMs), firm age (AGE), capital expenditure (CEX), 
sales growth (SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. The following subsection provides a 
description of all variables employed to examine whether ownership structure variables can 
moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus. 
5.3.3.3 The Interaction Effect of Ownership Variables on the UKCGI-Pay Nexus  
Distinct from most past studies that investigate only the direct link among CG quality and 
executive pay, this study seeks to extend as well as contribute to previous work by investigating 
whether ownership structure variables (i.e., managerial, institutional and block ownership) can 
moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus. The rationale for focusing only on examining whether 
ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-EP relationship is that the UKCGI is 
the main interest of this study, because it constitutes a broad set of CG mechanisms, including 
those used in the individual CG variable model. The next subsection discusses all variables 
included in the moderating effect model.  
(i) The Dependent Variable: Executive Pay 
As explained, the main predicted variable is the total pay of the CEO (CEOP), the CFO 
(CFOP) and all other executive directors (AEDP). The definitions of the predicted (EP), 
explanatory (CG), interaction (ownership) and control (general) are outlined in Table 10. 
(ii) The Independent Variable: UKCGI 
The UKCGI is employed as the main explanatory variable. As discussed, the provisions 
included in this index have been extracted mainly from the 2010 Combined Code. These 
provisions cover five areas: (i) board leadership; (ii) board effectiveness; (iii) board 
accountability; (iv) executive pay; and (v) relations with shareholders. 
(iii) The Moderating Variables: Ownership Structure Variables  
This study analyses the interaction role of ownership variables on the UKCGI-EP nexus. 
These moderating variables are: managerial, institutional and block ownership. Following prior 
studies, managerial (Duong & Evans, 2015; Lee & Isa, 2015) and institutional ownership (Ntim 
et al., 2015a; Reddy et al., 2015) were measured as the percentages of each type of ownership 
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to the total firm shareholdings. Block ownership (Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Shin & Seo, 2011) was 
computed as proportion of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary 
shareholdings). 
(iv) Justification and Measurement of Control Variables  
Variables controlled for in the interaction effect model are identical to those used in the 
composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models (i.e., Models 5 and 6). This study 
controls for the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), cross-listing (CL), audit firm 
size (AFS), board meetings (FMs), firm age (AGE), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth 
(SG), industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. 
 
Table 10: Summary of Variables Employed in the Moderating-Effect Model 
Dependent Variable 
CEOP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total non-
cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) remuneration of CEOs scaled by 
a firm’s total assets. 
CFOP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total non-
cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) remuneration of CFOs scaled by 
a firm’s total assets. 
AEDP NL of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) and total non-
cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) remuneration of AEDs scaled 
by a firm’s total assets. 
Explanatory Variables 
UKCGI UK corporate governance (CG) index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the CG 
Code of 2010. Each CG provision of the constructed index is awarded a value of 1 if disclosure is 
made in the annual reports of firms and 0 otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging 
between 0 to 100 percent. 
Moderating Variables 
MANO Ratio of common shares owned by all inside and outside executives. 
ISTO Ratio of common shares owned by institutional shareholders. 
BLKO Ratio of block ownership (at least own 3% to total company ordinary shareholdings). 
Control Variables 
PCGC 1, if a corporation establish a separate CG committee, 0 if not. 
CL 1 if a corporation listed in an international stock exchange, 0 if not. 
AFS 1 if a corporation is audited by any of the big 4 auditing firms (KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young), 0 if not. 
FMs Number of a company’s board meetings. 
AGE Number of years since establishing. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
SG Difference between sales of current and previous years scaled by sales of previous year. 
IDU Dummies for each of the five industries. 
YDU Dummies for each of the six years. 
(v) Model Specification 
Assuming that managerial, institutional and block ownership can moderate the UKCGI-EP 
relationship, the seventh OLS equation is specified as follows: 
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Where: CEOP, CFOP or AEDP denotes total pay of CEO (CEOP), CFO (CFOP) and AEDs 
(AEDP); UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; OWN denotes ownership structure 
variables, including managerial (MANO), institutional (ISTO) and block (BLKO) ownership; INT 
denotes the interaction variables, namely UKCGI*MANO, UKCGI*ISTO and UKCGI*BLKO; CONTS 
denotes control variables for the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), cross-listing (CL), audit 
firm size (AFS), board meetings (FMs), firm age (AGE), capital expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), 
industry (IDU) and year (YDU) dummies. 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Data sources, the models employed and the measurement of variables included in all 
equations are discussed in the chapter. This chapter has covered three main issues: (i) 
addressing issues related to the research methodology, the sample selection procedure and the 
sources of required data; (ii) explaining models employed to examine the associations among 
CG mechanisms, CG compliance and disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and 
executive pay; and (iii) shedding light on the limitations of sampling and the index construction. 
As explained in the first section, this study relies on quantitative data to answer its research 
questions. Firms’ annual reports were used to extract CG, financial and executive pay data, 
while the DataStream was used to collect market data These data were collected for 100 
stratified firms listed on LSE throughout the period from 2008-2013. There are several reasons 
motivating the restriction of the final sample to 100 stratified listed firms, including the labour-
intensive nature of manually collecting data. 
The second section explains the seven models employed: the voluntary CG disclosure 
model (i.e., Model 1), the models employed to investigate CG’s impact on the 
performance/valuation of the sampled firms (i.e., Models 2 and 3), the model employed to 
examine whether ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-Performance nexus 
(i.e., Model 4), the models employed to investigate the effect of firm-level CG quality on 
executive pay (i.e., Models 5 and 6), and finally, the model 7 employed to investigate whether 
ownership structure variables can moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus. The first model examines 
the antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. As explained, a self-constructed 
index (UKCGI) has been developed in this study to measure CG quality among UK listed firms. 
The reliability and validity of the UKCGI were discussed in subsection 5.3.1.1. 
This study also uses two models (i.e., composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable 
models) to examine the association among firm-level CG quality, corporate 
performance/valuation and executive pay. The composite-CG-index model helps examine the 
association among firm-level CG quality using a broad measure, corporate 
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performance/valuation and executive pay, while the individual-CG-variable model examines 
the association among individual CG mechanisms, firm performance/valuation and executive 
pay. This study also creates an interaction variable among ownership structure variables, the 
UKCGI, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay so as to investigate whether 
ownership structure variables moderate such relationships. 
The next chapter presents the summary descriptive statistics and OLS assumptions for all 
variables employed to examine the antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure; it 
also presents the findings obtained from the multivariate regression. The chapter also reports 
and discusses the results obtained from different robustness tests, which address various 
endogeneity concerns and alternative CG indices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
CHAPTER SIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE VOLUNTARY CG 
DISCLOSURE MODEL 
6 AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
After shedding light on the research philosophy, the sample size and the sample selection 
procedures in Chapter Five, this chapter provides descriptive statistics and empirical results of 
the antecedents of CG disclosure. In particular, Section 6.1 presents and discusses the level of 
compliance with CG rules (UKCGI). Sections 6.2 and 6.3 present a statistical summary of the 
independent and control variables, respectively. Section 6.4 conducts general Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) misspecification tests relating to the variables employed in the voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure model. Section 6.5 presents and discusses the estimated OLS 
regression results relating to antecedents of voluntary CG disclosure. Section 6.6 checks the 
robustness and sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications and measures. The final 
section (6.7) summaries main points covered in this chapter.  
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE (UKCGI) 
This section provides a detailed description of CG compliance and disclosure of provisions 
that constitute the UKCGI in order to: (i) investigate the level of compliance with the 2010 
Combined Code; and (ii) to examine the improvement in compliance with CG provisions that 
constitutes the UKCGI over the study period. Additionally, as will be explained further below, 
the variability in CG compliance and disclosure among different firms can be explained by 
industrial classification and firm size. Thus, this study aims to understand the extent to which 
industry type and firm size can explain any observable differences in the levels of CG 
disclosure. The next subsection reports disclosure and compliance with the 2010 Combined 
Code (UKCGI) for all firms across six years. The followed subsection (6.1.2) reports CG 
compliance and disclosure for large and small firms. The level of disclosure and compliance 
with the UKCGI across different industries is reported in Subsection 6.1.3. Finally, Subsection 
6.1.4 reports CG compliance and disclosure for each sub-index that constitutes the UKCGI. 
6.1.1 The Levels of CG Compliance and Disclosure (Full Sample)  
As explained in Chapter Five, a CG index, called the UKCGI, has been developed in this 
research to investigate CG compliance and disclosure, and to determine CG provisions and sub-
indices that significantly contribute to the variability in the levels of CG compliance and 
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disclosure. Figure 3 presents a comparison of the levels of compliance with CG 
recommendations contained in the 2010 Combined Code using computed means and yearly 
increases/decreases expressed as a percentage. The figure shows that the aggregate compliance 
levels improved over time. Additionally, Table 11 shows that the aggregated CG score of the 
UKCGI slightly increased, from 59.97% in 2008 to 63.43% in 2013 (a small improvement of 
3.46%), with firms complying with an average of 61.73% of the provisions included in the 
UKCGI over the six years.  
 
Figure 3: Levels of compliance with the UKCGI over the period 2008-2013 using computed means 
The evidence that CG compliance has increased over time is consistent with past CG and 
accounting disclosure studies (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; Chen & Zhang, 2014; Henry, 2008). For 
instance, Ntim et al. (2012b) report evidence that compliance with CG provisions contained in 
King II report improves over time from 47% in 2002 to 69% in 2006 for 169 firms listed on 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Similarly, Moumen et al. (2015) examine whether voluntary 
risk disclosure in annual reports provides useful information to investors in MENA14 emerging 
markets for 809 firm-year observations throughout the period from 2007 to 2009. They report 
an annual increase in the number of risk sentences, from 23.41 sentences in 2007 to 29.76 
sentences in 2009. In the UK, past empirical studies also provide evidence that CG compliance 
is improving over time (Clacher et al., 2008; Conyon, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Farag et 
al., 2014; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005; Shrives & Brennan, 2015). 
For example, Arcot et al. (2010) investigate compliance with eight CG provisions that relate to 
the composition of the board and its subcommittees for 245 non-financial listed firms covering 
seven-years period 1998-2004. They provide empirical evidence that compliance with these 
                                               
14Moumen et al. (2015) include nine MENA emerging markets, including Egypt, Jordon, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.  
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provisions increased from 76.7% in 1998 to 91.14% in 2004, indicating that compliance with 
CG provisions increased in every year during the time period of their study.  
  Table 11: Compliance with CG Provisions that Constitute the UKCGI (%) 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
UKCGI for All Firm Years       
Mean 61.73 59.97 60.88 61.47 61.99 62.67 63.43 
Median  64.58 63.33 63.75 64.58 65.00 65.83 66.25 
STD 14.53 15.03 14.82 14.71 14.32 14.15 14.24 
Minimum 20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Maximum 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Further analysis of the compliance levels with all 120 CG provisions that constitute the 
UKCGI are reported in Table 12. The compliance levels (expressed as a percentage) for each 
provision as well as for each of the six years are reported to facilitate comparison. The 
comparison shows that compliance levels with each CG provision in each of the six years are 
substantially varied. The compliance levels range from 1% to 100%, where 1% is a significantly 
low level of compliance by all 100 firms over the sampled period and 100% means perfect 
compliance by all 100 firms over the sampled period. For example, all the firms have a 
significantly low level of compliance (1%) with the recommendations related to the attendance 
of a company secretary to board meetings (OCSBM) and the disclosure of meeting attendance 
records of a company secretary (OCSMAR). On the other hand, all firms perfectly comply 
(100%) with the recommendations related to disclosing information about board membership 
(DBM), board members’ names (DNBMs) and directors’ ownership interests (DDOI). 
The low level of compliance with OCSBM and OCSMAR indicates that firms pay less 
attention to these provisions. A possible explanation for the total non-compliance with these 
provisions is that UK CG regulations require listed firms to disclose information about board 
meetings and individual members’ attendance without clearly stating that firms should disclose 
information about the attendance of a company secretary. This can motivate the regulatory 
authorities (e.g., the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Reporting Council) to find ways 
to further strengthen enforcement. The perfect compliance with DBM, DNBMs and DDOI is in 
line with the guidance of the 2010 Combined Code and the 1995 Greenbury Report, 
respectively. The evidence of no variation in these five provisions (i.e., OCSBM, OCSMAR 
DBM, DNBMs and DDOI) over the sample period suggests that using a single CG mechanism 
(i.e., as suggested by the individual-CG variable model) as a measure for CG and linking it to 
performance or executive pay can be methodologically inappropriate.15 
                                               
15If all the sampled firms were either to comply with a provision or not comply with that provision, then a carefully specified cross-sectional 
regression should find no association among CG mechanisms, performance (Padgett & Shabbir, 2005, pp. 5-6) and executive pay (Newton, 
2015, p. 203). 
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Table 12 also reports that 90% or more of the sampled firms show relatively high 
compliance levels with 27 (22.5%) CG provisions contained in the 2010 Combined Code, 
including: separating CEO and chairperson positions (DUAL), establishment of nomination 
committee (NCOME), disclosure of audit fees (DAFs), disclosure of internal control policy and 
procedure (DICPPA), disclosure of the pay packages of directors (DCEOR), disclosure of the 
pay packages of outsider directors (DNEDR), disclosure about remuneration policy (DDRP) 
and disclosure of obligations to shareholders (OSHOLD).  
Additionally, Table 12 shows that there are 54 (45%) provisions with compliance levels 
ranging from 50% to about 88%. This suggests that around half of the sampled firms show 
relatively good compliance levels with these provisions. The provisions include disclosure of 
individual directors’ attendance at board meetings (DIDA), the existence of a nomination 
committee (NCOME), evaluation of board performance (EBPE), disclosure of terms of 
reference of a company secretary (OCSTR), whether the audit committee comprises at least 
three NEDs (ACCOM), whether audit committee performance is evaluated (ACPEE), the 
existence of a separate internal audit unit (EIAU), disclosure of all directors’ non-cash 
remuneration (DDNCR), existence of a remuneration consultant (RCONS), and disclosure of 
environmental (DENVE) as well as social (SOCD) issues.  
For the remaining 32 provisions, the levels of compliance range from 2%, in the case of 
evaluating the performance of both risk management chairperson (RMCCPE) and individual 
members (RMCIME), to 48%, with regard to the independence of the chairperson (CMI) and 
evaluating CEO performance (ECEOPE). Additionally, Table 12 reports that compliance levels 
with about 61% of the CG provisions included in the UKCGI (73 out of 120) improved slightly 
among the sampled firms. The table also shows that there is no improvement in 33% (39 out of 
120) of the provisions. In contrast, the table provides evidence of a reduction of about 1% in 
compliance with 8 CG provisions included in the UKCGI. 
Overall, Table 12 provides evidence that UK listed firms attach more importance to some 
internal CG provisions than others. For example, while 91% of the sampled firms comply with 
the recommendation that the CEO and chairperson positions should be separated (DUAL), only 
48% of the sampled firms have an independent chairperson (CMI). Similarly, while 97.8% of 
the sampled firms disclose their director remuneration policy (DDRP), only 32% disclose their 
“say on executive pay” policy. 
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Table 12: Compliance with CG Provisions that Constitute the UKCGI – Full Sample (%) 
Individual Internal CG Provisions of the UKCGI Yearly Average of the Level of Compliance (%) 
Avg. of 6 
Years 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
A. Leadership:        
1 Disclosure of board membership (DBM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 Role duality (DUAL) 91 90 91 91 91 92 90 
3 Frequency of board meetings (FBMs) 97.7 97 97 98 98 98 98 
4 Disclosure of individual director attendance (DIDA) 84.8 82 83 85 85 86 88 
5 Attendance of board’s meetings (PABMs) 87 84 85 87 87 88 88 
6 Statement on the independence of the chairperson (SICM) 38 36 39 36 37 41 40 
7 Senior independent director appointment (SID) 87 86 86 87 87 88 88 
8 The roles of the board and management (RBM) 50 48 49 50 50 51 51 
B. Effectiveness         
9 Board chairperson (BCM)  81 77 81 83 82 83 82 
10 Chairperson independence (CMI) 48 44 47 45 48 51 50 
11 Board composition (BCOM) 62.5 60 63 60 65 62 65 
12 Disclosure of the classification of directors (DCDs) 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
13 Disclosure of the process of evaluating board/executives (DPBE) 74.8 71 72 74 77 77 78 
14 Evaluation of board performance (EBPE) 74.5 72 74 74 75 75 77 
15 Evaluation of individual director performance (EIDs) 69.3 66 68 70 71 70 71 
16 Evaluation of board’s subcommittees performance (EBSCPE) 70.7 68 70 72 72 70 72 
17 Evaluation of CEO’s performance (ECEOPE) 48 51 49 44 44 47 53 
18 Evaluation of chairperson’s performance (ECPPE) 23 25 24 23 22 23 22 
19 Externally facilitated evaluation (EFE) 12.3 06 07 12 15 15 19 
20 Disclosure of the process of board/executives’ re-election (DPBRE) 86.7 85 85 86 86 89 89 
21 Disclosure of board members’ names (DNBMs) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
22 Disclosure of directors’ biographical details (DDBD) 97.8 97 98 98 98 98 98 
23 Disclosure of directors’ other details (DDODs) 66.2 62 65 67 69 67 67 
24 Disclosure of directors’ experience (DDEx) 94.7 93 95 95 95 95 95 
25 Disclosure about induction and training programmes (DITP) 57.7 54 56 57 59 60 60 
26 Detailed disclosure about training programmes (DDTP) 25.5 19 19 21 28 31 35 
27 Directors/subcommittees access to free independent legal advice (DAFILA) 81.5 80 80 82 81 82 84 
28 Directors/officers dealings and securities (DDS) 20.6 19 19 20 20 23 23 
29 Directors/officers share dealings (DSDs) 22.6 22 23 23 23 23 22 
30 Existence of nomination committee (NCOME) 88.3 87 87 87 89 90 90 
31 Terms of reference of nomination committee (NCOMTR) 74.8 72 73 73 75 78 78 
32 Disclosure of nomination committee membership (DNCOMM) 87.5 86 86 87 88 89 89 
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Continuation: Table 12 
Yearly Average of the Level of Compliance (%) 
Avg. of 6 
Years 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
33 Composition of nomination committee (NCOMC) 80.8 80 81 82 81 80 81 
34 Independence of chairperson of nomination committee (NCOMCP) 53.5 53 54 52 53 54 55 
35 Frequency of nomination committee meetings (NCOMFM) 27.5 20 25 23 29 32 36 
36 Individual members attendance of nomination committee’s meetings (NCOMIMA) 67.8 66 67 71 67 67 69 
37 Attendance of majority of nomination committee’s meetings (NCOMAMs) 68.5 67 68 72 68 68 68 
38 Evaluation of nomination committee as a group (ENCOMPE) 67.2 66 68 70 69 68 68 
39 Evaluation of nomination committee’s chairperson (ENCOMCP) 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 
40 Evaluation of performance of individual nomination committee members (ENCOMIMs) 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 
41 Existence of a company secretary (OCSE) 96.2 95 96 96 96 97 97 
42 Disclosure of the identity of a company’s secretary office holder (OCSI) 83.8 82 84 83 84 85 85 
43 Terms of reference of a company secretary (OCSTR) 64.3 62 63 64 64 66 67 
44 Attendance of board meetings by a company secretary (OCSBM) 0.1 0 0 01 01 01 02 
45 Disclosure of a company secretary meetings attendance record (OCSMAR) 0.1 0 0 01 01 01 01 
C. Accountability         
46 Preparing annual reports and accounts (PARA) 93.2 93 93 93 93 94 93 
47 Board statement on the status of a company’s going concern (BSSFGC) 92 92 92 92 92 92 93 
48 Existence of audit committee (ACE) 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
49 Conducting the roles of risk management committee (CRRMC) 76.5 78 77 75 76 76 77 
50 Terms of reference of audit committee (ACTR) 94 92 93 94 95 95 95 
51 Disclosure of audit committee membership (ACM) 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
52 Composition of audit committee (ACCOM) 69.3 64 64 69 71 72 76 
53 Independence of chairperson of audit committee (ACCP) 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
54 Frequency of audit committee meetings (ACFM) 58.3 52 56 56 61 63 62 
55 Individual members attendance of audit committee’s meetings (ACIMA) 82 78 81 82 82 83 83 
56 Attendance of majority of audit committee’s meetings (ACAMs) 81.3 78 81 82 82 83 82 
57 External auditor’s scope and responsibility (EASR) 85 82 84 84 86 87 87 
58 External auditor’s attendance of audit committee meetings (EAM) 75.3 72 73 75 73 76 83 
59 External auditor’s private meetings with audit committee (EAPMs) 52 49 49 51 52 53 58 
60 Disclosure of audit fees (DAFs) 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
61 Evaluation of audit committee as a group (ACPEE) 71.2 70 71 73 72 70 71 
62 Evaluation of audit committee’s chairperson (ACCPPE) 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 
63 Evaluation of performance of individual audit committee members (ACIME) 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 
64 Disclosure of a company’s risks (DFR) 94.3 92 93 94 96 95 96 
65 Disclosure of risk evaluation (DRE) 68 53 59 66 73 76 81 
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Continuation: Table 12 
Yearly Average of the Level of Compliance (%) 
Avg. of 6 
Years 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
66 Disclosure of policy on risk management (DPRM) 81.3 74 80 81 84 84 85 
67 Existence of risk management committee (RMC) 08 06 07 09 09 09 09 
68 Terms of reference of risk management committee (RMCTR) 06 05 06 08 07 07 07 
69 Disclosure of risk management committee membership (RMCM) 05 04 05 07 06 06 06 
70 Frequency of risk management committee meetings (RMCFM) 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 
71 Individual members attendance of risk management committee’s meetings (RMCIMA) 02 01 02 03 03 03 03 
72 Attendance of majority of risk management committee’s meetings (RMCAMs) 02 01 02 03 03 03 03 
73 Evaluation of risk management committee as a group (RMCPEE) 02 01 02 03 03 03 03 
74 Evaluation of risk management committee’s chairperson (RMCCPE) 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 
75 Evaluation of performance of individual risk management committee members (RMCIME) 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 
76 Composition of risk management committee (RMCCOMP) 02 01 02 02 02 02 02 
77 Disclosure of internal control policy and procedure (DICPPA) 95.8 95 96 96 96 96 96 
78 Existence of internal audit unit (EIAU) 56.2 55 55 56 56 57 58 
79 Internal auditor’s attendance of audit committee meetings (AMWAC) 37.7 36 37 37 35 37 38 
80 Internal auditor’s private meetings with audit committee (PMWAC) 21.8 21 22 21 22 22 23 
81 Review of risk management and internal control systems (RRMICSE) 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
D. Remuneration        
82 Existence of remuneration committee (RCE) 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
83 Disclosure of remuneration committee membership (RCM) 98.8 98 99 99 99 99 99 
84 Composition of remuneration committee (RCCOMP) 90.7 91 90 91 91 90 91 
85 Independence of chairperson of remuneration committee (RCCP) 
86 Frequency of remuneration committee meetings (RCFM) 
93.5 92 94 93 93 94 95 
60.3 61 61 62 52 62 64 
87 Individual members attendance of remuneration committee meetings (RCIMA) 79.8 76 78 81 80 82 82 
88 Evaluation of remuneration committee’s chairperson (RCCE) 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 
89 Evaluation of performance of individual remuneration committee members (RCIME) 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 
90 Attendance of majority of remuneration committee’s meetings (RCAMs) 79.7 77 79 81 80 81 80 
91 Terms of reference of remuneration committee (RCTR) 86.7 85 85 87 88 88 87 
92 Disclosure of CEO’s remuneration (DCEOR) 90 91 89 89 90 90 91 
93 Disclosure of other executive directors’ remuneration (DEDR) 90.5 91 90 90 90 91 91 
94 Disclosure of all directors’ cash remuneration (DDCR) 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
95 Disclosure of NEDs’ remuneration (DNEDR) 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
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Continuation: Table 12 
Yearly Average of the Level of Compliance (%) 
Avg. of 6 
Years 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
96 Disclosure of all directors’ non-cash remuneration (DDNCR) 88 87 87 87 87 88 89 
97 Disclosure of “say on executive pay” policy (DSEPP) 32 26 28 28 29 34 46 
98 Disclosure of directors’ ownership interests (DDOI) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
99 Composition of NEDs’ remuneration (CNEDR) 87 86 87 87 87 87 88 
100 Remuneration consultants (RCONS) 55 52 53 53 56 57 59 
101 Disclosure of all directors’ remuneration by name (DADRN) 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
102 Disclosure of executive directors long term incentive plan (DLTIP) 78.5 79 78 76 77 80 81 
103 Disclosure of directors’ remuneration policy (DDRP) 97.8 97 98 98 98 98 98 
E. Relations with Shareholders         
104 Obligations to shareholders (OSHOLD) 77.6 95 95 96 97 97 97 
105 Notice on AGMs (NAGMs) 96.2 72 72 72 73 74 74 
106 Disclosure of shareholders’ rights (DSHOLDR) 72.8 79 80 81 82 82 83 
107 Disclosure of names of board member attend AGMs (NBMAAGMs) 81.2 34 33 33 33 35 36 
108 Board chairperson attendance of AGMs (BCAAGMs) 34 23 23 23 24 26 27 
109 Nomination committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (NCCAAGMs) 24.3 23 23 23 22 23 24 
110 Remuneration committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (RCCAAGMs) 23 29 29 30 30 30 30 
111 Audit committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (ACCAAGMs) 29.7 29 29 28 27 28 30 
112 Risk management committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (RCCAAGMs) 28.5 04 04 04 03 03 04 
113 Disclosure of shareholder activism (DSHOLDA)  3.7 71 72 72 74 74 74 
114 Disclosure of policy about proxy voting (DPPV) 72.8 80 82 84 84 84 85 
115 Disclosure about obligations to society/community (DOS) 83.2 71 76 79 81 81 80 
116 Disclosure of environmental issues (DENVE) 78 82 84 83 88 89 95 
117 Social disclosure (SOCD) 86.8 56 59 61 64 65 65 
118 Disclosure about employee training and education programmes (ETEP) 61.7 55 58 59 64 65 66 
119 Health and safety disclosure (HSD) 70.8 68 69 68 72 74 74 
120 Disclosure of code of ethics (CETHICs) 69.7 67 69 70 70 70 72 
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The variations in the aggregate mean scores of the UKCGI can be explained by two possible 
reasons. First, high compliance with some provisions might be because these provisions are 
required by UK CG regulations (Arcot et al., 2010; Shrives & Brennan, 2015). For example, 
the UK Companies Act and Listing Rules require firms to provide information about board 
membership. Thus, all the sampled firms comply with the provision regarding disclosure of 
board membership (100%). Second, firms may take time to comply with all CG 
recommendations and this can be noticed in Table 12, which show that the levels of compliance 
gradually improve over the time period. For instance, the average compliance level with the 
provision of risk evaluation (DRE) scored 53%, 59%, 66%, 73%, 76% and 81% during the 
years from 2008 to 2013, respectively. The lower scores might due to (i) weak enforcement by 
regulatory authorities (e.g., the London Stock Exchange and the Financial Reporting Council); 
and (ii) some CG provisions may not applicable to all firms. For instance, some of the sampled 
corporations stated that establishing a separate internal audit unit is inappropriate or irrelevant. 
In spite of varied levels of compliance with the UKCGI, it should be acknowledged that most 
compliance levels slightly improved over the sample time period.  
To better explain the differences in CG compliance and disclosure among the UK listed 
firms, the next subsections will further present the distributional features of the UKCGI among 
the sampled firms based on firm size (Subsection 6.1.2), industry type (Subsection 6.1.3) and 
the UKCGI sub-indices (Subsection 6.1.4).   
6.1.2 The Levels of CG Compliance and Disclosure (Firm Size) 
As explained above, this study seeks to ascertain whether firm size can explain the 
observable differences in CG compliance and disclosure. In line with existing literature, which 
suggest that the level of CG disclosure is influenced positively by firm size (e.g., Bauer et al., 
2008; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Liao et al., 2013), the current study 
divided the sampled firms into two sample groups (i.e., 50 large and 50 small) according to 
their market capitalisation.16  
Table 13 presents a comparison of CG compliance and disclosure, using computed means 
and yearly increases/decreases expressed as a percentage, among the sampled large and small 
firms. First, Table 13 reports that the compliance levels among smaller sampled firms are 
generally lower than those for large firms over the sampled period. More precisely, large firms 
complied with 69% of the 120 CG provisions investigated, whereas small firms complied only 
with 54% of the provisions. Second, Table 13 also indicates that the levels of compliance with 
                                               
16Market capitalisation is considered an objective measure of firm size (Ghosh & Wu, 2007; Holland, 2006). 
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good CG practices for both large and small firms have improved over time. For example, the 
levels of compliance for large firms slightly increased, from 67.8% in 2008 to 68.7%, 69.1%, 
69.5%, 70.2% and 70.7% in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. This provides 
further evidence that there is an improvement in CG practices among UK listed firms over time, 
regardless of firm size.  
  Table 13: Compliance with CG Provisions that Constitute the UKCGI – Firm Size (%) 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A:UKCGI        
Mean 61.73 59.97 60.88 61.47 61.99 62.67 63.43 
Median  64.58 63.33 63.75 64.58 65.00 65.83 66.25 
STD 14.53 15.03 14.82 14.71 14.32 14.15 14.24 
Minimum 20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Maximum 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel B:All Large Firms       
Mean 69.37 67.85 68.73 69.17 69.52 70.23 70.70 
Median  72.92 71.25 71.67 72.50 72.92 73.75 73.33 
STD 12.70 13.42 13.09 12.85 12.51 12.06 12.68 
Minimum 20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Maximum 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel C:All Small Firms         
Mean 54.10 52.08 53.03 53.77 54.47 55.10 56.17 
Median  55.83 52.92 55.00 55.83 56.25 57.08 57.92 
STD 12.04 12.23 12.12 12.30 11.93 11.92 11.89 
Minimum 23.33 23.33 23.33 24.17 24.17 24.17 25.83 
Maximum 76.67 74.17 75.00 75.00 75.00 76.67 75.83 
Figure 4 reveals that CG compliance has improved over time, regardless of firm size. It 
also shows that larger firms comply more with CG recommendations contained in the 2010 
Combined Code. This is in line with the results of past CG literature. For instance, Farag et al. 
(2014) find that larger companies comply more with CG standards than smaller counterparts 
over the years 2000-2007. Similarly, other studies conducted in the UK (e.g., Hussainey & Al‐
Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012) find that larger firms tend to comply more with good 
CG practices than smaller counterparts. 
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Figure 4: The levels of CG compliance by firm size. 
To make further informative inferences about the research data, Appendix 3 investigates 
whether there is any variation among large and small companies in terms of complying with 
good CG practices, by examining compliance with each of the 120 CG provisions that constitute 
the UKCGI. This allows us to identify CG provisions that may account for the observed 
variations among small and large companies.  As explained above, the sample was divided into 
50 large and 50 small firms over the sample period. This resulted in all small and large firms 
having 300 firm-year observations each.  
Evidence from Appendix 3 indicates that there is substantial difference among the sampled 
large and small companies in terms of complying with provisions contained in the 2010 
Combined Code. Particularly, Appendix 3 shows that all larger companies have higher levels 
of compliance with 94 out of 120 CG provisions than smaller counterparts. The Appendix also 
shows that there is no substantial difference among the sampled large and small companies in 
eight out of 120 CG provisions. In contrast, the levels of compliance with 18 out of 120 CG 
provisions are higher for small companies than for large firms. These include disclosure of the 
classification of directors (DCDs); disclosure of board statement on the status of a company’s 
going concern (BSSFGC); disclosure of audit fees (DAFs) and disclosure of all directors’ 
remuneration by name (DADRN).  
The appendix also provides evidence that certain CG provisions can better explain the 
observed differences in compliance with CG standards between small and large firms. To be 
specific, 26 CG provisions included in the UKCGI (21.5%) showed the highest variability 
between small and large sampled firms. The variability for these provisions is 30 percentage 
points or more. For example, whilst on average 90% of large firms have a majority of outside 
directors on their boards; only 35% of small firms have a majority of outside directors on their 
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boards. Similarly, while the audit committees of 84% of large firms meet four times per year; 
this is true for only 33% of small firms.  
As explained above, the positive association between firm size and CG scores provides 
support for prior UK studies (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Farag et 
al., 2014; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012). The evidence that firms 
size has a positive relationship with the CG scores can be explained by these reasons. First, 
large firms are associated with greater asymmetry of information compared with small firms, 
because they tend to have complex capital structure (Chung & Zhang, 2011). As a result of that, 
large firms are required to maintain good CG systems in order to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems (Christensen et al., 2015; Klapper & Love, 2004). Second, the variation 
of compliance levels might also due to the cost of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG 
practices (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015). Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) and Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) argue that smaller companies may not able to afford the costs involved in 
complying with good CG practices than larger counterparts . Finally, large firms have a greater 
need for external finance than small firms, and so they need to enhance their voluntary 
disclosure practices in order to attract external capital at low cost (Botosan, 1997; Klapper & 
Love, 2004).  
6.1.3 The Levels of CG Compliance and Disclosure (Industrial Groups) 
As explained in the research design chapter, industry type is an important factor that may 
influence compliance levels with CG standards (Bauer et al., 2004; Botosan, 1997; Cooke, 
1992). Farag et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that companies operating in the 
biotechnology sectors tend to have a high degree of CG compliance, while companies operating 
in electronics sectors have the lowest levels of compliance. In line with previous CG studies 
(e.g., Elbadry et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Farag et al., 2014; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 
2012; Ntim et al., 2012b), this research sample is classified into five main industries based on 
LSE classification. The sample of the study has been classified according to industry type in 
order to ascertain whether industry type can explain observable differences in CG compliance 
with the recommendations contained in the 2010 Combined Code. The five industries examined 
in this research are technology, consumer services, industrials, consumer goods, basic 
materials. Therefore, the full sample is divided into 20 firms from each industry, and those 20 
firms (ten large and ten small) are selected based on market capitalisation. 
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Table 14: Compliance with CG Provisions that Constitute the UKCGI – Industry Type (%) 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A:UKCGI        
Mean 61.73 59.97 60.88 61.47 61.99 62.67 63.43 
Median  64.58 63.33 63.75 64.58 65.00 65.83 66.25 
STD 14.53 15.03 14.82 14.71 14.32 14.15 14.24 
Minimum 20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Maximum 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel B:Basic Material Firms       
Mean 56.18 54.71 55.54 56.17 56.04 57.17 57.46 
Median  54.17 50.83 52.08 53.33 53.33 54.58 56.25 
STD 18.22 19.01 19.08 18.70 18.23 17.89 18.58 
Minimum 20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Maximum 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel C:Consumer Goods Firms       
Mean 64.69 63.21 64.21 64.29 64.67 65.71 66.08 
Median  71.66 66.67 70.83 70.42 72.50 72.92 73.33 
STD 12.67 13.75 13.41 13.27 12.58 12.28 12.09 
Minimum 30.00 30.00 34.17 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
Maximum 79.17 77.50 79.17 77.50 75.83 76.67 75.83 
Panel D:Consumer Services Firms      
Mean 63.94 64.42 62.67 63.67 64.83 65.38 65.71 
Median  66.67 63.33 65.83 67.08 67.08 67.50 69.17 
STD 11.15 12.42 11.99 11.57 11.02 10.35 10.19 
Minimum 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.83 40.83 42.50 
Maximum 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 
Panel E:All Industrial Firms       
Mean 61.60 59.75 60.67 61.46 62.13 62.33 63.25 
Median  63.33 61.67 62.50 63.33 62.92 63.33 63.33 
STD 12.76 13.55 13.19 13.03 12.58 12.60 12.90 
Minimum 32.50 32.50 33.33 33.33 34.17 34.17 35.00 
Maximum 82.50 80.00 80.83 80.83 81.67 81.67 82.50 
Panel F: All Technology Firms      
Mean 62.26 60.75 61.33 61.75 62.29 62.75 64.67 
Median  66.67 67.08 67.50 66.67 65.83 66.25 67.92 
STD 15.45 15.68 15.43 15.98 15.64 16.03 15.60 
Minimum 23.33 23.33 23.33 24.17 24.17 24.17 25.83 
Maximum 80.00 80.00 79.17 79.17 80.00 80.00 80.00 
Table 14 provides a comparison of compliance levels with the recommendations contained 
in the 2010 Combined Code among the five sampled industries using computed means. First, 
the Table reports that consumer goods and consumer services firms complied with 64.69% and 
63.94% of the CG provisions included in the UKCGI, respectively, indicating that firms 
operating in the consumer goods and consumer services industries tend to comply more with 
the recommendations of the 2010 Combined Code than those operating in the other industries. 
The industrials and technology industries come second, with compliance scores of about 62%. 
Basic materials firms scored the lowest, at 56%.  
Table 14 also reports that compliance with the recommendations of the 2010 Combined 
Code for the five main industries have slightly improved over time. For example, the levels of 
compliance for consumer goods firms slightly increased, from 63.2% in 2008 to 64.2%, 64.3%, 
64.7%, 65.7% and 66.1% in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively. This provides 
evidence that levels of compliance have improved over time regardless of industry type. 
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Similarly, Figure 5 reports that there are slight improvements in CG compliance and 
disclosure over time regardless of industry type. It also shows that consumer goods and 
consumer services industries have the highest levels of compliance, whereas basic materials 
firms have the lowest levels of compliance. This is in line with Farag et al. (2014) and Mallin 
and Ow-Yong (2012) results that basic materials and oil and gas firms have the lowest 
compliance scores. The figure also provides evidence that there is little variation in CG 
compliance and disclosure amongst the classified industries compared with firm size groupings. 
This may suggest that the variability in CG compliance and disclosure amongst the sampled 
firms is explained less by industrial classification and more by firm size. 
 
Figure 5: The levels of CG compliance by industry type. 
Further, to identify CG provisions that may account for the observed differences between 
various industries, a comparison of the levels of compliance with each of the 120 CG provision 
based on the five industrial groupings is provided in Appendix 4. First, the levels of compliance 
with each CG provision included in the UKCGI vary substantially amongst industries. For 
example, only 40% of basic materials firms complied with disclosure of evaluation of 
nomination committee (ENCOMPE), whereas 81% of consumer services firms complied with 
the same provision. In addition, CG disclosure score of evaluation of audit committee (ACPEE) 
is only 45% for basic material firms, whilst 81% and 80% of consumer services and technology 
firms complied with this provision, respectively.  
Second, 26 out of the 120 provisions examined (21.5%) scored 80 percentage points or 
above in all the five industries. These provisions include disclosure of board membership 
(DBM), disclosure of members’ meetings attendance record (PABMs) and the existence of an 
audit committee (ACE). In contrast, 19 out of 120 provisions (16%) scored between 0% and 
20% in all industries. These provisions include the presence of a risk committee (RMC), 
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disclosure of RM committee’s membership (RMCM) and disclosure about evaluating the 
performance of the remuneration committee’s chair (RCCE).  
The levels of compliance for the remaining 75 provisions (62.5%) vary between 21% and 
89% in all industries. For instance, the aggregate mean score of disclosure about a company 
secretary’s terms of reference (OCSTR) ranges from 53%, for basic material firms, to 82%, for 
consumer goods firms; similarly, the aggregate mean score of disclosure about risk evaluation 
(DRE) ranges from 42%, for basic material firms, to 81%, for consumer service firms. 
Furthermore, consumer services and technology firms scored the highest levels of compliance 
with CG standards. Specifically, consumer services and technology firms complied most with 
20 and 18 CG provisions examined, respectively. Basic material industries had the highest level 
of compliance for only nine provisions. Overall, the finding that firms operating in different 
industries engage in different levels of disclosure and compliance with CG practices is 
consistent with the findings of past UK empirical and theoretical literature (e.g., Elshandidy et 
al., 2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Melis et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007).  
6.1.4 The Levels of CG Compliance and Disclosure (Sub-Indices)  
  A statistical summary of CG compliance and disclosure for each sub-index is reported 
here. The UKCGI is divided into five sub-indices based on the recommendations of the 2010 
Combined Code. These five sub-indices are: (i) leadership (LSH), with 8 CG provisions; (ii) 
effectiveness (ETIV), with 37 CG provisions; (iii) accountability (ACNT), with 36 CG 
provisions; (iv) remuneration (REM), with 22 CG provisions; and (v) relations with 
shareholders (RWS), with 17 CG provisions. The following figure (6) shows CG compliance 
for each of the five sub-indices over the six years examined. 
 
Figure 6: The levels of CG compliance by sub-indices. 
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Figure 6 indicates that there are variations among the sampled firms in terms of the 
importance they attach to the provisions included in each sub-index of the UKCGI. Specifically, 
79.35% of the sampled firms complied with the leadership provisions, while 77.58% of the 
sampled firms complied with the remuneration provisions. The level of compliance with the 
provisions related to effectiveness, relations with shareholders and accountability provisions is 
59.01%, 57.50% and 52.94%, respectively. 
The high levels of compliance with leadership and remuneration provisions, as explained 
in Subsection 6.1.1, may be due to the nature of these provisions. Regulatory bodies, such as 
the LSE, impose these provisions to improve the independence of firm boards, as well as to 
improve control over executives’ remuneration by requiring higher disclosure and transparency 
of board practices and executive pay. For example, levels of compliance with the requirements 
of disclosure of board membership (DBM), disclosure of the existence of an independent 
remuneration committee (RCE) and disclosure about remuneration policy (DDRP) are 100%, 
99% and 97.8%, respectively. By contrary, the lower compliance with provisions relating to 
effectiveness and relations with shareholders may due to that some CG provisions may not 
applicable to all firms. 
The distribution of the five UKCGI sub-indices varies substantially, as presented in Table 
15. For example, the board accountability sub-index (ACNT) ranges from 11.11% to 97.22%, 
with firms complying with an average of 52.94% of the 36 CG provisions examined. Similarly, 
Table 15 reports that compliance with CG provisions relating to the other UKCGI sub-indices 
vary substantially. Additionally, the levels of compliance with the provisions included in the 
five sub-indices have slightly improved over time. Specifically, the scores for the leadership 
sub-index slightly increased, from 78.75% in 2008 to 80.38% in 2013. Similarly, the scores for 
effectiveness, accountability, remuneration and relations with shareholders’ sub-indices 
slightly increased, from 57.03%, 51.03%, 76.73% and 55.18% in 2008 to 60.84%, 54.50%, 
79.09% and 59.76% in 2013, respectively. This may be due to growing understanding of the 
importance of CG amongst listed firms (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013).  
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Table 15: Compliance with the UKCGI Sub-Indices (%) 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A:UKCGI        
Mean 61.73 59.97 60.88 61.47 61.99 62.67 63.43 
Median  64.58 63.33 63.75 64.58 65.00 65.83 66.25 
STD 14.53 15.03 14.82 14.71 14.32 14.15 14.24 
Minimum 20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Maximum 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel B:Leadership       
Mean 79.35 78.75 78.75 79.25 79.38 80.50 80.38 
Median  87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 
STD 18.02 18.68 18.68 17.87 17.80 17.16 17.79 
Minimum 12.50 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 12.50 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel C:Effectiveness        
Mean 59.01 57.03 58.11 58.68 59.41 60.00 60.84 
Median  64.86 62.16 62.16 64.86 66.22 64.86 64.86 
STD 18.33 18.75 18.54 18.36 18.35 17.89 18.25 
Minimum 13.51 13.51 13.51 16.22 16.22 16.22 16.22 
Maximum 91.89 89.19 89.19 89.19 89.19 91.89 91.89 
Panel D:Accountability        
Mean 52.94 51.03 52.06 52.89 53.39 53.78 54.50 
Median  52.78 52.78 52.78 52.78 52.78 52.78 55.56 
STD 12.86 13.22 12.98 12.97 12.91 12.51 12.56 
Minimum 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 
Maximum 97.22 97.22 97.22 97.22 97.22 97.22 97.22 
Panel E:Remuneration        
Mean 77.58 76.73 77.05 77.32 77.09 78.18 79.09 
Median  81.82 81.82 81.82 81.82 81.82 81.82 86.36 
STD 15.00 14.79 15.27 15.13 14.90 15.21 14.97 
Minimum 04.55 04.55 04.55 04.55 04.55 04.55 04.55 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel F: Relations with shareholders       
Mean 57.50 55.18 56.29 56.82 58.12 58.82 59.76 
Median  58.82 52.94 52.94 52.94 58.88 58.82 58.82 
STD 22.71 23.75 22.75 23.01 22.28 22.57 22.13 
Minimum 05.88 05.88 05.88 05.88 05.88 05.88 11.76 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
To conclude, this section shows that the CG compliance and disclosure increased slightly 
from 2008 to 2013. Additionally, in line with extant literature (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Cooke, 
1992; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012), the study finds that the level 
of CG compliance varies substantially amongst UK listed firms according to firm size and sub-
indices. However, the study also provides evidence that the variability in the level of CG 
compliance is explained less by industrial classification and more by firm size. Overall, the 
evidence provided in the current study suggest that firm size and industry type impact CG 
practices among the sampled firms. This justifies the selection of the sample based on company 
size and industrial classification, in order to reduce sample selection bias by achieving greater 
variability amongst the selected firms.  
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6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
A statistical summary of the independent variables used in the model examining the 
antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure is reported in Table 16. First, with 
respect to board characteristics, Panels A to F of Table 16 contain the descriptive statistics for 
these characteristics. The panels show wide variations for all board characteristics under 
examination. In line with existing CG studies (Guest, 2009b; Ozkan, 2007) Panel A shows that 
board size ranges between 3 and 18 members, with a mean of 9. The board size average is in 
line with prior UK studies (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Ozkan, 2011; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 
2013; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), which report an average board size of 9 directors. 
Furthermore, Panel A shows that the board size mean was stable over the sampled period – nine 
board members in 2008 and 8.92 board members in 2013. This finding is in line with those of 
Ozkan (2011).  
The proportion of outside (unaffiliated) directors ranges from 10% to 92.86%, with a mean 
of 59.12%, which is line with the results of Al-Najjar and Abed (2014). The mean percentage 
of outside (unaffiliated) directors slightly increased, from 58.05% in 2008 to 60.20% in 2013. 
This suggests that CG reforms assisted in enhancing the independence of firm boards. The 
evidence of increasing the percentage of outside (unaffiliated) directors over time is  in line 
with those of Ozkan (2011), who reports that the proportion of outside (unaffiliated) directors 
increased from 49.1% in 1999 to 57.1% in 2005. Similarly, this  result is in line with 
Veprauskaitė and Adams (2013), reporting that the average proportion of outside (unaffiliated) 
directors is 57%. 
Summary descriptive statistics for board diversity based only on gender (BDG) are reported 
in Panel C of Table 16. This ranges from 0% to 50%, with an average of 10.27%. This implies 
that males dominate the average UK listed firm’s board, which lend support to past UK studies 
(e.g., Brammer et al., 2007; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004). For example, Brammer et al. (2007) 
report that the average UK listed corporation’s board consists of 8.4 males and 0.5 females. 
Similarly, Dowling and Aribi (2013) reveal that board gender diversity for FTSE 100 firms 
ranges from 0% to 40%, with a mean of 8%. Panel C also implies that the percentage of females 
on UK corporate boards has increased over the sampled period, from 7.69% in 2008 to 13.40% 
in 2013. This implies that CG reforms (i.e., Davies-Report, 2011; FRC, 2008, 2010) have 
helped increased the gender diversity of UK corporate boards. 
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        Table 16: Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Board Size     
Mean 9.00 9.07 9.10 9.00 8.95 8.96 8.92 
Median  8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
STD 3.46 3.43 3.49 3.55 3.55 3.51 3.33 
Minimum   3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 
Maximum 18.00 17.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Panel B: Board Independence (%)     
Mean 59.12 58.05 58.05 58.86 60.58 58.94 60.20 
Median  60.00 58.33 60.00 60.00 66.67 60.00 63.64 
STD 17.66 17.47 18.23 18.03 17.56 17.75 17.23 
Minimum   10.00 10.00 10.00 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 
Maximum 92.86 92.31 92.86 90.91 91.67 92.31 92.31 
Panel C: Board Diversity Based on Gender (%)      
Mean 10.27 7.69 8.07 9.04 10.80 12.62 13.40 
Median  10.00 7.14 7.14 7.42 10.00 12.50 13.81 
STD 10.43 8.63 8.79 9.81 10.92 11.25 11.63 
Minimum   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 50.00 42.86 37.50 40.00 50.00 40.00 44.44 
Panel D: Board Diversity Based on Ethnicity (%)      
Mean 1.37 1.26 1.51 1.26 1.48 1.39 1.36 
Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 3.98 3.56 4.22 3.59 4.04 4.23 4.25 
Minimum   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 25.00 18.18 20.00 22.22 22.22 25.00 25.00 
Panel E: Board Diversity Based on Gender & Ethnicity (%)  
Mean 11.65 8.95 9.58 10.30 12.28 14.01 14.76 
Median  11.11 7.69 8.71 10.00 12.50 14.29 14.29 
STD 11.40 9.82 9.94 10.44 11.80 12.23 12.83 
Minimum   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 50.00 42.86 37.50 40.00 50.00 40.00 44.44 
Panel F: Existence of a Separate CG Committee (%)     
Mean 14.33 13.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 17.00 
Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 35.07 33.80 34.87 34.87 34.87 34.87 37.75 
Minimum   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel G: Cross-listing (%)       
Mean 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 45.86 46.06 46.06 46.06 46.06 46.06 46.06 
Minimum   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel H: Audit Firm Size (%)       
Mean 82.00 82.00 81.00 81.00 82.00 83.00 83.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 38.45 38.62 39.43 39.43 38.61 37.75 37.75 
Minimum   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel I: Managerial Ownership (%)       
Mean 5.95 6.20 6.00 5.74 5.69 5.87 6.18 
Median  0.58 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.46 0.53 
STD 11.40 11.52 11.32 11.03 11.10 11.49 12.21 
Minimum   0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.009 
Maximum 52.37 51.33 51.33 51.33 51.33 51.33 52.37 
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        Table 16 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel J: Institutional Ownership (%)     
Mean  38.38 38.22 38.03 37.27 38.58 39.69 38.45 
Median  36.38 36.66 35.40 37.16 37.25 36.38 36.07 
STD 20.70 21.71 21.33 19.47 20.20 20.58 21.32 
Minimum   3.07 4.12 3.98 4.97 5.92 3.07 4.02 
Maximum 97.49 97.49 97.42 95.54 96.56 96.30 96.42 
Panel K: Block Ownership (%)     
Mean 42.62 42.15 42.43 42.03 43.15 43.75 42.23 
Median  43.20 42.98 42.23 41.94 44.06 46.51 43.13 
STD 21.55 22.09 21.87 20.92 21.34 21.33 22.24 
Minimum   3.07 3.29 3.98 4.97 5.92 3.07 4.02 
Maximum 98.08 96.22 98.08 97.60 97.36 95.14 92.04 
The descriptive statistics of board diversity based on ethnicity (BDE), is presented in Panel 
D. The evidence shows that board diversity based on ethnicity is low, ranging from 0% to 25%, 
with a mean of 1.37%. Panel D also shows that the mean of board diversity based on ethnicity 
was stable over the sampled period – 1.26% in 2008 and 1.36% in 2013. This indicates that 
non-white people make up a small proportion of UK corporate boards. Additionally, Panel E 
presents the descriptive statistics for board diversity based on both gender and ethnicity (BD), 
ranging from 0% to 50%, with a mean of 11.65%. Overall, Panel E indicates that white males 
dominate the average UK listed firm’s board; this lends supports to the results of Brammer et 
al. (2007). Panel E also reports board diversity in general has increased over the sampled period, 
from 8.95% in 2008 to 14.76% in 2013. This may due to increasing requirements for UK listed 
firms to have diversified boards (e.g., FRC, 2008, 2010).  
The descriptive statistics for the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) among UK 
listed firms are presented in Panel F. The panel shows that only 14% of the firms have a separate 
CG committee, indicating that about 86% of the sampled firms do not have separate CG 
committees. Two categorical variables are used in Panels G and H to measure the impact of 
cross-listing and audit firm size on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. As shown in Table 
16, 70% and 82% of the examined firms are cross-listed and audited by a Big Four firm, 
respectively. Additionally, a statistical summary of the ownership structure variables is reported 
in Panels I to K of Table 16. The panels indicate adequate variation in these variables. To be 
specific, Panel I reports that managerial ownership has a mean of 5.95%, and ranges from 
0.005% to 52.37%, with a standard deviation of 11.40%. Additionally, as reported in Table 16, 
the mean of managerial ownership was relatively stable over the sampled period; it was 6.20% 
in 2008 and decreased slightly to 6.18% in 2013. The low mean percentage of managerial 
ownership among UK listed firms lends supports to the results of past UK studies (e.g., 
Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012). For example, Wang and Hussainey 
(2013) report that managerial ownership has a mean of 7%. 
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Panel J reports the statistical analysis for institutional ownership. It ranges from 3.07% to 
97.49%, with average of 38.38%. The institutional ownership has a standard deviation of 
20.70%, indicating adequate variation in this variable. Additionally, the mean of institutional 
ownership was relatively stable over the sampled period – from 38.22% in 2008 to 38.45% in 
2013. The high mean  percentage of institutional ownership among sampled firms lends support 
to past UK studies (e.g., Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Mallin and 
Ow-Yong (2012), for example, report that institutional ownership ranges from 0% to 98.30%, 
with a mean of 29.58%. This implies that institutional investors in the UK hold large stakes and 
manage large investment funds, which might encourage them to monitor management 
effectively. 
Finally, Panel K reports the statistical analysis for block ownership. It ranges between 
3.07% and 98.08%, with an average of 42.62%. As shown in Table 16, the mean of block 
ownership was relatively stable over the sampled period; it was 42.15% in 2008 and become 
42.23% in 2013. The high mean percentage of block ownership lends support to the results of 
previous UK studies (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Ozkan, 2007). For example, Veprauskaitė 
and Adams (2013) report that the average block ownership among UK listed firms is 40%. This 
result also similar to the findings of Padgett and Shabbir (2005) and Ozkan (2011), who report 
an average block ownership of 28.89% and 20.22%, respectively. The mean percentage of block 
ownership remains constant and high over the sampled period. This indicates that block holders 
in the UK hold large stakes and hence they can play an active role to monitor management 
effectively. 
6.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CONTROL VARIABLES 
A statistical summary of control variables, namely firm size (LTA), firm age (AGE), capital 
expenditure (CEX), growth of sales (SG), gearing (GR) and profitability (Q-ratio) is presented 
in Table 17. Panel A reports that firm size ranges from £0.983 million to £274,508 million, with 
an average of £17,744 million. Additionally, Panel B indicates the age of the UK sampled firms, 
ranging from three years to 199 years, with an average of 58 years. Panel C provides summary 
descriptive statistics for capital expenditure after winsorising.17 Overall, the capital expenditure 
                                               
17Outliers were present in the control variables. The value of sales growth, for instance, ranges from -83% to 841%. This suggests the presence 
of extreme values, which can seriously violate the assumptions of the OLS. To reduce the effect of outliers, and following prior CG literature 
(Ammann et al., 2011, p. 42; 2013, p. 460; Beiner et al., 2006, p. 259; Hüttenbrink et al., 2014, p. 1185; Liu et al., 2014, p. 172), control 
variables (CEX, SG) were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. Particularly, an ascending ranking order for the entire sample (600 firm-year 
observations) based on each of the control variables is followed. The highest and lowest 30 values of each of the control variables is replaced 
with the 31st and 569th values, respectively. It should be acknowledged that the main CG variables were not winsorised in all models used in 
this research because they generally have less extreme values. The reasons for winsorising control variables at 5% and 95% levels are: (i) the 
data fails to meet the normality and linearity assumptions of OLS using low levels of alternative percentiles; (ii) winsorising at 5% and 95% 
levels is done in existing CG literature (Black & Khanna, 2007; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Liu et al., 2014); and (iii) the multiple linear 
regression was conducted before and after winsorising at 5% and 95% levels, and the results were highly consistent for all models (disclosure, 
performance and executive pay).  
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ranges from 0.42% to 14.73%, with an average of 4.99%. This lends support to the results of 
Farag et al. (2014), who report that the average capital expenditure for AIM firms is 3.57%. 
The panel also reveals that mean of capital expenditure was relatively stable over the sampled 
period; it was 5.39% in 2008 and become 5.14% in 2013.  
     Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Firm Size (£m)       
Mean 17,743.80 15,477.86 15.786.96 17,545.00 18,563.40 19,119.69 19,969.89 
Median  431.25 373.67 400.96 426.04 438.08 437.60 496.93 
STD 41,859.22 36,504.40 36,577.51 41,224.84 44,396.30 45,479.90 46,642.72 
Min  0.983 5.350 5.711 5.066 4.782 3.576 0.983 
Max 274,507.71 195,533.14 194.741.57 226,169.34 254,004.33 274,507.71 272,588.01 
Panel B: Firm Age       
Mean 58.19 55.69 56.69 57.69 58.69 59.69 60.69 
Median  38.00 35.50 36.50 37.50 38.50 39.50 40.50 
STD 46.59 46.76 46.76 46.76 46.76 46.76 46.76 
Min  3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 
Max 199.00 194.00 195.00 196.00 197.00 198.00 199.00 
Panel C: Capital Expenditure (%)      
Mean 4.99 5.39 4.48 4.46 5.15 5.31 5.14 
Median  3.70 3.95 2.74 3.60 3.92 3.99 3.59 
STD 4.14 4.30 3.83 3.67 4.27 4.41 4.32 
Min  0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Max 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 
Panel D: Sales Growth (%)      
Mean 7.61 22.91 -0.73 9.63 9.07 2.20 2.60 
Median  5.65 20.71 -3.93 6.73 6.99 1.90 0.38 
STD 18.60 21.56 18.44 17.91 15.24 13.11 13.97 
Min  -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 
Max 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 
Panel E: Gearing (%)      
Mean 21.29 23.25 21.51 20.32 20.54 20.78 21.35 
Median  18.98 21.37 20.25 17.52 17.83 18.57 19.47 
STD 14.82 15.54 15.31 14.70 14.37 14.78 14.38 
Min  1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 
Max 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 
Panel F: Q-ratio       
Mean 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 
Median  0.56 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 
STD 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Min  0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.055 0.049 0.049 
Max 1.66 1.66 1.16 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.19 
In contrast with the capital expenditure ratio, Panel D suggests the sampled firms’ sales, 
after winsorising, decreased from 22% in 2008 to 2.6% in 2013. Panel E presents the descriptive 
analysis of firm gearing. The average value of gearing for the sampled UK companies is 
21.29%, and ranges between 1.57% and 53.20%. This supports the results of past UK studies 
(e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Balafas and Florackis (2014), for 
example, find that the mean value of gearing is 18%. However, Mallin et al. (2015) find a 
gearing ratio of 53% among UK listed firms. Their results differ from the results of the current 
study, possibly because: (i) their sample is different (i.e., 273 firm-year observation); and (ii) 
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their sample covers only a small time period, during the global financial crisis (i.e., 2007-2009). 
Finally, Panel F reports the analysis of firm profitability (Q-ratio) and it ranges between 0.014 
and 1.66, with an average of 0.54. Comparing the mean over the sampled period shows that Q-
ratio slightly decreased. Specifically, the mean value of Q was 0.57 in 2008 and became 0.53 
in 2013.  
The next section will test OLS assumptions, and Section 6.5 will present the empirical 
results. Section 6.6 discusses potential endogeneity problems as well as the findings from a 
number of robustness analyses.  
6.4 TESTS OF OLS ASSUMPTIONS 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is employed in this research to investigate the antecedents 
of CG compliance and disclosure. Because of using OLS, a number of tests have been carried 
out to address its assumptions. First, the assumption of normality is tested by computing the 
skewness and kurtosis statistics, as well as by conducting the normal histogram (for brevity 
purposes not reported here) of all continuous variables, and the results are reported in Table 18. 
Variables are statistically said to be close to normal distribution if their skewness value is within 
+/-1.96 and their kurtosis value is within +/-3 (Field, 2009, p. 139; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 
1048). Based on that, the statistics of skewness and kurtosis of the dependent variable (UKCGI) 
are close to the accepted values, indicating that the UKCGI is not abnormally distributed. 
Specifically, the skewness of the UKCGI is -0.716, whereas the kurtosis value is -0.034.  
Table 18 demonstrates that the skewness statistics for the majority of independent variables 
fall within the accepted range, as are the kurtosis values of most of the continuous variables, 
implying that the continuous independent variables are not abnormally distributed. 
Additionally, the skewness and kurtosis values of gearing and profitability fall within the 
accepted range indicating that these two variables are not abnormally distributed. However, the 
results of skewness and kurtosis statistics for the rest control variables indicate that these 
variables deviate from a normal distribution. To reduce non-normalities in these variables, the 
current study used different kinds of transformation, including winsorising and natural 
logarithm. Consistent with existing literature (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Maseda et al., 
2015), the natural logarithm of assets is employed to reduce non-normality of firm size (LTA), 
while non-normality in capital expenditure (CEX) and sales growth (SG) is mitigated by 
winsorising them at 5% and 95% levels. The skewness and kurtosis values of the transformed 
variables are improved, implying that the transformed variables are less non-normally 
distributed than the actual variables.  
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   Table 18: Tests of Normality 
Variables Skewness Kurtosis 
UKCGI -0.716 -0.034 
BSE 0.640 -0.503 
IOE -0.523 -0.275 
BD 0.639 -0.409 
MANO 2.308 4.707 
ISTO 0.437 -0.407 
BLKO 0.132 -0.658 
TA 3.584 13.761 
AGE 0.847 -0.325 
CEX 1.967 6.107 
SG 11.420 200.824 
GR 1.115 1.255 
Q-ratio 0.115 0.262 
Notes: UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board 
independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO 
denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; TA denotes firm size; AGE denotes firm 
age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes Gearing; and Q-ratio denotes 
profitability. 
To test for multicollinearity among explanatory variables, a number of statistical 
techniques have been employed in the current study, including Spearman’s and Pearson’s 
correlation matrices, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistic tests (Tolerance). 
Following prior literature (Chapple & Truong, 2015; Elshandidy et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2012b), the correlation coefficients of both Pearson and Spearman are reported in Table 19. 
According to Field (2009, p. 224), larger correlation coefficient between two variables (above 
0.80 or 0,90) indicates the presence of severe multicollinearity problem. As reported in Table 
19, the correlations coefficients of Spearman and Pearson indicate no serious multicollinearity 
problems among the variables. Additionally, the direction and magnitude of both correlation 
matrices are relatively similar, indicating that non-normalities in the variables employed are not 
going to seriously violate the assumptions of OLS regression (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 
478).
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  Table 19: Correlation matrices of dependent and independent variables  
Variable UKCGI BSE IOE BDG BDE BD PCGC CL AFS MANO ISTO BLKO LTA AGE CEX SG GR Q-ratio 
UKCGI 
 
.487*** .532*** .337*** .252*** .367*** .173*** .491*** .525*** -.601*** -.258*** -.503*** .533*** .088** .128*** .066 .317*** .251*** 
BSE .444*** 
 
.519*** .314*** .340*** .381*** .157*** .512*** .177*** -.619*** -.313*** -.541*** .809*** .069* .121*** .089** .245*** .251*** 
IOE .489*** .458*** 
 
.268*** .219*** .308*** .250*** .450*** .222*** -.684*** .146*** -.367*** .700*** .113*** .261*** .044 .265*** .120*** 
BDG .303*** .256*** .239*** 
 
.117*** .947*** .184*** .134*** .010 -.348*** -.249*** -.318*** .366*** .247*** .095** -.014 .281*** .196*** 
BDE .156*** .290*** .161*** .067 
 
.403*** .004 .147*** .132*** -.197*** -.052 -.233*** .286*** -.050 .120*** .017 .010 -.038 
BD .332*** .335*** .275*** .938*** .410*** 
 
.165*** .172*** .032 -.367*** -.255*** -.364*** .418*** .210*** .126*** -.007 .248*** .151*** 
PCGC .157*** .144*** .233*** .170*** -.021 .148*** 
 
.108*** .030 -.231*** -.047 -.081** .211*** -.184*** .068* -.046 .222*** .019 
CL .459*** .507*** .459*** .138*** .123*** .169*** .108*** 
 
.224*** -.530*** -.288*** -.405*** .533*** -.166*** .241*** .079* .240*** .090** 
AFS .568*** .195*** .230*** -.005 .073* .021 .030 .224*** 
 
-.265*** -.009 -.234*** .166*** .034 .060 .005 .153*** .124*** 
MANO -.420*** -.361*** -.352*** -.037 -.027 -.043 .006 -.376*** -.326*** 
 
.159*** .466*** -.754*** -.121*** -.156*** -.036 -.355*** -.297*** 
ISTO -.280*** -.266*** -.106** -.218*** -.078* -.225*** -.034 -.251*** -.043 .025 
 
.748*** -.260*** -.141*** .019 -.100** -.182*** -.166*** 
BLKO -.485*** -.517*** -.312*** -.291*** -.240*** -.349*** -.090** -.377*** -.255*** .291*** .722*** 
 
-531*** -.182*** .002 -.095** -.252*** -.233*** 
LTA  .447*** .809*** .658*** .331*** .243*** .388*** .216*** .525*** .151*** -.446*** -.209*** -.493*** 
 
.149*** .189*** .128*** .306*** .268*** 
AGE .100** .096** .128*** .227*** .001 .208*** -.173*** -.156*** .025 -.059 -.169*** -.202*** .173*** 
 
-.046 .010 .084* .137*** 
CEX .070* .096** .211*** .065 .108*** .097** .018 .208*** .045 -.028 .086** .091** .151*** -.047 
 
.103** .003 -.111*** 
SG .022 .091** .0.34 -.039 .020 -.029 -.026 .071* -.012 .004 -.057 -.045 .109*** -.010 .102** 
 
-.014 -.019 
GR .302** .248*** .203*** .257*** -.017 .226*** .251*** .228*** .126*** -.220*** -.139*** -.216*** .288*** .001 -.033 -.020 
 
.450*** 
Q-ratio .250*** .190*** .094** .127*** -.034 .104** .011 .099** .148*** -.256*** -.187*** -.207*** .251*** .087** -.106*** -051 .445*** 
 
Notes:  The upper right half of the table provides the coefficients relating to Spearman’s correlation, whilst the bottom left half of the table presents the coefficients relating to Pearson’s correlation. UKCGI denotes the UK CG index;  BSE denotes board 
size; IOE denotes board independence; BDG denotes board gender diversity; BDE denotes board ethnic diversity;  BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing ; AFS 
denotes audit firm size ; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; LTA denotes firm size; AGE denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes 
gearing; and Q-ratio denotes profitability. ***, **, and* indicate that correlation is significant at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The current study also checks for the presence of multicollinearity problem by using 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistic (Tolerance) tests to check whether the 
independent variables were highly correlated. It is argued that multicollinearity is expected to 
be a problem if the value of VIF exceeds 10 and the Tolerance value is below 0.1 (Field, 2009, 
p. 224). Table 20 shows that the maximum value of VIF is 6.116 and the lowest value of 
Tolerance is 0.164, suggesting no major problem of multicollinearity. 
   Table 20: Tests of Multicollinearity 
 
After conducting the normality and multicollinearity analyses, this study examined Cook’s 
Distances, Leverage Value, Studentised Residual, P-P Plot and Scatter Plot to identify the 
presence of outliers in the variables after transforming and winsorising, which may cause non-
linearity and heteroscedasticity. According to Field (2009, p. 293), outliers are present if the 
Cook’s Distance and Leverage Values exceed one, as well as if the Studentised Residual value 
exceeds three. The computed Cook’s Distance for the CG compliance and disclosure model 
ranges from 0.00 to 0.022, with a mean of 0.002. The computed Leverage Value for the 
voluntary CG disclosure model ranges from 0.023 to 0.134, with a mean of 0.049. Therefore, 
the values of Cook’s Distance and Leverage do not exceed one, suggesting that outliers seem 
not to exist after transforming and winsorising variables. The Studentised Residual for the 
voluntary CG disclosure model does not exceed the critical value of three; it ranges from -2.871 
to 2.919, with a mean of -0.001. The computed P-P Plot and Scatter Plot (for brevity purposes 
not reported here) for the CG compliance and disclosure model suggest that outliers are not 
present and the distribution looks fairly linear and with random patterns.  
Variables VIF Tolerance  
BSE 3.895 0.257 
IOE 2.283 0.438 
BD 1.498 0.668 
PCGC 1.322 0.757 
CL 2.031 0.492 
AFS 1.386 0.721 
MANO 1.451 0.689 
ISTO 2.425 0.412 
BLKO 3.715 0.269 
LTA 6.116 0.164 
AGE 1.370 0.730 
CEX 1.314 0.761 
SG 1.312 0.762 
GR 1.556 0.643 
Q-ratio 1.562 0.640 
Notes: BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic 
diversity; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit 
firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block 
ownership; LTA denotes firm size; AGE denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales 
growth; GR denotes gearing (GR); and Q-ratio denotes profitability. 
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The final OLS assumption is autocorrelation; this assumption is tested by conducting the 
Durbin-Watson test. According to Field (2009, pp. 220-221) and Wooldridge (2013, p. 419), 
the Durbin-Watson value can vary between zero and four. The closer the value is to two, the 
less likely it is that there is not any serious problem of autocorrelation (correlation among the 
error terms). The computed Durbin-Watson values range from 1.871 to 1.984, as reported in 
Tables 22. Therefore, the Durbin-Watson statistic test indicates that there is no serious problem 
of autocorrelation.  
To conclude, different statistical tests were conducted, including skewness, kurtosis, 
correlation matrix, VIF, Cook’s Distance, Scatter Plot, P-P Plot and Durbin-Watson, to check 
for normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Overall, these 
tests suggest that the OLS assumptions are not seriously violated, and this implies that OLS is 
appropriate statistical estimation to conduct the analysis of the study. The next section, 
therefore, reports the results of the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure. 
6.5 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
This section presents the main empirical findings related to CG compliance and disclosure 
model. Particularly, Subsection 6.5.1 reports the empirical results relating to the antecedents of 
CG compliance and disclosure, whilst Subsection 6.5.2 presents sensitivity analysis regarding 
endogeneity problems and alternative CG indices. 
6.5.1 Empirical Results: CG Compliance and Disclosure 
As discussed in Chapter Five (Subsection 5.3.1.2), this study examines whether 
board/audit/firm and ownership mechanisms can explain the observed differences in CG 
compliance and disclosure behaviour. A summary of the empirical findings and the 
hypothesised relationships among board, firm, ownership, audit mechanisms and the UKCGI is 
presented in Table 21. As reported in Table 21, this study finds that board size, board 
independence, board diversity, cross-listing and audit firm size are significantly and positively 
associated with the UKCGI, which is in line with the formulated hypotheses. Additionally, both 
managerial and block ownership are significantly and negatively related to the UKCGI, which 
also lend support to the formulated hypotheses. Finally, Table 21 reports that both the existence 
of a separate CG committee and institutional ownership are positively and insignificantly 
associated with the UKCGI, and thus the hypotheses for these two variables are rejected. The 
following paragraphs discuss in detail the results related to each variable included in the CG 
compliance and disclosure model.  
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Table 22 presents the empirical findings of the association among board/audit/firm 
characteristics, ownership structure variables and firm-level voluntary CG disclosure practices. 
In Model 1, board diversity is measured based only on the overall proportion of women and 
ethnic minorities on a corporate board (BD), whilst in Model 2 board diversity is measured 
based on board gender (BDG) and board ethnicity (BDE), separately. The F-value is statistically 
significant (1% level), suggesting that board, audit, firm, ownership and control variables are 
not equal to zero. This implies that the null hypothesis that these variables do not have influence 
on the UKCGI is rejected. Additionally, the adjusted R2 suggests that 62% of the variability in 
the UKCGI is explained in this model. 
     Table 21: A Summary of the Findings and Hypotheses of the CG Compliance and Disclosure Model 
Dependent Variable The UK CG Index (UKCGI)  
Independent Variable: No. Hyp. Predicted 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding 
sig.  
Hyp. 
Status  
CG Variables:      
Board Size (BSE) 1 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Board Independence (IOE) 2 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Board Diversity (BD) 3 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Existence of a separate CG Committee (PCGC) 4 + + Insig.  Rejt. 
Cross-listing (CL) 5 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Audit Firm Size (AFS) 6 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Managerial Ownership (MANO) 7 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Institutional Ownership (ISTO) 8 + + Insig. Rejt. 
Block Ownership (BLKO) 9 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Notes: The nine hypotheses are discussed in Chapter Four. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting 
hypothesised relationships, respectively.  
Table 22 reports that the coefficient on board size is statistically positive (1% level), 
suggesting that Hypothesis One is accepted. This finding lends support to the theoretical 
predictions that larger boards are associated with increased monitoring of management 
activities as well as greater diversity of skills and experience than smaller counterparts (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2007; Ozkan, 2007). This may increase pressure on managers to provide additional 
information about CG practices in order to enhance their firm’s reputation and attract critical 
resources from influential stakeholders (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Additionally, the positive 
finding provides empirical support to the results of previous  studies (Chapple & Truong, 2015; 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Hyun et 
al., 2014; Jizi et al., 2014; Liao et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2015). In the 
UK corporate context, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015), for 
instance,  provide empirical evidence that CG and risk disclosures are statistically significantly 
associated with board size.  
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The statistically significant and positive (at 1% level) coefficient on board independence 
lends empirical support to Hypothesis Two – that board independence impacts positively on 
firm-level CG disclosure. The positive and significant effect of board independence offers 
support to the theoretical expectation that the presence of outside (unaffiliated) directors 
mitigates information asymmetry problems by increasing stakeholder representation and 
encouraging firms to provide additional information about their CG compliance (Kesner & 
Johnson, 1990; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Pincus et al., 1989). Empirically, the significant and 
positive finding lends support to past studies (e.g., Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Donnelly 
& Mulcahy, 2008; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2015), 
including prior UK studies (e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013) which report empirical evidence that board independence is statistically 
significantly associated with CG disclosure. 
The model finds a statistically significant (at 1% level) and positive association between 
board gender and ethnic minority diversity and the UKCGI, which lends empirical support to 
Hypothesis Three. This finding offers support to prior empirical studies (Barako & Brown, 
2008; Liao et al., 2015) which report empirical evidence that the level of corporate disclosure 
is significantly and positively affected by board diversity. Theoretically, the positive finding 
lends support to the prediction that having directors with different gender and ethnic 
backgrounds can improve monitoring on management activities (Carter et al., 2003) in order to 
attract critical resources from powerful stakeholders (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a) and to 
enhance the board’s trustworthiness and corporate legitimacy (Bear et al., 2010). However, the 
result reported in Model 2 of Table 22 shows that CG disclosure is significantly and positively 
affected by the percentage of female directors, whilst board ethnic diversity is negatively and 
insignificantly associated with the UKCGI. The evidence of insignificant influence of ethnic 
minorities in the UK boardroom is largely consistent with their extremely low representation 
(1.37%, see Table 16) and the results of past UK studies (Brammer et al., 2007). This suggests 
that ethnic minorities have less influence over their boards’ decisions, including CG disclosure 
(Carter et al., 2010). 
The study finds a statistically insignificant and positive relationship among the existence 
of a separate CG committee and the UKCGI, indicating that Hypothesis Four is not empirically 
supported. The evidence of an insignificant association does not offer support to the results of 
Ntim et al. (2012b), who report empirical evidence that firms listed on Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange improve their CG practices by establishing separate CG committees. Additionally, 
the evidence of an insignificant influence of a CG committee is not in line with the prediction 
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that boards with CG committees tend to disclosure additional CG information in order to attract 
critical resources from powerful stakeholders and also to enhance corporate legitimacy. 
However, the evidence of an insignificant association between the PCGC and the UKCGI is 
not surprising, given that only about 8% of the sampled firms have a CG committee. This results 
in small cross-sectional variations of the PCGC among the sampled firms, making this variable 
(PCGC) value irrelevant in any regression.  
The coefficient on cross-listing is statistically significant (at 1% level) and positive, which 
lend empirical support to Hypothesis Five – that cross-listed companies provide additional 
information about their CG practices. The statistically significant and positive effect suggest 
that cross-listed companies have a greater need to be accountable to the public in order to 
enhance their corporate legitimacy, gain access to critical resources and also to gain the support 
of influential stakeholders (Coffee, 2002; Cooke, 1989; Eaton et al., 2007; Robb & Zarzeski, 
2001). Empirically, the finding lends support to past studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Aly et 
al., 2010; Lin et al., 2015; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Ntim et al., 2012b; Pan et al., 2013) which 
report evidence that cross-listing enhances firm-level CG disclosure. 
The model finds a statistically significant (at 1% level) and positive relationship among the 
size of auditing firm and the UKCGI, which lend empirical support to Hypothesis Six. This 
finding suggests that companies audited by big four provide more information on CG 
compliance than companies audited by smaller audit firms, thus supporting the multi-theoretical 
framework’s expectation that big audit firms may enhance the level of voluntary CG disclosure. 
Big audit firms have a greater incentive to provide high quality audit services in order to avoid 
losing customers (DeAngelo, 1981b; Zhu & Sun, 2012). Additionally, hiring big audit firms 
may signal to the market that high-quality information is being disclosed; this can improve 
corporate legitimacy, as well as limiting the opportunistic behaviour of agents (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Lennox, 1999; Titman & Trueman, 1986). Empirically, the evidence offers 
support to the results past studies (e.g., Kent & Stewart, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a; Ntim et al., 
2012b; Omar & Simon, 2011; Satta et al., 2014; Waweru, 2014) which suggest that big audit 
firms enhance CG disclosure practices.  
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    Table 22: Antecedents of CG Compliance and Disclosure 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years      All Firm Years _______________________________ Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
(Model) 
Predicted 
sign         (1)       (2)           (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Corporate governance variables:      
  BSE + 0.051(.008)*** 0.060(.002)*** 0.096(.106) 0.074(.182) 0.027(.599) 0.054(.317) 0.040(.429) 0.043(.441) 
  IOE + 0.109(.001)*** 0.114(.000)*** 0.144(.122) 0.155(.097)* 0.124(.162) 0.116(.201) 0.135(.125) -0.012(.896) 
  BDG + - 0.239(.000)*** - - - - - - 
  BDE + - -069(.494) - - - - - - 
  BD + 0.193(.000)*** - 0.223(.110) 0.291(.033)** 0.225(.075)* 0.216(.052)* 0.172(.104) 0.128(.176) 
  PCGC + 0.016(.258) 0.011(0.447) -0.003(.947) 0.014(.744) 0.007(.866) 0.020(.600) 0.025(.501) 0.036(.296) 
  CL + 0.043(.000)*** 0.039(.001)*** 0.025(.491) 0.028(.397) 0.040(.230) 0.045(.165) 0.055(.106) 0.056(.091)* 
  AFS + 0.121(.000)*** 0.121(.000)*** 0.120(.000)*** 0.132(.000)*** 0.126(.000)*** 0.116(.000)*** 0.103(.000)*** 0.121(.000)*** 
  MANO - -0.171(.000)*** -0.161(.000)*** -0.218(.129) -0.211(.133) -0.149(.271) -0.106(.421) -0.159(.222) -0.211(.050)** 
  ISTO + 0.010(.716) 0.020(.475) -0.004(.959) 0.010(.893) 0.031(.694) 0.039(.625) -0.002(.979) 0.010(.906) 
  BLKO  - -0.148(.000)*** -0.160(.000)*** -0.169(.085)* -0.158(.102) -0.191(.041)** -0.153(.111) -0.146(.110) -0.144(.176) 
Control Variables:       
  LTA  + -0.006(.073)* -0.006(.063)* -0.013(.238) -0.012(.248) -0.005(.632) -0.005(.606) -0.007(.438) -0.003(.757) 
  AGE + 0.001(.800) 0.000(.977) -0.008(.555) -0.006(.672) -0.004(.780) 0.004(.759) 0.007(.597) 0.018(.196) 
  CEX  +/- 0.093(.384) 0.107(.313) 0.017(.954) 0.173(.590) 0.162(.623) 0.046(.877) 0.210(.476) 0.047(.858) 
  SG + -0.001(.960) -0.003(.901) 0.015(.831) -0.016(.841) -0.021(.807) 0.005(.948) -0.047(.646) 0.013(.885) 
  GR  + 0.065(.038)** 0.059(.061)* 0.135(.152) 0.051(.558) 0.032(.716) 0.053(.548) 0.055(.517) 0.072(.388) 
  Q-ratio + 0.004(.854) 0.003(.892) 0.016(.810) 0.013(.837) 0.017(.777) 0.006(.919) 0.021(.735) -0.053(.380) 
IDU  YES YES    YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES YES    YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.477*** 0.462***   0.505*** 0.534*** 0.508*** 0.416*** 0.472*** 0.451*** 
Durbin-W. Stat  1.938 1.923   1.893 1.871 1.984 1.924 1.963 1.871 
F- value  33.903*** 33.372***    5.601*** 6.064*** 5.620*** 5.635*** 6.270*** 6.476*** 
Adj. R2  62.0% 62.6%    52.2% 54.6% 51.1% 52.7% 55.9% 57.5% 
Number of observations  600 600 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes:  BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BDG denotes board gender diversity; BDE denotes board ethnic diversity;  BD board gender and ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes 
existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; 
LTA denotes firm size; AGE denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes gearing; Q-ratio denotes profitability; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU 
denotes year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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With respect to ownership structure variables, Table 22 reports a statistically significant 
and negative relationship among managerial ownership and the UKCGI at the 1% level of 
significance, suggesting that Hypothesis Seven is empirically supported. This finding indicates 
that UK companies with large portions of managerial ownership are not motivated to provide 
additional CG information. The negative effect of managerial ownership lends supports to 
considerable number of past studies (Baek et al., 2009; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010). Theoretically, this result 
offers support to the prediction that firms with high managerial ownership have less of a need 
to be accountable to the general public because outsiders in such firms tend to have relatively 
small interests (Eng & Mak, 2003; Khan et al., 2013). The negative effect of managerial 
ownership is further supported by the prediction that higher managerial ownership may help in 
aligning management and shareholder interests (Core et al., 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Lilienfeld‐Toal & Ruenzi, 2014), which may limit the need to engage in good CG practices.  
Table 22 also provides evidence that institutional ownership is positively, but 
insignificantly, associated with the UKCGI, which indicates that Hypothesis Eight is not 
empirically supported. The insignificant effect of institutional ownership suggests that 
institutional investors do not play active role in enhancing CG compliance and disclosure. 
Theoretically, this finding does not support the multi-theoretical framework’s prediction that 
institutional investors, as powerful stakeholders, are inherently motivated to monitor and 
encourage management to invest in CG activities (Barako et al., 2006; Dong & Ozkan, 2008). 
The insignificant influence of institutional ownership on the UKCGI does not support the view 
that firms with large portions of institutional ownership are less likely to suffer from agency 
problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and are of more need to meet the expectations of key 
stakeholders (including institutional shareholders) in order to gain their support to access 
critical resources (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Empirically, the positive and insignificant 
finding does not support the results of past studies (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Barako et al., 2006; 
Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b) which provide evidence of significant impact 
of institutional investors on CG compliance and disclosure. However, the insignificant effect 
of institutional ownership is supported by the results of past UK studies (e.g., Cosh & Hughes, 
1997; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Filatotchev & Dotsenko, 2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013) which find evidence of no significant effect of institutional ownership on 
CG compliance and disclosure, indicating that “institutional investors in the UK are passive 
and inefficient in monitoring” (Dong & Ozkan, 2008, p. 28). 
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Finally, the model finds a statistically significant (1% level) and negative relationship 
among block ownership and CG compliance and disclosure, suggesting that Hypothesis Nine 
is supported. The result suggests that companies with concentrated ownership are less likely to 
provide additional CG information than those with no concentration of ownership. Empirically, 
the negative effect of block ownership lends support to past studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; 
Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Chapple & Truong, 2015; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012). This 
finding also supports the prediction that ownership concentration may be a substitute for good 
CG mechanisms, including voluntary CG disclosure (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). The negative and 
significant influence of block ownership also further supports the prediction that firms with 
concentrated ownership have less of a need to demonstrate accountability to the public (Ntim 
& Soobaroyen, 2013b) and have less information asymmetry (Reverte, 2009), which can impact 
negatively on levels of CG disclosure.  
The empirical results relating to control variables are also reported in Table 22. First, the 
coefficient on firm size suggests a significant and negative influence of firm size on CG 
disclosure. The negative effect of firm size does not lend support to the prediction that larger 
firms need to maintain good CG systems in order to attract external capital at low costs 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999, p. 364). Additionally, the negative effect of firm size does not 
empirically support past studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim et 
al., 2012b; Wang & Hussainey, 2013) which report evidence that CG compliance is influenced 
significantly and positively by firm size. However, the significant negative finding offers 
supports to the results of Campbell et al. (2014), and Waweru (2014). A possible explanation 
for the negative influence of firm size is that small firms have greater growth opportunities, and 
thereby a greater need to maintain strong CG systems in order to attract external capital at low 
costs (Klapper & Love, 2004, p. 713). 
Second, the model finds a statistically insignificant association among firm age and the 
UKCGI. This does not lend support to past studies (Biswas, 2013; Dharmadasa et al., 2014; 
Pandey et al., 2015), which report that firm age impacts significantly on the quality of CG 
practices. However, the insignificant finding is line with the results of Alsaeed (2006). A 
possible explanation for the insignificant influence of firm age is that older firms have more 
time to enhance their CG systems in response to pressure from investors and internal needs 
(Black et al., 2006a, p. 678). Additionally, Table 22 reports that capital expenditure is positively 
and insignificantly associated with the UKCGI, indicating that capital expenditure has no 
impact on CG compliance and disclosure. The insignificant finding offers support to past 
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studies (Ntim et al., 2012b; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a). Similarly, the coefficient on sales 
growth suggests an insignificant impact of sales growth on firm-level CG disclosure. This 
finding lends empirical support to past studies (Black et al., 2006a; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Scholtz & Smit, 2015). 
Third, the result for gearing shows that gearing has a statistically positive influence on the 
UKCGI. This offers support to the prediction that corporations with high debt in their capital 
structure have a greater need to improve their monitoring by increasing transparency and 
disclosure of compliance with good CG practices (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) in order to 
legitimise their actions to the providers of debt (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013a) and also to reduce 
finishing costs (Hackbarth, 2009; Jensen, 1986). The significant positive finding lends support 
to past studies (Abdallah et al., 2015; Barako et al., 2006; Omar & Simon, 2011; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). 
Fourth, unlike gearing, profitability (Q-ratio) has insignificant impact on the UKCGI, 
which do not support the prediction that managers in profitable companies disclose additional 
CG information in order to maintain and legitimise their presence as stewards (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013a). The evidence of an insignificant influence of profitability supports the 
findings of prior studies (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Elzahar & Hussainey, 
2012; Eng & Mak, 2003). However, the study’s finding is inconsistent with those provided by 
Al-Najjar and Abed (2014), Elshandidy et al. (2015), Hassanein and Hussainey (2015) and 
Ntim et al. (2012b), which suggest that profitable firms appear to provide additional CG 
information. 
Finally, the results (for brevity purposes not reported here) suggest that most industry and 
some year dummies are significantly associated with the UKCGI. Particularly, with reference 
to the industry dummies, the OLS regression shows that consumer goods, basic materials and 
telecommunications industries are significantly and positively associated with the UKCGI.  
This provides further support to the suggestions and findings of prior CG literature that the CG 
compliance and disclosure vary across industries (Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; Elshandidy & 
Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In terms of 
year dummies, only year 2008 is statistically negatively associated with the UKCGI, whereas 
other years (2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) have a negative and insignificant influence. Overall, 
this supports the suggestion that CG compliance and disclosure practices differ over time 
(Barako et al., 2006; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Farag et al., 2014; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Ntim et al., 2012b; Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). 
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To sum up, this section has provided results related to the antecedents of voluntary CG 
disclosure among UK listed firms. Overall, as reported in Tables 21 and 22, the current study 
finds that cross-listing, audit firm size, board independence, managerial ownership, board size, 
block ownership and board diversity have a significant relationship with the UKCGI, thereby 
providing support to theoretical and empirical CG literature. However, this study also finds that 
both the existence of a separate CG committee and institutional ownership are positively and 
insignificantly associated with the UKCGI, indicating that these two variables have no power 
in explaining the variations of the UKCGI. 
6.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This study carried out several additional tests to check the robustness of the reported results 
in Section 6.5 to alternative estimations and measures. Subsection 6.6.1 reports and discusses 
the results relating to non-linearity and the use of alternative CG indices, whereas Subsection 
6.6.2 discusses results relating to potential endogeneity problems. Overall, as discussed below, 
all the tests suggest that the obtained results are robust to alternative CG proxies and different 
endogeneity problems.  
6.6.1 Alternative CG Proxies and Non-Linearity 
As discussed above, the CG index employed in this study consists of 120 internal CG 
provisions divided into five main sub-indices: leadership (LSH), effectiveness (ETIV), 
accountability (ACNT), remuneration (REM) and relations with shareholders (RWS). These five 
sub-indices each have a different number of provisions (LSH has eight provisions, ETIV has 37, 
ACNT has 36, REM has 22 and RWS has 17), suggesting that the results of this study may be 
sensitive to the weight of each sub-index. Therefore, to check whether the associations among 
each category (sub-index) and the explanatory variables is similar to the main results, this study 
re-estimated the main model by replacing the UKCGI with LSH, ETIV, ACNT, REM and RWS. 
The result of each sub-index is reported in Table 23.  
Observably, the results of the five sub-indices remain essentially the same. Apart from a 
few sensitivities (such as a negative coefficient on BSE, PCGC, and ISTO in Model 1; a negative 
coefficient on ISTO in Models 3 and 4; and a negative coefficient on IOE and PCGC in Model 
5), the results in Models 1 to 5 of Table 23 remain essentially the same as those reported in 
Table 22, indicating that the evidence is fairly robust to the use of different sub-indices. 
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                   Table 23: The Results Based on Weighted and Sub CG Indices  
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
LSH ETIV ACNT REM RWS W-UKCGI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate governance variables:      
  BSE -0.067(.040)** 0.093(.000)*** 0.019(.363) 0.030(.107) 0.110(.005)*** 0.037(.063)* 
  IOE 0.260(.000)*** 0.237(.000)*** 0.048(.172) 0.029(.359) -0.008(.909) 0.113(.001)*** 
  BD 0.280(.000)*** 0.243(.000)*** 0.135(.003)*** 0.206(.000)*** 0.147(.084)* 0.202(.000)*** 
  PCGC -0.011(.646) 0.054(.002)*** 0.020(.191) 0.027(.053)* -0.077(.009)*** 0.003(.860) 
  CL 0.025(.215) 0.041(.006)*** 0.042(.001)*** 0.063(.000)*** 0.032(.194) 0.041(.001)*** 
  AFS 0.148(.000)*** 0.164(.000)*** 0.111(.000)*** 0.111(.000)*** 0.050(.020)** 0.117(.000)*** 
  MANO -0.196(.013)** -0.125(.028)** -0.042(.397) -0.302(.000)*** -0.363(.000)*** -0.205(.000)*** 
  ISTO -0.074(.130) 0.064(.070)* -0.021(.512) -0.022(.423) 0.042(.480) 0.002(.938) 
  BLKO -0.114(.051)* -0.219(.000)*** -0.088(.019)** -0.155(.000)*** -0.125(.074)* -0.140(.000)*** 
Control Variables:       
  LTA -0.005(.359) -0.016(.000)*** 0.002(.530) -0.012(.000)*** 0.006(.400) -0.005(.146) 
  AGE -0.006(.473) 0.016(.006)*** 0.005(.987) 0.011(.017)** -0.039(.000)*** -0.003(.494) 
  CEX 0.076(.676) 0.202(.125) 0.033(.776) -0.153(.143) 0.308(.162) 0.093(.402) 
  SG -0.016(.717) -0.013(.684) -0.018(.516) -0.022(.381) 0.092(.077)* 0.005(.854) 
  GR 0.096(.074)* 0.019(.619) 0.029(.396) 0.046(.130) 0.251(.000)*** 0.088(.007)*** 
  Q-ratio -0.032(.407) -0.039(.161) 0.005(.825) 0.038(.080)* 0.067(.146) 0.008(.729) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.811*** 0.439*** 0.329*** 0.825*** 0.265** 0.534*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.319 2.031 1.844 1.984 2.145 2.031 
F- value 13.089*** 35.710*** 18.886*** 31.721*** 14.586*** 30.969*** 
Adj. R2 37.5% 63.3% 47.0% 60.4% 40.3% 59.8% 
Number of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Notes: LSH denotes leadership sub-index; ETIV denotes effectiveness sub-index; ACNT denotes accountability sub-index; REM denotes remuneration 
sub-index; RWS denotes relations with shareholder sub-index; W-UKCGI denotes weighted index; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board 
independence; BD board gender and ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes 
audit firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; LTA denotes firm size; 
AGE denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes gearing; Q-ratio denotes profitability; IDU denotes 
industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level 
and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Additionally, and as discussed above, the UKCGI consists of five sub-indices comprising 
120 equally weighted provisions. Since the number of provisions included in each of the five 
sub-indices varies substantially, this leads to different weights being assigned to each sub-index 
(i.e., LSH 6%, ETIV 31%, ACNT 30%, REM 19% and RWS 14%). To ensure that the association 
between the explanatory variables and the UKCGI is not sensitive to the weighting of the five 
sub-indices, and following prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 274; Ntim et al., 2012b, p. 137), 
an alternative index, called W-UKCGI, was constructed, in which each sub-index was given 
equal weight of 20%. Model 1 of Table 22 is re-estimated by replacing the un-weighted UKCGI 
with the W-UKCGI and the findings are reported in Table 23. Model 6 of Table 23 reports that, 
the direction and level of significance of CG mechanisms have not changed from the un-
weighted index. This evidence suggests that the findings of the main model are fairly robust to 
the use of different weighting of the five sub-indices. 
Additional to examining the sensitivity of the main results to the weighting of the five sub-
indices, several prior studies indicate that the impact of some CG variables (e.g., board size, 
managerial, institutional and block ownership) on corporate voluntary disclosures and 
performance is non-linear (Beiner et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2008; Connelly et al., 2012; Morck 
et al., 1988; Ntim et al., 2013). To examine whether board size, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership and block ownership have a non-linear association with the UKCGI, 
Model 1 of Table 22 is re-estimated by including the square root of board size, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership as reported in Table 24. 
Model 2 of Table 24 suggests that board size has a non-linear association with the UKCGI, 
thereby providing evidence that as the size of a corporate board increases, CG compliance and 
disclosure decreases. The non-linear effect of board size is consistent with Conyon and Peck 
(1998b) and Guest (2009b). Additionally, the coefficients on both managerial and institutional 
ownership are insignificant, indicating there is no curvilinear relationship among these two 
ownership structures and the UKCGI. In terms of block ownership, Model 2 demonstrates that 
block ownership has a non-linear association with CG compliance and disclosure. This further 
supports the prediction that companies with concentrated ownership provide less CG 
information than those with no concentration of ownership (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b), 
because companies with concentrated ownership are associated with fewer agency and 
asymmetry information problems (Reverte, 2009). Overall, the empirical evidence reported in 
Model 2 suggest that only the coefficients of BSE2 and BLKO2 are significant, with the other 
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findings remaining unchanged compared with Model 1. Therefore, this study provides further 
evidence that both BSE and BLOK have a non-linear association with the UKCGI, whereas both 
MANO and ISTO do not have a non-linear association with the UKCGI. 
   Table 24: Test of the Presence of Non-Linearity 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model Square-Root 
(1) (2) 
Corporate governance variables:  
  BSE 0.051(.008)*** 0.501(.000)*** 
  BSE2 - -0.112(.000)*** 
  IOE 0.109(.001)*** 0.106(.000)*** 
  BD 0.193(.000)*** 0.180(.000)*** 
  PCGC 0.016(.258) 0.010(.456) 
  CL 0.043(.000)*** 0.040(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.121(.000)*** 0.098(.000)*** 
  MANO -0.171(.000)*** -0.278(.047)** 
  MANO2 - 0.412(.224) 
  ISTO 0.010(.716) 0.154(.229) 
  ISTO2 - -0.183(.162) 
  BLKO -0.148(.000)*** 0.385(.005)*** 
  BLKO2 - -0.584(.000)*** 
Control Variables:   
  LTA -0.006(.073)* 0.006(.087)* 
  AGE 0.001(.800) -0.005(.257) 
  CEX 0.093(.384) 0.121(.213) 
  SG -0.001(.960) -0.019(.391) 
  GR 0.065(.038)** 0.075(.009)*** 
  Q-ratio 0.004(.854) -0.026(.219) 
IDU YES YES 
YDU YES YES 
Constant 0.477*** -0.255** 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.938 1.832 
F- value 33.903*** 40.069*** 
Adj. R2 62.0% 69.3% 
Number of observations 600 600 
Notes: BSE denotes board size; BSE2 denotes board size squared; IOE denotes board 
independence; BD board gender and ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes existence of a 
separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO 
denotes managerial ownership; MANO2 denotes managerial ownership squared; ISTO 
denotes institutional ownership; ISTO2 denotes institutional ownership squared; BLKO 
denotes block ownership; BLKO2 denotes block ownership squared; LTA denotes firm 
size; AGE denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; 
GR denotes gearing; Q-ratio denotes profitability; IDU denotes industry dummies and 
YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
6.6.2 Endogeneity 
A number of tests were conducted to address some concerns associated with endogeneity. 
It is suggested that endogeneity problems emerge when one or more variables are associated 
with the error terms (Gippel et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2010). This may increase concerns about 
the validity of the results obtained from the regression model (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; 
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Wintoki et al., 2012). According to Roberts and Whited (2012), much CG literature does not 
adequately address the problem of endogeneity. Therefore, this research attempts to address 
some concerns associated with endogeneity using different techniques, as explained below. 
Prior accounting and CG literature suggests that there are three main causes for 
endogeneity problems, namely simultaneity, omitted variables and measurement errors 
(Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2010). These three causes of 
endogeneity are briefly discussed here. First, simultaneity arises when one or more explanatory 
variables are simultaneously affected by the dependent variable (Gippel et al., 2015; Schultz et 
al., 2010); for example, whether a firm’s CG structure leads to improved performance or vice 
versa. The second source of endogeneity is the omission of variables; this type of endogeneity 
arises when the association between two or more variables is actually influenced by some 
omitted variables from the regression model that are unobserved and thus difficult to quantify 
(Schultz et al., 2010; Wooldridge, 2013). For example, Ntim et al. (2013) suggest that other 
variables (e.g., firm size, leverage and sales growth) can influence corporate voluntary 
disclosure in addition to CG mechanisms. The final cause of endogeneity is measurement error; 
this problem arises when key variables of the study are measured inaccurately (Gippel et al., 
2015; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). 
The above mentioned causes of endogeneity have been considered in this study to avoid 
biased results. Following prior governance literature (e.g., Core et al., 2015; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010; Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013), the current study uses a number of 
econometric methods to check and control for endogeneity problems. First, following prior CG 
literature (e.g., Core et al., 2015; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2013; Ntim et al., 2012b), this study re-estimates the main OLS model using lagged structure, 
fixed-effect and 2SLS models to address concerns associated with the omitted variables and 
simultaneity problems. Second, this study follows prior literature (e.g., Hassanein & Hussainey, 
2015; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013) and controlled for several variables in 
addition to the CG mechanisms to reduce concerns associated with omitted variables bias. 
Third, cross-sectional and time-series data were employed in the current study to address 
simultaneity problems (Börsch‐Supan & Köke, 2002). Finally, in order to address concerns that 
associated with measurement errors, the researcher constructed a comprehensive index 
(UKCGI) comprising 120 provisions, and did not rely on analysts’ rankings to measure CG 
practices of UK firms.  
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6.6.2.1 Lagged Structure Model 
 To address endogeneity concerns that may arise from simultaneous association between 
CG mechanisms (i.e., BSE, IOE, BD, PCGC, CL, AFS, MANO, ISTO and BLKO) and the 
UKCGI, a lagged structure model was estimated, in which all explanatory, control and 
dependent variables were lagged one period. This study uses the lagged structure model as an 
alternative estimation method, whereby the current year’s level of CG disclosure is influenced 
by past year’s CG and control variables, and this result in reducing the number of observations 
to 500 firm-year observations. The lagged structure equation is as follows: 

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i
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                                        (8)
 
All dependent, explanatory and control are the same as those used in the first equation, 
except introducing a one-year lag for each of these variables. Table 25 presents the results based 
on the lagged structure model. Model 2 reports that the magnitude and significance of the 
estimated coefficients using the lagged structure model remain largely the same as those 
reported in the main OLS regression model. Specifically, board size, board independence, board 
diversity, cross-listing and audit firm size have significantly positive associations with the 
UKCGI, whereas the influence of the existence of a separate CG committee is found to be 
positive and insignificant. Both managerial and block ownership remained negatively 
associated with the UKCGI at the same level of significance, whereas the result related to 
institutional ownership shows some sensitivity, as it becomes negative and insignificant. The 
coefficients of control variables in both models are relatively similar, except that the coefficient 
on firm age becomes negative and insignificant, and the coefficient on sales growth becomes 
positive and insignificant. 
Table 25 also shows that Models 1 and 2 are relatively similar in terms of the value of 
adjusted R2, as it is 62% in the simple OLS model and 65% in the lagged model. The F-value 
is 33.903 and 35.884 in the main OLS and the lagged structure model, respectively. Therefore, 
Table 25 shows that the results presented in the two models are relatively similar, indicating 
that the findings of the study remained fairly robust using lagged structure model.  
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  Table 25: Lagged-Effect Model 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model Lagged-Effect Model 
(1) (2) 
Corporate governance variables:  
  BSE 0.051(.008)*** 0.076(.000)*** 
  IOE 0.109(.001)*** 0.214(.000)*** 
  BD 0.193(.000)*** 0.192(.000)*** 
  PCGC 0.016(.258) 0.020(.213) 
  CL 0.043(.000)*** 0.029(.023)** 
  AFS 0.121(.000)*** 0.121(.000)*** 
  MANO -0.171(.000)*** -0.158(.002)*** 
  ISTO 0.010(.716) -0.002(.935) 
  BLKO -0.148(.000)*** -0.160(.000)*** 
Control Variables:   
  LTA -0.006(.073)* -0.013(.000)*** 
  AGE 0.001(.800) -0.001(.909) 
  CEX 0.093(.384) 0.011(.924) 
  SG -0.001(.960) 0.013(.625) 
  GR 0.065(.038)** 0.077(.024)** 
  Q-ratio 0.004(.854) 0.021(.369) 
IDU YES YES  
YDU YES YES  
Constant 0.477*** 0.539*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.938 1.908 
F- value 33.903*** 35.884*** 
Adj. R2 62.0% 65.9% 
Number of observations 600 500 
Notes: BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD board gender and 
ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-
listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes 
institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; LTA denotes firm size; AGE 
denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes 
gearing; Q-ratio denotes profitability; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes 
year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
6.6.2.2 2SLS Model 
In order to address endogeneity concerns associated the omitted variables bias, this 
study follows prior CG studies (Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013) and adopts 2SLS 
methodology. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH) was conducted in this study following the 
recommendations of Beiner et al. (2006, p. 267). The test involves two-stages (results for 
brevity purposes are not reported here). Stage one, as specified in equation 9 below, the nine 
independent variables (CG Mechanisms-CGM) are assumed to be endogenous in equation 1, 
and are regressed on the eight control variables. The resulting residual values are saved as 
R_CGM.   
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CGM and CONTS refer to the same variables included in the main Model (1). Stage two, 
the UKCGI is regressed on the actual values of CGM, the saved residuals from regression in 
equation 9 (R_CGM), and the same control variables as specified in the following model: 

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                              (10)
 
The DWH test rejects the null hypothesis that endogeneity problem is not present as the 
coefficients on the saved residuals from regression in equation 9 (R_CGM) are significant.18 
This indicates that 2SLS may be more appropriate than OLS regression (Beiner et al., 2006). 
Therefore, following past studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013), 
this study uses 2SLS methodolgy to check whether the obtained results are affected by 
endogeneity. In the first stage, all CG mechanisms (BSE, IOE, BD, PCGC, CL, AFS, MANO, 
ISTO and BLKO) are expected to be determined by the eight control variables. Based on that 
expectation, all CG mechaisms were regressed on the control variables and the predicted value 
of each CG mechanisim was saved. In stage two, the predicted values of all CG mechamisms 
are used as instrument and the model is re-estimated as follows:  

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                                     (11)
 
The variables included in Model 11 remain the same as those included in first equation, 
except that the actual value of all CG mechanisms is replaced with the predicted values from 
stage one. However, before replacing the actual values of CGM, it is essential to check whether 
the predicted values of CGM are appropriate to replace their actual values. This was done using 
both Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices, and it was found that the P_CGM was highly 
correlated with the actual values of CGM. Additionallt, the P_CGM found to have low/no-
correlation with the residual R_CGM. This suggests that the predict values of CG mechanisims 
(CGM) are appropriate instrumenst to replace their actual values (Durnev & Kim, 2005, p. 
1483; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2016, p. 7). Table 26 provides the results of 2SLS. 
                                               
18Specifically, the coefficients on the residuals of BSE, IOE, BD, CL, AFS, MANO and BLOK are statistically significant, whereas the 
coefficients on the residuals of PCGC and ISTO are positive and insignificant. 
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  Table 26: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model 2SLS 
(1) (2) 
Corporate governance variables:  
  BSE 0.051(.008)*** 0.878(.000)*** 
  IOE 0.109(.001)*** 0.031(.928) 
  BD 0.193(.000)*** 2.201(.032)** 
  PCGC 0.016(.258) 0.963(.000)*** 
  CL 0.043(.000)*** -0.364(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.121(.000)*** 0.776(.000)*** 
  MANO -0.171(.000)*** -0.455(.376) 
  ISTO 0.010(.716) 1.092(.000)*** 
  BLKO -0.148(.000)*** -1.022(.000)*** 
Control Variables:   
  LTA -0.006(.073)* -0.153(.000)*** 
  AGE 0.001(.800) 0.007(.826) 
  CEX 0.093(.384) -0.622(.025)** 
  SG -0.001(.960) 0.142(.020)** 
  GR 0.065(.038)** -0.484(.000)*** 
  Q-ratio 0.004(.854) 0.503(.000)*** 
IDU YES YES 
YDU YES YES 
Constant 0.477*** 0.842* 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.938 1.938 
F- value 33.903*** 33.903*** 
Adj. R2 62.0% 62.0% 
Number of observations 600 600 
Notes: BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD board gender and 
ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-
listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes 
institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; LTA denotes firm size; AGE 
denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes 
gearing; Q-ratio denotes profitability; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes 
year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Table 26 reports that the results presented in Model 2 remain largely the same as those 
reported in Model 1, with some exceptions. Specifically, Model 2 suggests that BSE, BD, AFS 
and ISTO are positively and significantly associated with the UKCGI. Both IOE and MANO 
become insignificantly associated with the UKCGI, whereas ceofficient on CL, which was 
positive and significant , is now statistically negative. The coefficient on PCGC, which was 
statistically insignificant, is now statistically significant. Model 2 of Table 26 also shows that 
results related to BLKO remain negative, at the same level of significance. Additionally, the 
direction and significance of only firm size and firm age remain the same as in Model 1 and 
other control variables have changed. Table 26 also shows that Models 1 and 2 are relatively 
similar in terms of the value of adjusted R2, as it is 62% in the two models. The F-value is 
33.903 in both models. 
Overall, after comparing the results of 2SLS with the main OLS results, the findings 
remain relatively similar, with some exceptions, such as the negative and significant cross-
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listing, the insignificance of board independence, the significance of the existence of a separate 
CG committee, the insignificance of managerial ownership and the significance of institutional 
ownership. Although the significance of some CG mechanisms slightly changed, they remained 
in the same direction, indicating that the results of the current study are not largely affected by 
endogeneity.    
6.6.2.3 Firm-Level Fixed-Effects Model 
This study also attempts to control for concerns that CG compliance and disclosure 
might be influenced by unobserved firm-level characteristics by creating 99 dummies that 
represent 100 UK listed corporations. These 99 dummies are used to re-estimate the main model 
and the results reported in Column 3 of Table 27.  
  Table 27: Fixed-Effects Model 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Main OLS Model Fixed-Effect 
(1) (2) 
Corporate governance variables:  
  BSE 0.051(.008)*** 0.050(.002)*** 
  IOE 0.109(.001)*** 0.156(.000)*** 
  BD 0.193(.000)*** 0.155(.000)*** 
  PCGC 0.016(.258) 0.002(.895) 
  CL 0.043(.000)*** 0.027(.009)*** 
  AFS 0.121(.000)*** 0.101(.000)*** 
  MANO -0.171(.000)*** -0.320(.005)*** 
  ISTO 0.010(.716) 0.104(.006)*** 
  BLKO -0.148(.000)*** -0.012 (.719) 
Control Variables:   
  LTA -0.006(.073)* 0.010(.060)* 
  AGE 0.001(.800) -0.022(.000)*** 
  CEX 0.093(.384) 0.064(.479) 
  SG -0.001(.960) -0.014(.269) 
  GR 0.065(.038)** 0.147(.000)*** 
  Q-ratio 0.004(.854) -0.050(.018)** 
IDU YES YES  
YDU YES YES 
FDU NO YES 
Constant 0.477*** 0.296*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.938 1.835 
F- value 33.903*** 60.728*** 
Adj. R2 62.0% 91.4% 
Number of observations 600 600 
Notes: BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD board gender and 
ethnic diversity; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-
listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes 
institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; LTA denotes firm size; AGE 
denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; GR denotes 
gearing; Q-ratio denotes profitability; IDU denotes industry dummies; YDU denotes year 
dummies; and FDU denotes firm dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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First, the sign and the significance level on coefficients of BSE, IOE, BD, PCGC, CL, 
AFS and MANO remain the same as those predicted by the main model. However, Model 2 also 
reports that the significance level of ISTO and BLKO has changed. Specifically, Table 27 
reports that ISTO was insignificant, is now significant at 1% level, whereas the coefficient on 
BLKO was significant, is insignificant. The direction and significance of some control variables 
show some changes. Overall, the results of fixed effect analysis are relatively similar to those 
reported in Column 2, with the exception of some sensitivity, such as the positive and 
significant effect of ISTO and the negative and insignificant effect of BLKO. 
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter presents a statistical summary of all variables employed in CG compliance and 
disclosure model. It also examines whether the data used in the voluntary CG disclosure model 
meets OLS assumptions, including normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. The skewness and kurtosis statistics indicate that some control variables 
deviate from a normal distribution. Different types of transformation (e.g., winsorising and 
natural logarithm) have been conducted to reduce non-normalities of these control variables. 
After transforming the variables, different statistical tests were conducted, including VIF, 
Cook’s Distance, Scatter Plot, P-P Plot and Durbin-Watson. Overall, these tests suggest that the 
OLS assumptions are not seriously violated, and this implies that OLS is appropriate statistical 
estimation to conduct the analyses of the study. 
This chapter also reports results related to CG compliance and disclosure among UK listed 
firms. The study finds that the aggregated CG score slightly increased from 59.97% in 2008 to 
63.43% in 2013, which lend support to previous CG literature (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; Chen & 
Zhang, 2014; Henry, 2008) which provided evidence that CG compliance improves over time. 
The aggregate mean of CG score ranges from 20% to 94.17%, with an average of 61.73% firms 
complying with 120 CG provisions investigated. Additionally, the results suggest that small 
firms provide less CG information than large firms. The results based on industrial groups 
suggest that the CG compliance and disclosure appear to be higher in the consumer goods and 
consumer services industries (64.69% and 63.94%) followed by industrials and technology 
industries (about 62%) whereas basic materials firms show lower level of CG compliance and 
disclosure (56%). The results based on the five sub-indices suggest that firms tend to provide 
more information on leadership and remuneration CG provisions, than other CG provisions that 
relate to accountability, effectiveness and relations with shareholders. 
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The empirical results related to the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure, were 
discussed in section 6.5. The obtained empirical evidence suggests that firm-level CG 
compliance and disclosure is significantly influenced by board, firm, ownership and audit 
characteristics. Specifically, the analysis of the independent variables indicates that cross-
listing, board size, audit firm size, board independence, and board gender/ethnic diversity have 
statistically positive associations with the UKCGI, whereas the existence of a separate CG 
committee and institutional ownership have no association with the UKCGI. Additionally, the 
results suggest that both managerial and block ownership have statistically negative 
associations with the UKCGI. Overall, the results lend support to the predictions of the multi-
theoretical framework adopted in this study. 
Finally, the results of sensitivity analyses were discussed in Section 6.6. Five sensitivity 
analyses were used to check the robustness of the obtained results. These analyses include 
examining non-linearity, the use of lagged model, 2SLS model, Fixed Effects model, and the 
use of alternative CG indices. Overall, the additional tests indicate that the results of the current 
study are largely robust to different endogeneity problems (with a few sensitivities in the 2SLS 
and Fixed-Effects models) and using alternative CG indices. The results also suggest that both 
BSE and BLOK have a non-linear association with firm-level CG compliance and disclosure. 
The next chapter presents and discusses the descriptive statistics and OLS assumptions for 
variables employed in the performance models. After that, the empirical results of OLS 
regressions based on the composite-CG-index model and individual-CG variable model are 
discussed, whereas the final section discusses and presents tests used to check the robustness 
of the obtained results. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE PERFORMANCE MODELS 
7 AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter provides the statistical analysis of factors employed in the performance 
models. In particular, Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 present a statistical summary of the dependent, 
explanatory and control variables, respectively. Section 7.4 conducts general Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) misspecification tests relating to the variables employed in the performance 
models. Section 7.5 presents and discusses the estimated OLS regression results relating to the 
composite-CG-index model, the individual-CG-model, and the moderating influence of 
ownership structure variables on the UKCGI-Performance nexus. Section 7.6 checks the 
robustness and sensitivity of the results reported in Section 7.5 to alternative specifications and 
measures. The final section (7.7) summaries main points covered in this chapter. 
7.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DEPENDENT VARIABLES (Q-
ratio, ROA and SR) 
Panels A-C of Table 28 provide the descriptive statistics of Q-ratio, ROA and SR, 
respectively. Panel A reports the descriptive statistic of Q-ratio, which ranges from 0.014 to 
1.66, with an average of 0.54. For the yearly analysis, Panel A shows that Q-ratio remains 
relatively steady over the sampled period. The average Q-ratio for the sampled firms (0.54) 
lends support to the results of past UK studies. For instance, Poutziouris et al. (2015) report an 
average Q value of 0.68 for 1,477 firm-year observations from 1998-2008. Prior UK studies 
also report high levels of variation of Q-ratio among their sampled companies. Clacher et al. 
(2008), for instance, report that the value of Q ranges from 0.07 to 6.65, with an average of 1.38 
among 63 UK listed companies over the years 2003-2005. Similarly, in Dahya et al. (2008), Q 
value ranges from 0.78 to 2.64, with an average of 1.39, for 19 UK listed firms in 2002.  
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Table 28:  Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Performance 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Q       
Mean 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 
Median  0.56 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.54 
STD 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Min  0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.055 0.049 0.049 
Max 1.66 1.66 1.16 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.19 
Panel B: ROA (%)       
Mean 8.64 8.57 8.32 8.56 9.60 8.80 8.00 
Median  7.77 7.96 7.47 7.88 8.94 7.83 6.86 
STD 9.76 10.79 9.28 9.68 10.02 9.10 9.79 
Min  -13.76 -13.76 -13.76 -13.76 -13.76 -13.76 -13.76 
Max 29.96 29.96 29.96 29.96 29.96 29.96 29.96 
Panel C: SR (%)        
Mean 8.69 -27.34 27.13 21.04 -1.74 12.10 20.53 
Median  3.93 -30.58 25.03 14.31 -0.39 8.28 20.28 
STD 39.69 27.44 46.23 39.33 28.73 34.47 32.09 
Min  -60.58 -60.58 -60.58 -60.58 -60.58 -60.58 -60.58 
Max 91.61 40.48 91.61 91.61 91.61 91.61 91.61 
Panel B of Table 28 reveals that ROA, after winsorising,19 ranges from -13.76% to 29.96%, 
with an average of 8.64% for the overall sampled period. The standard deviation of 9.76% 
suggests that the variation in ROA, among the UK listed firms, is significant. Panel B also shows 
that ROA was highest in 2011, with a mean of 9.60%, and lowest in 2013, with a mean of 8%. 
The mean value of ROA (8.64%) is in line with prior UK studies. Clacher et al. (2008), for 
instance, report that ROA has a mean of 6.65% for 63 UK listed companies over the period 
2003-2005, similarly, Guest (2009) reports that the average ROA among UK listed firms is 
11%. 
Finally, Panel C reports that SR, after winsorising, ranges from -60.58% to 91.61%, with 
an average of 8.69%. The standard deviation is 39.69%, suggesting that the variation in SR, 
among the UK listed firms, is significant. The significant variation in SR lends support to prior 
UK studies. For instance, Gregory‐Smith et al. (2014b) report that the value of SR ranges from 
-23.4% to 12.9%, with a mean of -1%, for all FTSE 350 listed firms over the period 1996-2011. 
Similarly, Hüttenbrink et al. (2014) find that SR ranges from -92.23% to 129.65%, with an 
average of 2.77%, for 706 firms over the period 2005-2008.  
                                               
19Outliers were present in the financial performance proxies. The value of ROA, for example, ranges from -227% to 77%; similarly, the value 
of SR ranges from -93% to 1370%. This suggests the presence of extreme values, which can seriously violate the OLS assumptions. To reduce 
the effect of outliers, following prior CG literature (Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Beiner et al., 2006; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013; Hüttenbrink 
et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014; Müller, 2014), the financial performance proxies (ROA and SR) were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. 
Particularly, an ascending ranking order for the entire sample (600 firm-year observations) based on each of the financial performance proxies 
is followed. The highest and lowest 30 values of each of the financial performance proxies were replaced with the 31st and 569th values, 
respectively. Finally, multiple-linear regression was conducted before and after winsorising at 5% and 95% levels. The results were highly 
consistent with those discussed below. 
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7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EXPLANATORY AND 
INTERACTION VARIABLES 
As noted above, some of the explanatory and interaction variables, which employed in the 
performance models, are discussed in Chapter Six, including the UKCGI, board size (BSE), 
board independence (IOE), board gender diversity (BDG), board ethnic diversity (BDE), board 
gender and ethnic diversity (BD), managerial ownership (MANO), institutional ownership 
(ISTO) and block ownership (BLKO). Therefore, this section reports the statistical analysis of 
board committees (PSC), separation CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT) and frequency 
of board meetings (FMs). 
A categorical variable is employed in Panel G to measure the effect of the existence of 
board committees (PSC) on corporate performance/valuation. 88% of the examined firms have 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees (see Table 29). Additionally, the aggregated 
mean of the PSC slightly increases over the sampled period, from 87% in 2008 to 90% in 2010, 
indicating that increased attention is being paid by firms to establishing board committees over 
time. Panel H shows the statistical summary of separating CEO and chairperson positions 
(DSPLIT). The aggregated mean of DSPLIT remains fairly steady over the sampled period. The 
aggregated mean indicates that 90% of the sampled firms split CEO and chairperson positions 
(DSPLIT). This aggregated mean is consistent with those reported by prior UK studies. For 
instance, Weir et al. (2002) report that 16% of examined firms combine CEO and chairperson 
positions for 311 UK listed companies over the period 1994-1996. Similarly, in Dedman (2016), 
only 11% of sampled firms combine these positions. 
Finally, Panel I reports the statistical analysis for board meetings. It ranges between two 
and thirty-six annual meetings, with a mean of 9.02% annual meetings. As shown in Table 29, 
the mean of board meetings was relatively steady over the sampled period; it was 9.03 in 2008 
and become 8.94 annual meetings in 2013. The average value of board meetings lends support 
to past UK studies. Yekini et al. (2015), for example, report that board meeting frequency 
ranges from two to sixteen annual meetings, with a mean of 8.37 annual meetings, for 73 UK 
listed firms over the years 2002-2012. Similarly, Hahn and Lasfer (2007) report that the 
frequency of board meeting ranges from four to seventeen meetings, with an average of 8.81 
meetings per year.  
 
189 
 
      Table 29: Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory and Interaction Variables 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: UKCGI (%)       
Mean 61.73 59.97 60.88 61.47 61.99 62.67 63.43 
Median  64.58 63.33 63.75 64.58 65.00 65.83 66.25 
STD 14.53 15.03 14.82 14.71 14.32 14.15 14.24 
Min  20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Max 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel B: Board Size        
Mean 9.00 9.07 9.10 9.00 8.95 8.96 8.92 
Median  8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
STD 3.46 3.43 3.49 3.55 3.55 3.51 3.33 
Min  3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 
Max 18.00 17.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Panel C: Board Independence (%)      
Mean 59.12 58.05 58.05 58.86 60.58 58.94 60.20 
Median  60.00 58.33 60.00 60.00 66.67 60.00 63.64 
STD 17.66 17.47 18.23 18.03 17.56 17.75 17.23 
Min  10.00 10.00 10.00 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 
Max 92.86 92.31 92.86 90.91 91.67 92.31 92.31 
Panel D: Board Diversity Based on Gender (%)      
Mean 10.27 7.69 8.07 9.04 10.80 12.62 13.40 
Median  10.00 7.14 7.14 7.42 10.00 12.50 13.81 
STD 10.43 8.63 8.79 9.81 10.92 11.25 11.63 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 50.00 42.86 37.50 40.00 50.00 40.00 44.44 
Panel E: Board Diversity Based on Ethnicity (%)      
Mean 1.37 1.26 1.51 1.26 1.48 1.39 1.36 
Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 3.98 3.56 4.22 3.59 4.04 4.23 4.25 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 25.00 18.18 20.00 22.22 22.22 25.00 25.00 
Panel F: Board Diversity Based on Gender & Ethnicity (%)     
Mean 11.65 8.95 9.58 10.30 12.28 14.01 14.76 
Median  11.11 7.69 8.71 10.00 12.50 14.29 14.29 
STD 11.40 9.82 9.94 10.44 11.80 12.23 12.83 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 50.00 42.86 37.50 40.00 50.00 40.00 44.44 
Panel G: Existence of Board Committees (%)      
Mean 88.33 87.00 87.00 87.00 89.00 90.00 90.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 32.13 33.80 33.80 33.80 31.47 30.15 30.15 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel H: Director Split 
(%) 
       
Mean 90.33 91.00 91.00 90.00 90.00 91.00 89.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 29.57 28.76 28.76 30.15 30.15 28.76 31.45 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel I: Frequency of Board Meetings      
Mean 9.02 9.03 9.07 9.19 8.84 9.02 8.94 
Median  8.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
STD 3.66 3.09 3.44 3.73 3.79 4.01 3.91 
Min  2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
Max 36.00 4.38 23.00 26.00 33.00 36.00 35.00 
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      Table 29 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory and Interaction Variables 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel J: Managerial Ownership (%)       
Mean 5.95 6.20 6.00 5.74 5.69 5.87 6.18 
Median  0.58 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.46 0.53 
STD 11.40 11.52 11.32 11.03 11.10 11.49 12.21 
Min  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.009 
Max 52.37 51.33 51.33 51.33 51.33 51.33 52.37 
Panel K: Institutional Ownership (%)      
Mean 38.38 38.22 38.03 37.27 38.58 39.69 38.45 
Median  36.38 36.66 35.40 37.16 37.25 36.38 36.07 
STD 20.70 21.71 21.33 19.47 20.20 20.58 21.32 
Min  3.07 4.12 3.98 4.97 5.92 3.07 4.02 
Max 97.49 97.49 97.42 95.54 96.56 96.30 96.42 
Panel L: Block Ownership (%)      
Mean 42.62 42.15 42.43 42.03 43.15 43.75 42.23 
Median  43.20 42.98 42.23 41.94 44.06 46.51 43.13 
STD 21.55 22.09 21.87 20.92 21.34 21.33 22.24 
Min  3.07 3.29 3.98 4.97 5.92 3.07 4.02 
Max 98.08 96.22 98.08 97.60 97.36 95.14 92.04 
 
7.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CONTROL VARIABLES 
A statistical summary of control variables, cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), capital 
expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG) and CEO tenure (CEOT), is presented in Table 30. Given 
that the analyses of CL, AFS, CEX and SG have been discussed in Chapter Six, this section 
shows the statistical summary of CEOT. Panel E of Table 30 shows that the aggregated CEOT 
ranges from zero (less than a year) to 35 years, with an average of 5.5 years. Comparing the 
aggregated mean over the sampled period shows that CEOT stayed relatively stable (around 5.5 
years) among the sampled firms. This aggregated CEOT value is in line with past UK studies. 
Gregory‐Smith et al. (2014b) report that the mean value of CEO tenure among all FTSE 350 
listed companies is 5.64. Similarly, Ozkan (2011) reports an average board tenure of six years 
for 390 non-financial listed corporations during the period 1999 to 2005. 
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     Table 30: Descriptive Statistics of the Control Variables 
Control Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Cross-listing (%)       
Mean 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 45.86 46.06 46.06 46.06 46.06 46.06 46.06 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel B: Size of Auditing Firm (%)      
Mean 82.00 82.00 81.00 81.00 82.00 83.00 83.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 38.45 38.62 39.43 39.43 38.61 37.75 37.75 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel C: Capital Expenditure (%)      
Mean 4.99 5.39 4.48 4.46 5.15 5.31 5.14 
Median  3.70 3.95 2.74 3.60 3.92 3.99 3.59 
STD 4.14 4.30 3.83 3.67 4.27 4.41 4.32 
Min  0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Max 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 14.73 
Panel D: Sales Growth (%)       
Mean 7.61 22.91 -0.73 9.63 9.07 2.20 2.60 
Median  5.65 20.71 -3.93 6.73 6.99 1.90 0.38 
STD 18.60 21.56 18.44 17.91 15.24 13.11 13.97 
Min  -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 -23.77 
Max 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 52.04 
Panel E: CEO Tenure       
Mean 5.54 5.42 5.57 5.50 5.71 5.57 5.45 
Median  4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.50 
STD 5.21 5.04 5.35 5.53 5.63 5.09 4.68 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 35.00 32.00 33.00 34.00 35.00 25.00 20.00 
The next section will test OLS assumptions, and Section 7.5 will present the empirical 
results. Section 7.6 discusses potential endogeneity problems as well as the findings from a 
number of robustness analyses.  
7.4 TESTS OF OLS ASSUMPTIONS  
Analysis of the link between CG practices and corporate performance/valuation is 
conducted using OLS. Because of that, a number of tests have been carried out to address the 
OLS assumptions. First, the assumption of normality is tested using skewness and kurtosis 
statistics, as well as by conducting the normal histogram (for brevity purposes not reported 
here) of all continuous variables, and the findings are reported in Table 31. Given that the 
normality assumption for some of the variables included in the performance models, (i.e., Q-
ratio, UKCGI, BSE, IOE, BD, MANO, ISTO, BLKO, CEX and SG) is discussed in Chapter Six, 
this section presents normality tests for ROA, SR, FMs and CEOT. As discussed in Chapter Six, 
variables are statistically said to be close to normal distribution if their skewness value is within 
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+/-1.96 and their kurtosis value is within +/-3 (Field, 2009, p. 139; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 
1048).  
   Table 31: Tests of Normality 
Variables Skewness Kurtosis 
Q-ratio 0.115 0.262 
ROA -4.829 49.697 
SR 10.003 156.131 
UKCGI -0.716 -0.034 
BSE 0.640 -0.503 
IOE -0.523 -0.275 
BD 0.639 -0.409 
FMs 2.558 13.306 
MANO 2.308 4.707 
ISTO 0.437 -0.407 
BLKO 0.132 -0.658 
CEOT 1.701 5.056 
CEX 1.967 6.107 
SG 11.420 200.824 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; SR denotes shareholder return ratio; 
UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board 
independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; 
MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block 
ownership; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; and SG denotes sales growth. 
The skewness and kurtosis value of performance proxies (ROA and SR) are above the 
accepted values, and therefore these two variables are not normally distributed. To reduce non-
normality in ROA and SR, following prior literature (Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Dharmapala 
& Khanna, 2013; Hüttenbrink et al., 2014; Liang et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014), the performance 
proxies (ROA and SR) were winsorised at 5% and 95% levels. The skewness and kurtosis values 
and the distribution of normal histogram (not reported here for brevity purposes) improved, 
indicating that the winsorised variables are less abnormally distributed than the actual variables. 
With respect to corporate governance variables (FMs and CEOT), although their figures show 
slight non-normality, they do not seem to be statistically harmful to the analysis. The skewness 
and kurtosis figures for FMs and CEOT are generally similar to those of earlier studies (Jizi et 
al., 2014, p. 609; Kamardin, 2014, p. 68; Peni, 2014, p. 191; Voulgaris et al., 2010, p. 520; 
Yekini et al., 2015, p. 11). Therefore, any remaining non-normality seems not to be statistically 
harmful. 
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   Table 32: Tests of Multicollinearity 
Variables Tolerance VIF 
UKCGI 0.536 1.864 
BSE 0.500 1.999 
IOE 0.665 1.504 
BD 0.708 1.412 
PSC 0.787 1.271 
DSPLIT 0.870 1.150 
FMs 0.808 1.238 
CL 0.573 1.746 
AFS 0.697 1.435 
CEOT 0.860 1.162 
CEX 0.815 1.228 
SG 0.802 1.246 
Notes: UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board 
independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; PSC denotes the existence of board committees; 
DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; 
CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital 
expenditure; and SG denotes sales growth. 
To test for multicollinearity among variables, a number of statistical techniques have been 
employed in the current study, including Spearman’s and Pearson’s correlation matrices, 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistic tests (Tolerance). Table 32 shows that 
the maximum value of VIF is 1.999 and the lowest value of Tolerance is 0.500, suggesting no 
major problem of multicollinearity (Field, 2009, p. 224; Wooldridge, 2013, p. 98). Similarly, 
and as reported in Table 33, the correlations coefficients of Spearman and Pearson indicate no 
severe multicollinearity among variables. Additionally, the direction and magnitude of both 
correlation matrices are relatively similar, indicating that non-normalities in the variables 
employed are not going to seriously violate the assumptions of OLS regression (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 478). 
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Table 33: Correlation matrices of dependent, interaction and independent variables
Variable UKCGI PSC BSE IOE BDG BDE BD CL AFS DSPLIT CEOT FMs MANO ISTO BLKO CEX SG ROA Q-ratio SR 
UKCGI 
 
.499*** .487*** .532*** .337*** .252*** .367*** .491*** .525*** .284*** -.076* -.001 -.601*** -.258*** -.503*** .128*** .066 .233*** .251*** .122*** 
PSC .612*** 
 
.130*** .212*** .267*** .139*** .289*** .215*** .398*** .057 .003 .015 -.214*** -.061 -.275*** .027 .001 .047 .039 .028 
BSE .444*** .160*** 
 
.519*** .314*** .340*** .381*** .512*** .177*** .011 -.005 -.144*** -.619*** -.313*** -.541*** .121*** .089** .310*** .220*** .033 
IOE .489*** .249*** .458*** 
 
.268*** .219*** .308*** .450*** .222*** -.002 -.022 -.204*** -.684*** .146*** -.367*** .261*** .044 .449*** .120*** .119*** 
BDG .303*** .254*** .256*** .239*** 
 
.117*** .947*** .134*** .010 -.111*** .015 -.193*** -.348*** -.249*** -.318*** .095** -.014 .241*** .196*** .098*** 
BDE .156*** .126*** .290*** .161*** .067 
 
.403*** .147*** .132*** .074* -.006 -.124*** -.197*** -.052 -.233*** .120*** .017 .053 -.038 -.006 
BD .332*** .276*** .335*** .275*** .938*** .410*** 
 
.172*** .032 -.089** .000 -.219*** -.367*** -.255*** -.364*** .126*** -.007 .247*** .151*** .095** 
CL .459*** .215*** .507*** .459*** .138*** .123*** .169*** 
 
.224*** .020 -.112*** .114*** -.530*** -.288*** -.405*** .241*** .079* .268*** .090** .058 
AFS .568*** .398*** .195*** .230*** -.005 .073* .021 .224*** 
 
.273*** -.009 .137*** -.265*** -.009 -.234*** .060 .005 .013 .124*** .017 
DSPLIT .270*** .057 .016 -.020 -.100** .056 -.072* .020 .273*** 
 
-.019 .091** -.120*** .020 .009 -.002 .004 -.031 -.118*** -.017 
CEOT -.153*** -.114*** -.045 -.036 -.037 -.057 -.054 -.162*** -.087** -.074* 
 
-.151*** .126*** -.059 -.018 .094** .085** .173*** -.070* .115*** 
FMs .003 -.103** -.087** -.064 -.193*** -.053 -.195*** .125*** .036 .095** -.187*** 
 
.018 .023 .061 .006 -.017 -.171*** .068* -.069* 
MANO -.420*** -.266*** -.361*** -.352*** -.037 -.027 -.043 -.376*** -.326*** -.194*** .055 -.141*** 
 
.159*** .466*** -.156*** -.036 -.333*** -.297*** -.033 
ISTO -.280*** -.112*** -.266*** -.106** -.218*** -.078* -.225*** -.251*** -.043 .017 .010 -.030 .025 
 
.748*** .019 -.100** -.157*** -.166*** -.136*** 
BLKO -.485*** -.315*** -.517*** -.312*** -.291*** -.240*** -.349*** -.377*** -.255*** .011 .078* .115*** .291*** .722*** 
 
.002 -.095** -.245*** -.233*** -.097** 
CEX .070* .003 .096** .211*** .065 .108*** .097** .208*** .045 -.018 .023 .051 -.028 .086** .091** 
 
.103** .225*** -.111*** -.048 
SG .022 -.037 .091** .0.34 -.039 .020 -.029 .071* -.012 -.001 .034 .036 .004 -.057 -.045 .102** 
 
.277*** -.019 .008 
ROA .139*** -.001 .297*** .426*** .242*** .051 .239*** .218*** -.010 -.053 .162*** -.148*** -.078* -.093** -.187*** .161*** .216*** 
 
.067 .243*** 
Q-ratio .250*** .040 .190*** .094** .127*** -.034 .104** .099** .148*** -.121*** -.028 .033 -.256*** -.187*** -.207*** -.106*** -051 .083** 
 
-.014 
SR .082** .024 .014 .116*** .076* -.008 .067 .052 .016 -.006 .078* -.033 -.011 -.094** -.058 -.073* -.014 .222*** -.044 
 
Notes:  The upper right half of the table provides the coefficients relating to Spearman’s correlation, whilst the bottom left half of the table presents the coefficients relating to Pearson’s correlation. UKCGI denotes the UK CG index;  PSC denotes the existence 
of board committees;  BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BDG denotes board gender diversity; BDE denotes board ethnic diversity;  BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity;  CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; 
DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; FMs denotes board meetings;  MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership;   ROA denotes return on assets; 
Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; and SR denotes shareholder return. ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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After conducting the normality and multicollinearity analyses, the assumptions of linearity 
and heteroscedasticity must be met in order to ensure that OLS is appropriate to estimate 
models. A number of statistical tests were used to examine the presence of outliers that may 
cause non-linearity and heteroscedasticity, including Cook’s Distances, Leverage Value, 
Studentised Residuals, P-P Plot and Scatter Plot. First, this study computed the Cook’s 
Distances, Leverage Value and Studentised Residuals for the individual-CG-variable and 
composite-CG-index models based on Q-ratio, ROA and SR. The computed value of Cook’s 
Distances for the models (six models) ranges between 0.00 and 0.069, with a mean of 0.002. 
The computed Leverage Value for the six models ranges between 0.016 and 0.145, with a mean 
of 0.036. This implies the non-existence of serious outliers, as the values of both Cook’s 
Distance and Leverage do not exceed one (Field, 2009, p. 293). The computed Studentised 
Residuals for the six models of performance range between -3.359 and 4.670, with an average 
of -0.001. The minimum and maximum Studentised Residuals exceed the critical value of three, 
however the mean (-0.001) indicates that there are no severe outliers. Additionally, the Scatter 
Plot and the P-P Plot (not reported here for brevity purposes) for the six models suggest that 
outliers are not present and the distribution looks fairly linear and with random patterns. 
The final OLS assumption is autocorrelation; this assumption is tested by conducting the 
Durbin-Watson test. The Durbin-Watson value for the six performance models is close to two 
– it ranges from 1.974 to 2.311. This implies that there is no serious autocorrelation problem in 
the residuals from the regression (Field, 2009, pp. 220-221; Wooldridge, 2013, p. 419). To sum 
up, different statistical tests were conducted, including skewness, kurtosis, correlation matrix, 
VIF, Cook’s Distance, Scatter Plot, P-P Plot and Durbin-Watson, to check for normality, 
multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Overall, these tests suggest 
that the OLS assumptions are not seriously violated, and this implies that OLS is appropriate 
statistical estimation to conduct the analyses of the study. The next section, therefore, reports 
the results of the composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models. 
7.5 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The main empirical findings related to the performance models are reported in this section. 
As explained in the third chapter, existing CG studies that examine the association among CG 
structures and corporate performance/valuation employ two approaches: (i) the composite-CG-
index model (e.g., Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Bauer et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec et 
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al., 2010; Chang et al., 2015; Connelly et al., 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Mishra & Mohanty, 
2014; Mouselli & Hussainey, 2014); and (ii) the individual-CG-variable model (e.g., 
Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Guest, 2009b; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Low et al., 2015; Mangena 
et al., 2012; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2016; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002). 
Although prior UK literature mainly employs either the composite-CG-index model (e.g., Farag 
et al., 2014; Mouselli & Hussainey, 2014; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005) or the individual-CG-
variable approach (e.g., Guest, 2009b; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002), this study 
aims to extend, as well as contribute to the extant CG literature by using both models, and that 
may provide better understanding about the effect of employing different models. Subsection 
7.5.1 reports the empirical results relating to the composite-CG-index model, whilst Subsection 
6.5.2 reports the empirical results relating to the individual-CG-variable model. 
7.5.1 Empirical Results: The Composite-CG-Index Model 
This section reports the empirical results related to the impact of CG, using a broad CG 
index, on corporate performance/valuation, and thereby answers the question of whether the 
UKCGI, as a broad measure of CG, impacts corporate performance/valuation. As explained in 
the research design chapter, a self-constructed CG index (UKCGI) was developed in this study, 
comprising 120 provisions extracted mainly from the 2010 Combined Code. A summary of the 
empirical findings and the hypothesised relationships between the UKCGI and corporate 
performance/valuation is reported in Table 34.  
             Table 34: A Summary of the Findings and Hypotheses of Corporate Performance Models 
Dependent Variable (Q-ratio, ROA and SR)  
Independent Variable: No. Hyp. Predicted 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding sig.  Hyp. Status  
Composite-CG-Index Model:      
  UKCGI_Q 10 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  UKCGI_ROA 10 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  UKCGI_SR 10 + + Insig. Rejt. 
Notes:  Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter Four. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting 
hypothesised relationships, respectively. 
 
7.5.1.1 Results Based on Q-ratio (Q) 
Table 34 reports that the UKCGI is significant and positively (1% level) associated with 
both Q-ratio and ROA, which is in line with the formulated hypotheses. However, the UKCGI 
is positively and insignificantly associated with RS, which is inconsistent with the formulated 
hypotheses. The results related to the association between the UKCGI and Q-ratio, as a measure 
of market valuation, are presented in Table 35. 
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As explained in Table 34, this study uses two market-based measures (Q-ratio and SR) of 
corporate valuation in addition to ROA. The F-value, as reported in Table 35, is statistically 
significant (1% level), suggesting that the UKCGI, in addition to control variables, are not equal 
to zero. This implies that the null hypothesis that these variables do not have influence on 
corporate performance/valuation is rejected. Additionally, the adjusted R2 suggests that 17.5% 
of the variability in the Q-ratio is explained in this model. This lends support to Ammann et al. 
(2011) and Connelly et al. (2012), who report an adjusted R2 of 12.9% and 27.5%, respectively. 
The following paragraphs discuss in detail the results reported in Table 35. 
The model finds a statistically positive (at 1% level) association among the UKCGI and Q-
ratio, which lends empirical support to Hypothesis Ten. Theoretically, the positive finding 
lends support to the prediction that engaging in increased compliance with CG standards can 
reduce agency costs, protect shareholders’ interests and enhance corporate reputation (Black et 
al., 2006c, p. 362; Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 323; Klapper & Love, 2004, p. 718; Suchman, 
1995, p. 587). This allows firms to gain the support of powerful stakeholders to access critical 
resources (Freeman & Reed, 1983, p. 89; Zahra & Pearce, 1989, p. 297), which ultimately can 
improve corporate market value. Empirically, this finding offers support to past empirical 
studies (e.g., Ammann et al., 2011; Beiner et al., 2006; Connelly et al., 2012; Klapper & Love, 
2004; Ntim, 2013b; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), which report empirical evidence that the 
corporate valuation is significantly positively influenced by quality of CG practices. In the UK, 
for instance, Clacher et al. (2008) and Padgett and Shabbir (2005) provide empirical evidence 
that corporate valuation (Q-ratio) is statistically significantly linked to firm-level CG quality. 
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        Table 35: Composite-CG-Index (Q-ratio) 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       ____________________________     Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
     (Model) 
Predicted 
sign        (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Compliance-Index (UKCGI)  
   
 
  UKCGI + 0.328(.000)***  0.382(.061)* 0.349(.094)* 0.304(.136) 0.333(.106) 0.330(.130) 0.252(.240) 
Control Variables:       
  CL  + 0.047(.036)**  0.080(.171) 0.070(.233) 0.039(.497) 0.037(.513) 0.000(.995) 0.029(.594) 
  AFS + -0.029(.217)  -0.020(.739) -0.038(.535) -0.058(.342) -0.042(.473) -0.011(.864) -0.004(.941) 
  CEOT  + 0.001(.399)  0.008(.106) 0.005(.233) 0.003(.490) 0.000(.969) -0.005(.247) -0.004(.360) 
  CEX - -0.046(.841)  -0.204(.721) 0.061(.925) 0.606(.365) -0.166(.763) -0.185(.754) -0.008(.988) 
  SG  + -0.058(.270)  -0.074(.535) -0.004(.978) -0.186(.222) -0.191(.197) -0.016(.931) -0.007(.963) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  0.471***  0.483*** 0.460*** 0.495*** 0.504*** 0.516*** 0.532*** 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.185  2.296 2.038 2.176 2.179 2.237 2.302 
F- value  9.330***  3.289*** 2.690*** 2.201** 2.292** 1.884* 1.932* 
Adj. R2  17.5%  19.1% 14.7% 10.9% 11.7% 8.3% 8.8% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX 
denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The study finds a statistically positive (5% level) relationship among cross-listing and Q-
ratio. The statistically significant and positive effect suggests that cross-listed corporations 
have a high market valuation compared with non-cross-listed counterparts. Empirically, the 
finding lends support to the results of Klapper and Love (2004) and Ntim (2013b), who report 
evidence that cross-listing enhances the market value of firms. Additionally, the negative and 
insignificant coefficient on audit firm size suggests that this variable does not affect the market 
value of firms. The model also finds a statistically insignificant association among CEO tenure 
and firms’ valuation (Q-ratio). The evidence of an insignificant influence of CEO tenure does 
not offer support to the prediction that companies with longer-tenured directors are expected to 
have better market valuation. However, the insignificant finding lends empirical support to 
Coles et al. (2001) findings that CEO tenure does impact the market valuation of firms. 
The model provides evidence that capital expenditure impacts negatively, but 
insignificantly, on firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio). The insignificant association between 
capital expenditure and Q-ratio does not lend empirical support to past studies (Bozec et al., 
2010; Brown et al., 2009) which report that capital expenditure significantly impacts firms’ 
market valuation (Q-ratio). However, the evidence of insignificant effect of capital expenditure 
offers support to the results of Ntim (2013b). Additionally, the result for sales growth shows 
that SG has a statistically insignificant and positive influence on Q-ratio, which indicates that 
sales growth does not impact firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio).   
Finally, in terms of industry and year dummies, the results (for brevity purposes not 
reported here) suggest that all industries are significantly negatively (1% level) associated with 
firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio). This suggests that firms in the four industries tend to be 
associated with a significantly low Q-ratio. This provides empirical support to previous studies 
(e.g., Ntim, 2013b; Wahba, 2015) which find that a firm’s industry significantly influences its 
market valuation (Q-ratio). In terms of year dummies, only year 2008 is statistically positively 
associated with Q-ratio, whereas years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 are insignificantly 
associated with Q-ratio. Overall, this finding supports Ntim (2013b), Padgett and Shabbir 
(2005) and Wahba (2015), who report that firms’ market valuation tends to vary over time. 
7.5.1.2 Results Based on Return on Assets (ROA) 
The null hypothesis that the UKCGI, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is 
rejected as the F-value (9.683) is statistically significant (1% level). Additionally, the adjusted 
R2 suggests that 18.1% of the variation in the sampled firms’ ROA is explained by the model. 
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This lends support to the results of Klapper and Love (2004) and Renders et al. (2010), who 
report an adjusted R2 of 29% and 25%, respectively. The following paragraphs discuss in detail 
the results reported in Table 36. The model finds a statistically positive (1% level) association 
among the UKCGI and ROA. Specifically, the coefficient on UKCGI is statistically positive, 
suggesting that Hypothesis Ten is empirically supported. Theoretically, this finding supports 
the prediction that engaging in increased compliance with CG standards can reduce agency 
costs and enhance corporate performance (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) by 
increasing board independence, enhancing its monitoring on management activities (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), reducing information asymmetry (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and enhancing internal control systems (Jensen, 1993). Additionally, LT 
suggests that compliance with CG standards can align corporate goals with those of wider 
society, which can help improve corporate reputation and image (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Suchman, 1995), as well as helping obtain the support of powerful corporate stakeholders to 
access critical resources (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Pfeffer, 1972; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Empirically, the positive finding provides support to past studies. For example, Klapper 
and Love (2004) reports empirical evidence of a statistically positive association among CG 
index and ROA for 374 companies across 14 countries. Similarly, Bauer et al. (2010) examine 
the association between CG quality, using Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) rankings,  
and US firms’ performance. They report empirical evidence that CG quality, using ISS ranking, 
is statistically positively associated with ROA. Other empirical studies report a positive and 
significant relationship among CG quality, using a broad CG indices, and ROA (e.g., Giroud & 
Mueller, 2011; Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Ntim, 2013b; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). In terms of the 
results of past UK studies, Clacher et al. (2008) report empirical evidence of a statistically 
positive association among their developed index (G-index) and ROA for 63 UK listed firms 
for years 2003 to 2005.  
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             Table 36: Composite-CG-Index (ROA) 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       ____________________________     Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
     (Model) 
Predicted 
sign        (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Compliance-Index (UKCGI)      
  UKCGI + 0.092(.007)***  0.045(.622) 0.143(.078)* 0.079(.315) 0.154(.090)* 0.087(.286) 0.067(.434) 
Control Variables:   
   
 
  CL  
+ 0.039(.000)***  0.019(.471) 0.028(.217) 0.036(.106) 0.037(.135) 0.061(.007)*** 0.058(.009)*** 
  AFS + -0.022(.028)**  -0.010(.705) -0.019(.440) -0.005(.842) -0.036(.171) -0.032(.172) -0.024(.316) 
  CEOT  + 0.003(.000)***  0.003(.216) 0.003(.059)* 0.004(.017)** 0.003(.143) 0.004(.017)** 0.005(.005)*** 
  CEX - 0.145(.127)  0.497(.056)* 0.456(.070)* 0.510(.050)** 0.084(.727) -0.149(.500) -0.224(.294) 
  SG  + 0.089(.000)***  0.073(.175) -0.037(.506) 0.243(.000)*** 0.115(.078)* 0.063(.375) 0.157(.014)** 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  -0.024  0.005 -0.060 -0.043 -0.037 -0.027 -0.039 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.311  2.394 2.241 2.550 2.374 2.407 2.021 
F- value  9.683***  2.838*** 2.675*** 4.304*** 2.178** 2.640*** 3.425*** 
Adj. R2  18.1%  15.9% 14.6% 25.2% 10.7% 14.3% 20.0% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: ROA denotes accounting returns; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; 
CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The empirical results relating to control variables are also reported in Table 36. First, the 
study finds a statistically positive (1% level) association among cross-listing and ROA. The 
positive effect of cross-listing offers supports the prediction that cross-listed companies are 
expected to engage in increased compliance with CG standards (Black et al., 2006c, p. 363; 
Core, 2001, pp. 443-444) in order to enhance corporate legitimacy (Klapper & Love, 2004, p. 
713), gain access to critical resources and gain the support of influential stakeholders (Doidge 
et al., 2009, p. 428; Doidge et al., 2004, p. 208). This can reduce agency costs (Doidge et al., 
2004, p. 209) and thus improve corporate performance (Ghosh & He, 2015, p. 2). Additionally, 
the positive effect of cross-listing empirically support past studies (e.g., Charitou & Louca, 
2009; Ntim, 2013b). 
Second, the model finds a statistically negative (5% level) association among the size of 
auditing firm and ROA. This finding endorses the prediction that large audit firms are associated 
with high costs of auditing (André et al., 2016; Palmrose, 1986), which may negatively impact 
ROA. Additionally, the coefficient on CEO tenure is statistically positive (1% level), and 
thereby lending support to the results of Hoque et al. (2013). The positive effect of CEO tenure 
is in line with predictions that longer-tenured directors are expected to have good reputations 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) and that can enhance corporate legitimacy by providing better networks 
with their external environment (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) and winning the support of powerful 
stakeholders to access critical resources (Geletkanycz et al., 2001), which can improve 
corporate accounting returns (ROA).  
Third, the results for capital expenditure suggest that capital expenditure has an 
insignificant association with ROA. The insignificant effect of capital expenditure lends 
empirical support to the results of Ntim (2013b) and Jackling and Johl (2009), who report that 
capital expenditure does not influence ROA. Additionally, the coefficient on sales growth is 
statistically positive (1% level), suggesting that sales growth impacts significantly on ROA. 
Theoretically, this suggests that fast-growing firms have a greater need to maintain strong CG 
systems so as to attract external capital at low costs (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 254; Klapper & 
Love, 2004, p. 712), which can improve corporate performance, including ROA. Empirically, 
the positive effect of sales growth lends support to past CG studies (e.g., Clacher et al., 2008; 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Tariq & Abbas, 2013). 
Finally, the results (not reported in Table 36) suggest that both basic materials and 
consumer goods industries are statistically positively associated with ROA. This indicates that 
basic materials and consumer goods firms tend to have significantly higher ROA compared with 
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other firms (i.e., industrials, consumer services and technology). This lends empirical support 
to past studies (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, 2013b) showing that corporate accounting 
returns can be affected by industry type. In terms of year dummies, the results suggest that ROA 
is not affected by the financial year factors. The insignificant effect of financial year factors 
does not lend empirical support to the results of Padgett and Shabbir (2005), who report that 
ROA is affected by the financial year factors; however, the evidence is in line with Ntim 
(2013b). 
7.5.1.3 Results Based Shareholder Return (SR) 
As mentioned above, this study employs SR as an alternative proxy to investigate the 
impact of firm-level CG quality (UKCGI) on firms’ market valuation. First, as outlined in Table 
37, the null hypothesis that the UKCGI, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is 
rejected as the F-value (14.520) is statistically significant (1% level). Additionally, the adjusted 
R2 suggests that 25.7% of the variation in the sampled firms’ SR is explained by this model. 
This lends support to the results of Ntim (2013a) and Ntim (2013b), who report an adjusted R2 
of 27% and19.8%, respectively. 
Second, the statistically insignificant coefficient on the UKCGI does not lend support to 
Hypothesis Ten – that firm-level CG quality impacts positively on SR. The insignificant effect 
of the UKCGI does not lend support to the prediction that corporations with good CG systems 
tend to have better market valuation (Clacher et al., 2008; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). 
Empirically, the evidence of an insignificant influence of firm-level CG quality does not support 
the results of past studies that CG practices significantly impact firms’ market valuation (e.g., 
Ntim, 2013a, 2013b; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). However, the insignificant effect of the UKCGI 
can be explained by: (i) SR may not reflect actual corporate performance, since it primarily 
measures “shareholder expectations about future cash flows” (Burgman & Van-Clieaf, 2012, 
p. 3); (ii) there are many macroeconomic factors that can significantly impact total shareholder 
return, including general market conditions and government monetary policy (Burgman & Van-
Clieaf, 2012, p. 2), and this may suggest that CG has a small influence on SR compared with 
other macroeconomic factors; and/or (iii) SR is more volatile and associated with more noise 
(Zakaria, 2012, p. 191), making it a weak measure to “reflect a fair and reasonable view of 
shareholder returns over a measurement period” (Burgman & Van-Clieaf, 2012, p. 3). 
The empirical results relating to control variables are also reported in Table 37. The model 
report that both cross-listing and audit firm size are not associated with SR. This does not 
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support the prediction that cross-listed and big-four audited firms tend to have high market 
valuation. However, the insignificant effect of cross-listing and audit firm size is in line with 
Ntim (2013b). The coefficient on CEO tenure is statistically positive (1% level), suggesting that 
companies with long-tenured CEOs tend to have better market valuation (SR). The positive 
effect of CEO tenure lends empirical support to Brookman and Thistle (2009). Similarly, the 
model reports a statistically positive relationship among sales growth and firms’ market 
valuation, which offer support to the predictions and findings of previous CG studies (e.g., 
Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006c; Ntim, 2015). Table 37 also reports a statistically 
negative relationship among capital expenditure and firms’ market valuation. The negative 
finding lends empirical support to the hypothesis that capital expenditure impacts negatively on 
firm performance. The negative effect of capital expenditure lends also empirical support to the 
results of previous studies (e.g., Guest, 2009b; Ntim, 2015). For instance, Ntim (2015) reports 
that capital expenditure is significantly negatively associated with market valuation, measured 
by SR. 
In terms of industry and year dummies, the results (for brevity purposes not reported here) 
suggest that firms’ market valuation differs across time and industry. Specifically, the results 
show that the technology industry is statistically positively (5% level) associated with SR. This 
suggests that technology firms tend to be associated with significantly higher SR than other 
industries that are insignificantly associated with share return (i.e., basic materials, consumer 
services, consumer goods, industrials). Additionally, dummies for years 2008, 2011, 2012 and 
2013 for the full sample are statistically negative, whereas dummies for years 2009 and 2010 
are statistically insignificant. Overall, consistent with the predictions and results of prior 
studies, this study finds that firms’ market valuation differs across industries and years (e.g., 
Bauer et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Clacher et al., 2008; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Padgett 
& Shabbir, 2005). 
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         Table 37: Composite-CG-Index (SR) 
 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       ____________________________     Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
     (Model) 
Predicted 
sign        (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Compliance-Index (UKCGI)  
   
 
  UKCGI + 0.149(.257)  0.202(.418) 0.294(.511) 0.144(.655) 0.188(.489) 0.044(.890) 0.002(.996) 
Control Variables:       
  CL  + 0.040(.275)  0.132(.071)* -0.080(.531) -0.029(.748) 0.077(.304) 0.090(.304) 0.080(.278) 
  AFS + -0.019(.615)  -0.009(.904) -0.066(.622) 0.063(.516) 0.060(.445) -0.013(.884) -0.133(.104) 
  CEOT  + 0.008(.006)***  0.003(.603) 0.004(.723) 0.020(.003)*** 0.008(.142) 0.010(.146) 0.004(.547) 
  CEX - -0.679(.067)*  -0.829(.247) 0.252(.857) -1.465(.171) -0.508(.485) -0.372(.668) -0.737(.302) 
  SG  + 0.397(.000)***  0.234(.113) 0.006(.984) 0.799(.001)*** 0.249(.202) 0.737(.009)*** 1.010(.000)*** 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  0.052  -0.464*** -0.011 -0.005 -0.304* -0.108 0.283* 
Durbin-W. Stat  1.976  1.954 2.062 1.707 2.213 2.161 1.987 
F- value  14.520***  1.294 0.510 3.744*** 1.140 2.021** 3.441*** 
Adj. R2  25.7%  3.0% 5.30% 22.10% 1.40% 9.40% 20.10% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: SR denotes shareholder return; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes 
capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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7.5.1.4 Comparison of Q-ratio, ROA and SR Results 
As shown in Tables 35 and 36, the results indicate that better-governed firms (proxied by 
the UKCGI) are associated with significantly better performance (Q-ratio and ROA) than poorly 
governed firms. By contrast, the results presented in Table 37 suggest no significant relationship 
among the UKCGI and SR. As explained above, the insignificant effect of the UKCGI may have 
several causes, one of which is that total shareholder return may not reflect actual corporate 
performance. Generally, in spite of the insignificant association between the UKCGI and SR, 
the results support Hypothesis Ten, that firms with good CG practices tend to have better 
performance (proxied by Q-ratio and ROA). However, the interpretation of the coefficients on 
the UKCGI presented in Tables 35 and 36 show that the relationship between firm-level CG 
quality and Q-ratio seems to be stronger (0.328) than the association between firm-level CG 
quality and ROA (0.092). Theoretically, this finding is expected because Q-ratio captures future 
growth potential (Bharadwaj et al., 1999, p. 1010), whereas ROA is a historical measure that 
captures actual accounting profits (Christensen et al., 2015, p. 143). 
The next subsection discusses the results of the individual-CG-variable model to test 
Hypotheses eleven to sixteenth. Specifically, the results of the impact of individual CG 
variables and Q-ratio are presented in Subsection 7.5.2.1, while Subsections 7.5.2.2 and 7.5.2.3 
provide the results based on ROA and SR, respectively.  
7.5.2 Empirical Results: The Individual-CG-Variable Model 
This section presents the findings related to the association between individual CG 
variables and corporate performance/valuation, using Q-ratio, ROA and SR. This section aims 
to answer research question regarding whether individual CG mechanisms impact corporate 
performance/valuation. The individual CG mechanisms employed in the model include: board 
size (BSE), board independence (IOE), board diversity (BD), existence of board committees 
(PSC), separating CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT) and board meetings (FMs). A 
summary of the empirical findings and the hypothesised relationships is reported in Table 38. 
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                Table 38: A Summary of the Findings and Hypotheses of Corporate Performance Models 
Dependent Variable (Q-ratio, ROA and SR)  
Independent Variables: No. Hyp. Predicted 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding sig.  Hyp. Status  
Panel A: ICGV_Q      
  BSE 11 + + Sig. (10%) Acep. 
  IOE 12 + + Sig. (10%) Acep.  
  BD 13 + + Insig. Rejt. 
  PSC 14 + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
  DSPLIT 15 + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
  FMs 16 + + Insig.  Rejt. 
Panel B: ICGV_ROA      
  BSE 11 + + Sig. (10%) Acep.  
  IOE 12 + + Sig. (1%) Acep.  
  BD 13 + + Sig. (1%) Acep.  
  PSC 14 + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
  DSPLIT 15 + + Insig.  Rejt. 
  FMs 16 + - Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
Panel C: ICGV_SR      
  BSE 11 + - Insig. Rejt. 
  IOE 12 + + Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  BD 13 + + Insig.  Rejt. 
  PSC 14 + - Insig. Rejt. 
  DSPLIT 15 + + Insig. Rejt. 
  FMs 16 + - Insig. Rejt. 
 Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter Four. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and 
rejecting hypothesised relationships, respectively. 
7.5.2.1 Results Based on Q-ratio (Q) 
As shown in Panel A of Table 38, this study hypothesises a positive association between 
all individual CG variables and the market-based proxy (Q-ratio) of performance. The signs of 
the individual CG variables are generally lending support to the theoretical expectations. First, 
the null hypothesis that CG mechanisms, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is 
rejected as the F-value (9.182) is statistically significant (1% level). Additionally, Table 39 
suggests that 22.5% of the variability in the Q-ratio is explained in this model. This lends 
support to Bozec et al. (2010) and Guest (2009b), who report an adjusted R2 of 24.4% and 
28.7%, respectively 39.20  
Second, the model reports a statistically positive (at the 10% level) relationship between 
board size and Q-ratio, indicating that Hypothesis Eleven is empirically supported. The positive 
effect of board size lends empirical support to the existing CG literature (e.g., García-Meca et 
al., 2015; Mangena et al., 2012; Pandey et al., 2015), but the finding contradicts the results of 
some prior UK studies (e.g., Guest, 2009b; Müller, 2014). Theoretically, the result offers 
                                               
20In Model 1, board diversity is measured based only on the overall proportion of women and ethnic minorities on a corporate board (BD), 
whilst in Model 2 board diversity is measured based board gender (BDG) and board ethnicity (BDE), separately. 
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support to the prediction that larger boards are viewed by the market as more effective, since 
larger boards are suggested to be associated with more knowledge, experience and 
stakeholders’ representation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1038; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 
473), which increase the stakeholder confidence and facilitates access to critical resources 
(Goodstein et al., 1994, p. 242; Pearce & Zahra, 1992, p. 412). 
Third, board independence has a significantly positive (at the 10% level) relationship with 
firms’ market valuation, which empirically support Hypothesis Twelve. This finding lends 
support to the recommendations of CG codes, including the 2010 Combined Code. This finding 
also offers support to the prediction that the existence of outside directors can enhance firms’ 
reputation by increasing stakeholder representation on boards (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 
473), as well as by signalling to the market that agency and asymmetry information problems 
are low (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315). This allows firms to access critical resources and 
improve their market valuation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1039). The statistically significant 
and positive coefficient on board independence lends support to the existing CG literature (e.g., 
Dharmadasa et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). Particularly, this 
finding empirically supports the results of Weir et al. (2002), which indicate that the existence 
of outside (unaffiliated) executives improves investors’ confidence and enhances firm valuation 
for 311 UK listed firms. 
Fourth, the coefficient on board gender and ethnic diversity suggest an insignificant effect 
of board gender and ethnic diversity on Q-ratio, indicating that Hypothesis Thirteen is not 
empirically supported. The evidence of an insignificant influence of board diversity does not 
lend support to the recommendations of CG codes, including the 2010 Combined Code, and the 
results of Carter et al. (2003) and Ntim (2015), who report empirical evidence that Q-ratio is 
significantly associated with board gender and ethnic diversity. However, the statistically 
positive (10% level) coefficient on board gender diversity (Model 2) suggests that having 
directors with different genders can improve firms’ market valuation.   
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Table 39: Individual-CG-Variables (Q-ratio) 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       All Firm Years ______________________________    Yearly estimations__________________________________ 
     (Modesl) 
Predicted 
sign         (1)       (2)           (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
     
  BSE + 0.053(.085)* 0.058(.064)* 0.081(.348) 0.075(.334) 0.052(.496) 0.070(.358) 0.078(.335) 0.053(.561) 
  IOE + 0.104(.085)* 0.102(.092)* 0.191(.236) 0.240(.128) 0.064(.674) -0.031(.847) 0.125(.442) 0.124(.447) 
  BDG + - 0.157(.093)* - - - - - - 
  BDE + - -0.030(.897) - - - - - - 
  BD + 0.134(.130) - 0.187(.486) 0.251(.330) 0.125(.625) 0.069(.749) 0.071(.760) 0.151(.456) 
  PSC + -0.122(.001)*** -0.123(.001)*** -0.172(.070)* -0.186(.055)* -0.160(.067)* -0.084(.354) -0.083(.391) -0.021(.838) 
  DSPLIT + -0.089(.003)*** -0.088(.004)*** -0.059(.496) -0.060(.479) -0.087(.292) -0.175(.029)** -0.163(.043)** -0.017(.814) 
  FMs + 0.003(.260) 0.003(.258) 0.017(.079)* 0.010(.188) 0.002(.766) 0.002(.703) 0.000(.983) 0.005(.513) 
Control Variables:          
  CL + 0.053(.033)** 0.051(.041)** 0.088(.189) 0.045(.516) 0.050(.439) 0.044(.478) -0.011(.870) 0.022(.741) 
  AFS + 0.034(.150) 0.034(.143)*** 0.022(.719) 0.014(.824) 0.020(.763) 0.046(.462) 0.049(.418) 0.014(.801) 
  CEOT  + 0.002(.383)                      0.001(.404)               0.007(.178)         0.005(.312) 0.003(.530) -0.001(.856) -0.004(.461) -0.003(.524) 
  CEX - 0.100(.661) 0.103(.652) 0.254(.672) 0.265(.679) 0.901(.181) -0.153(.785) -0.114(.855) 0.064(.908) 
  SG  + -0.080(.125) -0.081(.120) -0.159(.215) 0.090(.550) -0.259(.103) -0.192(.194) 0.041(.832) 0.031(.855) 
IDU  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES YES - - - - - - 
Constant  0.613*** 0.599*** 0.467** 0.492** 0.680*** 0.731*** 0.665*** 0.474** 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.121 2.123 2.239 1.985 2.197 2.113 2.144 2.190 
F- value  9.182*** 8.767*** 2.612*** 2.606*** 2.136** 2.021** 1.777* 1.566 
Adj. R2  22.50% 22.50% 21.0% 20.80% 15.30% 14.0% 11.0% 8.40% 
Number of observations  600 600 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BDG denotes board gender diversity; BDE denotes board ethnic diversity;  BD denotes board gender and 
ethnic diversity; PSC denotes the existence of board committees;  DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; FMs denotes board meetings; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes 
audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The positive effect of board gender diversity lends support to past studies (e.g., Peni, 2014; 
Perryman et al., 2016; Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2016; Terjesen et al., 2015) which report 
empirical evidence that board gender diversity can enhance firms’ market valuation by 
facilitating access to critical resources (Terjesen et al., 2015, p. 6), increasing stakeholders’ 
representation (Ntim, 2015, p. 173) and increasing board independence and effectiveness (Walt 
& Ingley, 2003, p. 220). Model 2 of Table 39 also finds an insignificant relation between board 
ethnic diversity and Q-ratio. The evidence of insignificant influence of ethnic minorities in the 
UK boardroom can be explained by their extremely low representation (1.37%, as shown in 
Table 29), as well as the possibility that non-white people may be appointed by the board “as 
a sign of tokenism” (Low et al., 2015, p. 5; Ntim, 2015, p. 173). Therefore, ethnic minorities 
have less influence over their boards’ decisions. 
Fifth, the existence of board committees is predicted to be positively linked to firms’ 
market valuation. The model finds a statistically negative (1% level) relationship among the 
existence of board committees and Q-ratio, which rejects Hypothesis Fourteen. The negative 
effect of board committees is consistent with the prediction that the establishment of these 
committees can increase agency and monitoring costs, as well as the potential for conflict 
between board members (Hearn, 2011, p. 133; Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116). This may signal to 
investors that the presence of board committees can increase agency and information 
asymmetry problems, thus impacting negatively on firms’ market valuation. Empirically, the 
finding lends support to the results of Hearn (2011), reporting that companies, which have high 
market valuation, are less likely to establish board committees in 37 West African firms. In 
terms of past UK studies, Main and Johnston (1993) provide empirical evidence that executive 
pay is influenced positively by the existence of a remuneration committee among 220 listed 
firms in 1990; this implies that establishing board committees may increase agency costs (in 
the form of excessive executive pay) which can have a negative effect on the wealth of 
shareholders.  
Sixth, the separation of CEO and chairperson positions is found to be statistically 
negatively linked to firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio), indicating that Hypothesis Fifteen and 
the recommendations of CG codes are not empirically supported. Theoretically, the statistically 
significant and negative effect supports the prediction that CEOs tend to have greater 
knowledge and experience about their firms’ operating environment (Pham et al., 2015, p. 5; 
Weir et al., 2002, p. 585), and act in the best interests of their companies to secure their position 
(Davis et al., 1997, p. 26). This can signal to the market that CEOs are willing to be accountable 
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to their firms (Ntim et al., 2013, p. 369). Empirically, the negative coefficient of DSPLIT lends 
support to the results of Elsayed (2007), Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Nguyen et al. (2015). 
Finally, the study finds a statistically insignificant and positive association among Q-ratio 
and board meetings, suggesting that Hypothesis Sixteen is rejected. The insignificant finding 
does not lend empirical support to previous CG studies (Christensen et al., 2015; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006; Vafeas, 1999a) which report that firms’ market valuation is negatively 
influenced by the frequency of board meetings. However, the positive coefficient on board 
meetings offers support to the evidence provided by Hu et al. (2010), Jackling and Johl (2009) 
and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005). From a theoretical perspective, the positive and 
insignificant link between board meetings and Q-ratio suggests that even though meeting more 
frequently has no implications on market valuation, stock market participants perceive it as a 
good CG practice. This is because regular board meetings can increase monitoring of 
managerial activities to protect shareholders’ and/or stakeholders’ interests (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 
116). 
The empirical results relating to control variables are also outlined in Table 39. Only cross-
listing is significantly associated with firms’ market value. Audit firm size, CEO tenure, capital 
expenditure and sales growth are insignificantly associated with firms’ market valuation. The 
positive impact of cross-listing offers empirical support to previous CG studies (e.g., Cetorelli 
& Peristiani, 2015; Ntim, 2013b, 2015; Shi et al., 2014). The positive effect of cross-listing also 
lends support to the prediction that cross-listing allows firms to access different sources of 
finance at low costs (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2015, p. 152; Miller, 1999, p. 104), which can 
enhance firm value. The positive coefficient on audit firm size suggests that stock market 
participants perceive auditing by larger audit firm as important CG mechanisms. 
The results reveal that CEO tenure has an insignificant and positive influence on Q-ratio. 
The positive coefficient on CEO tenure lends empirical support to past studies (e.g., Brookman 
& Thistle, 2009; Coles et al., 2001) which indicate that firms with longer-tenured CEOs receive 
higher market valuation than those with shorted-tenured CEOs. Similarly, the positive 
coefficient on capital expenditure implies that increasing capital expenditure may enhance 
market valuation, because of the expectation that capital expenditure is associated with long-
term growth potential (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1044). By contrast, the negative coefficient 
on sales growth, which lend support to the results of Weir et al. (2002), indicates that faster-
growing firms receive lower market valuation. Finally, supporting the results of previous CG 
literature (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim, 2013b), the study finds 
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that Q-ratio is significantly affected by year and industry dummies, which suggests that firms’ 
market valuation can vary across industries and years.  
7.5.2.2 Results Based on Return on Assets (ROA)  
As reported in Table 4021, The F-value is statistically significant (1% level), suggesting 
that CG mechanisms, in addition to control variables are not equal to zero. This implies that the 
null hypothesis that these variables do not have influence on ROA is rejected. Additionally, the 
adjusted R2 indicates that 31.8% of the variability in ROA is explained in this model. This lends 
support to the results of Ntim (2015) and (Upadhyay et al., 2014), who report an adjusted R2 of 
32.6% and 34.24%, respectively. 
The model reports empirical evidence of an insignificant association among board size and 
ROA in Model 1. However, ROA is found to be statistically positively (10% level) influenced 
by board size in Model 2. The positive coefficients on board size in the two models lend 
empirical support to Hypothesis Eleven and the results of existing CG literature (e.g., García-
Meca et al., 2015; Gaur et al., 2015; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mangena et al., 2012; Onakoya 
et al., 2014). Additionally, the positive effect of board size offers support to Müller (2014), who 
reports evidence that ROA is significantly positively influenced by board size among FTSE100 
UK listed companies. Theoretically, the positive coefficient lends support to theoretical 
prediction that board size positively impacts corporate performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, 
p. 1038). 
The statistically significant and positive (1% level) coefficient on board independence 
lends support to Hypothesis Twelve, and the results of existing CG literature (e.g., Dharmadasa 
et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). Specifically, the finding 
advocates the results of Clacher et al. (2008) and Müller (2014), who report empirical evidence 
that ROA is affected positively by the existence of outside (unaffiliated) executives. The finding 
also supports the recommendations CG codes, including the 2010 Combined Code that a large 
proportion of corporate board members need to be outside (unaffiliated) directors. 
Theoretically, the positive findings lends support to the prediction that appointing outside 
directors can enhance corporate performance by reducing agency and information asymmetry 
problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315) and by meeting the expectations of stakeholders (Ntim 
                                               
21In Model 1, board diversity is measured based only on the overall proportion of women and ethnic minorities on a corporate board (BD), 
whilst in Model 2 board diversity is measured based board gender (BDG) and board ethnicity (BDE), separately. 
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& Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473), which can help improve corporate reputation and win the 
support of influential stakeholders to access critical resources. 
Table 40 also provides evidence that board gender and ethnic diversity is statistically 
positively linked with ROA, suggesting that Hypothesis Thirteen and the results of previous 
studies (e.g,. Khan & Vieito, 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b; Peni, 2014; 
Terjesen et al., 2015) are empirically supported. The positive finding offers support to the 
prediction that board diversity leads to increased board innovation and creativity, since it can 
nurture diverse ideas, experience, knowledge and perspectives (Estélyi & Nisar, 2016; 
Goodstein et al., 1994), which may improve decision-making and corporate performance 
(Carter et al., 2003, p. 36; Ntim, 2015, pp. 172-173). Additionally, the statistically positive 
coefficient on board gender diversity (Model 2) suggests that having directors with different 
gender can improve corporate operating performance. Model 2 of Table 40 also finds a 
statistically negative relation among board ethnic diversity and ROA. The negative finding lends 
support to the prediction that board ethnic diversity may decrease board effectiveness 
(Goodstein et al., 1994, p. 243) and increase the possibility of conflict between board members 
(Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2009, p. 725), which can negatively impact corporate operating 
performance. 
The coefficient on board committees is statistically (1% level) negative, which does not 
lend empirical support to Hypothesis Fourteen or previous studies (e.g., Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein, 2009; Klein, 1998; Vafeas, 1999b; Wild, 1994). However, the evidence of a negative 
influence of board committees on board effectiveness and corporate performance lends support 
to the results of some UK studies (Main & Johnston, 1993; Weir et al., 2002). For example, 
Main and Johnston (1993) provide empirical evidence that executive pay is influenced 
positively by the existence of a remuneration committee, which may impact negatively on 
shareholder value. The negative effect of board committees can theoretically be explained by 
the prediction that the establishment of these committees may result in duplicating board 
responsibilities and increased agency costs, such as the remuneration of board committee 
members, which can negatively impact firm performance (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116). Additionally, 
Conger et al. (1998, p. 139) suggest that board committees may increase monitoring on 
managerial activities, and that may constrain executive initiative, possibly impacting negatively 
on corporate performance. 
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            Table 40: Individual-CG-Variables (ROA) 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       All Firm Years __________________________________     Yearly estimations____________________________________ 
     (Model) 
Predicted 
sign         (1)       (2)           (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
     
  BSE + 0.012(.341) 0.021(.097)* 0.048(.200) -0.005(.867) -0.007(.804) 0.029(.365) 0.008(.774) -0.014(.660) 
  IOE + 0.206(.000)*** 0.203(.000) *** 0.242(.001)*** 0.193(.002)*** 0.232(.000)*** 0.194(.005)*** 0.193(.001)*** 0.140(.017)** 
  BDG + - 0.133(.000)*** - - - - - - 
  BDE + - -.173(.0.56)* - - - - - - 
  BD + 
0.095(.007)*** - 0.052(.654) 0.100(.309) 0.053(.563) 0.151(.099)* 0.148(.071)* 0.174(.016)** 
  PSC + -0.040(.005)*** -0.041(.003)*** -0.018(.664) 0.019(.606) -0.024(.428) -0.064(.094)* -0.071(.036)** -0.086(.021)** 
  DSPLIT + 
0.007(.578) 0.009(.422) 0.020(.594) 0.030(.356) 0.009(.765) 0.034(.309) -0.002(.938) -0.52(.048)** 
  FMs + -0.004(.000)*** -0.004(.000)*** 0.001(.828) -0.005(.098)* -0.006(.013)** -0.004(.102) -0.002(.277) -0.006(.022)** 
Control Variables:       
  CL + 
0.008(.420) 0.005(.626) -0.042(.152) 0.012(.641) 0.015(.501) 0.014(.582) 0.029(.218) 0.055(.021)** 
  AFS + -0.012(.180) -0.011(.217) -0.024(.372) -0.008(.736) 0.003(.899) -0.027(.299) -0.016(.433) -0.001(.977) 
  CEOT  + 0.002(.005)*** 0.002(.007)*** 0.002(.256) 0.003(.112) 0.003(.085)* 0.002(.361) 0.003(.060)* 0.005(.010)** 
  CEX - 0.014(.879) 0.018(.838) 0.261(.316) 0.395(.108) 0.374(.119) -0.034(.883) -0.367(.094)* -0.350(.074)* 
  SG  + 0.093(.000)*** 0.091(.000)*** 0.058(.291) -0.025(.659) 0.206(.000)*** 0.105(.090)* 0.116(.086)* 0.181(.004)*** 
IDU  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES YES - - - - - - 
Constant  -0.028 -0.051 -0.151 -0.060 -0.023 -0.033 -0.002 0.102 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.240 2.237 2.306 2.101 2.393 2.272 2.356 2.255 
F- value  14.097*** 14.151*** 2.892*** 2.895*** 5.656*** 3.002*** 3.592*** 5.145*** 
Adj. R2  31.80% 32.90% 23.80% 23.60% 42.60% 24.20% 29.30% 40.10% 
Number of observations  600 600 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: ROA denotes accounting returns ; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BDG denotes board gender diversity; BDE denotes board ethnic diversity;  BD denotes board gender and 
ethnic diversity; PSC denotes the existence of board committees;  DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; FMs denotes board meetings; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm 
size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The model finds a statistically insignificant association among DSPLIT and ROA, 
indicating that Hypothesis Fifteen is rejected. However, the positive coefficient on DSPLIT 
offers support to the recommendation of CG codes that the positions of CEO and chairperson 
should be split. Empirically, the positive coefficient of DSPLIT offers supports to previous CG 
studies (Christensen et al., 2015; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Specifically, Dahya et al. (1996) 
provide empirical evidence of a statistically positive link among role splitting and the 
performance of 76 UK listed corporations during the period 1989 to 1992. The positive effect 
of DSPLIT also lends support to the prediction that separating CEO and chairperson positions 
may lead to reduced agency problems by enhancing board effectiveness in monitoring CEOs 
(Jensen, 1993, p. 866) and increasing board independence (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002, p. 321), 
which can improve corporate performance. 
The study reports evidence of a statistically negative relationship among board meeting 
and ROA, which does not lend empirical support to Hypothesis Sixteen. The theoretical 
explanation for the negative finding is that frequent meetings may not always be beneficial, as 
they can increase agency costs, including travel and meeting costs (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 118), 
which can impact negatively on corporate performance. Empirically, the negative effect of the 
frequency of board meetings offers empirical support to the results of Jackling and Johl (2009), 
Rodriguez-Fernandez et al. (2014) and Vafeas (1999a).  
The empirical results relating to control variables are also outlined in Table 40. The positive 
influence of cross-listing lends support to the evidence provided by Charitou and Louca (2009) 
and Ntim (2013b), which suggests that cross-listing is positively associated with corporate 
operating performance, which is theoretically expected. Additionally, the statistically 
insignificant and negative effect of audit firm size lends support to the prediction that large 
audit firms are associated with high audit costs (André et al., 2016; Palmrose, 1986). 
Additionally, CEO tenure is statistically positively associated with ROA, providing support for 
the prediction that CEO tenure can enhance corporate legitimacy (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) 
and allow corporations to win the support of powerful stakeholders to access critical resources 
(Geletkanycz et al., 2001), which can improve corporate operating performance. 
The positive coefficient on capital expenditure offers further support to past studies (e.g., 
Jackling & Johl, 2009; Ntim, 2013b). Similarly, the positive effect of sales growth lends support 
to Clacher et al. (2008), who report empirical evidence that ROA is positively influenced by 
sales growth. Finally, the results suggest that only the basic materials industry has a statistically 
positive (1% level) relationship with ROA, which  lends empirical support to existing CG 
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literature (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, 2013b) that corporate accounting returns can be 
affected by industry type. Additionally, none of the year dummies are significantly associated 
with ROA, which not lending  support to the results of Padgett and Shabbir (2005), who find 
that ROA is affected by the financial year factors.  
7.5.2.3 Results Based on Shareholder Return (SR)  
The null hypothesis that CG mechanisms, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero 
is rejected as the F-value (10.578) is statistically significant (1% level). Additionally, the 
adjusted R2 suggests that 25.5% of the variability in the SR is explained in this model22. This 
lends support to the results of Padgett and Shabbir (2005), who report an adjusted R2 of 24% in 
UK listed firms. Table 41 reports the empirical results of explanatory and control variables. 
First, the coefficient on BSE is insignificantly negative, leading to reject Hypothesis Eleven. 
The negative coefficient on board size suggests that stock market participants perceive large 
boards as a bad CG practice. This finding lends empirical support to the existing CG literature 
(e.g., Conyon & Peck, 1998b; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). For instance, Padgett and Shabbir (2005) 
report empirical evidence of an insignificant association among board size and firms’ market 
valuation (proxied by SR) among 478 of the largest UK listed companies. Theoretically, the 
negative coefficient on BSE lends support to the prediction that larger boards are associated 
with less monitoring on management activities (Eisenberg et al., 1998, p. 37) because they are 
associated with more co-ordination and communication problems (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 
1038; Jensen, 1993, p. 865). 
Second, the obtained results also suggest a statistically positive link between board 
independence and firms’ market valuation, empirically supporting Hypothesis Twelve and the 
recommendations of CG codes. The positive finding lends support to the prediction that board 
independence is perceived as a good CG practice by stock market participants (Fama & Jensen, 
1983, p. 315; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473). This finding also offer empirical support to 
existing CG literature (e.g. Dahya et al., 2008; Weir et al., 2002) which report evidence that 
firms’ market valuation is influenced positively by board independence. 
Third, the model reports evidence of an insignificant and positive association among board 
gender and ethnic diversity and SR, suggesting that Hypothesis Thirteen is not empirically 
supported. The positive coefficient on board gender and ethnic diversity lends empirical support 
                                               
22In Model 1, board diversity is measured based only on the overall proportion of women and ethnic minorities on a corporate board (BD), 
whilst in Model 2 board diversity is measured based board gender (BDG) and board ethnicity (BDE), separately. 
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to existing CG literature (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Ntim, 2015) which indicate that board gender 
and ethnic diversity is viewed as a good CG practice by capital market participants. Similarly, 
as reported in Model 2 of Table 41, the result suggests that board gender diversity has an 
insignificant positive association with SR. The positive coefficient on board gender diversity 
offers support to previous CG studies (e.g., Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015) which indicate 
that board gender diversity can enhance firms’ market valuation by increasing board 
independence and effectiveness (Walt & Ingley, 2003, p. 220). However, Model 2 of Table 41 
also finds an insignificant negative link among board ethnic diversity and SR. The negative 
effect of board ethnic diversity suggests that capital market participants perceive board ethnic 
diversity as a bad CG practice, as it may lead to increased potential for conflict among board 
members (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2009, p. 715), which can negatively impact board performance 
and effectiveness (Goodstein et al., 1994, p. 243).  
Fourth, the Fourteenth Hypothesis predicts that SR is positively influenced by the 
existence of board committees (PSC). However, the evidence from this study indicates that the 
PSC is negatively, but insignificantly, related to SR. The negative effect of board committees 
suggests that capital market participants do not perceive it as a good CG practice, because it 
can increase agency and monitoring costs (Hearn, 2011, p. 133; Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116). The 
negative finding lends empirical support to the results of previous studies; for instance, Main 
and Johnston (1993) provide empirical evidence that executive pay is influenced positively by 
the existence of a remuneration committee, which may impact negatively on firms’ market 
valuation. Fifth, the model reports a statistically insignificant association among DSPLIT and 
SR, suggesting that Hypothesis Fifteen is rejected. However, the positive effect of DSPLIT lends 
support to the prediction that capital market participants perceive such role splitting as a positive 
development, because it can lead to reduced agency problems by enhancing board effectiveness 
(Jensen, 1993, p. 866) and increasing board independence (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002, p. 321). 
Empirically, the positive coefficient on DSPLIT offers support to Dahya et al. (1996) who report 
evidence that the market reacts more favourably to separating CEO and chairperson positions 
among 76 UK listed companies. 
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     Table 41: Individual-CG-Variables (SR) 
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       All Firm Years _____________________________     Yearly estimations__________________________________ 
     (Model) 
Predict
ed sign         (1)       (2)           (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
     
  BSE + -0.035(.503) -0.019(.723) 0.196(.071)* -0.238(.184) -0.099(.436) 0.013(.888) -0.156(.194) 0.024(.846) 
  IOE + 0.269(.008)*** 0.263(.010) *** 0.161(.425) 0.548(.127) -0.097(.697) 0.301(.143) 0.352(.145) 0.323(.146) 
  BDG + - 0.084(.593) - - - - - - 
  BDE + - -0.458(.235) - - - - - - 
  BD + 0.016(.916) - 0.280(.401) -0.225(.697) 0.269(.525) -0.113(.682) 0.375(.279) -0.131(.631) 
  PSC + -0.037(.537) -0.039(0.513) -0.129(.272) 0.152(.483) 0.105(.464) -0.237(.043)** -0.059(.680) -0.018(.896) 
  DSPLIT + 0.031(.538) 0.036(.476) 0.031(.783) -0.067(.734) 0.060(.655) 0.295(.004)*** -0.059(.614) -0.121(.227) 
  FMs + -0.005(.277) -0.005(.282) 0.002(.898) -0.016(.356) -0.22(.047)** -0.024(.005)*** 0.019(.041)** 0.002(.860) 
Control Variables:          
  CL + 0.028(.496) 0.023(.585) 0.063(.451) -0.026(.868) 0.039(.711) 0.084(.285) 0.073(.466) 0.040(.651) 
  AFS + -0.010(.800) -0.008(.837) -0.025(.743) 0.016(.914) 0.072(.517) 0.015(.852) 0.010(.914) -0.151(.054)* 
  CEOT  + 0.006(.032)**                  0.006(.037)**             0.001(.851)          0.007(.560) 0.018(.012)** 0.003(.544) 0.012(.099)* 0.004(.590) 
  CEX + 0.844(.027)** -0.835(.029)** -0.874(.244) 0.237(.871) -1.587(.153) -0.579(.417) -1.227(.187) -1.034(.166) 
  SG  + 0.420(.000)*** 0.417(.000)*** 0.153(.335) -0.008(.980) 0.809(.002)*** 0.286(.129) 0.761(.009)*** 0.968(.000)*** 
IDU  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES YES - - - - - - 
Constant  0.134 0.093 -0.702** 0.349 0.343 -0.122 -0.049 0.229 
Durbin-W. Stat  1.974 1.970 1.765 1.974 1.628 2.090 2.197 1.958 
F- value  10.578*** 10.173*** 1.392 0.733 2.898*** 1.820** 1.711* 2.335*** 
Adj. R2  25.5% 25.6% 6.1% -4.6% 23.2% 11.6% 10.2% 17.7% 
Number of observations  600 600 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: SR denotes shareholder return; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BDG denotes board gender diversity; BDE denotes board ethnic diversity;  BD denotes board 
gender and ethnic diversity; PSC denotes the existence of board committees;  DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; FMs denotes board meetings; CL denotes cross-
listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  
P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Finally, Table 41 provides evidence of an insignificant negative relationship among board 
meetings (FMs) and SR, which does not lend support to Hypothesis Sixteen and past studies 
(e.g., Jackling & Johl, 2009; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) which find a positive association 
among board meetings and firms’ market valuation. However, the evidence of a negative impact 
of board meetings offers support to Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Vafeas (1999a). 
Theoretically, the negative effect of board meetings suggest that markets may react 
unfavourably to board meetings, as they may lead to increased agency and monitoring costs 
(Vafeas, 1999a, p. 118). 
The empirical results relating to control variables are also outlined in Table 41. The model 
finds an insignificant positive relationship among cross-listing and SR. The positive effect of 
cross-listing lends empirical support to previous CG studies (e.g., Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2015; 
Ntim, 2013b, 2015; Shi et al., 2014). Additionally, Table 41 indicates that audit firm size is 
negatively and insignificantly linked with SR. The negative coefficient on audit firm size lends 
support to the prediction that large audit firms are associated with high audit costs (André et 
al., 2016; Palmrose, 1986) The model finds a statistically positive (5% level) relationship 
among CEOT and SR. This finding offers support to the prediction that firms with long-tenured 
CEOs receive high market valuation, because those CEOs tend to have better knowledge about 
their firms’ operating environment, and act in the best interests of their companies to improve 
their reputation in the market (Coles et al., 2001, p. 29; Shakir, 2009, p. 52). The positive finding 
also lends support to Coles et al. (2001).  
The study finds a statistically positive (at the 5% level) relationship between capital 
expenditure and SR. The positive effect of capital expenditure lends support to the prediction 
that markets react favourably to capital expenditure because it is associated with long-term 
growth potential (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1044). Similarly, and consistent with past studies 
(e.g., Ntim, 2013b; Ntim, 2015; Peni, 2014), the results show that sales growth is statistically 
positively (1% level) linked to SR. the positive effect of sales growth suggests that markets react 
favourably to sales growth. Finally, in line with past studies (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim, 2013b), the results reveal that SR is significantly affected by year 
and industry dummies, which suggests that firms’ market valuation can vary across industries 
and financial year factors.  
7.5.2.4 Comparison of Q-ratio, ROA and SR Results 
To sum up, this subsection examines and reports results relating to the impact of firm-level 
CG quality on corporate performance, measured using different proxies, including Q-ratio, 
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ROA and SR. Similar to existing CG literature (e.g., Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005), this study find variations in the results based on the 
performance proxy employed. First, as shown in Table 38, board size is found to have a 
statistically positive influence on both Q-ratio and ROA, whilst it is negatively and 
insignificantly related to SR. Such variation may encourage the adoption of a multi-theoretical 
framework to provide a better and richer explanation of the obtained results (Gaur et al., 2015; 
Low et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). For example, larger boards, from agency (AT) theoretical 
perspective, are associated with more agency and information asymmetry problems (Yawson, 
2006, p. 77), which may impact negatively on corporate performance/valuation. By contrast, 
RDT, SHT and LT suggest that larger boards are associated with more knowledge and 
experience (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1038; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473), which can 
increase stakeholder confidence and facilitate access to critical resources (Goodstein et al., 
1994, p. 242; Pearce & Zahra, 1992, p. 412). Additionally, the differences in the results may 
due to that there is no agreement in the literature about an optimal proxy for corporate 
performance (Zakaria, 2012, p. 191). 
Second, the findings suggest that boards with greater independent members generate 
significantly higher performance (Q-ratio, ROA and SR) than less independent boards. This 
empirically supports Hypothesis Twelve and CG codes’ recommendations. This is also in line 
with the prediction of the multi-theoretical framework that board independence can enhance 
corporate reputation and image by increasing stakeholder representation (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013b, p. 473), and by signalling to the market that agency and information asymmetry 
problems are low (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315). This allows firms to access critical resources 
and improve their market valuation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1039). 
Third, the finding suggests that boards with greater ethnic and gender diversity generate 
significantly higher ROA than less diverse boards; this supports Hypothesis Thirteen as well as 
the recommendations of CG codes, including the 2010 Combined Code. However, the evidence 
also indicates that ethnic and gender diversity is insignificantly positively related to Q-ratio and 
SR. This fails to empirically support Hypothesis Thirteen, as well as the recommendations of 
CG codes, including the 2010 Combined Code. As explained above, the percentage of females 
and non-white people on UK boards is very small, and many such members probably nominated 
“as a sign of tokenism” (Low et al., 2015, p. 5; Ntim, 2015, p. 173). Therefore, females and 
non-white board members may be valued less by market participants. 
Fourth, the results indicate that both Q-ratio and ROA are statistically negatively influenced 
by board committees, but SR has an insignificant negative relation with board committees. The 
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negative effect of board committees does not support Hypothesis Fourteen, or the 
recommendations of CG codes. Additionally, and contrary to the theoretical predictions, the 
study finds an insignificant link among role splitting and both ROA and SR. However, role 
splitting is found to have a statistically negative relationship with Q-ratio. This fails to provide 
empirical support for Hypothesis Fifteen or the recommendations of CG codes. This finding 
also suggests that the market may react unfavourably to role splitting, because CEOs tend to 
have greater knowledge and experience about their firms’ operating environment (Weir et al., 
2002, p. 585), and they work towards the best interests of shareholders to secure their positions 
(Davis et al., 1997, p. 26). 
Finally, the results show that board meetings are insignificantly associated with both 
market valuation measures (i.e., Q-ratio and SR), thereby suggesting that Hypothesis Sixteen is 
not empirically supported. ROA found to be negatively and significantly associated with board 
meetings, indicating that Hypothesis Sixteen is rejected. The negative finding implies that 
frequent board meetings may not always be beneficial, as they can increase agency costs, 
including travel and meeting costs (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 118), which may negatively impact 
corporate performance. 
7.5.3 The Moderating Influence of Ownership Structure on the UKCGI-Performance 
Nexus 
As explained in the Fourth Chapter, most past studies only examine the direct link among 
firm-level CG practices and corporate performance, without considering the moderating 
influence of ownership structure on this relationship. Therefore, this study attempts to extend, 
as well as contribute to the extant CG literature by investigating whether managerial, 
institutional and block ownership moderate the association between the UKCGI and firm 
performance. There are two main reasons for examining only the moderating role of ownership 
structure on the association between the UKCGI and firm financial performance: (i) the current 
study is interested mainly in examining the impact of firm-level CG quality, using a broad CG 
index (UKCGI), on corporate performance, and (ii) the UKCGI comprises several CG 
provisions, including those examined in the individual-CG variable models. Therefore, this 
subsection discusses the moderating effect of ownership structure, and compares these results 
with the main results obtained from composite-CG-index models. The moderating effect 
findings are outlined in Table 42. 
First, the coefficients of UKCGI on both the Q-ratio and ROA in Panel B are significantly 
positive (1% level), whilst the coefficient on SR in the same panel is positive, but statistically 
insignificant. Crucially, it is observable from the results that, using Q-ratio and ROA as proxies 
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for performance, the UKCGI-Performance relationship has noticeably improved. Specifically, 
the link between the UKCGI and the Q-ratio has noticeably increased, from 0.328(.000) in 
Column 2 of Table 42 to 0.454(.009) in Column 5 of the same table. Similarly, Table 42 shows 
that the association between the UKCGI and ROA has improved, from 0.092(.007) in Column 
3 to 0.406(.000) in Column 6. The differences between the coefficients are fairly large 
compared to those reported by other studies. Ammann et al. (2011), Connelly et al. (2012), 
Ntim (2013b) and Weir et al. (2002), for instance, reporting coefficients of 0.007, 0.100, 0.001 
and 0.0095 for the link between CG quality indices and the Q-ratio for listed firms in 22 
developed countries, Thailand, South Africa and the UK, respectively. However, Table 42 also 
shows that, using SR as a proxy for firms’ market valuation, the UKCGI-Performance nexus 
has not improved. Specifically, the link between the UKCGI and SR decreases from 0.149(.257) 
in Column 4 of to 0.008(.977) in Column 7 of the same table. 
Overall, the provided results in Panel B lend empirical support to Hypothesis Seventeen, 
that the UKCGI-Performance (using Q-ratio and ROA) nexus is positively and significantly 
enhanced by ownership structure variables. In comparison, the reported findings indicate that 
the association between the UKCGI and Q-ratio is higher than that between the UKCGI and 
ROA.23 Theoretically, this finding is expected, because the Q-ratio captures future growth 
potential (Bharadwaj et al., 1999, p. 1010), whereas ROA is a historical measure that captures 
actual accounting profits (Christensen et al., 2015, p. 143).   
                                               
23As explained in Subsection 7.5.1.3, the link between the UKCGI and SR is insignificant, possibly for the following reasons: (i) SR does not 
reflect actual corporate performance; (ii) there are other macroeconomic factors that may impact significantly on SR; and (iii) SR is more 
volatile. 
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            Table 42: The Moderating Influence of Ownership Structure on the UKCGI-Performance Nexus 
Independent Variable 
Panel A: Main OLS Model  Panel B: Moderating Effect Model 
Q-ratio ROA SR  Q-ratio ROA SR 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI 0.328(.000)*** 0.092(.007)*** 0.149(.257)  0.454(.009)*** 0.406(.000)*** 0.008(.977) 
Ownership Variables:        
  MANO - - -  -0.788(.043)** 0.173(.269) 0.196(.762) 
  ISTO - - -  -0.870(.001)*** -0.105(.312) -0.183(.670) 
  BLKO - - -  1.006(.001)*** 0.455(.000)*** -0.036(.943) 
Interaction Variables:        
  UKCGI*MANO - - -  1.027(.162) -0.260(.379) -0.387(.751) 
  UKCGI*ISTO - - -  1.152(.006)*** 0.208(.216) 0.178(.797) 
  UKCGI*BLKO - - -  -1.454(.002)*** -0.846(.000)*** -0.043(.956) 
Control Variables:        
  CL 0.047(.036)** 0.039(.000)*** 0.040(.275)  0.019(.422) 0.024(.011)** 0.036(.355) 
  AFS -0.029(.217) -0.022(.028)** -0.019(.615)  -0.048(.055)* -0.013(.198) 0.017(.684) 
  CEOT 0.001(.399) 0.003(.000)*** 0.008(.006)***  -0.005(.968) 0.003(.000)*** 0.007(.014)** 
  CEX -0.046(.841) 0.145(.127) -0.679(.067)*  -0.187(.426) 0.139(.143) -0.672(.088)* 
  SG -0.058(.270) 0.089(.000)*** 0.397(.000)***  -0.070(.187) 0.096(.000)*** 0.360(.000)*** 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant 0.471*** -0.024 0.052  0.455*** -0.207*** 0.170 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.185 2.311 1.976  2.195 2.235 1.944 
F- value 9.330*** 9.683*** 14.520***  7.391*** 8.680*** 10.498*** 
Adj. R2 17.5% 20.1% 25.7%  19.4% 22.4% 26.4% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; SR denotes shareholder return; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; MANO denotes managerial 
ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; the next three variables are interactions variables between the UKCGI and the three types of 
ownership, respectively; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes 
industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Second, with reference to the interaction variables, Table 42 generally provides evidence 
that ownership structure variables moderate the association between the UKCGI and 
performance. Specifically, the positive coefficient of UKCGI*MANO in Column 5 supports the 
prediction that managerial ownership improves firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio) by aligning 
management and shareholder interests (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This finding 
offers support to existing CG literature (e.g., Davies et al., 2005; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009; 
Jermias & Gani, 2014; Mangena et al., 2012; Short & Keasey, 1999) which indicate that 
managerial ownership is positively linked to the Q-ratio. However, the negative coefficients of 
UKCGI*MANO in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 42 suggest that high managerial ownership is 
associated with low ROA and SR, which is consistent with the prediction that managerial 
ownership might not lead to aligned interests between managers and shareholders, because 
managers are expected to have unrestricted  access to inside information and can use this 
information to maximise their own interests at the expense of shareholders (McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990, p. 609). 
Additionally, the positive coefficient on UKCGI*ISTO in Columns 5, 6 and 7 provide new 
evidence suggesting that the UKCGI-Performance nexus is statistically positively strengthened 
by institutional ownership. This provides empirical support to prior studies (e.g., Chung & 
Yang, 2015; Jermias & Gani, 2014; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Navissi & Naiker, 2006; Tsai 
& Gu, 2007) which provide evidence of a statistically positive relationship among institutional 
ownership and corporate performance. The positive moderating effect of institutional 
shareholders lends support to the recommendations of CG codes, including the 2010 Combined 
Code, which suggests that shareholders, particularly institutional one, should be active at 
monitoring the opportunistic behaviour of management in order to enhance corporate 
performance. Theoretically, institutional investors, as powerful stakeholders, are expected to 
have a greater incentive to monitor management (Dong & Ozkan, 2008, p. 19; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986, p. 465), and corporations with large portions of institutional shareholdings are 
of more need to meet the expectations of key stakeholders (including institutional shareholders) 
in order to gain their support to access critical resources (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, p. 466; 
Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009, p. 391). 
Finally, the negative coefficient on UKCGI*BLKO in Columns 5, 6 and 7 indicates that the 
UKCGI-Performance nexus is negatively and significantly strengthened by the proportion of 
block investors. This evidence supports the findings of Hamadi (2010), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), Hu et al. (2010), and Veprauskaitė and Adams (2013), who report evidence of a 
statistically negative association among block ownership and corporate performance for 
  
225 
 
Belgian, Malaysian, Chinese and UK listed firms, respectively. Theoretically, greater 
proportions of shares owned by large shareholders might lead to their increased power, allowing 
them to connive with managers to enhance their personal benefits, and that can damage minority 
shareholders’ interests (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1042). 
To conclude, the reported results offer new evidence that the interaction improves the 
magnitude of the UKCGI coefficients, which indicates that ownership structure variables 
moderate the UKCGI-Performance relationship. The next subsections compare the empirical 
results from the composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models, while Section 7.6 
reports and discusses the results relating to the use alternative CG indices, and results relating 
to potential endogeneity problems. 
7.5.4 A Comparison of the Composite-Index and Individual-CG-Variable Models 
As explained above, this study uses the composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable 
models to investigate the impact of firm-level CG quality on firms’ market 
valuation/performance. In the composite-CG-index model, a self-constructed index comprising 
120 provisions was employed as a broad proxy for CG quality, whereas in the individual-CG-
variable model, six CG mechanisms were used to measure CG quality. For both models, the 
adjusted R2, F-statistics and Durbin statistics are outlined in Table 43. 
The reported results (Panel A) indicate that both models (composite-CG and individual-
CG) have relatively the same power to explain the association among firm-level CG quality and 
Q-ratio. The adjusted R2 is 22.50% in the individual-CG-variable model, and 17.50% in the 
composite-CG-index model. The F-value and Durbin-Watson statistic are relatively the same 
in both models; based on the yearly estimations, Panels B-G of Table 43 show that the adjusted 
R2 and F-value in both models are relatively the same. In terms of the association between CG 
and accounting returns, the reported results indicate that the individual-CG variables have more 
power to explain accounting returns than the composite-CG index. The adjusted R2 is 31.80% 
for the individual-CG variables, and 18.10% for the composite-CG-index. Also, the F-statistic 
is 14.097 for the individual-CG variables, and 9.683 for the composite-CG index. The Durbin 
statistic is relatively similar in both models; similarly, regarding yearly estimations, Panels B-
G of Table 43 show that the adjusted R2 and F-value in the individual-CG variables are better 
at explaining accounting returns than the composite-CG index. 
Finally, regarding the association between CG and SR, the reported results suggest that 
both models are relatively similar at explaining SR. Specifically, the adjusted R2 is 25.70% and 
25.50% for the composite-CG-index model and the individual-CG-variable model, 
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respectively. The F-value is 14.520 and 10.578 for the composite-CG-index model and the 
individual-CG-variable model, respectively. In yearly estimations, Panels B-G of Table 43 
generally show that both models have relatively the same power to explain the association 
among CG and SR. 
                Table 43: A Comparison of Performance Models 
Models Used Composite-CG-Index Model (UKCGI)  Individual-CG-Variable Model 
Q-ratio ROA SR  Q-ratio ROA SR 
Panel A: Full Sample        
Adj. R2 17.50% 18.10% 25.70%  22.50% 31.80% 25.50% 
F-value 9.330*** 9.683*** 14.520***  9.182*** 14.097*** 10.578*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.185 2.311 1.976  2.121 2.240 1.974 
Panel B: 2008 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 19.10% 15.90% 3.0%  21.0% 23.80% 6.10% 
F-value 3.289*** 2.838*** 1.294  2.162*** 2.892*** 1.392 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.296 2.394 1.954  2.239 2.306 1.765 
Panel C: 2009 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 14.70% 14.60% 5.30%  20.80% 23.60% -4.60% 
F-value 2.690*** 2.675*** 0.510  2.606*** 2.895*** 0.733 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.038 2.241 2.062  1.985 2.101 1.974 
Panel D: 2010 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 10.90% 25.20% 22.10%  15.30% 42.60% 23.20% 
F-value 2.201** 4.304*** 3.744***  2.136** 5.656*** 2.898*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.176 2.550 1.707  2.197 2.393 1.628 
Panel E: 2011 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 11.70% 10.70% 1.40%  14.0% 24.20% 11.60% 
F-value 2.292** 2.178** 1.140  2.021** 3.002*** 1.820** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.179 2.374 2.213  2.113 2.272 2.090 
Panel F: 2012 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 8.30% 14.30% 9.40%  11.0% 29.30% 10.20% 
F-value 1.884* 2.640*** 2.021**  1.777* 3.592*** 1.711* 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.237 2.407 2.161  2.144 2.356 2.197 
Panel G: 2013 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 8.80% 20.0% 20.10%  8.40% 40.10% 17.70% 
F-value 1.932* 3.425*** 3.441***  1.566 5.145*** 2.335*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.302 2.021 1.987  2.190 2.255 1.958 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; and SR denotes shareholder return. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
To conclude, the comparison between the two models suggests that the individual-CG 
variables are better in explaining accounting returns than the composite-CG index. However, 
both models have relatively the same power to explain the impact of firm-level CG quality on 
firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio and SR). This implies that there is no optimal methodology to 
investigate the influence on firm-level CG quality on firms’ market valuation. Thus, this study 
uses both models to offer better understanding about the effect of employing different models. 
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7.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
As explained above, the UKCGI is the main interest of this study because it constitutes a 
broad set of CG mechanisms, including those used in the individual-CG-variable models. 
Therefore, this section presents the results using various sensitivity analyses that check the 
extent to which the main findings are robust to alternative CG proxies and different endogeneity 
concerns. The results relating to the use of alternative CG indices are reported and discussed in 
Subsection 7.6.1, whereas Subsection 7.6.2 discusses results relating to potential endogeneity 
problems. Overall, as will be discussed below, all the tests suggest that the main findings are 
robust to alternative CG proxies and different endogeneity problems.  
7.6.1 Alternative CG Proxies 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the CG index employed in the current study consists 
of 120 internal CG provisions divided into five main sub-indices: leadership (LSH), 
effectiveness (ETIV), accountability (ACNT), remuneration (REM) and relations with 
shareholders (RWS). These sub-indices each have a different number of provisions,24 suggesting 
that the results of this study may be sensitive to the weight of each sub-index. Therefore, to 
check whether the association among each category (sub-index) and the explanatory variables 
is similar to the main results, this study re-estimated the main model by replacing the UKCGI 
with LSH, ETIV, ACNT, REM and RWS. The result of each sub-index is reported in Table 44.  
With reference to Q-ratio, the results remain statistically positive. Specifically, the models 
(Panel A) find a statistically positive association among Q-ratio and four sub-indices (i.e., ETIV, 
ACNT, REM and RWS), whereas the estimated coefficient on LSH is positive but insignificant. 
Additionally, the control variables of the five models show relatively similar magnitudes and 
directions.  Regarding the evidence of alternative performance proxies, Panel B shows that ROA 
remains positive and significant for two sub-indices (i.e., ETIV and ACNT), while the estimated 
coefficients on LSH, REM and RWS remain positive but insignificant. Panel B also shows that 
control variables for the five models have similar magnitudes and signs. In terms of SR, the 
reported results indicate that the coefficients on LSH, ETIV, ACNT, REM and RWS remain 
statistically insignificant. Also, the control variables for all five sub-indices show similar 
directions and magnitudes. Therefore, the results of Table 44 are relatively the same as those 
reported in Tables 35, 36 and 37, indicating that the findings of the main models are relatively 
robust to the use of different sub-indices. 
                                               
24The number of provisions in each sub-index is as follows: LSH has eight provisions, ETIV has 37, ACNT has 36, REM has 22 and RWS has 
17. 
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                         Table 44: The Results Based on Weighted and Sub CG Indices 
Composite-CG-Index Model Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model(6) 
Panel A: Market Measure  Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio Q-ratio 
  LSH 0.026(.646) - - - - - 
  ETIV - 0.132(.045)** - - - - 
  ACNT - - 0.267(.002)*** - - - 
  REM - - - 0.317(.000)*** - - 
  RWS - - - - 0.242(.000)*** - 
  W-UKCGI - - - - - 0.328(.000)*** 
Control Variables:       
  CL 0.084(.000)*** 0.069(.002)*** 0.060(.007)*** 0.055(.011)** 0.044(.042)** 0.047(.037)** 
  AFS 0.013(.563) -0.009(.705) -0.013(.573) -0.026(.257) -0.005(.814) -0.027(.246) 
  CEOT 0.001(.580) 0.001(.491) 0.001(.441) 0.002(.355) 0.001(.639) 0.001(.405) 
  CEX -0.044(.850) -0.058(.800) -0.050(.828) 0.036(.875) -0.053(.813) -0.042(.853) 
  SG -0.048(.368) -0.052(.321) -0.051(.330) -0.047(.362) -0.068(.187) -0.059(.260) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.606*** 0.572*** 0.513*** 0.412*** 0.521*** 0.460*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.169 2.171 2.191 2.209 2.198 2.182 
F- value 8.038*** 8.346*** 8.797*** 9.504*** 10.543*** 9.395*** 
Adj. R2 15.2% 15.7% 16.5% 17.8% 19.5% 17.6% 
Number of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Panel B: Accounting Measure  ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
  LSH 0.005(.818) - - - - - 
  ETIV - 0.108(.000)*** - - - - 
  ACNT - - 0.088(.014)** - - - 
  REM - - - 0.006(.859) - - 
  RWS - - - - 0.029(.116) - 
  W-UKCGI - - - - - 0.070(.035)** 
Control Variables:       
  CL 0.049(.000)*** 0.036(.000)*** 0.041(.000)*** 0.049(.000)*** 0.045(.000)*** 0.041(.000)*** 
  AFS -0.010(.306) -0.030(.003)*** -0.019(.052)* -0.010(.325) -0.011(.201) -0.018(.064)* 
  CEOT 0.003(.000)*** 0.003(.000)*** 0.003(.000)*** 0.003(.000)*** 0.003(.000)*** 0.003(.000)*** 
  CEX 0.145(.127) 0.133(.159) 0.143(.131) 0.147(.124) 0.144(.129) 0.146(.125) 
  SG 0.092(.000)*** 0.088(.000)*** 0.091(.000)*** 0.092(.000)*** 0.090(.000)*** 0.090(.000)*** 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.015 -0.022 -0.018 0.015 0.006 -0.016 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.324 2.331 2.315 2.321 2.299 2.315 
F- value 9.074*** 10.417*** 9.573*** 9.072*** 9.274*** 9.438*** 
Adj. R2 17.0% 19.3% 17.9% 17.0% 17.4% 17.6% 
Number of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
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Continuation of Table 44. Panel C: Market 
Measure 
SR SR SR SR SR SR 
  LSH 0.045(.625) - - - - - 
  ETIV - 0.168(.111) - - - - 
  ACNT - - 0.098(.482) - - - 
  REM - - - 0.093(.439) - - 
  RWS - - - - 0.032(.653) - 
  W-UKCGI - - - - - 0.127(.325) 
Control Variables:       
  CL 0.053(.120) 0.036(.308) 0.048(.179) 0.049(.167) 0.052(.145) 0.042(.245) 
  AFS -0.004(.902) -0.031(.430) -0.009(.802) -0.011(.767) -0.002(.965) -0.015(.686) 
  CEOT 0.008(.007)*** 0.008(.005)*** 0.008(.007)*** 0.008(.006)*** 0.007(.008)*** 0.008(.006)*** 
  CEX -0.679(.067)* -0.696(.061)* -0.680(.067)* -0.654(.079)* -0.682(.067)* -0.678(.068)* 
  SG 0.400(.000)*** 0.394(.000)*** 0.400(.000)*** 0.402(.000)*** 0.400(.000)*** 0.397(.000)*** 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.093 0.057 0.081 0.060 0.108* 0.058 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.969 1.979 1.973 1.973 1.969 1.975 
F- value 14.424*** 14.636*** 14.448*** 14.457*** 14.421*** 14.491*** 
Adj. R2 25.5% 25.8% 25.6% 25.6% 25.5% 25.6% 
Number of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; SR denotes shareholder return; LSH denotes leadership sub-index; ETIV denotes effectiveness sub-index; ACNT denotes accountability sub-
index; REM denotes remuneration sub-index; RWS denotes relations with shareholder sub-index; W-UKCGI denotes weighted index; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO 
tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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Additionally, and as outlined above, the UKCGI consists of five sub-indices comprising 
120 equally weighted provisions. Since the number of provisions included in each of the five 
sub-indices varies substantially, this leads to different weights being assigned to each sub-
index: (i) leadership (6%); (ii) effectiveness (31%); (iii) accountability (30%); (iv) 
remuneration (19%); and (v) relations with shareholders (14%). To ensure that the association 
between the UKCGI  and corporate performance is not sensitive to the weighting of the five 
sub-indices, and following prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 274; Ntim, 2013b, p. 385), an 
alternative index, called W-UKCGI, was constructed, in which each sub-index was given equal 
weight of 20%. Model 1 of Tables 35, 36 and 37 is re-estimated by replacing the un-weighted 
UKCGI with the W-UKCGI and the findings are reported in Panels A-C in Model 6.  
Table 44 indicates that the results of the W-UKCGI remain the same as that reported in 
Table 35. Specifically, the model (6) reports empirical evidence that the W-UKCGI is 
statistically positively (1% level) related to Q-ratio. The direction and the level of significance 
of the control variables remain relatively unchanged. Also, the adjusted R2 and F-value of both 
W-UKCGI and un-weighted UKCGI remain relatively similar (17.5% and 9.330 for the un-
weighted UKCGI, and 17.6% and 9.395 for the W-UKCGI). Additionally, the W-UKCGI is 
used to check whether the results relating to accounting returns (ROA) are different from the 
main model. The results suggest that the direction and significance of the W-UKCGI remained 
the same. In addition, the direction and significance of control variables remained unchanged. 
The adjusted R2 and F-value of both the W-UKCGI and un-weighted UKCGI remain relatively 
similar (18.1% and 9.683 for the un-weighted UKCGI, and 17.6% and 9.438 for the W-UKCGI). 
Finally, Panel C of Model 6 in Table 44 shows that the W-UKCGI is positively and 
insignificantly associated with SR, which is similar to the main finding in Table 37. The control 
variables show similar directions and magnitudes. Additionally, the adjusted R2 and F-value of 
both the W-UKCGI and un-weighted UKCGI remain relatively similar (25.7% and 14.520 for 
the un-weighted UKCGI, and 25.6% and 14.491 for the W-UKCGI). Overall, the direction and 
significance of variables employed in both W-UKCGI and un-weighted UKCGI remain 
relatively the same. This evidence suggests that the findings of the main models are relatively 
robust to the use of different weighting of the five sub-indices. 
7.6.2 Endogeneity 
As explained in the previous chapter, endogeneity problems emerge when one or more 
variables are associated with the error terms (Gippel et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2010). This 
may increase concerns about the validity of the empirical results obtained from the regression 
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model (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). According to Roberts and Whited 
(2012), much CG literature does not adequately address endogeneity concerns. Prior accounting 
and CG literature have identified three main causes of endogeneity problems, namely, 
simultaneity, omitted variables bias and measurement errors (Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2013; Schultz et al., 2010). These three causes of endogeneity need to be checked to avoid 
biased results (Gippel et al., 2015). Therefore, this research uses different techniques to address 
concerns associated with endogeneity problems. 
7.6.2.1 Lagged Structure Model 
To address endogeneity concerns that may arise from simultaneous association between 
the UKCGI and corporate performance proxies (i.e., Q-ratio, ROA and SR), and following CG 
literature (e.g., Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Ntim, 2013b), a lagged structure model was 
estimated, in which all explanatory, control and dependent variables were lagged one period. 
This study uses the lagged structure model as an alternative estimation method, whereby the 
present year’s performance is affected by past year’s CG practice (UKCGI) and control 
variables, and this result in reducing the number of observations to 500 firm-year observations. 
The lagged structure equation is as follows: 


 
n
i
ititiitit CONTSUKCGIFFP
1
11110 
                                           (12)
 
All dependent, explanatory and control are the same as those used in the main model (2), 
except introducing a one-year lag for each of these variables. Columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 45 
report the findings of the lagged structure model using Q-ratio, ROA and SR, respectively. The 
relationship among the UKCGI and Q-ratio remain essentially the same as that reported by the 
un-lagged structure model, indicating that the UKCGI has the same explanatory power in both 
models. In terms of control variables, the coefficients show some changes. Specifically, the 
coefficient on cross-listing was statistically positive, and is now positive and insignificant. 
Capital expenditure was negative and insignificant, and is now positive and insignificant. The 
level of significance and magnitude of other control variables remain relatively similar in both 
models. Table 45 also shows that both models are fairly the same in terms of the value of 
adjusted R2, as it is 17.5% for the estimated un-lagged UKCGI-Performance structure and 
16.2% for the lagged structure model. The F-statistics in both models is also relatively similar; 
it is 9.330 for un-lagged structure model and 7.824 for lagged structure model.  
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                Table 45: Lagged-Effect Model 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: Main Models  Panel B: Lagged-Effect Models 
Q-ratio 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
SR 
(3) 
 Q-ratio 
(4) 
ROA 
(5) 
SR 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI 0.328(.000)*** 0.092(.007)*** 0.149(.257)  0.454(.000)*** 0.096(.009)*** 0.102(.498) 
Control Variables:        
  CL 0.047(.036)** 0.039(.000)*** 0.040(.275)  0.037(.128) 0.041(.000)*** 0.022(.597) 
  AFS -0.029(.217) -0.022(.028)** -0.019(.615)  -0.036(.169) -0.023(.035)** -0.004(.934) 
  CEOT 0.001(.399) 0.003(.000)*** 0.008(.006)***  0.002(.230) 0.003(.001)*** 0.006(.057)* 
  CEX -0.046(.841) 0.145(.127) -0.679(.067)*  0.003(.989) 0.147(.162) -0.377(.383) 
  SG -0.058(.270) 0.089(.000)*** 0.397(.000)***  -0.053(.338) 0.039(.093)* 0.187(.049)* 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant 0.471*** -0.024 0.052  0.454*** -0.028 0.064 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.185 2.311 1.976  2.197 2.284 1.997 
F- value 9.330*** 9.683*** 14.520***  7.824*** 7.590*** 4.117*** 
Adj. R2 17.5% 20.1% 25.7%  16.2% 15.8% 8.2% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  500 500 500 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; SR denotes shareholder return; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; CL denotes 
cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies 
and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Table 45 shows that the results presented in the two models are relatively similar and 
support the results reported in Subsection 7.5.1.1. This suggests that well-governed firms tend 
to have better market valuation, proxied by the Q-ratio.  
The model reports that ROA is statistically positively affected by firm-level CG quality 
(UKCGI) for the estimated lagged structure model, indicating that the UKCGI has the same 
explanatory power in explaining differences in accounting returns. In addition, the significance 
level on the coefficients of control variables remains relatively the same in both models. 
Specifically, cross-listing, CEO tenure and sales growth are reported to be positively linked 
with ROA. Audit firm size is reported to be negatively linked with ROA, whereas capital 
expenditure is reported to be positively, but insignificantly, related to ROA in both models. 
Table 45 also shows that both models are fairly the same in terms of the value of adjusted R2, 
as it is 20.1% for the estimated un-lagged UKCGI-Performance structure and 15.8% for the 
lagged structure model. The F-value in both models is also relatively similar – it is 9.683 for 
un-lagged structure model and 7.590 for lagged structure model. Table 45 shows that the results 
presented in the two models are relatively similar and support the results reported in Subsection 
7.5.1.2. This implies that ROA is statistically positively influenced by the UKCGI. 
Finally, and in terms of the effect of firm-level CG quality (UKCGI) on SR, the main model 
report empirical evidence that the UKCGI is insignificantly and positively associated with SR. 
Similarly, the estimated lagged UKCGI-Performance structure model indicates a positive and 
insignificant link between the UKCGI and SR. This finding implies that the UKCGI has no 
power to explain the impact of firm-level CG quality on firms’ market valuation (SR). 
Additionally, the statistical significance level on the coefficients of control variables has 
changed. Specifically, CEO tenure and sales growth, which were statistically significant at 1%, 
are now statistically significant at the 10%. Similarly, the coefficient on capital expenditure, 
which was statistically significant at the 10%, is now no longer statistically significant. The 
statistical significance level of other control variables remains relatively similar in both models. 
Table 45 shows that the results presented in the two models are relatively similar and support 
the results reported in Subsection 7.5.1.3. This implies that SR is statistically insignificantly 
influenced by the UKCGI. 
7.6.2.2 2SLS Model 
In order to address endogeneity concerns associated the omitted variables bias, this study 
follows past CG studies (e.g., Black et al., 2006b; Ntim, 2013a) and adopts 2SLS methodology. 
A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH) was conducted in this study following the 
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recommendations of Beiner et al. (2006, p. 267). The test involves two-stages. Stage one, as 
specified in equation 13 below, the UKCGI is assumed to be endogenous and is regressed on 
the seven control variables. The resulting residual values are saved as R_UKCGI.   
 


n
i
ititiit CONTSUKCGI
1
0 
                                                                              (13)
 
UKCGI and CONTS refer to the same variables included in the main Model (2). Stage two, 
the performance proxies (Q-ratio, ROA and SR) are regressed on the actual value of the UKCGI, 
the saved residuals from regression in equation 13 (R_UKCGI), and the same control variables 
as specified in the following equation: 



n
i
ititiititit CONTSUKCGIRUKCGIFFP
1
210 _ 
                                (14)
 
The DWH test rejects that endogeneity problem is not present (null hypothesis) as the 
coefficients on the saved residuals from regression in equation 13 (R_UKCGI) are significant.25 
This indicates that 2SLS may be more appropriate than OLS regression (Black et al., 2006b, p. 
394). Therefore, following past studies (e.g., Black et al., 2006b; Ntim, 2013a), this study uses 
2SLS methodolgy to check whether the obtained results are affected by endogeneity. In the first 
stage, the UKCGI is expected to be determined by the seven control variables. Based on that 
expectation, the UKCGI was regressed on the control variables and the UKCGI predicted value 
is saved. In stage two, the predicted value of the UKCGI is used as an instrument and the model 
is re-estimated as follows: 




n
i
ititiitit CONTSUKCGIPFFP
1
10 _ 
                                          (15) 
 
 
                                               
25Specifically, the coefficients on the residuals of UKCGI show that it is statistically significant at 1% level for both Q-ratio and ROA and 
insignificant for SR. 
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                 Table 46: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: Main Models  Panel B: 2SLS 
Q-ratio 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
SR 
(3) 
 Q-ratio 
(4) 
ROA 
(5) 
SR 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:         
  UKCGI 0.328(.000)*** 0.092(.007)*** 0.149(.257)  - - - 
  P_UKCGI - - -  0.398(.036)** 0.327(.000)*** 0.336(.275) 
Control Variables:        
  CL 0.047(.036)** 0.039(.000)*** 0.040(.275)  0.212(.000)*** 0.060(.007)*** 0.097(.257) 
  AFS -0.029(.217) -0.022(.028)** -0.019(.615)  -0.086(.017)** -0.068(.000)*** -0.067(.250) 
  CEOT 0.001(.399) 0.003(.000)*** 0.008(.006)***  0.004(.040)** 0.004(.000)*** 0.009(.002)*** 
  CEX -0.046(.841) 0.145(.127) -0.679(.067)*  -0.313(.187) 0.067(.495) -0.803(.038)** 
  SG -0.058(.270) 0.089(.000)*** 0.397(.000)***  -0.181(.000)*** 0.074(.001)*** 0.379(.000)*** 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant 0.471*** -0.024 0.052  0.370*** -0.151*** -0.065 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.185 2.311 1.976  2.185 2.311 1.976 
F- value 9.330*** 9.683*** 14.520***  9.330*** 9.683*** 14.520*** 
Adj. R2 17.5% 20.1% 25.7%  17.5% 18.1% 25.7% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; SR denotes shareholder return; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; P_UKCGI denotes 
the saved predicted value of the UKCGI; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes 
sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 
level and 0.10 level, respectively.  
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The variables included in Model 15 remain the same as those included in the equation 
2, except that the actual value of the UKCGI is replaced with the predicted values from stage 
one. However, before replacing the actual value of the UKCGI, it is essential to check whether 
the predicted value of UKCGI is appropriate to replace its actual value. This was done using 
both Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices, and it was found that the P_UKCGI was 
highly correlated with its actual value. Additionally, the P_UKCGI was found to have no 
correlation with the residual (R_UKCGI). This suggests that the predicted value of the UKCGI 
can replace its actual value (Black et al., 2006b, p. 394). Table 46 provides the results of 2SLS. 
The reported results of the P_UKCGI are relatively similar to the main findings for Q-ratio, 
ROA and SR. Specifically, the coefficient of the UKCGI in the Q-ratio model, which was 
statistically positive at 1%, is now statistically positive at 5%. Similarly, the study finds that 
ROA is statistically positively (1% level) influenced by the P_UKCGI, which similar to that 
discussed in the main model. Additionally, the coefficient on the UKCGI in the SR model, 
which was positive and insignificant in the main model, is now positive and insignificant. 
Additionally, the direction and the statistical significance level of some control variables 
have changed. Specifically, in terms of the Q-ratio model, the coefficient on cross-listing, 
which was significant at 5%, is now significant at 1%. The coefficient on CEO tenure, which 
was statistically insignificant, is now significant at 5%. Additionally, the coefficients on audit 
firm size and sales growth, which were negative and insignificant, are now statistically negative. 
For the ROA model, the statistical significance level of coefficients on cross-listing, CEO tenure 
and sales growth remain unchanged. Similarly, capital expenditure remains positive and 
insignificant, whereas audit firm size remains negative and significant. Finally, with reference 
to the SR model, the coefficients on CEO tenure, cross-listing, audit firm size and sales growth 
remain statistically unchanged. The statistical significance level of coefficient on capital 
expenditure has changed (was 10% and is now 5%). 
The reported results also suggest that the adjusted R2 and F-statistics for both main and 
2SLS models remain fairly similar. Specifically, the adjusted R2 for Q-ratio, ROA and SR in the 
main model is 17.5%, 20.1% and 25.7%, respectively, whereas the adjusted R2 for Q-ratio, 
ROA and SR in the 2SLS model is 17.5%, 18.15 and 25.7%, respectively. Similarly, the F-value 
for Q-ratio, ROA and SR in both the main model and the 2SLS remains the same. This indicates 
that the UKCGI has the same explanatory power in both models, indicating that the main 
findings are not largely affected by endogeneity resulting from omitted variable bias. 
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7.6.2.3 Firm-Level Fixed-Effects Model 
Following prior CG studies (Guest, 2009b, p. 389; Henry, 2008, p. 923; Ntim, 2013a, p. 
164; 2015, p. 182), this study attempts to control for concerns that corporate performance might 
be influenced by unobserved firm-level characteristics by creating 99 dummies that represent 
100 UK listed corporations. These 99 dummies are employed to re-estimate the main models 
and the findings reported in Table 47. For the Q-ratio model, the results suggest that the 
significance level of coefficient on the UKCGI remains statistically positive (1% level). 
Similarly, for the ROA model, the direction of the coefficient on the UKCGI has not changed, 
but becomes insignificant, indicating the sensitivity of the results related to ROA to potential 
unobserved firm-level characteristics. By contrast, the coefficient on the UKCGI in the SR 
model, which was positive and insignificant in the main model, is now negative and 
insignificant, indicating that the result related to SR is also sensitive to unobserved firm-level 
characteristics. 
In terms of the control variables, the results indicate some sensitivity. Specifically, for the 
Q-ratio model, the coefficients on audit firm size, capital expenditure and sales growth remain 
negative, whereas the coefficients on cross-listing and CEO tenure, which were positive, are 
now negative. Additionally, for the ROA model, the coefficient on sales growth remains 
statistically positive at 1%. The statistical significance level of the coefficient on audit firm size 
has changed (was 5% and is now 10%). The coefficient on capital expenditure remains positive 
and insignificant. However, the direction and the significance level of the coefficient on cross-
listing has changed (was statistically positive at 1% level, is now negative and insignificant). 
Similarly, the coefficient on CEO tenure becomes positive and insignificant. Finally, for the SR 
model, the coefficient on cross-listing remains positive and insignificant. Similarly, the 
coefficient on sales growth remains statistically positive at 1% level. The coefficients on AFS 
and CEX remain negative. 
Overall, the reported results in Table 47 indicate some sensitivity, where the findings from 
the fixed-effects model confirm that the UKCGI is statistically positively linked with Q-ratio. 
However, the reported results also indicate sensitivity of the findings related to the ROA and SR 
models. 
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                Table 47: Fixed-Effects Model 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: Main OLS Model  Panel B: Fixed-Effects Model 
Q-ratio 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
SR 
(3) 
 Q-ratio 
(4) 
ROA 
(5) 
SR 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI 0.328(.000)*** 0.092(.007)*** 0.149(.257)  0.445(.000)*** 0.043(.543) -0.498(.333) 
Control Variables:        
  CL 0.047(.036)** 0.039(.000)*** 0.040(.275)  -0.012(.692) -0.014(.412) 0.065(.604) 
  AFS -0.029(.217) -0.022(.028)** -0.019(.615)  -0.031(.393) -0.040(.065)* -0.033(.832) 
  CEOT 0.001(.399) 0.003(.000)*** 0.008(.006)***  -0.002(.127) 0.001(.300) 0.002(.648) 
  CEX -0.046(.841) 0.145(.127) -0.679(.067)*  -0.273(.090)* 0.063(.499) -1.461(.0.33)** 
  SG -0.058(.270) 0.089(.000)*** 0.397(.000)***  -0.002(.926) 0.078(.000)*** 0.288(.002)*** 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
FDU NO NO NO  YES YES YES 
Constant 0.471*** -0.024 0.052  0.254*** 0.057* 0.591*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.185 2.311 1.976  1.935 1.984 1.983 
F- value 9.330*** 9.683*** 14.520***  42.427*** 19.638*** 2.865*** 
Adj. R2 17.5% 20.1% 25.7%  87.8% 76.5% 24.7% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: Q-ratio denotes Tobin’s Q; ROA denotes accounting returns; SR denotes shareholder return; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; CL denotes 
cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies; 
YDU denotes year dummies; and FDU denotes firm dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 
level, respectively. 
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7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter presents the statistical summary of all variables employed in the composite-
CG-index model, individual-CG-variable model, and the moderating effect model. It also 
examines whether the data used in the performance models meets OLS assumptions, including 
normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics indicate that ROA and SR deviate from a normal distribution. To reduce 
non-normalities of these variables, they were winsorised. After winsorising the variables, 
different statistical tests were conducted, including VIF, Cook’s Distance, Scatter Plot, P-P Plot 
and Durbin-Watson. Overall, these tests suggest that the OLS assumptions are not seriously 
violated, and this implies that OLS is appropriate statistical estimation to conduct the analyses 
of the study. 
This chapter also reports results related to the composite-CG-index, individual-CG-
variable and moderating effect models. The composite-CG-index model examines the 
association between the UK CG index (UKCGI) and corporate performance, using Q-ratio, 
ROA and SR. The results indicate that the UKCGI is statistically positively associated with both 
the Q-ratio and ROA; however, the UKCGI is positively and insignificantly related to SR. The 
individual-CG-variable model examines the association between individual CG variables (i.e., 
board size, board independence, board diversity, board committees, separating CEO and 
chairperson position and board meetings) and corporate performance, using Q-ratio, ROA and 
SR. The results from this model are mixed as discussed in details in subsection 7.5.2. The study 
also investigates the moderating influence of ownership structure variables on the UKCGI-
Performance nexus. The reported results offer new evidence that the interaction improves the 
magnitude of the UKCGI coefficients, which indicates that ownership structure variables 
moderate the UKCGI-Performance relationship. 
Finally, the results of sensitivity analyses were discussed in Section 7.6. Four sensitivity 
analyses were employed to examine the robustness of the obtained findings. These analyses 
include examining the use of lagged model, 2SLS model, Fixed Effects model, and the use of 
alternative CG indices. Overall, these tests suggest that the obtained findings are largely robust 
to different endogeneity problems (with a few sensitivities in the Fixed-Effects models) and 
using alternative CG indices. The next chapter presents and discusses the statistical summary 
and OLS assumptions for variables employed in the executive pay models. The empirical results 
based on the composite-CG-index, individual-CG-variable and moderating effect models are 
then discussed, whereas the final section discusses and presents tests employed to examine the 
robustness of the obtained findings. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE PAY MODELS 
8 AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
The statistical analysis of factors employed in the executive pay (EP) models is provided 
in this chapter. Specifically, Sections 8.1, 8.2 present a statistical summary of the dependent 
and explanatory variables, respectively. Section 8.3 conducts general Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) misspecification tests relating to the variables employed in the EP models. Section 8.4 
presents and discusses the estimated OLS regression results relating to the composite-CG-index 
model, the individual-CG-model, and the moderating influence of ownership structure variables 
on the UKCGI-EP nexus. Section 8.5 checks the robustness and sensitivity of the findings to 
alternative specifications and measures. The final section (8.6) summaries main points covered 
in this chapter.  
8.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
(EXECUTIVE PAY) 
Table 48 provides the descriptive statistics of chief executive officer pay, including annual 
cash (e.g., salary, cash-bonus and other reported cash remuneration) and non-cash (e.g., 
performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) pay. Panels A-E suggest that the 
distribution of remuneration of CEOs varies substantially. Specifically, Table 48 shows that the 
average (median) of CEO base salary, cash bonus, total cash pay, total non-cash pay and total 
CEO pay are £0.56m (£0.40m), £0.75m (£0.52m), £1.57m (£0.68m), £1.98m (£0.46m) and 
£3.55m (£1.14m), respectively. Overall, Table 48 indicates that CEO pay increased over the 
sampled period.  
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Table 48: Descriptive Statistics of CEOs’ Pay 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A:CEO Salary (£m)       
Mean 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.58 
Median  0.40 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
STD 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.43 
Min  0.0009 0.003 0.0009 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.009 
Max 2.12 1.89 1.57 1.72 1.43 1.45 2.12 
Panel B:CEO Bonus(£m)      
Mean 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.79 
Median  0.52 0.28 0.45 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.54 
STD 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.78 
Min  0.0006 0.010 0.0006 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.011 
Max 3.65 3.65 3.52 3.21 3.46 2.97 3.56 
Panel C:CEO total cash (£m)       
Mean 1.57 1.47 1.41 1.64 1.57 1.65 1.71 
Median  0.68 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.68 0.86 0.80 
STD 3.07 2.68 2.21 2.88 2.97 3.86 3.63 
Min  0.020 0.031 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.022 
Max 36.65 23.82 19.46 26.01 27.35 36.65 34.34 
Panel D:CEO total non-cash (£m)      
Mean 1.98 1.87 1.70 1.69 2.08 1.82 2.73 
Median  0.46 0.36 0.44 0.62 0.39 0.63 0.66 
STD 3.73 3.95 3.68 2.36 3.58 2.67 5.37 
Min  0.003 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.003 
Max 29.92 24.80 28.59 10.61 20.15 11.05 29.92 
Panel E:CEO total pay (£m)      
Mean 3.55 3.34 3.11 3.33 3.65 3.47 4.44 
Median  1.14 0.96 1.09 1.31 1.07 1.49 1.46 
STD 6.15 5.80 4.84 5.69 5.97 6.18 8.04 
Min  0.020 0.031 0.020 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.025 
Max 61.44 38.54 33.40 35.59 47.50 47.03 61.44 
Table 48 and Figure 7 also show that CEO base salary remains unchanged over the study 
period; however, CEO cash bonus increases during the period of the study by around 20%, from 
£0.66m in 2008 to £0.79m in 2013. Similarly, total CEO cash pay increases during the sampled 
period, from £1.47m to £1.71m. 
 
Figure 7: CEOs’ cash-bonus, base salary, and total pay over the period 2008-2013 using computed mean 
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Table 48 and Figure 8 demonstrate that CEO non-cash and total pay gradually increase 
over the sampled period, by around 46% and 32%, from £1.87m to £2.73m, and from £3.34m 
to £4.44m. Crucially, and in compliance with the suggestions of UK CG codes (i.e., FRC, 2008, 
2010) equity-based pay forms a large part of total CEO pay. Specifically, the average total CEO 
equity-based pay of £1.98m is large, and it is about 56% of the average total CEO pay of 
£3.55m, whereas the average total CEO cash pay of £1.57m is small, and about 44% of the 
average total CEO pay of £3.55m. Overall, Table 48 and Figure 8 provide evidence that CEO 
equity-based pay is generally higher than cash pay. Table 48 and Figure 8 provide further 
evidence of increasing levels of CEO pay, which lends support to previous CG studies (e.g., 
Ntim et al., 2015a; Ozkan, 2011; Reddy et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 8: CEOs’ total cash, non-cash and total pay over the period 2008-2013 using computed mean 
With respect to CFO pay, Table 49 shows that CFO base salary remains roughly similar 
over the sampled period, while CFO cash bonus reaches its peak in 2011 and increases by 20%, 
from £0.35m to £0.42m, by the end of 2011. Similarly, CFO total cash pay reaches its peak in 
2010 and increases from £0.74m to £0.85m (around 15%) by the end of 2010.  
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  Table 49: Descriptive Statistics of CFOs’ Pay 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A:CFO Salary (£m)       
Mean 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.36 
Median  0.29 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30 
STD 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Min  0.015 0.015 0.017 0.023 0.040 0.025 0.024 
Max 1.82 1.82 1.18 1.22 0.92 0.86 0.86 
Panel B:CFO Bonus(£m)      
Mean 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.38 
Median  0.30 0.21 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.32 
STD 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.33 
Min  0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.005 
Max 1.85 1.55 1.40 1.39 1.48 1.30 1.85 
Panel C:CFO total cash (£m)       
Mean 0.81 0.74 0.77 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Median  0.56 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.45 0.67 0.51 
STD 0.82 0.70 0.69 0.83 0.92 0.90 0.89 
Min  0.017 0.017 0.027 0.027 0.060 0.027 0.044 
Max 7.07 3.12 3.76 5.49 6.67 7.07 6.90 
Panel D:CFO total non-cash (£m)      
Mean 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.85 1.05 0.99 1.08 
Median  0.38 0.23 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.57 
STD 1.44 1.34 1.25 1.07 1.46 1.60 1.83 
Min  0.0009 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.0009 0.007 
Max 12.31 6.33 6.04 5.22 6.37 11.68 12.31 
Panel E:CFO total pay (£m)      
Mean 1.76 1.63 1.62 1.70 1.88 1.82 1.91 
Median  0.94 0.74 0.96 1.00 0.90 1.09 1.08 
STD 2.04 1.82 1.73 1.70 2.16 2.19 2.51 
Min  0.029 0.060 0.029 0.054 0.060 0.029 0.044 
Max 15.28 8.14 7.42 9.09 13.04 13.10 15.28 
Figure 9 shows the trends of CFO salary, bonus and total cash pay over the sampled period, 
and provide evidence of increasing levels of CFO pay.  
 
Figure 9: CFOs’ cash-bonus, base salary  and total pay over the period 2008-2013 using computed mean. 
Table 49 and Figure 10 also show that CFO equity-based and total pay increase over the 
sampled period by 21% and 17%, from £0.89m to £1.08m, and from £1.63m to £1.91m, 
respectively. Crucially, and consistent with the recommendations of the Combined Code (FRC, 
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2008, 2010), Table 49 and Figure 10 provide evidence that CFO equity-based pay forms a large 
part of CFO total pay. Specifically, Table 49 and Figure 10 demonstrate that the average total 
CFO equity-based pay of £0.95m is large and constitutes about 54% of the average total CFO 
pay of £1.76m, whereas the average total CFO cash pay of £0.81m is small, and constitutes 
about 46% of the average total CFO pay of £1.76m.  
 
 
Figure 10: CFOs’ total cash, non-cash and total pay over the period 2008-2013 using computed mean 
Overall, the statistical analyses provide evidence that CFO equity-based pay is generally 
higher than cash pay. Table 49 and Figure 10 also provide further evidence of increasing levels 
of CFO pay over time. 
Table 50 provides the descriptive statistics of all executive directors’ pay (AED), including 
annual cash and non-cash pay. Panels A-E suggest that the distribution of pay of all executives 
varies substantially. Specifically, Panel A shows that all executives’ salary ranges between 
£0.003m and £9.80m, with a mean (median) of £1.36m (£0.92m). Panel B shows that the 
average executives’ bonus is £1.56m, with a median of £0.94m, and a range of £0.002 to 
£13.66m. All executive directors’ total cash pay for the entire sample has a mean of £3.50m 
and ranges from £0.065 to £58.85m, and a standard deviation of £5.44m.  
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  Table 50: Descriptive Statistics of All Executives’ Pay 
 All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A:All executives Salary (£m)       
Mean 1.36 1.39 1.42 1.35 1.34 1.37 1.30 
Median  0.92 0.87 0.85 0.93 0.91 1.06 0.94 
STD 1.21 1.29 1.45 1.22 1.19 1.13 0.96 
Min  0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.009 
Max 9.80 6.62 9.80 6.81 7.13 5.70 3.89 
Panel B: All executives Bonus(£m)     
Mean 1.56 1.46 1.52 1.66 1.70 1.47 1.58 
Median  0.94 0.76 0.97 0.82 1.00 1.07 1.33 
STD 1.90 1.97 1.60 2.09 2.16 1.81 1.76 
Min  0.002 0.010 0.002 0.015 0.009 0.023 0.006 
Max 13.66 10.25 6.51 12.49 13.66 12.11 10.88 
Panel C: All executives total cash (£m)     
Mean 3.50 3.45 3.33 3.61 3.48 3.51 3.61 
Median  1.66 1.64 1.82 1.86 1.69 1.61 1.51 
STD 5.44 4.98 4.50 5.11 5.42 6.02 6.49 
Min  0.065 0.15 0.065 0.074 0.093 0.120 0.104 
Max 58.85 35.46 31.46 37.56 41.27 52.09 58.85 
Panel D: All executives total non-cash (£m)      
Mean 4.03 3.67 3.23 3.79 4.51 4.08 4.88 
Median  1.08 0.84 0.92 1.33 0.79 1.51 1.55 
STD 6.59 6.45 5.43 5.65 7.54 5.61 8.36 
Min  0.011 0.027 0.016 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.011 
Max 46.73 31.01 34.32 31.08 40.64 23.60 4.67 
Panel E: All executives total pay (£m)      
Mean 7.53 7.12 6.56 7.40 7.99 7.59 8.49 
Median  2.74 2.48 2.74 3.19 2.48 3.12 3.06 
STD 11.19 11.15 8.83 9.90 12.01 10.79 13.94 
Min  0.065 0.15 0.065 0.074 0.093 0.120 0.104 
Max 105.58 65.17 45.71 56.72 81.92 73.10 105.58 
Figure 11 presents the changes in the means of all executive directors’ cash pay, including 
base salary, bonus and total cash pay. 
 
Figure 11: All executives’ cash-bonus , base salary, and total pay over the period 2008-2013 using computed 
mean 
 Table 50 and Figure 11 demonstrate that the base salary of all executive directors remains 
relatively stable during the study period, whereas cash bonus and total executive directors’ cash 
pay increases from £1.46m to £1.58m, and £3.45m to £3.61m, respectively, by the end of 2013. 
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Table 50 and Figure 12 show that all executives’ non-cash pay increases from £3.67m in 2008 
to £4.88m in 2013. Similarly, the total pay of all executives’ increases from £7.12m in 2008 to 
£8.49m in 2013. Overall, Table 50 and Figures 11 and 12 provide evidence of an increase in 
the levels of executive pay over the sampled period; this lends support to past UK studies (e.g., 
Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Main et al., 1996; Ozkan, 2011). 
 
Figure 12: All executives’ total cash, non-cash and total pay over the period 2008-2013 using computed 
mean 
Noticeably, and in line with the recommendations of UK CG codes (i.e., FRC, 2008, 2010) 
that a large proportion of executives’ remuneration should be equity-based to motivate 
executives to act in the shareholders’ best interests, total equity-based pay forms a large 
proportion of the whole executive pay in the UK. The average total equity-based pay for all 
executive directors is £4.03m; this is a large amount, and it is about 54% of the average total 
pay of £7.53m, whilst the average of all executives total cash pay is £3.50m is comparably small 
and is about 46% of the average total pay of £7.53m.  
Therefore, and based on the analyses of CEO, CFO and all executive pay over the sampled 
period, the analyses provide evidence of increasing levels of executive pay over time. The 
analyses also provide evidence that equity forms a large part of CEO, CFO and all executives’ 
pay, which is in accordance to the suggestions of UK CG codes.  
8.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EXPLANATORY AND 
INTERACTION VARIABLES 
Given that some of the explanatory and all interaction variables employed in EP models 
have been discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, this section reports the statistical analysis of 
only two explanatory variables: frequency of remuneration committee meetings (RCMs) and 
remuneration committee independence (RCI). Panel B reports that remuneration committee 
meetings range between 0.00 meetings to 13 meetings each year, with an average of 4.04 annual 
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meetings. The aggregated mean value of the frequency of remuneration committee meetings 
remains relatively stable over the sample period – from 4.06 in 2008 to 4.16 in 2013.26  
     Table 51: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory and Interaction Variables 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: UKCGI (%)       
Mean 61.73 59.97 60.88 61.47 61.99 62.67 63.43 
Median  64.58 63.33 63.75 64.58 65.00 65.83 66.25 
STD 14.53 15.03 14.82 14.71 14.32 14.15 14.24 
Min  20.00 20.00 23.33 24.17 24.17 23.33 24.17 
Max 94.17 93.33 94.17 94.17 90.00 89.17 94.17 
Panel B: Frequency of Remuneration Committee Meetings     
Mean 4.04 4.06 4.22 4.18 3.72 3.88 4.16 
Median  4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
STD 2.05 2.07 2.22 2.10 1.76 1.91 2.23 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 13.00 11.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 12.00 13.00 
Panel C: Remuneration Committee Independence (%)     
Mean 87.00 87.7 87.1 87.2 87.2 87.2 87.1 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 23.87 23.09 23.51 23.37 24.70 25.21 23.86 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel D: Board Size        
Mean 9 9.07 9.1 9 8.95 8.96 8.92 
Median  8 9 8 8 8 8 8 
STD 3.46 3.43 3.49 3.55 3.55 3.51 3.33 
Min  3 4 3 3 3 3 4 
Max 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 
Panel E: Board Independence (%)      
Mean 59.12 58.05 58.05 58.86 60.58 58.94 60.20 
Median  60.00 58.33 60.00 60.00 66.67 60.00 63.64 
STD 17.66 17.47 18.23 18.03 17.56 17.75 17.23 
Min  10.00 10.00 10.00 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 
Max 92.86 92.31 92.86 90.91 91.67 92.31 92.31 
Panel F: Board Diversity Based on Gender (%)     
Mean 10.27 7.69 8.07 9.04 10.80 12.62 13.40 
Median  10.00 7.14 7.14 7.42 10.00 12.50 13.81 
STD 10.43 8.63 8.79 9.81 10.92 11.25 11.63 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 50.00 42.86 37.50 40.00 50.00 40.00 44.44 
Panel G: Board Diversity Based on Ethnicity (%)      
Mean 1.37 1.26 1.51 1.26 1.48 1.39 1.36 
Median  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
STD 3.98 3.56 4.22 3.59 4.04 4.23 4.25 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 25.00 18.18 20.00 22.22 22.22 25.00 25.00 
Panel H: Board Diversity Based on Gender & Ethnicity (%)     
Mean 11.65 8.95 9.58 10.30 12.28 14.01 14.76 
Median  11.11 7.69 8.71 10.00 12.50 14.29 14.29 
STD 11.40 9.82 9.94 10.44 11.80 12.23 12.83 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 50.00 42.86 37.50 40.00 50.00 40.00 44.44 
                                               
26There is a scarcity of studies investigating the link among the frequency of remuneration committee meetings and executive directors’ pay. 
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Panel C reports the statistical analysis for remuneration committee independence. It ranges 
from 0.00% to 100.00%, with a mean of 87%. The aggregated mean value of remuneration 
committee independence remains high for the whole sample of the study over the sampled 
period, indicating that most of the sampled firms have high proportions of independent directors 
on their remuneration committees. This lends support to past CG studies, including Bugeja et 
al. (2015) and Conyon (2014), who, respectively, report that independent outside directors 
constitute about 81% and 98% of US boards.  
Given that other explanatory, interaction and control variables included in EP models are 
discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the next section tests the OLS assumptions, whilst Section 
8.4 provides the results of multivariate analysis. Finally, a discussion about potential 
endogeneity problems and the findings from a number of robustness analyses are presented in 
Section 8.5.  
8.3 TESTS OF OLS ASSUMPTIONS 
This study uses OLS regression to analyse the link between CG and executive pay. Thus, 
OLS assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation need to be met before conducting the analysis. First, the assumption of 
Table 51 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory and Interaction Variables 
Variables All  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel I: Director Split (%)       
Mean 90.33 91.00 91.00 90.00 90.00 91.00 89.00 
Median  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
STD 29.57 28.76 28.76 30.15 30.15 28.76 31.45 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Panel J: CEO Tenure       
Mean 5.54 5.42 5.57 5.50 5.71 5.57 5.45 
Median  4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.50 
STD 5.21 5.04 5.35 5.53 5.63 5.09 4.68 
Min  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 35.00 32.00 33.00 34.00 35.00 25.00 20.00 
Panel K: Managerial Ownership (%)      
Mean 5.95 6.20 6.00 5.74 5.69 5.87 6.18 
Median  0.58 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.46 0.53 
STD 11.40 11.52 11.32 11.03 11.10 11.49 12.21 
Min  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.009 
Max 52.37 51.33 51.33 51.33 51.33 51.33 52.37 
Panel L: Institutional Ownership (%)      
Mean 38.38 38.22 38.03 37.27 38.58 39.69 38.45 
Median  36.38 36.66 35.40 37.16 37.25 36.38 36.07 
STD 20.70 21.71 21.33 19.47 20.20 20.58 21.32 
Min  3.07 4.12 3.98 4.97 5.92 3.07 4.02 
Max 97.49 97.49 97.42 95.54 96.56 96.30 96.42 
Panel M: Block Ownership (%)      
Mean 42.62 42.15 42.43 42.03 43.15 43.75 42.23 
Median  43.20 42.98 42.23 41.94 44.06 46.51 43.13 
STD 21.55 22.09 21.87 20.92 21.34 21.33 22.24 
Min  3.07 3.29 3.98 4.97 5.92 3.07 4.02 
Max 98.08 96.22 98.08 97.60 97.36 95.14 92.04 
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normality is tested using skewness and kurtosis statistics, as well as by conducting the normal 
histogram (for brevity purposes not reported here) of all continuous variables (see Table 52). 
Given that the normality assumption for some of the variables included in the EP models, (i.e., 
UKCGI, BSE, IOE, BD, DSPLIT, CEOT, MANO, ISTO, BLKO, FMs, AGE, CEX and SG) is 
discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, this section presents normality tests for CEO pay, CFO 
pay, AED pay, frequency of remuneration committee meetings and remuneration committee 
independence. As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, Variables are statistically said to be 
close to normal distribution if their skewness value is within +/-1.96 and their kurtosis value is 
within +/-3 (Field, 2009, p. 139; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1048). Table 52 shows that the 
skewness and kurtosis values of EP, including cash, non-cash and total pay, are above the 
critical value of +/-1.96 and +/-3, respectively, indicating that these variables are not normally 
distributed. To overcome the problem of non-linearity, it has been suggested that data 
transformation can be used to make the data more normally distributed (Field, 2009, pp. 153-
164). Therefore, following prior literature (Lippert & Porter, 1997; Ntim et al., 2015a; Schaefer, 
1998), EP is computed as the natural logarithm of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other 
reported cash remuneration) and total non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other 
reported LTIPs) pay scaled by a firm’s total assets in order to eliminate any potential size 
effects. 
The skewness and kurtosis values and the distribution of normal histogram (not reported 
here for brevity purposes) has improved, indicating that the transformed variables are more 
normally distributed than the actual variables. Table 52 also presents the normality tests of CG 
and control variables. Given that most CG (except RCMs and RCI) and all interaction and 
control variables are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, this section discusses the normality 
tests for only RCMs and RCI. Table 52 shows that the statistics of skewness and kurtosis of 
RCMs are close to the accepted values, indicating that RCMs is less abnormally distributed. 
With respect to RCI, although the figure shows slight non-normality, it does not seem to be 
statistically harmful to the analysis. Further, the skewness and kurtosis values for RCI are 
generally similar to those of earlier studies (Jizi et al., 2014, p. 609; Yekini et al., 2015, p. 11). 
This indicates that the remaining non-normality of RCI is statistically tolerable. 
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  Table 52: Tests of Normality 
Variables Skewness Kurtosis 
CEO_Cash 7.891 74.448 
CEO_Non-cash 4.129 22.371 
CEOP 4.719 29.678 
CFO_Cash 3.167 18.00 
CFO_Non-cash 3.352 16.80 
CFOP 2.765 11.761 
AED_Cash 5.316 39.748 
AED_Non-cash 2.927 10.495 
AEDP 3.435 17.853 
UKCGI -0.716 -0.034 
RCMs 0.705 1.018 
RCI -2.298 5.141 
BSE 0.640 -0.503 
IOE -0.523 -0.275 
BD 0.639 -0.409 
CEOT 1.701 5.056 
MANO 2.308 4.707 
ISTO 0.437 -0.407 
BLKO 0.132 -0.658 
FMs 2.558 13.306 
AGE 0.847 -0.325 
CEX 1.967 6.107 
SG 11.420 200.824 
Notes: CEO_Cash denotes CEOs’ cash-based pay; CEO_Non-cash denotes CEOs’ non-cash-based pay; 
CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFO_Cash denotes CFOs’ cash-based pay; CFO_Non-cash denotes CFOs’ 
non-cash-based pay; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AED_Cash denotes all executive directors cash-based 
pay; AED_Non-cash denotes all executive directors non-cash-based pay; AEDP denotes total pay of all 
executive directors; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; RCMs denotes the frequency of 
remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board 
size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; CEOT denotes CEO 
tenure; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block 
ownership; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital 
expenditure; and SG denotes sales growth. 
Second, the multicollinearity assumption is tested using a number of statistical tests, 
including Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Tolerance statistic and correlation matrices. Table 
53 indicates that the maximum value of VIF is 2.150 and the minimum value of Tolerance 
statistic is 0.465, suggesting no serious multicollinearity among the variables of the study 
(Field, 2009, p. 224; Wooldridge, 2013, p. 98). Additionally, the coefficients of both Pearson 
parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric are low, indicating no serious multicollinearity 
problem. Table 54 also shows that the directions and magnitudes of the variables included in 
the executive pay models are relatively similar, suggesting no serious non-normality for those 
variables (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 478). 
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Table 53: Tests of Multicollinearity 
Variables Tolerance VIF  
UKCGI 0.561 1.783 
RCMs  0.726 1.377 
RCI 0.737 1.357 
BSE 0.465 2.150 
IOE 0.524 1.909 
BD 0.712 1.405 
DSPLIT 0.853 1.173 
CEOT 0.811 1.233 
PCGC 0.786 1.272 
CL 0.557 1.795 
AFS 0.727 1.375 
FMs 0.766 1.306 
AGE 0.740 1.351 
CEX 0.789 1.267 
SG 0.803 1.246 
Notes: UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; RCMs denotes the frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE 
denotes board independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO 
and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; 
CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE 
denotes firm age; CEX denotes capital expenditure; and SG denotes sales growth. 
Third, this study performs a number of statistical tests to examine the existence of outliers 
that can cause non-linearity and heteroscedasticity. These tests include Cook’s Distances, 
Leverage Value, Studentised Residuals, P-P Plot and Scatter Plot. The computed Cook’s 
Distances for the individual-CG-variable and composite-CG-index models (18 models) range 
between 0.00 and 0.142, with a mean of 0.002. The value of computed Leverage for the eighteen 
executive pay models ranges between 0.017 and 0.157, with a highest mean of 0.048. This 
finding indicates that serious outliers do not exist in the study variables, since the values of 
Cook’s Distances and Leverage do not exceed one (Field, 2009, p. 293). The computed 
Studentised Residuals for the eighteen executive pay models exceed the critical value of three 
and range between -5.296 (minimum) and 3.260 (maximum). However, the highest mean of 
Studentised Residuals for the eighteen models of executive pay is small (0.001), indicating the 
non-existence of severe outliers. Additionally, the P-P Plot (not reported here for brevity 
purposes) and Scatter Plot (not reported here for brevity purposes) for the eighteen models 
suggest that severe outliers do not exist in the variables, with the distribution looking reasonably 
linear and random. 
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      Table 54: Correlation Matrices for dependent, interaction and explanatory variables 
Variable UKCGI RCMs RCI BSE IOE BD PCGC CL AFS DSPLIT CEOT FMs MANO ISTO BLKO AGE CEX SG AEDP CEOP CFOP 
UKCGI 
 
.489*** .335*** .487*** .532*** .367*** .173*** .491*** .525*** .284*** -.076* -.001 -.601*** -.258*** -.503*** .088** .128*** .066 -.461*** -.556*** -.565*** 
RCMs .462***  .262*** .436*** .318*** .253*** .079* .412*** .349*** -.025 -.090** .114*** -.413*** -.235*** -.371*** .006 -.027 .018 -.310*** -.369*** -.339*** 
RCI .466*** .321***  .128*** .307*** .126*** .018 .275*** .264*** -.025 .040 .187*** -.276*** -.027 -.210*** .077 .091** .041 -.141*** -.156*** -.195*** 
BSE .444*** .377*** .161*** 
 
.519*** .381*** .157*** .512*** .177*** .011 -.005 -.144*** -.619*** -.313*** -.541*** .069* .121*** .089** -.731*** -.773*** -.803*** 
IOE .489*** .279*** .480*** .458***  .308*** .250*** .450*** .222*** -.002 -.022 -.204*** -.684*** .146*** -.367*** .113*** .261*** .044 -.664*** -.555*** -.607*** 
BD .332*** .185*** .160*** .335*** .275***  .165*** .172*** .032 -.089** .000 -.219*** -.367*** -.255*** -.364*** .210*** .126*** -.007 -.406*** -.463*** -.490*** 
PCGC .157*** .082** .057 .144*** .233*** .148***  .108*** .030 .019 -.134*** -.214*** -.231*** -.047 -.081** -.184*** .068* -.046 -.199*** -.204*** -.195*** 
CL .459*** .343*** .327*** .507*** .459*** .169*** .108***  .224*** .020 -.112*** .114*** -.530*** -.288*** -.405*** -.166*** .241*** .079* -.463*** -.454*** -.417*** 
AFS .568*** .339*** .251*** .195*** .230*** .021 .030 .224***  .273*** -.009 .137*** -.265*** -.009 -.234*** .034 .060 .005 -.053 -.106** -.114** 
DSPLIT .270*** -.024 -.024 .016 -.020 -.072* .019 .020 .273***  -.019 .091** -.120*** .020 .009 -.075* -.002 .004 .007 .039 .069 
CEOT -.153*** -.115*** .067 -.045 -.036 -.054 -.146*** -.162*** -.087** -.074*  -.151*** .126*** -.059 -.018 .060 .094** .085** .088** .149*** .133*** 
FMs .003 .088** .137*** -.087** -.064 -.195*** -.186*** .125*** .036 .095** -.187***  .048 .023 .061 -.103** .006 -.017 .194*** .199*** .285*** 
MANO -.420*** -.360** -.347*** -.361*** -.352*** -.043 .006 -.376*** -.326*** -.194*** .055 -.141***  .159*** .466*** -.121*** -.156*** -.036 .716*** .686*** .737*** 
ISTO -.280*** -.196*** .002 -.266*** -.106** -.225*** -.034 -.251*** -.043 .017 .010 -.030 .025  .748*** -.141*** .019 -.100** .198*** .289*** .342*** 
BLKO -.485*** .311*** -.198*** -.517*** -.312*** -.349*** -.090** -.377*** -.255*** .011 .078* .115*** .291*** .722***  -.182*** .002 -.095** .440*** .582*** .628*** 
AGE .100** -.005 .090** .096** .128*** .208*** -.173*** -.156*** .025 -.084** .101** -.152*** -.059 -.169*** -.202***  -.046 .010 -.121*** -.179*** -.211*** 
CEX .070* -.081** .071* .096** .211*** .097** .018 .208*** .045 -.018 .023 .051 -.028 .086** .091** -.047  .103** -.167*** -.074* -.131*** 
SG .022 -.009 .012 .091** .0.34 -.029 -.026 .071* -.012 -.001 .034 .036 .004 -.057 -.045 -.010 .102**  -.095** -.076* -.075* 
AEDP -.297*** -.203*** -.179*** -.698*** -.600*** -.331*** -.188*** -.427*** -.014 .019 .087** .012 .340*** .075* .297*** -.129*** -.195*** -.102**  .969*** .966*** 
CEOP -.482*** -.282*** -.196*** -.754*** -.488*** -.409*** -.210*** -.418*** -.105** .056 .175*** .178*** .317*** .238*** .548*** -.212*** -.087** -.069 .973***  .960***  
CFOP -.504*** -.267*** -.243*** -.797*** -.541*** -.436*** -.214*** -.390*** -.121*** .059 .167*** .227*** .437*** .292*** .597*** -.236*** -.109** -.073 .967*** .959***  
Notes: The upper right half of the table provides the coefficients relating to Spearman’s correlation, whilst the bottom left half of reports the coefficients relating to Pearson’s correlation; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; RCMs denotes the frequency of 
remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity;  PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; 
AFS denotes audit firm size; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure;  FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings;  MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; 
AGE denotes firm age;  CEX denotes capital expenditure; SG denotes sales growth; AEDP denotes total all executive directors pay; CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; and CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs. ***, **, and* indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 
0.10 level, respectively. 
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The final OLS assumption is autocorrelation; this assumption is tested by conducting the 
Durbin-Watson test. The Durbin-Watson value for the eighteen executive pay models is close 
to two, ranging between 1.853 and 2.550, indicating no serious autocorrelation problem in the 
residuals from the regression (Field, 2009, pp. 220-221; Wooldridge, 2013, p. 419). To 
conclude, to check for normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation assumptions of OLS, a number of tests are performed, including skewness, 
kurtosis, correlation matrices, VIF, Cook’s Distances, P-P Plot, Scatter Plot and Durbin-
Watson. Overall, the assumptions of normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation are not seriously violated, indicating that it is statistically tolerable to 
estimate models of the study using OLS. The next section, therefore, provides the findings of 
the composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable models. 
8.4 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The main empirical findings related to the executive pay models are reported in this section. 
As explained in the literature review chapter, past studies that examine the association among 
CG practices and EP have employed two approaches: (i) the composite-CG-index model (e.g., 
Brown & Lee, 2010; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015) and (ii) the 
individual-CG-variable model (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Guest, 2009a; 
Ntim et al., 2015a; Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Reddy et al., 2015; Wang & Xiao, 2011). Although 
prior studies mainly employ either the composite-CG-index model or the individual-CG-
variable model, this study aims to extend, as well as contribute to the extant CG literature by 
using both models, and that may provide better understanding about the effect of employing 
different models. Subsection 8.4.1 reports the empirical results relating to the composite-CG-
index model, whilst Subsection 8.4.2 reports the empirical results relating to the individual-CG-
variable model 
8.4.1 Empirical Results: The Composite-CG-Index Model 
This section reports the empirical results related to the impact of CG, using a broad CG 
index, on EP, and thereby answers the question (Hypothesis 18) of whether the UKCGI, as a 
broad measure of CG, impacts on EP. As explained in Chapter Five, a self-constructed CG 
index (UKCGI) has been developed in this study, comprising 120 provisions extracted mainly 
from the 2010 Combined Code. A summary of the empirical findings and the hypothesised 
relationships between the UKCGI and EP is outlined in Table 55.  
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  Table 55: A Summary of the Findings and Hypotheses of Executive Pay Models 
Dependent Variable CEOs, CFOs and All Executive Directors’ Pay  
Independent Variable: No. Hyp. Predicted 
sign 
Finding 
sign 
Finding sig.  Hyp. Status  
Composite-CG-Index Model:      
  UKCGI_CEOP 18 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  UKCGI_CFOP 18 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  UKCGI_AEDP 18 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter Four. Acep denote accepting hypothesized 
relationships. 
8.4.1.1 Chief Executive Officer Pay (CEOP) 
Table 55 reports that the UKCGI is statistically negatively (1% level) associated with 
CEOs’, CFOs’ and AEDs’ pay, which lends support to the formulated hypotheses. The findings 
related to the association between the UKCGI and CEOs’ pay are presented in Table 56. The 
F-values (Models 1, 2 and 3), are statistically significant (1% level), suggesting that the UKCGI, 
in addition to control variables, are not equal to zero. This implies that the hypothesis that these 
variables do not have influence on EP is not accepted (null hypothesis). Additionally, the 
adjusted R2 for Model 3 suggests that 49.9% of the variability in the total CEOs’ pay is jointly 
explained the UKCGI and control variables. This is consistent with the results of Fahlenbrach 
(2009)and Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) who report  adjusted R2 of 48.1% and 37.7%, 
respectively. The main findings of Table 56 are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 
Consistent with Hypothesis Eighteen, which states that firm-level CG quality associates 
negatively with the chief executive director pay, the models find that the UKCGI is statistically 
negatively associated with CEOs’ pay27. Specifically, Table 56 shows that the coefficients of 
UKCGI on cash, non-cash and total pay for CEOs (-6.851, -5.211 and -5.985) are negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that Hypothesis Eighteen is empirically supported. 
Empirically, the negative findings lends support to past CG studies (e.g., Brown & Lee, 2010; 
Newton, 2015). However, the negative effect of firm-level CG quality does not offer support to  
Fahlenbrach (2009) and Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012), findings which indicate that CEO pay is 
positively influenced by CG quality among listed companies in the US, France, Canada and the 
UK28. Theoretically, the negative finding is in line with OCT’s prediction that the pay of 
executives results from arms-length negotiations between executives and strong/independent 
boards, which may lead to the design of effective incentive contracts that can motivate 
executives to work in the shareholders’ best interests (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009, p. 489; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990, p. 226). 
                                               
27Yearly estimations of the association between the UKCGI and CEOP, CFOP and AEDP are reported in Appendix 5. 
28There are two possible reasons can explain why Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) obtained different results: (i) they have only included the FTSE 
100 firms, and (ii) they examined different period (2004-2008).  
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  Table 56: Composite-CG-Index Model (CEOs’ Pay) 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
CEO_Cash 
(1) 
CEO_Non-Cash 
(2) 
CEOP 
(3) 
Compliance-Index (UKCGI)    
  UKCGI -6.851(.000)*** -5.211(.000)*** -5.985(.000)*** 
Control Variables:    
  PCGC -1.126(.000)*** -0.615(.024)** -0.934(.000)*** 
  CL -1.212(.000)*** -0.672(.001)*** -1.096(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.208(.182) 0.835(.000)*** 0.385(.011)** 
  FMs 0.106(.000)*** 0.056(.028)** 0.085(.000)*** 
  AGE -0.498(.000)*** -0.357(.000)*** -0.424(.000)*** 
  CEX 1.083(.471) 1.262(.509) 1.079(.462) 
  SG 0.237(.502) 0.251(.574) 0.239(.487) 
IDU YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES 
Constant -0.939** -3.464*** -1.117*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.550 2.358 2.513 
F- value 39.850*** 12.116*** 32.691*** 
Adj. R2 54.9% 27.3% 49.9% 
No. of observations 600 600 600 
Notes: CEO_Cash denotes CEOs’ cash-based pay; CEO_Non-cash denotes CEOs’ non-cash-based pay; 
CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-
listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG 
denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
The study finds a statistically negative association among the existence of a separate CG 
committee (PCGC), CEOs’ cash, non-cash and total pay. The statistically negative effect of 
PCGC suggest that well-governed firms, defined as those having a separate CG committee 
(Ntim et al., 2012b), tend to pay significantly low remuneration. Similarly, the models find 
statistically negative associations among cross-listing (CL) and CEOs’ cash, non-cash and total 
pay. The negative finding does not offer support to past CG studies (e.g., Chi & Zhang, 2010; 
Chizema et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a), which provide empirical evidence of a statistically 
positive relationship among CL and executive pay. Theoretically, the negative finding suggests 
that cross-listed firms are associated with more monitoring (Chi & Zhang, 2010, p. 150) and 
lower private benefit of control (Doidge, 2004, p. 521), and hereby cross-listing is associated 
with lower EP.  
Table 56 provides evidence that AFS is positively associated with CEO pay, which lends 
empirical support to the findings of  Ntim et al. (2015a). However, the positive effect of AFS 
does not provide support to Ding et al. (2014), findings that EP is statistically negatively 
associated with AFS for Chinese listed firms. Additionally, the coefficient on board meeting 
(FMs) is statistically positive indicating that frequent board meetings may not always be 
beneficial, as it can lead to limit the time that outside directors spend to monitor management 
effectively  (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 114). Empirically, this result is consistent with Luo (2015) 
findings that the pay of CEOs is positively affected by the frequency of board meetings among 
Chinese listed firms. 
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The negative and significant association among firm age (AGE) and the pay of CEOs 
indicates that older firms tend to pay lower remuneration for their CEOs compared with younger 
firms. Empirically, the negative finding lends support to Brandes et al. (2016) and Peng et al. 
(2015) results that CEO pay is statistically negatively influenced by AGE among the US and 
Chinese listed firms, respectively. The model also provides evidence that capital expenditure 
(CEX) impacts positively, but insignificantly, on CEO pay. The positive coefficient on CEX 
suggests that CEO pay is positively influenced by CEX, which lends support to the results of 
Cheng (2004) for 137 US listed firms. The positive coefficient on sales growth (SG), which 
offers support to Bugeja et al. (2015) and Conyon (2014), indicate that faster growing firms 
pay their CEOs high remuneration. Finally, this study follows CG literature (e.g., Ding et al., 
2014; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2010) and control for the influence industry and 
time on CEO pay. The results (coefficients are not provided for brevity purposes) suggest that 
CEO pay differs across industries and years.  
8.4.1.2 Chief Financial Officers’ and All Executive Directors’ Pay (CFOP & AEDP) 
As explained in the literature review chapter, although there is increasing evidence to 
suggest that the pay packages of other executive directors below CEOs are becoming equally 
important (Duong & Evans, 2015; Hoitash et al., 2012; Hsu & Liao, 2012; Ntim et al., 2015a; 
Victoravich et al., 2012), most previous studies only examine the determinants of CEO pay 
(e.g., Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Luo, 2015; Ozkan, 2007, 2011; Reddy et al., 2015). This may 
limit existing knowledge about the determinants of other executive directors’ pay, such as CFOs 
and AEDs. Therefore, the current study aims to contribute and extend the extant CG studies by 
investigating whether CG quality impacts the cash, non-cash and total pay of CFOs and AEDs, 
in addition to CEOs. The results related to the association among the UKCGI, CFOs’ and 
AEDs’ pay are presented in Table 57. 
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              Table 57: Composite-CG-Index (CFOs and AEDs’ Pay) 
 
 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: CFOs’ Pay  Panel B: AEDs’ Pay 
CFO_Cash 
(1) 
CFO_Non-Cash 
(2) 
CFOP 
(3) 
 AED_Cash 
(4) 
AED_Non-Cash 
(5) 
AEDP 
(6) 
Compliance-Index (UKCGI)       
  UKCGI -7.680(.000)*** -4.631(.000)*** -6.752(.000)***  -6.715(.000)*** -3.538(.000)*** -3.534(.000)*** 
Control Variables:        
  PCGC -0.993(.000)*** -0.915(.002)*** -0.799(.000)***  -1.211(.000)*** -0.888(.000)*** -1.160(.000)*** 
  CL -1.212(.000)*** -0.284(.186) -1.028(.000)***  -1.157(.000)*** -0.782(.000)*** -1.437(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.293(.081)* 0.450(.052)* 0.283(.079)*  0.167(.269) 0.542(.003)*** 0.505(.003)*** 
  FMs 0.112(.000)*** 0.057(.053)* 0.098(.000)***  0.107(.000)*** 0.070(.003)*** -0.010(.578) 
  AGE -0.554(.000)*** -0.394(.000)*** -0.492(.000)***  -0.464(.000)*** -0.301(.000)*** -0.301(.000)*** 
  CEX -0.476(.773) 0.728(.744) 0.204(.898)  -0.926(.524) -0.944(.593) -2.474(.129) 
  SG -0.195(.612) 0.314(.540) -0.031(.932)  -0.182(.595) 0.001(.455) -0.197(.601) 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant -0.760 -4.189*** -1.073**  -0.198 -3.608*** -1.257*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.499 2.411 2.539  2.462 2.430 2.263 
F- value 38.435*** 8.606*** 32.472***                            41.889*** 13.562*** 24.822*** 
Adj. R2 56.0% 21.2% 51.7%  56.1% 28.7% 42.0% 
No. of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: CFO_Cash denotes CFOs’ cash-based pay; CFO_Non-cash denotes CFOs’ non-cash-based pay; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs;  AED_Cash denotes all executive 
directors cash-based pay; AED_Non-cash denotes all executive directors non-cash-based pay; AEDP denotes total pay of all executive directors; PCGC denotes existence of a 
separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; 
IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
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First, the null hypothesis that the UKCGI, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero 
is not accepted because the F-values are statistically significant (1% level). Additionally, the 
adjusted R2 for Models 3 and 6 suggests that 51.7% and 42.0% of the variation in the sampled 
firms’ CFOP and AEDP, respectively, is explained by the models. This lends support to the 
results of Fahlenbrach (2009) and Ntim et al. (2015a), who report an adjusted R2 of 48.1% and 
48.3% among US and South African listed firms, respectively. 
Second, the statistically negative coefficient on the UKCGI lends support to Hypothesis 
Eighteen – that firm-level CG quality impacts negatively on EP. The negative effect of the 
UKCGI lends support to OCT’s expectation that the pay of executives results from arms-length 
negotiations between executives and strong/independent boards,  leading to the design of 
incentives schemes that are able to reduce agency costs and maximise shareholder value 
(Edmans & Gabaix, 2009, p. 489; Jensen & Murphy, 1990, p. 226). Empirically, as explained 
above, most prior studies mainly investigated whether firm-level CG quality influences the pay 
package of CEO, and hence offering opportunities to make original contribution to the literature 
by investigating whether CG quality, measured by the UKCGI, impacts CFO and AED pay, in 
addition to CEO pay. The negative finding is consistent with Brown and Lee (2010) and Newton 
(2015), who report a negative association between firm-level CG quality and CEO pay among 
US firms. 
Third, and consistent with the results of CEO pay, the models find statistically negative 
associations among the PCGC, cash, non-cash and total pay for CFOs and AEDs. The 
statistically negative effect of PCGC suggest that firms with good CG practices, defined as 
those having a separate CG committee (Ntim et al., 2012b), tend to pay significantly low 
remuneration to their directors. Similarly, the evidence of statistically negative effect of cross-
listing lends support to the prediction that cross-listed firms are characterised by lower levels 
of private benefits (Doidge, 2004, p. 521), and thus cross-listing is generally linked with lower 
EP. The coefficient on AFS is statistically positive, indicating that AFS impacts positively on 
CFO and AED pay, which lends support to Ntim et al. (2015a), findings that EP is statistically 
positively influenced by AFS among firms listed on Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Fourth, the statistically positive coefficient on FMs (with the exception of the result of 
Model 6) lends support to Brick et al. (2006) and Luo (2015) findings, which suggest that 
frequent board meetings may not always be beneficial, as they can limit the time that outside 
directors spend effectively monitoring management (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 114). Table 57 also 
reports a statistically negative relationship among AGE, CFO and AED pay, which suggest that 
older firms tend to pay their executives significantly lower remuneration than younger 
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counterparts (Brandes et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2015). Additionally, the results reported in Table 
57 suggest that CEX is negatively (with the exception of Models 2 and 3) associated with CFO 
and AED pay, which lends support to Ntim et al. (2015a) findings.  
Finally, Table 57 shows that SG is negatively related to cash and total pay for CFOs and 
AEDs, whereas it is positively linked with non-cash pay for CFOs and AEDs. This finding 
suggests that faster-growing firms tend to pay their CFOs and AEDs higher non-cash and lower 
cash and total remuneration. The findings also (coefficients are not provided for brevity 
purposes) suggest that CFO and AED pay differs across industries and years.  
8.4.2 Empirical Results: The Individual-CG-Variable Model 
This section presents the findings related to the association among individual CG variables 
and EP, and thereby aims to answer the research sub-questions (Hypotheses 19-25) on whether 
individual CG mechanisms impact on CEO, CFO and all executives’ pay. The individual CG 
mechanisms employed in the individual-CG-variable model are: board gender and ethnic 
diversity (BD), frequency of remuneration committee meetings (RCMs), remuneration 
committee independence (RCI), board independence (IOE), separating CEO and chairperson 
positions (DSPLIT), CEO tenure (CEOT) and board size (BSE). A summary of the empirical 
findings and the hypothesised relationships is reported in Table 58.  
  Table 58: A Summary of the Findings and Hypotheses of Executive Pay Models 
Dependent Variable CEO, CFO and All Executive Directors’ Pay  
Independent Variables: No. Hyp. Predicted 
sign 
Finding sign Finding sig.  Hyp. Status  
Panel A: ICGV_CEOP      
  RCMs 19 - + Insig. Rejt. 
  RCI 20 - + Insig. Rejt. 
  BSE 21 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  IOE 22 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  BD 23 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  DSPLIT 24 - + Sig. (10%) Rejt. 
  CEOT 25 + + Sig. (1%) Acep.   
Panel B: ICGV_CFOP      
  RCMs 19 - + Insig. Rejt. 
  RCI 20 - + Insig.  Rejt. 
  BSE 21 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  IOE 22 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  BD 23 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  DSPLIT 24 - + Sig. (10%) Rejt.  
  CEOT 25 + + Sig. (1%) Acep.  
Panel C: ICGV_AEDP      
  RCMs 19 - + Insig.  Rejt. 
  RCI 20 - + Sig. (1%) Rejt. 
  BSE 21 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  IOE 22 - - Sig. (1%) Acep. 
  BD 23 - - Sig. (5%) Acep. 
  DSPLIT 24 - + Insig.  Rejt. 
  CEOT 25 + + Insig.  Rejt. 
Notes: Hypothesised relationships are discussed in Chapter Four. Acep and Rejt denote accepting and rejecting 
hypothesised relationships, respectively. 
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8.4.2.1  Chief Executive Officer Pay (CEOP) 
As shown in Panel A of Table 58, this study hypothesises a negative association between 
RCMs, RCI, BSE, IOE, BD and DSPLIT and CEO, CFO and AED pay, whereas CEOT is 
expected to impact positively on CEO, CFO and AED pay. With the exception of the positive 
coefficients on RCMs, RCI and DSPLIT, the signs of the individual CG mechanisms lend 
support to the theoretical expectations. The findings related to the association between 
individual CG variables and CEO pay are presented in Table 59.29 The null hypothesis that CG 
mechanisms, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is not accepted because the F-
values are statistically significant (1% level). The adjusted R2 for Model 3 suggests that 68.1% 
of the variation in the sampled firm’s CEOP is jointly explained by the individual CG 
mechanisms and control variables. This is consistent with the results of Chi and Zhang (2010) 
and Jian and Lee (2015), who report an adjusted R2 of 66.2% and 71.8% among Chinese and 
US listed firms, respectively. 
   Table 59: Individual-CG-Variable (CEOs’ Pay) 
Independent Variable 
(Models) 
CEO_Cash 
(1) 
CEO_Non-Cash 
(2) 
CEOP 
(3) 
    
  RCMs -0.002(.947) 0.073(.071)* 0.016(.536) 
  RCI 0.030(.913) 0.092(.829) 0.050(.860) 
  BSE -2.883(.000)*** -2.672(.000)*** -2.699(.000)*** 
  IOE -2.507(.000)*** -1.347(.020)** -2.107(.000)*** 
  BD -2.297(.000)*** -0.140(.840) -1.733(.000)*** 
  DSPLIT 0.071(.651) 0.424(.111) 0.275(.087)* 
  CEOT 0.027(.004)*** 0.035(.012)** 0.035(.000)*** 
Control Variables:    
  PCGC -0.552(.001)*** -0.238(.356) -0.422(.015)** 
  CL -0.152(.246) 0.128(.531) -0.133(.320) 
  AFS -0.252(.046)** 0.374(.062)* -0.061(.635)                
  FMs 0.007(.681) -0.015(.563) -0.001(.949) 
  AGE -0.210(.000)*** -0.176(.032)** -0.174(.002)*** 
  CEX 2.291(.052)* 1.055(.553) 2.183(.070)* 
  SG 0.129(.634) 0.277(.503) 0.161(.559) 
IDU YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES 
Constant 1.991*** -1.317* 1.313*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.918 2.111 1.853 
F- value 65.286*** 15.169*** 50.046*** 
Adj. R2 73.6% 39.8% 68.1% 
No. of observations 600 600 600 
Notes: CEO_Cash denotes CEOs’ cash-based pay; CEO_Non-cash denotes CEOs’ non-cash-based pay; CEOP 
denotes total pay of CEOs; RCMs denotes the frequency of remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes 
remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board 
gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; 
PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs 
denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry 
dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
                                               
29Yearly estimations of the association between the individual CG variables and CEOP, CFOP and AEDP are reported in Appendix 6. 
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The coefficient on RCMs in relation to CEO cash pay is negative and statistically 
insignificant, whereas it is positive in relation to CEO non-cash and total pay. The positive 
coefficient on RCMs in Model 3 suggests that frequent remuneration committee meetings may 
not always be beneficial, as they can limit the time that outside directors spend effectively 
monitoring management (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 114). However, the negative coefficient on RCMs 
in Model 1 is in line with the prediction that regular meetings can increase monitoring of 
managerial activities to protect shareholders’ and/or stakeholders’ interests (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 
116), which may impact negatively on CEO cash pay. This finding is consistent with Persons 
(2006), who reports that more frequent meetings by a remuneration committee is associated 
with lower EP among US listed firms. 
Additionally, the RCMs is found to be statistically positively linked with CEO non-cash 
pay (10% level). This suggests that the frequency of remuneration committee meetings is not 
only effective in decreasing CEOs’ cash pay, but is also effective in encouraging CEOs to 
enhance firms’ market valuation by improving the pay for performance. This lends support to 
the existing CG literature (e.g., Hu et al., 2010; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005) which view board meetings in general as an important aspect of board operations. For 
example, Kanapathipillai et al. (2015) report that RCMs are associated positively with voluntary 
narrative executive pay disclosure for firms listed on Australian Securities Exchange during the 
period from 2007-2011. This implies that remuneration committee meetings can enhance 
monitoring of executive activities to protect shareholders’ interests.  
RCI is reported to be positively and insignificantly linked with cash, non-cash and total pay 
for CEOs, indicating that Hypothesis Twenty is rejected. The insignificant and positive nexus 
among RCI and CEO pay does not empirically support the recommendations of CG codes, 
including the 2010 Combined Code. Theoretically, the positive coefficient on remuneration 
committee independence implies that independent outside directors have no incentive to 
monitor the opportunistic behaviour of management, because CEOs may select external 
directors who support their decisions rather than monitoring them (Lambert et al., 1993, p. 441). 
Empirically, the positive coefficient on remuneration committee independence supports the 
findings of prior studies (Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Chalmers et al., 2006). Specifically, this 
finding provides empirical support to the results of Conyon and Peck (1998a), which suggest 
that RCI is associated positively and insignificantly with top management pay for 94 UK listed 
companies during the period from 1991-1994. 
Table 59 also indicate that BSE is statistically negatively (1% level) linked with cash, non-
cash and total CEO pay, implying that Hypothesis Twenty-one is accepted. Although this 
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finding does not lend support to some of past UK studies (Guest, 2009a; Main, 1991; Ozkan, 
2007) which report a statistically positive link among BSE and EP, the evidence of statistically 
negative influence of BSE offers support to Al-Najjar et al. (2016), Firth et al. (2007), Menozzi 
et al. (2014) and Ryan and Wiggins (2004), findings that EP is statistically negatively 
influenced by BSE among Chinese, Italian and US listed firms, respectively. Theoretically, the 
result supports the prediction that larger boards are more efficient at determining EP compared 
with smaller boards since the latter can easily be controlled by powerful executives (Edmans & 
Gabaix, 2009; Van-Essen et al., 2015). 
The models find a statistically negative association among IOE and CEO cash, non-cash 
and total pay, which provides support for Hypothesis Twenty-two as well as the 
recommendation of CG codes. Theoretically, the negative and significant coefficient on IOE 
supports the view that independent outside directors, who often have directorship on several 
boards, tend to be experts in monitoring management (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315). This 
suggests that the IOE can enhance board effectiveness by increasing monitoring of executive 
activities, which may impact negatively on EP. Empirically, the negative finding lends support 
to past studies’ findings (e.g., Ding et al., 2014; Jian & Lee, 2015; Sánchez-Marín et al., 2010).  
The coefficient on BD is statistically negative (1% level) for cash and total CEO pay, 
whereas it is negative and statistically insignificant for CEO non-cash pay. This implies that 
Hypothesis Twenty-three is empirically supported. This also supports the recommendations of 
the 2010 Combined Code, which encourages UK listed firms to diversify their boards. The 
negative effect of BD can theoretically be explained by the prediction that board diversity can 
enhance board independence and effectiveness by increasing monitoring of managerial 
activities (Carter et al., 2003, p. 37; Ferreira, 2015, p. 108) as well as by bringing diverse ideas, 
experience, knowledge and perspectives to the board (Carter et al., 2010, p. 398). Empirically, 
the negative findings lends support to the existing CG literature (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Graham et al., 2012; Peng et al., 2015) which suggest that board diversity can help improve 
board effectiveness by establishing incentive packages that are more closely related to firm 
performance and by increasing control over the opportunistic behaviour of management. 
The results reported in Table 59 reveal that DSPLIT is positively, but insignificantly, 
associated with cash and non-cash pay of CEOs, whereas it is significantly positively linked 
with total CEO pay. This result does not support Hypothesis Twenty-four, or the 
recommendations of CG codes, including the 2010 Combined Code. Empirically, the positive 
coefficient on DSPLIT is not consistent with the results of existing CG literature (e.g., Abraham 
et al., 2016; Boyd, 1994; Brandes et al., 2016; Cambini et al., 2015; Core et al., 1999; Ding et 
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al., 2014; Fahlenbrach, 2009) which suggest that separating CEO and chairperson positions can 
reduce CEOs’ power over board decisions, including EP. However, the positive effect of 
DSPLIT lends support to Benito and Conyon (1999) and Kabir and Minhat (2014), who report 
that separating CEO and chairperson positions increases EP among UK listed firms. 
Theoretically, the positive coefficient on DSPLIT does not provide support to the prediction of 
OCT that separating CEO and chairperson positions can improve board effectiveness by 
preventing powerful CEOs from exploiting the wealth of shareholders (Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
The obtained results also suggest a statistically positive link among CEOT and CEO cash, 
non-cash and total pay, lending empirical support to Hypothesis Twenty-five. This finding also 
supports the prediction of the MPH that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to develop strong 
relationships with board members over time, and as a result board members are less likely to 
reject proposals or recommendations provided by CEOs (Byrd et al., 2010, p. 89; Vafeas, 2003, 
p. 1044; Wong et al., 2015, p. 87). Empirically, the evidence of a positive influence of CEOT 
on CEO pay lends support to the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2010), Conyon and He (2012), 
Ntim et al. (2015a) and Sur et al. (2015), which report that longed-tenured CEOs tend to receive 
high remuneration. Specifically, the positive finding offer support to Conyon and Sadler (2010), 
Ozkan (2011) and Renneboog and Zhao (2011), findings who report a statistically positive link 
among CEOT and CEO pay for UK listed firms. 
The empirical results relating to control variables are also outlined in Table 59. The 
negative coefficient on the PCGC suggest that well-governed firms (Ntim et al., 2012b), tend 
to pay CEOs significantly low remuneration. Additionally, the insignificant association 
between CL and CEO pay does not provide empirical support to the prediction that cross-listed 
firms are associated with more monitoring (Chi & Zhang, 2010, p. 150) and lower private 
benefit of control (Doidge, 2004, p. 521). The evidence of an insignificant influence of cross-
listing on CEO pay also does not support the findings of past studies (e.g., Chi & Zhang, 2010; 
Chizema et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a) which provide evidence of statistically positive 
association between CL and EP. 
Table 59 indicates that AFS is negatively linked with CEO cash-based and total pay, and 
statistically positively (10% level) linked with non-cash pay. Empirically, the negative 
coefficient on cash-based and total CEO pay lends support to Ding et al. (2014), findings that 
EP is statistically negatively influenced by AFS for Chinese listed firms. However, the positive 
coefficient on non-cash CEO pay lends support to Ntim et al. (2015a) results for 169 South 
African firms over the period 2002-2007. The result, therefore, indicates that AFS not only 
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affects the level of CEOs’ pay, but also the structure of their pay. Additionally, Table 59 shows 
that the FMs are insignificantly linked with CEO pay. This implies that FMs does not influence 
CEO pay, which lends support to Ding et al. (2010) and Ntim et al. (2015a) findings for Chinese 
and South African listed firms, respectively.  
The negative coefficient on AGE lends further support to the findings of existing literature 
(e.g., Brandes et al., 2016; Peng et al., 2015), which suggest that older companies tend to pay 
their managers significantly less than younger companies. In addition, the positive coefficient 
on CEX provides support to Cheng (2004) findings for 137 US listed firms. The positive 
coefficient on SG suggests that faster-growing firms tend to pay their CEOs higher 
remuneration compared with slower-growing firms. This lends support to Bugeja et al. (2015) 
and Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster (2015), who report evidence that EP is statistically 
positively influenced by SG for US and Spanish listed firms, respectively. Finally, the results 
(coefficients are not reported in Table 59 for brevity purposes) suggest that CEO pay differs 
across industries and years. 
8.4.2.2 Chief Financial Officers’ and All Executive Directors’ Pay (CFOP & AEDP) 
As explained in Subsection 8.4.1.2, this study seeks to extend as well as contribute to the 
extant literature by examining whether CG quality impacts cash, non-cash and total pay of 
CFOs and AEDs, in addition to CEOs. Results related to the association among the CG 
mechanisms, CFO and AED pay are presented in Table 60. The results indicate that the null 
hypothesis that CG mechanisms, in addition to control variables, are equal to zero is not 
accepted, because the F-values are statistically significant (1% level); additionally, the adjusted 
R2 for Models 3 and 6 suggests that 72.6% and 70.8% of the variation in the sampled firms’ 
CFOP and AEDP, respectively, can be jointly explained by the CG mechanisms and control 
variables. This lends support to Chung et al. (2015) and Jian and Lee (2015), who report an 
adjusted R2 of 76.5% and 71.8% among Taiwanese and US listed firms, respectively. 
Consistent with the results reported for CEO pay, Models 1 and 4 of Table 60 suggest that 
the RCMs is negatively, but insignificantly, associated with cash pay for CFOs and AEDs, 
respectively. Additionally, Models 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Table 60 provide evidence that the RCMs 
are positively linked with non-cash and total pay for CFOs and AEDs, respectively. The 
negative coefficients on RCMs in Models 1 and 4 suggest that regular remuneration committee 
meetings may enhance monitoring of managerial activities, thus protecting shareholders’ 
interests (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116), which can impact negatively on executives’ pay. This lends 
support to Knott (2015) and Persons (2006), who report that RCMs are linked with lower EP 
among US firms. 
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               Table 60: Individual-CG-Variables (CFOs and AEDs’ Pay) 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: CFOs’ Pay  Panel B: AEDs’ Pay 
CFO_Cash 
(1) 
CFO_Non-Cash 
(2) 
CFOP 
(3) 
 AED_Cash 
(4) 
AED_Non-Cash 
(5) 
AEDP 
(6) 
        
  RCMs -0.015(.570) 0.102(.015)** 0.003(.903)  -0.008(.729) 0.094(.008)*** 0.013(.628) 
  RCI 0.022(.945) 0.501(.322) 0.124(.693)  0.661(.010)*** 0.838(.018)** 1.194(.000)*** 
  BSE -3.089(.000)*** -2.944(.000)*** -2.885(.000)***  -2.411(.000)*** -2.271(.000)*** -2.291(.000)*** 
  IOE -2.713(.000)*** -1.390(.024)** -2.233(.000)***  -4.413(.000)*** -2.609(.000)*** -4.905(.000)*** 
  BD -2.038(.000)*** -1.063(.152) -1.846(.000)***  -1.766(.000)*** -0.380(.527) -0.986(.030)** 
  DSPLIT 0.125(.459) 0.978(.001)*** 0.315(.059)*  -0.058(.691) 0.673(.002)*** 0.035(.818) 
  CEOT 0.023(.011)** 0.030(.041)** 0.029(.001)***  0.014(.105) 0.025(.033)** 0.013(.138) 
Control Variables:        
  PCGC -0.405(.019)** -0.473(.078)* -0.263(.123)  -0.531(.001)*** -0.413(.063)* -0.315(.064)* 
  CL -0.091(.489) 0.740(.001)*** 0.018(.892)  -0.053(.664) 0.244(.171) 0.019(.883) 
  AFS -0.191(.139) -0.203(.339) -0.203(.111)               -0.174(.136) 0.223(.175) 0.169(.155) 
  FMs 0.010(.558) -0.033(.245) 0.008(.656)  0.009(.593) -0.004(.863) -0.047(.001)*** 
   AGE -0.230(.000)*** -0.148(.087)* -0.199(.000)***  -0.143(.006)*** -0.065(.367) -0.036(.512) 
  CEX 0.140(.908) 1.145(.556) 0.672(.576)  0.557(.610) 0.216(.890) 0.204(.861) 
  SG -0.163(.564) 0.505(.260) -0.025(.927)  0.053(.834) 0.432(.225) 0.001(.998) 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant 2.025*** -1.969** 1.284***  2.096*** -2.019*** 1.694*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 1.964 2.107 1.945  2.014 2.194 2.063 
F- value 70.776*** 15.285*** 58.191***  73.035*** 20.268*** 57.985*** 
Adj. R2 76.4% 40.7% 72.6%  75.7% 46.1% 70.8% 
No. of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: CFO_Cash denotes CFOs’ cash-based pay; CFO_Non-cash denotes CFOs’ non-cash-based pay; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs;  AED_Cash denotes all executive directors cash-
based pay; AED_Non-cash denotes all executive directors non-cash-based pay; AEDP denotes total pay of AEDs; RCMs denotes the frequency of remuneration committee meetings; RCI 
denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO 
and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the 
frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Additionally, Models 3 and 6 of Table 60 show that the RCMs do not influence CFO and 
AED total pay. However, the frequency of remuneration committee meetings is found to 
significantly increase CFO and AED non-cash pay at the significance levels of 5% and 1%, 
respectively. This suggests that the frequency of meetings is not only effective in decreasing 
CFOs’ and AEDs’ cash pay, but is also effective in encouraging them to enhance firms’ market 
valuation by improving the pay for performance. This lends support to Kanapathipillai et al. 
(2015) who suggest that the RCMs is an important aspect of board operations. 
The coefficients on RCI are positive for cash, non-cash and total pay for CFOs and AEDs. 
This is not consistent with Hypothesis Twenty, or with the recommendations of CG codes, 
which suggest that outside (unaffiliated) executives should form a large proportion of 
remuneration committee members. Empirically, the positive and significant association 
between RCI and AED pay does not lend support to Ntim et al. (2015a), who provide evidence 
that the pay packages of all executives are statistically negatively influenced by RCI among 169 
South African listed firms. By contrast, the  insignificant relationship among  RCI and CFO pay 
is consistent with the results of Conyon and Peck (1998a) and Gregory‐Smith (2012), who find 
an insignificant relationship between RCI and top management pay for UK listed firms. 
Theoretically, the positive coefficient on RCI supports the MPH, which suggests that executives 
may select external directors who support their decisions rather than monitoring them (Lambert 
et al., 1993, p. 441), and that may allow executives to influence their incentive packages. 
Consistent with the results reported for CEO pay, Table 60 reports a statistically negative 
(1% level) relationship among BSE and cash, non-cash and total pay for CFOs and AEDs, 
indicating that Hypothesis Twenty-one is empirically supported. Theoretically, the statistically 
negative effect of BSE offers support to the prediction that larger boards are more efficient at 
determining EP compared with smaller boards, since the former are associated with more 
knowledge, experience and stakeholders’ representation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1038; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473). This may reduce the influence of executives over board 
decisions, such as the level and structure of their pay. Empirically, the negative finding does 
not lend support to Chizema et al. (2015), Guest (2009a), Ozkan (2007), Ozkan (2011) and 
Reddy et al. (2015), who report that EP is statistically positively influenced by BSE among 
firms listed in China, the UK and New Zealand. However, the results of this study offer support 
to Adams and Ferreira (2009), Ding et al. (2014), Firth et al. (2007) and Menozzi et al. (2014), 
who report a statistically negative association among BSE and EP for US, Chinese and Italian 
listed firms. 
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Table 60 indicates that IOE is significantly negatively linked with cash, non-cash and total 
pay for CFOs and AEDs for the entire sample. This result provides empirical support to 
Hypothesis Twenty-two, as well as the recommendations of CG codes. Additionally, the 
negative link between IOE and CFO and AED pay lends support to Byrd et al. (2010), Jian and 
Lee (2015) and Ding et al. (2014) who provide empirical evidence that EP is statistically 
negatively influenced by board independence among firms listed in US and China. 
Theoretically, the evidence of a negative and significant influence of IOE is consistent with the 
prediction that outside (unaffiliated) directors have indirect financial incentive to monitor 
management to improve their current and future reputation in the labour market (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983, p. 315), which can impact negatively on EP. 
Table 60 shows that board gender and ethnic diversity is statistically negatively associated 
with the cash and total pay of CFOs and AEDs in Models 1, 3, 4 and 6, whereas it is negatively 
and insignificantly associated with non-cash-based pay for CFOs and AEDs in Models 2 and 5. 
This finding empirically supports Hypothesis Twenty-three, and the recommendations of CG 
codes. The negative influence of board gender and ethnic diversity lends support to Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), Graham et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2015) and Peng et al. (2015), who report that 
EP is statistically negatively influenced by board diversity among US and Chinese listed firms. 
Theoretically, the evidence of a negative and significant influence of board diversity is 
consistent with the prediction that board diversity can increase board independence and 
effectiveness by gathering diverse ideas, experience, knowledge and perspectives (Carter et al., 
2010, p. 398), which can improve monitoring of management (Carter et al., 2003, p. 37; 
Ferreira, 2015, p. 108). 
Table 60 indicate that the DSPLIT is insignificantly linked with cash-based pay for CFOs 
and AEDs, as shown in Models 1 and 4. Also, Table 60 reports that DSPLIT is statistically 
positively linked with total CFOs’ pay in Model 3, but insignificantly associated with total pay 
for AEDs in Model 6. This finding does not support Hypothesis Twenty-four, or the 
recommendations of CG codes. However, Models 2 and 5 of Table 60 show that the DSPLIT is 
statistically positively (1% level) associated with non-cash-based pay for both CFOs and AEDs. 
This implies that separating CEO and chairperson positions may lead to reduced agency 
problems by enhancing board effectiveness in monitoring management (Jensen, 1993, p. 866), 
which can increase firm value by improving the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The 
statistically positive effect of DSPLIT on non-cash-based pay for CFOs and AEDs lends support 
to Brandes et al. (2016), who suggest that role splitting is positively associated with executive 
equity-based pay among US listed firms. Overall, the result does not empirically support the 
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OCT that separating CEO and chairperson positions can improve board independence and 
effectiveness by preventing powerful CEOs from exploiting the wealth of shareholders (Davis 
et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Models 1-3 of Table 60 show that CEOT is statistically positively linked to cash, non-cash 
and total pay for CFOs. Models 4 and 6 suggest that CEOT is insignificantly positively 
associated with cash and total pay for AEDs, whereas it is statistically positively linked with 
AEDs’ non-cash pay in Model 5. The positive coefficients on CEOT lend further support to 
(e.g., Basu et al., 2007; Conyon & He, 2012; Kuo et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sur et al., 
2015) findings that EP is statistically positively influenced by CEOT. Similarly, Conyon and 
Sadler (2010), Ozkan (2011) and Renneboog and Zhao (2011) find a positive and significant 
association between CEOT and CEO pay among UK listed firms. Theoretically, the positive 
coefficient on CEO tenure lends support to the expectation of the MPH that CEO tenure is 
expected to increase CEOs’ power over board decisions, because long-tenured CEOs are more 
likely to form friendships with other board members over time, and as a result board members 
have less motivation to reject proposals/recommendations provided by CEOs (Byrd et al., 2010, 
p. 89; Vafeas, 2003, p. 1044; Wong et al., 2015, p. 87). 
The empirical results relating to control variables are also outlined in Table 60. The PCGC 
is found to be negatively related with cash, non-cash and total pay for both CFOs and AEDs. 
The negative coefficient on PCGC implies that well-governed firms, defined as those having a 
CG committee (Ntim et al., 2012b), tend to pay significantly low remuneration to their 
executive directors. Additionally, Models 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 60 show that CL is 
insignificantly associated with CFO and AED pay. This implies that CL has no association with 
cash and total pay for CFOs, nor does it influence cash, non-cash and total pay for AEDs. 
However, Model 2 of Table 60 shows that CL is statistically positively (1% level) related to 
non-cash pay for CFOs, which lends support to Ntim et al. (2015a) findings for 169 South 
African listed firms.  
Models 1-6 of Table 60 indicate that AFS is statistically insignificantly associated with 
CFO and AED pay, indicating that AFS has no effect on CFO and AED pay. This is inconsistent 
with Ding et al. (2014) and Ntim et al. (2015a) findings which suggest that executive directors 
pay is significantly influenced by AFS among Chinese and South African listed firms, 
respectively. Similarly, Table 60 reveals that FMs is insignificantly associated with cash, non-
cash and total pay for CFOs (Models 1-3). It is also insignificantly associated with cash and 
non-cash pay for AEDs (Models 4 and 5). This implies that the FMs does not influence cash, 
non-cash and total pay for CFOs, as well as cash and non-cash pay for AEDs, which lends 
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support to Ding et al. (2010) and Ntim et al. (2015a) findings among Chinese and South African 
listed firms, respectively. However, Model 6 of Table 60 suggests that the higher the frequency 
of meetings, the lower the AEDs’ total pay, which is consistent with the prediction that regular 
meetings can enhance board effectiveness (Conger et al., 1998, p. 142). 
Consistent with the results of CEO pay, Models 1-6 of Table 60 show that AGE is 
associated negatively with cash, non-cash and total remuneration for CFOs and AEDs. This 
lends support to Brandes et al. (2016) and Peng et al. (2015) findings for US and Chinese listed 
firms. Additionally, Table 60 indicates that CEX has no influence on CFO and AED pay, which 
is inconsistent with Ntim et al. (2015a) findings for South African listed firms. SG is found to 
be insignificantly associated with cash, non-cash and total pay for CFOs and AEDs, indicating 
that sales growth does not influence CFO and AED pay. This does not lend support to past CG 
studies (e.g., Bugeja et al., 2015; Correa & Lel, 2014; Ntim et al., 2015a) which report that 
faster-growing companies tend to pay their managers higher remuneration than slower-growing 
companies. Finally, similar to the results of CEO pay, the models (coefficients are not reported 
in Table 60 for brevity purposes) show that CFO and AED pay differs across industries and 
years. 
8.4.3 The Moderating Influence of Ownership Structure Variables on the UKCGI-EP 
Nexus 
As explained in the Fourth Chapter, most prior studies only examine the direct link between 
firm-level CG quality and EP, without considering the moderating effect of ownership structure 
on this relationship. Therefore, this study seeks to extend and contribute to the current literature 
by investigating the moderating effect of managerial, institutional and block ownership on the 
association among the UKCGI, CEO, CFO and AED pay. This study focuses only on the 
moderating effect of ownership structure variables on the association between the UKCGI and 
executive directors’ pay for two reasons: (i) the current study is interested mainly in examining 
the impact of firm-level CG quality, using a broad CG index (UKCGI), on EP, and (ii) the 
UKCGI comprises several CG provisions, including those examined in the individual-CG 
variable models. Therefore, this subsection discusses the moderating effect of ownership 
structure, and compares these results with the main results obtained from composite-CG-index 
models. The moderating effect findings are outlined in Table 61. 
The coefficients on CEOP, CFOP and AEDP in Panel B are statistically negative (1% 
level). Crucially, it is noticeable from the results that the UKCGI-EP relationship observably 
improved. In particular, the coefficient on the association between the UKCGI and CEOP 
increases from -5.985(.000) in Model 1 of Table 61 to -10.980(.000) in Model 4 of the same 
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table. Similarly, Table 61 shows that the coefficients on the association between the UKCGI 
and both CFOP and AEDP have improved, from -6.752(.000) and -3.534(.000) in Models 2 
and 3 to -8.849(.000) and -13.815(.000), respectively. The differences between the coefficients 
are relatively large compared with those reported by prior studies. For example, Brown and Lee 
(2010) and Newton (2015) report a coefficient of -0.094 and -0.1383 for the link between CG 
quality indices and CEO pay among US listed firms. Therefore, the reported findings in Panel 
B provide support to Hypothesis Twenty-six, indicating that the interactions among the UKCGI, 
CEOP, CFOP or AEDP and the ownership structure variables result in an improvement of the 
UKCGI-EP relationship.  
With regard to the interaction variables, Table 61 (Panel B) provides evidence that 
managerial, institutional and block ownership moderate the association between the UKCGI 
and executive directors’ pay. Specifically, the positive coefficients on UKCGI*MANO in 
Models 4-6 provide empirical support to the prediction that higher managerial ownership can 
increase managers’ incentive to maximise their own benefits at the expense of shareholders, 
because higher managerial ownership is assumed to increase managers’ power and influence 
over internal governance (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988, p. 324; Lambert et al., 1993, p. 441). 
Empirically, the evidence of a positive influence of managerial ownership lends support to past 
studies (e.g., Basu et al., 2007; Cyert et al., 2002; Duong & Evans, 2015; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1989; Khan et al., 2005; Lee & Isa, 2015; Mehran, 1995) which suggest that firms 
with greater managerial ownership award their executives higher remuneration. Therefore, the 
findings reported in Table 61 indicate that managerial ownership moderates the UKCGI-EP 
relationship by increasing the remuneration of executive directors.  
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        Table 61: The Moderating Influence of Ownership Structure on the UKCGI-EP Nexus 
 (Model) 
Panel A: Main Model  Panel B: Moderating Effect Model 
CEOP 
(1) 
CFOP 
(2) 
AEDP 
(3) 
 CEOP 
(4) 
CFOP 
(5) 
AEDP 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI -5.985(.000)*** -6.752(.000)*** -3.534(.000)***  -10.980(.000)*** -8.849(.000)*** -13.815(.000)*** 
Ownership Variables:        
  MANO - - -  -11.746(.000)*** -4.829(.191) -0.977(.701) 
  ISTO - - -  -0.138(.950) 3.813(.171) 3.780(.017)** 
  BLKO - - -  -3.318(.166) -4.133(.147) -16.572(.000)*** 
Interaction Variables:        
  UKCGI*MANO - - -  19.482(.000)*** 13.191(.034)** 5.781(.222) 
  UKCGI*ISTO - - -  -1.507(.640) -7.051(.078)* -7.600(.003)*** 
  UKCGI*BLKO - - -  10.262(.004)*** 12.062(.004)*** 29.478(.000)*** 
Control Variables:        
  PCGC -0.934(.000)*** -0.799(.000)*** -1.160(.000)***  -0.752(.000)*** -0.680(.000)*** -0.999(.000)*** 
  CL -1.096(.000)*** -1.028(.000)*** -1.437(.000)***  -0.568(.000)*** -0.300(.040)** -0.956(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.385(.011)** 0.283(.079)* 0.505(.003)***  0.303(.028)** 0.271(.065)* 0.579(.000)*** 
  FMs 0.085(.000)*** 0.098(.000)*** -0.010(.578)  0.027(.137) 0.050(.009)*** -0.025(.119) 
  AGE -0.424(.000)*** -0.492(.000)*** -0.301(.000)***  -0.281(.000)*** -0.322(.000)*** -0.182(.007)*** 
  CEX 1.079(.462) 0.204(.898) -2.474(.129)  1.031(.437) -1.500(.289) -2.789(.050)** 
  SG 0.239(.487) -0.031(.932) -0.197(.601)  0.136(.651) 0.091(.780) -0.234(.468) 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant -1.117*** -1.073** -1.257***  1.014 -1.500* 4.226*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.513 2.539 2.263  2.448 2.335 2.221 
F- value 32.691*** 32.472***                            24.822***  36.961*** 39.683*** 33.681*** 
Adj. R2 49.9% 51.7% 42.0%  61.6% 64.8% 58.5% 
No. of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AEDP denotes total pay of all executive directors; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance 
index; MANO denotes managerial ownership; ISTO denotes institutional ownership; BLKO denotes block ownership; the next three variables are interactions variables between 
the UKCGI and the three types of ownership, respectively; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs 
denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The negative coefficients on UKCGI*ISTO in Models 4-6 of Table 61 indicate that 
institutional ownership moderates the UKCGI-EP relationship by effectively decreasing the 
excessive pay of executive directors. This supports the recommendations of CG codes, which 
suggests that shareholders, particularly institutional one, should be active at monitoring 
management. The negative effect of ISTO also lends support to past CG studies (e.g., Dong & 
Ozkan, 2008; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Ning et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Van-Essen et al., 
2015), which report that EP is statistically negatively influenced by ISTO. Theoretically, 
institutional investors enjoy several advantages over small shareholders, including financial, 
information gathering and processing, skills and expertise advantages, which facilitate 
monitoring of management (Dong & Ozkan, 2008, p. 19; Khan et al., 2005, p. 1079; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986, p. 465), and can impact negatively on EP (Hartzell & Starks, 2003, p. 2352; 
Ntim et al., 2015a, p. 75). 
Finally, the positive coefficients on UKCGI*BLKO in Columns 5, 6 and 7 imply that block 
ownership moderates the UKCGI-EP relationship by increasing the pay of executive directors. 
Theoretically, the positive interaction of block ownership on the UKCGI-EP relationship 
supports the prediction that block-holders may collaborate with management to enhance their 
personal benefits, and that can damage minority shareholders’ interests (Cheung et al., 2005, p. 
513; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1042; Mallin et al., 2015, p. 178). Empirically, the positive 
effect of block ownership lends support to the findings of CG literature (e.g., Amzaleg et al., 
2014; Cheung et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2006; Reddy et al., 2015; Shin & Seo, 2011; Wang & 
Xiao, 2011), which suggest that EP is statistically positively influenced by block ownership.  
To sum up, Table 61 provides evidence that the interaction improves the magnitude of the 
UKCGI coefficients, which implies that ownership structure variables moderate the UKCGI-
EP relationship. The next subsections compare the results of using the composite-CG-index 
and individual-CG-variables models, whereas Section 8.5 reports and discusses the results 
relating to the use alternative CG indices, and results of tests addressing potential endogeneity 
problems. 
8.4.4 A Comparison of the Composite-Index and Individual-CG-Variable Models 
As explained above, this study uses the composite-CG-index and individual-CG-variable 
models to investigate the impact of firm-level CG quality on EP. For both models, the adjusted 
R2, F-statistics and Durbin statistics are outlined in Table 62. The reported results (Panel A) 
indicate that the individual-CG variables have more power to explain CEOP, CFOP and AEDP 
than the composite-CG-index. Specifically, with respect to CEOP, the adjusted R2 is 68.10% in 
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the individual-CG-variable model, whereas it is 49.90% in the composite-CG-index model. 
Also, the F-statistic is 50.046 for the individual-CG variables, and 32.691 for the composite-
CG-index. The Durbin-Watson value is relatively higher in the composite-CG-index model 
than the individual-CG-variable model; similarly, regarding yearly estimations, Panels B-G of 
Table 62 show that the adjusted R2 and F-value in the individual-CG-variable models are better 
at explaining CEOP than the composite-CG-index models.  
                   Table 62: A Comparison of the Executive Pay Models 
Models Used Composite-CG-Index Model (UKCGI)  Individual-CG-Variable Model 
CEOP CFOP AEDP  CEOP CFOP AEDP 
Panel A: Full Sample        
Adj. R2 49.90% 51.70% 42.00%  68.10% 72.60% 70.80% 
F-value 32.691*** 32.472*** 24.822***  50.046*** 58.191*** 57.985*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.513 2.539 2.263  1.853 1.945 2.063 
Panel B: 2008 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 47.30% 50.90% 41.30%  64.60% 67.50% 67.10% 
F-value 7.578*** 7.825*** 6.280***  9.723*** 10.098*** 10.867*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.285 2.710 2.328  1.712 2.112 1.912 
Panel C: 2009 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 47.40% 45.0% 37.10%  66.40% 69.20% 68.80% 
F-value 7.745*** 6.518*** 5.514***  10.675*** 11.087*** 11.924*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.609 2.389 2.345  1.895 1.777 1.955 
Panel D: 2010 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 39.80% 42.70% 32.0%  59.50% 66.50% 61.60% 
F-value 5.957*** 6.227*** 4.654***  8.191*** 10.267*** 9.006*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.548 2.594 2.166  1.709 1.711 1.836 
Panel E: 2011 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 49.30% 48.40% 40.40%  73.20% 69.20% 71.80% 
F-value 8.299*** 7.578*** 6.257***  14.364*** 11.338*** 13.733*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.529 2.521 2.171  1.810 2.125 2.154 
Panel F: 2012 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 48.50% 45.50% 38.30%  67.20% 72.20% 71.10% 
F-value 7.894*** 6.699*** 5.819***  10.784*** 12.711*** 13.271*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.496 2.410 2.210  1.734 1.961 2.132 
Panel G: 2013 Firm Year        
Adj. R2 44.30% 51.0% 37.80%  59.40% 67.80% 63.50% 
F-value 6.971*** 8.284*** 5.716***  8.165*** 10.697*** 9.690*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.384 2.284 2.208  1.914 1.915 2.375 
Notes Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AEDP denotes total pay of all 
executive directors***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Regarding the association between CG and CFOP, the reported results (Panel A) suggest 
that the individual-CG-variables have more power to explain CFOP than the composite-CG-
index. The adjusted R2 is 72.60% in the individual-CG-variable model, and 51.70% in the 
composite-CG-index model. The F-statistic is 58.191 for the individual-CG-variables, and 
32.472 for the composite-CG-index. The Durbin-Watson value is relatively higher in the 
composite-CG-index model than the individual-CG-variable model. In yearly estimations, 
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Panels B-G of Table 62 show that the adjusted R2 and F-value in the individual-CG-variable 
model are better at explaining CFOP than the composite-CG-index model. 
In terms of the association between CG and AEDP, the reported results reported suggest 
that the individual-CG-variables have more power to explain AEDP than the composite-CG-
index. The adjusted R2 is 70.80% in the individual-CG-variable model, and 42.00% in the 
composite-CG-index model. Also, the F-statistic is 57.985 for the individual-CG-variables, and 
24.822 for the composite-CG-index. The Durbin statistic is relatively similar in both models; 
regarding yearly estimations, Panels B-G of Table 62 show that the adjusted R2 and F-value for 
the individual-CG-variables are better at explaining AEDP than the composite-CG-index. 
To sum up, the comparison between the two models suggests that the individual-CG 
variables are better in explaining CEOP, CFOP and AEDP than the composite-CG-index. 
However, because prior studies use the composite-CG-index model or the individual-CG-
variable model, this study uses both in order to offer better understanding about the effect of 
employing different models. 
8.5 SENSTITIVITY ANALYSIS 
As explained in Subsection 8.4.3, the UKCGI is the main interest of this study because it 
constitutes a broad set of CG mechanisms, including those used in the individual-CG-variable 
models. This section reports and discusses the results related to using various sensitivity 
analyses that check the extent to which the main findings are robust to alternative CG proxies 
and different endogeneity concerns. Specifically, Subsection 8.5.1 presents and discusses the 
results of using alternative CG indices, whereas Subsection 8.5.2 reports the results of tests 
addressing potential endogeneity problems. Overall, as will be discussed below, all the tests 
suggest that the main findings are not sensitive to alternative CG proxies and different 
endogeneity problems.  
8.5.1 Alternative CG Proxies 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, the UKCGI consists of five main sub-indices 
and includes 120 CG provisions. These sub-indices each have a different number of provisions 
(i.e., LSH has eight provisions, ETIV has 37, ACNT has 36, REM has 22 and RWS has 17), 
indicating that the reported results may be sensitive to the weighting of each sub-index. 
Therefore, to ascertain whether the link between each sub-index and EP (CEOP, CFOP and 
AEDP) is similar to the main results (Tables 56 and 57), the main models are re-estimated by 
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replacing the UKCGI with LSH, ETIV, ACNT, REM and RWS. The results based on each sub-
index are reported in Table 63.  
Regarding the association between the five sub-indices and CEO pay, the results remain 
negative and significant. Specifically, Models 1-5 of Panel A indicate that CEOP is statistically 
negatively (1% level) influenced by the five sub-indices. The control variables of the five 
models show relatively similar magnitudes and directions. Similarly, the reported results in 
Table 63 (Panels B and C) indicate that there is a statistically negative (1% level) association 
among each sub-index and CFOP or AEDP. However, Model 4 in Panel C suggests that the 
remuneration (REM) sub-index is positively and insignificantly associated with AEDP for the 
entire sample. Also, the control variables for all five sub-indices show relatively similar 
directions and magnitudes. Therefore, the results reported in Table 63 remain fairly similar to 
those reported in Tables 56 and 57, indicating that the findings of the main models are relatively 
robust to the use of different sub-indices. 
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                            Table 63: The Results Based on Weighted and Sub CG Indices 
Composite-CG-Index Model Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model(6) 
Panel A: CEOs’ Pay  CEOP CEOP CEOP CEOP CEOP CEOP 
  LSH -1.858(.000)*** - - - - - 
  ETIV - -3.718(.000)*** - - - - 
  ACNT - - -6.778(.000)*** - - - 
  REM - - - -5.609(.000)*** - - 
  RWS - - - - -2.238(.000)*** - 
  W-UKCGI - - - - - -5.322(.000)*** 
Control Variables:       
  PCGC -1.164(.000)*** -0.904(.000)*** -0.873(.000)*** -1.067(.000)*** -1.291(.000)*** -1.020(.000)*** 
  CL -1.674(.000)*** -1.339(.000)*** -1.153(.000)*** -1.236(.000)*** -1.431(.000)*** -1.179(.000)*** 
  AFS -0.028(.861) 0.335(.030)** 0.325(.0.25)** 0.121(.429) -0.085(.564) 0.289(.057)* 
  FMs 0.089(.000)*** 0.083(.000)*** 0.093(.000)*** 0.098(.000)*** 0.059(.004)*** 0.085(.000)*** 
  AGE -0.525(.000)*** -0.404(.000)*** -0.448(.000)*** -0.455(.000)*** -0.509(.000)*** -0.457(.000)*** 
  CEX 0.029(.985) 1.149(.452) 0.952(.508) 0.357(.816) 0.905(.555) 0.792(.594) 
  SG 0.045(.903) 0.203(.570) 0.148(.658) 0.075(.834) 0.173(.630) 0.215(.537) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -2.505*** -2.639*** -1.166*** -0.092 -2.476*** -1.173** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.376 2.491 2.459 2.379 2.413 2.503 
F- value 23.591*** 27.951*** 35.409*** 27.282*** 27.272*** 30.985*** 
Adj. R2 41.5% 45.9% 52.0% 45.2% 45.2% 48.5% 
Panel B: CFOs’ Pay  CFOP CFOP CFOP CFOP CFOP CFOP 
  LSH -2.290(.000)*** - - - - - 
  ETIV - -4.143(.000)*** - - - - 
  ACNT - - -7.006(.000)*** - - - 
  REM - - - -6.495(.000)*** - - 
  RWS - - - - -2.654(.000)*** - 
  W-UKCGI - - - - - -6.123(.000)*** 
Control Variables:       
  PCGC -1.048(.000)*** -0.821(.000)*** -0.814(.000)*** -0.909(.000)*** -1.162(.000)*** -0.867(.000)*** 
  CL -1.557(.000)*** -1.275(.000)*** -1.066(.000)*** -1.158(.000)*** -1.374(.000)*** -1.103(.000)*** 
  AFS -0.049(.778) 0.268(.126) 0.259(.102) 0.025(.880) -0.272(.090)* 0.192(.234) 
  FMs 0.116(.000)*** 0.097(.000)*** 0.117(.000)*** 0.114(.000)*** 0.071(.002)*** 0.099(.000)*** 
  AGE -0.571(.000)*** -0.465(.000)*** -0.502(.000)*** -0.515(.000)*** -0.572(.000)*** -0.523(.000)*** 
  CEX -1.870(.277) -0.057(.973) -0.635(.684) -0.924(.579) 0.324(.847) -0.129(.936) 
  SG -0.232(.565) -0.084(.830) -0.160(.661) -0.219(.574) -0.085(.827) -0.045(.905) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -2.888*** -2.786*** -1.627*** 0.157 -2.562*** -1.060** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.455 2.536 2.485 2.436 2.475 2.538 
F- value 22.788*** 26.735*** 33.980*** 26.280*** 26.661*** 30.982*** 
Adj. R2 42.6% 46.7 % 52.9% 46.3% 46.6% 50.5% 
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Continuation of Table 63. Panel C: AEDs’ Pay AEDP AEDP AEDP AEDP AEDP AEDP 
  LSH -1.599(.000)*** - - - - - 
  ETIV - -2.493(.000)*** - - - - 
  ACNT - - -4.215(.000)*** - - - 
  REM - - - 0.204(.716) - - 
  RWS - - - - -2.085(.000)*** - 
  W-UKCGI - - - - - -3.406(.000)*** 
Control Variables:       
  PCGC -1.276(.000)*** -1.125(.000)*** -1.111(.000)*** -1.379(.000)*** -1.388(.000)*** -1.200(.000)*** 
  CL -1.695(.000)*** -1.531(.000)*** -1.447(.000)*** -1.872(.000)*** -1.473(.000)*** -1.450(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.259(.109) 0.510(.004)*** 0.483(.003)*** 0.013(.939) 0.212(.161) 0.463(.005)*** 
  FMs 0.003(.862) -0.011(.554) -0.003(.855) -0.008(.657) -0.022(.213) -0.008(.642) 
  AGE -0.384(.000)*** -0.287(.000)*** -0.313(.000)*** -0.395(.000)*** -0.366(.000)*** -0.320(.000)*** 
  CEX -2.954(.075)* -2.311(.160) -2.549(.114) -2.672(.113) -2.115(.191) -2.570(.115) 
  SG -0.256(.503) -0.198(.601) -0.256(.493) -0.317(.414) -0.140(.708) -0.191(.612) 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.599*** -1.997*** -1.187** -2.653*** -1.621*** -1.130** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.231 2.277 2.235 2.176 2.238 2.262 
F- value 22.963*** 23.911*** 25.872*** 21.279*** 25.707*** 24.797*** 
Adj. R2 40.0% 41.1% 43.1% 38.1% 42.9% 42.0% 
Number of observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AEDP denotes total pay of all executive directors; LSH denotes leadership sub-index; ETIV denotes effectiveness sub-index; 
ACNT denotes accountability sub-index; REM denotes remuneration sub-index; RWS denotes relations with shareholder sub-index; W-UKCGI denotes weighted index; PCGC denotes existence of a 
separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry 
dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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As explained above, the UKCGI consists of 120 equally weighted provisions. However, 
because the number of provisions included in each sub-index varies substantially, each sub-
index is weighted differently, as follows: (i) leadership (6%); (ii) effectiveness (31%); (iii) 
accountability (30%); (iv) remuneration (19%); and (v) relations with shareholders (14%). To 
examine whether the association between the UKCGI and EP is not sensitive to the weighting 
of the five sub-indices,30 an alternative index labelled W-UKCGI is constructed in this study by 
awarding an equal weight of 20% to each sub-index. The un-weighted UKCGI in Tables 56 and 
57 is replaced with the W-UKCGI, and the results are reported in Model 6 (Panels A-C). 
As shown in Model 6 of Table 63, the findings of the W-UKCGI remain the same as those 
reported in Tables 56 and 57. Specifically, with reference to the association between the W-
UKCGI and CEOP, Model 6 reports empirical evidence that the W-UKCGI is statistically 
negatively (1% level) related to CEOP. Model 6 also shows that the direction and the level of 
significance related to the control variables stay relatively unchanged. Additionally, the 
adjusted R2 and F-value of both the W-UKCGI and un-weighted UKCGI remain relatively 
similar (49.9% and 32.691 for the un-weighted UKCGI, and 48.5% and 30.985 for the W-
UKCGI). 
The reported results in Model 6 (Panels B and C), suggest that the W-UKCGI is statistically 
negatively (1% level) associated with both CFOP and AEDP, which is similar to the main 
finding (see Table 57). The control variables show similar directions and magnitudes. 
Additionally, the adjusted R2 and F-value for the W-UKCGI remain relatively the same as those 
for the un-weighted UKCGI in Table 57. Overall, the direction and significance of variables 
employed in both W-UKCGI and un-weighted UKCGI remained relatively the same. This 
evidence suggests that the findings of the main models are relatively robust to the use of 
different weighting of the five sub-indices. 
8.5.2 Endogeneity 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, endogeneity problems emerge when one or more 
variables are associated with the error terms (Gippel et al., 2015; Schultz et al., 2010). This 
may increase concerns about the validity of the empirical results obtained from the regression 
model (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). Prior studies have identified three main 
causes for endogeneity problems: simultaneity, omitted variables bias and measurement errors 
(Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2010). These three potential causes need 
                                               
30Prior CG studies indicate that the weighting scheme of the index may affect the reported results (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 274; Ntim, 2013b, p. 
385). Therefore, this study checks whether the main findings are robust to alternative CG proxies.  
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to be checked to assure that the findings are not influenced by the presence of endogeneity 
(Gippel et al., 2015). Therefore, this research attempts to consider these sources of endogeneity 
problems using different techniques, as explained below. 
8.5.2.1 Lagged Structure Model 
To address endogeneity concerns that may arise from simultaneous association between 
the UKCGI and EP (i.e., CEOP, CFOP and AEDP), and following existing CG literature (e.g., 
Luo, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sur et al., 2015), a lagged structure model is estimated, in which 
all explanatory, control and dependent variables were lagged one period. Particularly, this study 
used the lagged structure model as an alternative estimation method, whereby the current year’s 
executive directors’ pay is affected by past year’s CG practices (UKCGI) and control variables, 
this reduces the number of observations to 500 firm-year observations. The lagged structure 
model is as follows: 


 
n
i
ititiitit CONTSUKCGIEP
1
11110 
                                           (16)
 
Variables are defined as follows: EP refers to executive directors’ pay (i.e., CEOP, CFOP 
and AEDP); UKCGI refers to the constructed UK corporate governance index; and CONTS 
means control variables, which include the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), 
cross-listing (CL), audit firm size (AFS), frequency of board meetings (FMs), firm age (AGE), 
capital expenditure (CEX) and sales growth (SG). The variables included in the lagged structure 
model are the same as those included in the main model (5), with the exception that a one-year 
lag is introduced for each variable. Table 64 presents the results of both lagged and un-lagged 
structure models for CEOP, CFOP and AEDP.  
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                      Table 64: Lagged-Effect-Model 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: Main Models  Panel B: Lagged-Effect Models 
CEOP 
(1) 
CFOP 
(2) 
AEDP 
(3) 
 CEOP 
(4) 
CFOP 
(5) 
AEDP 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI -5.985(.000)*** -6.752(.000)*** -3.534(.000)***  -6.099(.000)*** -6.946(.000)*** -4.360(.000)*** 
Control Variables:        
  PCGC -0.934(.000)*** -0.799(.000)*** -1.160(.000)***  -1.066(.000)*** -0.852(.001)*** -0.913(.002)*** 
  CL -1.096(.000)*** -1.028(.000)*** -1.437(.000)***  -1.042(.000)*** -0.995(.000)*** -1.712(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.385(.011)** 0.283(.079)* 0.505(.003)***  0.401(.017)** 0.253(.153) 0.272(.185) 
  FMs 0.085(.000)*** 0.098(.000)*** -0.010(.578)  0.076(.001)*** 0.086(.000)*** -0.040(.078)* 
  AGE -0.424(.000)*** -0.492(.000)*** -0.301(.000)***  -0.456(.000)*** -0.466(.000)*** -0.293(.001)*** 
  CEX 1.079(.462) 0.204(.898) -2.474(.129)  0.193(.907) 0.587(.740) -1.688(.406) 
  SG 0.239(.487) -0.031(.932) -0.197(.601)  0.252(.494) -0.074(.853) 0.317(.477) 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant -1.117*** -1.073** -1.257***  -0.916* -1.020* 0.046 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.513 2.539 2.263  2.542 2.552 2.368 
F- value 32.691*** 32.472*** 24.822***  28.833*** 28.503*** 22.966*** 
Adj. R2 49.9% 51.7% 42.0%  49.7% 51.3% 42.1% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  500 500 500 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AEDP denotes total pay of all executive directors; the UK corporate governance index; PCGC 
denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG 
denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 
0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Column 2 and 5 of Table 64 report that the relationship among the UKCGI and CEOP 
remain essentially the same as that reported by the un-lagged structure model, indicating that 
the UKCGI has the same explanatory power in both models. The reported results also show that 
the level of significance and magnitude of other control variables remains relatively similar in 
both models. Additionally, Table 64 shows that both models are relatively similar in terms of 
adjusted R2 and F-value. Specifically, the adjusted R2 is 49.9% for the estimated un-lagged 
UKCGI-EP structure and 49.7% for the lagged structure model. The F-value is 32.691 for un-
lagged structure model 28.833 for lagged structure model. Table 64 shows that the results 
reported for both models are relatively similar, indicating that well-governed firms pay their 
CEOs significantly low remuneration.   
Models 2, 3, 5 and 6 reveal the results of the un-lagged and lagged structure models for 
CFOP and AEDP, respectively. The main OLS results reported in Models 2 and 3 indicate that 
the UKCGI is statistically negatively (1% level) related to CFOP and AEDP. Similarly, based 
on the lagged structure model, Models 5 and 6 of Table 64 show that the UKCGI is statistically 
negatively (1% level) related to CFOP and AEDP. This implies that the UKCGI has the same 
explanatory power in both models. Additionally, Table 64 shows that the direction and the 
statistical level of significance of control variables remain relatively the same in both un-lagged 
and lagged models. Similarly, Table 64 indicates that the adjusted R2 and F-value for the un-
lagged structure model remain largely the same as those for the lagged model for CFOP and 
AEDP. Overall, the significance and the magnitude of the coefficients for both models are 
relatively similar, suggesting that the results of this study are fairly robust to any simultaneity 
problems resulting from lagged CG practices. 
8.5.2.2 2SLS Model 
To address endogeneity concerns associated the omitted variables bias, this study follows 
past CG studies (e.g., Jian & Lee, 2015; Luo, 2015), and adopts 2SLS methodology. A Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test (DWH) was conducted in this study following the recommendations of 
Beiner et al. (2006, p. 267). The test involves two-stages. Stage one, as specified in equation 
17 below, the UKCGI is assumed to be endogenous and regressed on the nine control variables. 
The resulting residuals from the regression of equation 17 are saved as R_UKCGI. 


 
n
i
ititiit CONTSUKCGI
1
10 
                                                                              (17)
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  UKCGI and CONTS refer to the same variables included in the main Model (5). Stage 
two, executive directors’ pay variables, including CEOP, CFOP and AEDP, are regressed on 
the actual UKCGI value, the saved residuals (R_UKCGI), and the same control variables as 
specified in the following equation: 



n
i
ititiititit CONTSUKCGIRUKCGIEP
1
210 _ 
                                    (18)
 
The DWH test rejects that endogeneity problem is not present (null hypothesis) as the 
coefficients on the saved residuals from regression in equation 17 (R_UKCGI) are significant.31 
This implies that 2SLS may be more appropriate than OLS regression (Black et al., 2006b, p. 
394). Therefore, following past studies (e.g., Jian & Lee, 2015; Luo, 2015), this study adopts 
2SLS methodology, which involves two stages. In stage one, the nine control variables are 
expected to determine the CG variable (UKCGI). Based on that expectation, the UKCGI was 
regressed on the control variables and the UKCGI predicted value is saved (P_UKCGI). In stage 
two, the predicted UKCGI value is used as an instrument and the model is re-estimated as 
follows:  




n
i
ititiitit CONTSUKCGIPEP
1
10 _ 
                                                (19)
 
Variables included in Model 19 remain the same as those included in the equation 5, except 
that the actual value of the UKCGI is replaced with the predicted values from stage one. 
However, before replacing the actual value of the UKCGI, it is essential to check whether it is 
appropriate to replace the actual value of the UKCGI with its predicted value. This was done 
using both Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices, and it was found that the P_UKCGI was 
highly correlated with its actual value. Additionally, the P_UKCGI was found to have no 
correlation with the residual (R_UKCGI). This suggests that the predicted value of the UKCGI 
can replace its actual value (Black et al., 2006b, p. 394). Table 65 outlines the findings of 2SLS. 
                                               
31Specifically, the coefficients on the residuals of UKCGI show that it is significant at 1% for CEOP, CFOP and AEDP. 
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              Table 65: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: Main Models  Panel B: 2SLS 
CEOP 
(1) 
CFOP 
(2) 
AEDP 
(3) 
 CEOP 
(4) 
CFOP 
(5) 
AEDP 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI -5.985(.000)*** -6.752(.000)*** -3.534(.000)***  - - - 
  P_UKCGI - - -  -8.926(.000)*** -8.373(.000)*** -11.703(.000)*** 
Control Variables:        
  PCGC -0.934(.000)*** -0.799(.000)*** -1.160(.000)***  -0.304(.172) -0.186(.425) -0.420(.091)* 
  CL -1.096(.000)*** -1.028(.000)*** -1.437(.000)***  -3.655(.000)*** -4.123(.000)*** -2.158(.000)*** 
  AFS 0.385(.011)** 0.283(.079)* 0.505(.003)***  1.532(.000)*** 1.350(.000)*** 2.045(.000)*** 
  FMs 0.085(.000)*** 0.098(.000)*** -0.010(.578)  0.115(.000)*** 0.133(.000)*** 0.008(.676) 
  AGE -0.424(.000)*** -0.492(.000)*** -0.301(.000)***  -0.542(.000)*** -0.668(.000)*** -0.209(.012)** 
  CEX 1.079(.462) 0.204(.898) -2.474(.129)  4.153(.006)*** 3.653(.026)** -0.591(.722) 
  SG 0.239(.487) -0.031(.932) -0.197(.601)  0.764(.028)** 0.507(.177) 0.319(.403) 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Constant -1.117*** -1.073** -1.257***  1.360** 1.195* 2.493*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.513 2.539 2.263  2.513 2.539 2.263 
F- value 32.691*** 32.472*** 24.822***  32.691*** 32.472*** 24.822*** 
Adj. R2 49.9% 51.7% 42.0%  49.9% 51.7% 42.0% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AEDP denotes total pay of all executive directors; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate 
governance index; P_UKCGI denotes the saved predicted value of the UKCGI; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS 
denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes 
year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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The reported results of the P_UKCGI are relatively similar to the main findings for CEOP, 
CFOP and AEDP. Specifically, regarding the CEOP, the coefficient on UKCGI remains 
statistically negative (1% level). Regarding the control variables, the coefficients and signs of 
the 2SLS are relatively the same as those of the OLS model. Specifically, the coefficients on 
CL and AGE remained statistically negative (1% level). The coefficient related to FMs remains 
positive at the same level of significance. However, the statistical significance levels of 
coefficients related to PCGC, AFS, CEX and SG show some changes. Particularly, the 
coefficient on AFS, which was significant at 5%, is now statistically significant at 1%. The 
coefficients on CEX and SG, which were insignificant, are now significant at 1 and 5% level, 
respectively. The coefficient on PCGC, which was significant at 1%, is now insignificant. 
Models 1 and 4 of Table 65 also show that the adjusted R2 and the F-value in both the main 
regression and the 2SLS remain the same. This implies that the UKCGI, in addition to the 
control variables, has the same explanatory power in both models. 
With respect to the CFOP and AEDP, the coefficients on the UKCGI remain statistically 
negative (1% level). Regarding the control variables, the directions and signs of the 2SLS are 
relatively the same as those of the OLS regression. Specifically, with reference to CFOP, the 
coefficient related to the FMs remains positive at the same level of significance. Similarly, the 
coefficients on CL and AGE remain statistically negative (1% level). However, the statistical 
significance level and the signs of some other control variables have changed. Particularly, the 
coefficient on PCGC, which was significant at 1%, is now insignificant. Similarly, the 
coefficient on AFS, which was significant at 10%, is now significant at 1%.  The coefficient on 
CEX, which was insignificant, is now significant at 5%. The coefficient on SG, which was 
insignificantly negative, is now insignificantly positive.  
With reference to AEDP, the coefficients for the control variables remain relatively the 
same. Specifically, the coeficient on CL remains negative at the same level of significance. 
Similarly, the coefficient on AFS remains statistically positive (1% level). The coefficient on 
CEX remains statistically insignificant. However, the level of significance and the signs of some 
other control variables have changed. Particularly, the coefficient on PCGC, which was 
significant at 1%, is now significant at 10%. Similarly, the coefficient on AGE, which was 
significant at 1%, is now significant at 5%. The coefficient on SG, which was insignificantly 
negative, is now insignificantly positive. 
Models 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Table 65 also show that the adjusted R2 and the F-value in the main 
model and the 2SLS remain the same. This indicates that the UKCGI, in addition to the control 
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variables, have the same power to explain CFOP and AEDP in both models. Table 65 indicates 
that the main findings are not largely affected by omitted variable bias. 
8.5.2.3 Firm-Level Fixed-Effects Model 
Prior studies suggest that CG and EP can jointly be determined by unobserved firm-level 
characteristics (Benito & Conyon, 1999, p. 123; Sapp, 2008, p. 724), which may not be detected 
by simple OLS regression. Therefore, in order to take into account unobserved firm-level 
characteristics that may influence EP, and following CG literature (e.g., Graham et al., 2012; 
Luo, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a), a fixed-effects model is estimated by creating 99 dummies that 
represent 100 UK listed corporations. These 99 dummies are employed to re-estimate the main 
models and the findings reported in Table 66. 
The findings of the firm fixed-effects model are relatively the same as those obtained from 
the OLS regression. With respect to CEO pay, the results suggest that the significance level of 
coefficient on the UKCGI remains statistically negative (1% level). Additionally, the signs on 
the coefficients related to control variables are relatively the same as predicted by the main 
model. Specifically, the coefficients on CEX and SG remain positive and insignificant. 
However, the signs and the level of significance of other control variables have changed. 
Particularly, the coefficient on AGE, which was significant at 1%, is now significant at 10%. 
Similarly, the coefficient on AFS, which was significant at 5%, is now insignificant. The 
coefficients on PCGC and CL, which were staistically negative at 1%, are now statistically 
positive at 1%. The coefficient on FMs, which was positive and significant at 1%, is now 
negative and insignificant. Overall, the obtained results from fixed-effects model for CEO pay 
indicate that the UKCGI is statistically negatively related to CEO pay, which is similar to the 
main results obtained from the OLS regression.  
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            Table 66: Fixed-Effects Model 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
Panel A: Main OLS Model  Panel B: Fixed-Effects Model 
CEOP 
(1) 
CFOP 
(2) 
AEDP 
(3) 
 CEOP 
(4) 
CFOP 
(5) 
AEDP 
(6) 
Corporate Governance:        
  UKCGI -5.985(.000)*** -6.752(.000)*** -3.534(.000)***  -2.621(.000)*** -2.370(.000)*** -3.358(.000)*** 
Control Variables:        
  PCGC -0.934(.000)*** -0.799(.000)*** -1.160(.000)***  0.734(.002)*** 0.372(.105) 0.615(.003)*** 
  CL -1.096(.000)*** -1.028(.000)*** -1.437(.000)***  0.549(.004)*** 0.602(.001)*** 0.461(.006)*** 
  AFS 0.385(.011)** 0.283(.079)* 0.505(.003)***  0.215(.231) -0.047(.803) 0.282(.082)* 
  FMs 0.085(.000)*** 0.098(.000)*** -0.010(.578)  -0.001(.920) -0.009(.435) -0.012(.116) 
  AGE -0.424(.000)*** -0.492(.000)*** -0.301(.000)***  -0.181(.077)* -0.116(.257) -0.105(.254) 
  CEX 1.079(.462) 0.204(.898) -2.474(.129)  1.139(.198) -1.562(.104) -0.154(.845) 
  SG 0.239(.487) -0.031(.932) -0.197(.601)  0.143(.236) 0.127(.325) 0.100(.348) 
IDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
FDU NO NO NO  YES YES YES 
Constant -1.117*** -1.073** -1.257***  -3.356*** -3.839*** -2.386*** 
Durbin-W. Stat 2.513 2.539 2.263  1.991 2.074 2.176 
F- value 32.691*** 32.472*** 24.822***  102.867*** 105.479*** 140.255*** 
Adj. R2 49.9% 51.7% 42.0%  94.9% 95.1% 96.2% 
Number of observations 600 600 600  600 600 600 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; AEDP denotes total pay of all executive directors; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; PCGC 
denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales 
growth; IDU denotes industry dummies; YDU denotes year dummies; and FDU denotes firm dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 
level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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With respect to CFO and AED pay, the direction and the signs on the coefficients related 
to the UKCGI are the same as predicted by the main models. Specifically, the reported result in 
Model 5 indicates that the UKCGI is statistically negatively (1% level) related to the CFOP. 
The signs on the coefficients related to control variables have changed. Specifically, the 
coefficients on AFS and FMs, which were positive and significant, are now negative and 
insignificant. Similarly, the coefficient on PCGC, which was statistically negative at 1%, is 
now positive and insignificant. The coefficient on CL, which was statistically negative at 1%, 
is now statistically positive at 1%. The coefficient on firm age, which was statistically negative, 
is now insignificantly negative. The coefficient on CEX, which was insignificantly positive, is 
now insignificantly negative. Finally, the coefficient on SG, which was insignificantly negative, 
is now insignificantly positive. 
With reference to AED pay, the results provided in Table 66 indicate that the UKCGI is 
statistically negatively related to AEDP. Additionally, the coefficients for control variables 
show some changes. Specifically, the coefficients on PCGC and CL, which were statistically 
negative at 1%, are now positive and significant at 1%. Similarly, the coefficient on AFS, which 
was significant at 1%, is now significant at 10%. The coefficient on AGE, which was significant 
at 1%, is now insignificant. The coefficient on SG, which was negative and statistically 
insignificant, is now positive and statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient on FMs 
and CEX remain negative and insignificant. Overall, the obtained results from the fixed effects 
model for CFOP and AEDP indicate that the UKCGI is negatively and significantly associated 
with CFOP and AEDP, which is similar to the main results obtained from the OLS regression.  
Therefore, the results obtained from the fixed effects model indicate that well-goverened 
firms tend to pay significantly low remuneration to their executive directors, which is consistent 
with those of the OLS model. This implies that the result related to CEOP, CFOP and AEDP 
are not largely sensitive to unobserved firm-level characteristics.  
8.6   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter presents the statistical summary for variables used in the composite-CG-index 
model, individual-CG-variable model, and the moderating effect model. It also examines 
whether the data used in the executive pay models meets OLS assumptions, including 
normality, multicollinearity, linearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The skewness 
and kurtosis values of EP, including cash, non-cash and total pay, are above the critical value, 
indicating that these variables are not normally distributed. To reduce non-normalities of these 
variables, they were transformed using natural log. After transforming the variables, different 
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statistical tests were conducted, including skewness, kurtosis, VIF, Cook’s Distance, Scatter 
Plot, P-P Plot and Durbin-Watson. Overall, these tests reveal that the assumptions of OLS are 
not seriously violated, implying that it is statistically appropriate to investigate the association 
between firm-level CG quality and executive directors’ pay using OLS. 
The chapter then presents and discusses empirical results related to the Composite-CG-
index and individual-CG-variable models. The composite-CG-index model examines the 
association between the UK CG index (UKCGI) and executive directors’ pay. The results 
indicate that the UKCGI is statistically negatively (1% level) associated with CEOP, CFOP and 
AEDP. In terms of the individual-CG-variable model, the findings suggest that the meetings of 
remuneration committee are positively related to the non-cash and total pay of CEOs, CFOs 
and AEDs, but negatively related to the cash pay of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. Additionally, the 
results suggest that remuneration committee independence is positively related to executive 
directors’ pay (i.e., CEO, CFO and AED). Board size, board gender and ethnic diversity and 
board independence are statistically negatively linked with CEO, CFO and AED’s pay. 
Separating CEO and chairperson positions is positively linked with cash, non-cash and total 
pay for CEOs and CFOs. However, separating CEO and chairperson positions is negatively 
linked with the cash-based pay of AEDs, but positively associated with non-cash and total pay 
for AEDs. The study also finds that firms with long-tenured CEOs tend to pay significantly 
high remuneration to their executive directors. 
The study also examines the moderating influence of ownership variables on the UKCGI-
EP nexus. The reported results offer new evidence that the interaction improves the magnitude 
of the UKCGI coefficients, which indicates that ownership structure variables moderate the 
UKCGI-EP relationship. Finally, the results of sensitivity analyses were discussed in Section 
8.5. A number of statistical techniques are used in this study to examine whether the results are 
robust, including estimation using (i) sub-indices; (ii) the W-UKCGI; (iii) a lagged-effect 
model; (iv); 2SLS methodology; and (v) a firm fixed-effects model. Overall, these tests indicate 
that the obtained findings are largely not sensitive to different endogeneity problems and the 
use of alternative CG indices. 
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CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
9. AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter aims to provide a summary of the research findings, implications, 
contributions, limitations and potential avenues for further studies. In particular, Section 9.1 
summarises the estimated OLS regression results relating to CG compliance and disclosure, 
firm performance/valuation and executive pay. Section 9.2 discusses the policy 
recommendations and implications of the findings. Section 9.3 briefly discusses the research 
contributions. Section 9.4 addresses the research weaknesses, whilst Section 9.5 identifies 
potential avenues for further studies. 
9.1 STUDY’S FINDINGS 
This section outlines the empirical results related to the following questions: (i) What is 
the CG compliance and disclosure level among the UK sampled firms?; (ii) Do board, audit, 
firm and ownership mechanisms explain observable differences in firms’ motivations to 
voluntarily disclose CG information?; (iii) What is the association among firm-level CG quality 
and firm performance/valuation?; (iv) Do ownership structure variables moderate the UKCGI-
Performance nexus?; (v) What is the effect of firm-level CG quality on executive pay?; and 
(vi) whether ownership structure variables moderate the UKCGI-EP relationship? 
As explained in the research design chapter, a stratified sampling technique was employed 
to select the final sample. The final sample includes 100 UK listed companies over sequential 
years, 2008-2013, resulting in 600 firm years. Additionally, the study has constructed a CG 
index (UKCGI) to examine CG compliance and disclosure practices among the UK listed firms, 
as well as to investigate the relationship among firm-level CG quality, corporate 
performance/valuation and executive pay. 
The current study has employed two different models (i.e., the composite-CG-index and 
individual-CG-variable models) to examine the association among firm-level CG quality, firm 
performance/valuation and executive pay. Regarding the effect of CG quality on firm 
performance/valuation, past CG studies used either the composite-CG-index model (e.g., 
Ammann et al., 2011, 2013; Bauer et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bozec et al., 2010; Chang 
et al., 2015; Connelly et al., 2012; Gompers et al., 2003; Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Mouselli 
& Hussainey, 2014) or only the individual-CG-variable model (e.g., Dharmadasa et al., 2014; 
Guest, 2009b; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Low et al., 2015; Mangena et al., 2012; Reguera-
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Alvarado et al., 2016; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002). Regarding to  the 
relationship among firm-level CG quality and executive pay, few past CG studies used the 
composite-CG-index model (e.g., Brown & Lee, 2010; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 
2012; Newton, 2015), and most of past studies used the individual-CG-variable model (e.g., 
Core et al., 1999; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Duong & Evans, 2015; Firth et al., 2007; Graham et 
al., 2012; Guest, 2009a; Ntim et al., 2015a; Peng et al., 2015; Reddy et al., 2015). As discussed 
in the seventh and eighth chapters, this study seeks to extend as well as contribute to the extant 
literature by offering better understanding about the effect of employing different models. 
The following subsection summarises the main empirical results of the current study. In 
particular, Subsection 9.1.1 summarises the findings related to CG compliance and disclosure 
practices among the UK listed firms. Subsection 9.1.2 provides a summary of findings related 
to the association among CG quality, measured using a broad CG index, and firm 
performance/valuation. Subsection 9.1.3 summarises study’s results related to the relationship 
among CG quality, using individual CG variables, and firm performance/valuation. Subsection 
9.1.4 summarises the findings of the interaction role of ownership variables on the UKCGI-
Performance nexus. Subsection 9.1.5 provides a summary of findings related to the link among 
firm-level CG quality, measured using a broad CG index, and executive pay. Subsection 9.1.6 
summarises study’s results related to the relationship among individual CG variables and 
executive directors’ pay, and finally Subsection 9.1.7 summarises the findings of the interaction 
role of ownership variables on the UKCGI-EP relationship.  
9.1.1 Findings Related to Voluntary CG Compliance and Disclosure 
This subsection summarises the findings that aim to answer these questions: (i) What is the 
CG compliance and disclosure level among the UK sampled firms?; and (ii) Can board, firm, 
audit and ownership mechanisms explain firms’ motivations to disclose more information on 
CG compliance? As discussed in Chapter Six, the findings show that there is substantial 
variation in CG compliance and disclosure among the sampled firms. Specifically, the 
aggregate mean of UKCGI ranges from 20% to 94.17%, with an average of 61.73% firms 
complying with 120 CG provisions investigated.  
Regarding the compliance levels with each provision that constitutes the UKCGI, the 
results indicate that compliance levels are substantially varied. The compliance levels range 
from 1% to 100%, where 1% is a significantly low level of compliance by all 100 firms over 
the sampled period and 100% means perfect compliance by all 100 firms over the sampled 
period. Overall, the results suggest UK listed firms attach more importance to some CG 
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provisions than others. The study also finds that CG score slightly improved from 59.97% in 
2008 to 63.43% in 2013, which lends support to previous CG literature (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; 
Chen & Zhang, 2014; Henry, 2008) which provided evidence that CG compliance improves 
over time. 
To further explain the differences in CG compliance and disclosure among the UK listed 
firms, and following past CG studies (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2012b), this study presented the distributional features of the UKCGI among the 
examined firms using firm size, industry type and the UKCGI sub-indices. Generally, and 
consistent with the existing CG studies (e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 
2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b; Satta et al., 2014), the analyses show that 
small firms provide less CG information than large firms. The results based on industrial groups 
suggest that firms operating in different industries have different CG compliance and disclosure 
levels, which lends support to previous CG literature (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2015; Mallin & 
Ow-Yong, 2012; Melis et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007). The results based on the five sub-indices 
suggest that firms tend to provide more information on leadership and remuneration CG 
provisions compared with accountability, effectiveness and relations with shareholders CG 
provisions. 
With regard to the antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure, this study finds 
that board size, board independence, board diversity, cross-listing and audit firm size are 
statistically positively related to the UKCGI, which lends support to the formulated hypotheses 
and past CG studies, including Al-Najjar and Abed (2014), Jizi et al. (2014), Liao et al. (2015), 
Ntim et al. (2012b) and Samaha et al. (2012). The analyses also show that both managerial and 
block ownership are statistically negatively linked with the UKCGI, which lends support to the 
findings of Al-Najjar and Abed (2014), Chapple and Truong (2015), Eng and Mak (2003), and 
Hassanein and Hussainey (2015). However, the study reports that both the existence of a 
separate CG committee and institutional ownership are positively and insignificantly associated 
with the UKCGI, which does not offer support to past CG studies, including Hussainey and Al‐
Najjar (2012) and Ntim et al. (2012b). 
9.1.2 Findings Related to Corporate Performance (Composite-CG-Index Model) 
As explained in Section 9.1, this study employs two models (i.e., the composite-CG-index 
and individual-CG-variable models) to examine CG’s influence on corporate 
performance/valuation. This subsection summarises the findings relating to the composite-CG-
index model, whereas Subsection 9.1.3 summarises the study’s results relating to the individual-
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CG-variable model. To investigate the association among firm-level CG quality, using the 
composite-CG index model, and corporate performance/valuation, a self-constructed CG index 
(UKCGI) was developed in the current study, comprising 120 provisions extracted mainly from 
the 2010 Combined Code. Additionally, three proxies for performance/valuation were 
employed: Q-ratio as the key measure for firms’ market valuation, and two other measures 
(ROA & SR), as different proxies of performance/valuation. 
The results show that firm market valuation, proxied by Q-ratio, is statistically positively 
influenced by the UKCGI.  The positive finding offers support to the theoretical prediction that 
effective CG structures can help in reducing agency costs, protecting shareholders’ interests 
and enhancing corporate reputation/image (Black et al., 2006c; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Suchman, 1995), which may allow firms to gain the support of powerful 
stakeholders to access critical resources (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Empirically, the positive effect of firm-level CG quality (UKCGI) lends support to existing CG 
literature (e.g., Ammann et al., 2011; Beiner et al., 2006; Connelly et al., 2012; Klapper & 
Love, 2004; Ntim, 2013b; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012) which indicate that effective CG 
structures positively influence firms’ market valuation (Q-ratio). 
Similar to the above results, the study finds a statistically positive relationship among the 
UKCGI and return on assets (ROA), which provides support to past studies (e.g., Giroud & 
Mueller, 2011; Klapper & Love, 2004; Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Ntim, 2013b; Tariq & Abbas, 
2013) and the prediction that engaging in better CG practices can reduce agency costs by 
enhancing internal control systems (Jensen, 1993) and reducing information asymmetry (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), which may improve firm financial performance. With regard to association 
among the UKCGI and shareholder return (SR), the statistically insignificant coefficient on the 
UKCGI does not lend support to the prediction that engraining in good CG practices may 
enhance firms’ market valuation (Clacher et al., 2008; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). Empirically, 
the insignificant finding does not lend support to past CG studies (e.g., Ntim, 2013a, 2013b; 
Padgett & Shabbir, 2005) which report evidence that CG practices significantly impact firms’ 
market valuation. As discussed in the seventh chapter, the insignificant effect of firm-level CG 
quality on SR is due to various reasons, including that SR may not reflect actual corporate 
performance, since it primarily measures “shareholder expectations about future cash flows” 
(Burgman & Van-Clieaf, 2012, p. 3). 
  
293 
 
9.1.3 Findings Related to Corporate Performance (Individual-CG-Variable Model) 
As discussed above, this study also employs the individual-CG-variable model, in addition 
to the composite-CG-index model, to examine CG’s impact on firm performance/valuation. 
Following existing CG literature (e.g., García-Meca et al., 2015; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Hearn, 2011; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015), the study 
investigates the effect of CG using six individual CG variables on corporate 
performance/valuation. The individual CG mechanisms employed in the model include: board 
diversity (BD), existence of board committees (PSC), separating CEO and chairperson positions 
(DSPLIT), board independence (IOE), board meetings (FMs) and board size (BSE). The 
measures employed for corporate performance/valuation in the individual-CG variable model 
are the same as those employed in the composite-CG-index model, including Q-ratio, ROA and 
SR.  
First, and with regarding the association among BSE and corporate performance/valuation, 
the results indicate a statistically positive (at the 10% level) association among board size and 
Q-ratio, which lends support to the existing CG literature, including García-Meca et al. (2015) 
and Pandey et al. (2015). This positive finding offers support to the prediction that larger boards 
are viewed by the market as more effective in mitigating agency conflict compared with smaller 
boards, since larger boards enjoy more diversity in the form of members’ knowledge, 
experience and stakeholders’ representation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1038; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473), which can enhance corporate performance. However, the study 
finds insignificant association among performance (ROA and SR) and BSE, which does not 
provide support to past studies (e.g., Gaur et al., 2015; Guest, 2009b; Onakoya et al., 2014). 
Second, IOE has a significantly positive relationship with firms’ market valuation (Q-
ratio), which lends support to Dharmadasa et al. (2014) and Nguyen et al. (2015). This finding 
also offers support to the prediction that outside directors are inherently motivated to monitor 
management to assure that shareholders’ interests are protected (Weir et al., 2002). That can 
enhance firms’ market valuation by mitigating agency and asymmetry information problems 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315), increasing stakeholder representation on boards (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473), as well as by allowing access critical resources (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006, p. 1039). Similarly, the findings reveal that IOE is statistically positively associated with 
both ROA and SR, which offers support to the prediction that outside directors may place more 
pressure on managers to enhance corporate performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315; Ntim 
& Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473).  
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Third, the statistically positive coefficient on board gender diversity suggests that having 
directors with different gender can improve firms’ market valuation. The positive finding lends 
support to the findings and suggestions of past studies (e.g., Peni, 2014; Reguera-Alvarado et 
al., 2016; Terjesen et al., 2015) that greater gender diversity in the boardroom is perceived by 
the capital market participants as a good CG practice, because it can enhance board 
independence and effectiveness (Walt & Ingley, 2003, p. 220) by brining different knowledge, 
experience and skills into boardroom (Ntim, 2015, p. 173), which can enhance firms’ market 
valuation (Terjesen et al., 2015, p. 6). However, board ethnic diversity is insignificantly linked 
to the Q-ratio. Similarly, board gender diversity is statistically positively linked with ROA and 
SR, which lends support to past studies, including Khan and Vieito (2013) and Terjesen et al. 
(2015). In contrast, board ethnic diversity is negatively related to ROA and SR.  
Fourth, the regression analysis shows a statistically negative association among the PSC 
and Q-ratio, which is similar to the findings of Hearn (2011). Theoretically, The negative effect 
of board committees lends support to the prediction that the establishment of these committees 
may be viewed as a bad CG practices by the capital market participants, because it can increase 
agency and monitoring costs  by increasing the potential for conflict between board members 
(Hearn, 2011, p. 133; Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116). Similarly, the findings indicate that ROA and SR 
are negatively influenced by the PSC, which offer support to Main and Johnston (1993) findings 
that executive pay is influenced positively by the existence of a remuneration committee. This 
implies that establishing board committees may increase agency costs (i.e., excessive executive 
pay) which can negatively influence corporate performance/valuation. 
Fifth, the results from statistical tests show that DSPLIT is statistically negatively 
associated with Q-ratio. The statistically negative finding lends support to the results of Elsayed 
(2007), Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Nguyen et al. (2015), as well as the prediction that CEOs 
are encouraged to work in their companies’ best interest so as to secure their position and justify 
their pay (Davis et al., 1997, p. 26), and that can enhance corporate performance/valuation 
(Pham et al., 2015, p. 5; Weir et al., 2002, p. 585). By contrast, and similar to the findings of 
Dahya et al. (1996), DSPLIT is found to be insignificantly linked with both ROA and SR. 
Finally, the study finds a statistically insignificant and positive association among Q-ratio 
and board meetings, which implies that even though meeting more frequently has no 
implications for companies’ market valuation, it is perceived by stock market participants as a 
good CG practice, because regular board meetings can enhance board effectiveness by 
increasing monitoring of management activities (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116). By contrary, the 
findings indicate that ROA and SR are negatively influenced by board meetings. This indicates 
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that board’s frequent meetings may increase agency and monitoring costs (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 
118), which can negatively impact corporate performance/valuation. 
9.1.4 Findings Related to the Interaction Role of Ownership Structure Variables on the 
UKCGI-Performance Nexus 
As explained in seventh chapter, this study investigates whether managerial, institutional 
and block ownership moderate the UKCGI-Performance nexus. Regarding the association 
between CG and Q-ratio, the regression results show that the link among the UKCGI and the 
Q-ratio has become more pronounced. Specifically, the coefficients of UKCGI on the Q-ratio 
increased from 0.328 to 0.454, implying that ownership structure variables moderate the 
UKCGI-Q-ratio nexus.  
With regard to the interaction variables, the results suggest that managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership positively moderate the UKCGI-Q-ratio relationship. The evidence of 
a positive moderating influence of managerial ownership lends support to the prediction that 
increasing the percentage of shares owned by managers may enhance firms’ market valuation, 
because it can help to align management and shareholder interests (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Similarly, the positive moderating influence of institutional ownership offers 
support to the prediction that institutional investors, as powerful stakeholders, exert more 
pressure on managers to enhance firms’ performance (Dong & Ozkan, 2008, p. 19; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986, p. 465). In contrast, block ownership is found to negatively moderate the 
UKCGI-Q-ratio nexus. This suggests that ownership concentration might lead to the increased 
power of large shareholders, allowing them to connive with management to extract private 
benefits, and that can damage minority shareholders’ interests (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 
1042). 
Regarding the association among the UKCGI, ROA and SR, the regression results show 
that the link among the UKCGI and ROA has become stronger. This implies that ownership 
structure variables moderate the UKCGI-ROA nexus. However, the results also show that, when 
using SR as proxy for firms’ market valuation, the UKCGI-Performance relationship does not 
improve. This suggests that the ownership structure variables do not moderate the UKCGI-SR 
relationship.  
Finally, regarding the interaction variables, the results indicate that managerial and block 
ownership negatively moderate the UKCGI-ROA/SR nexus. The negative moderating effect of 
managerial ownership lends support to the prediction that increasing the percentage of shares 
owned by managers might not help in aligning management and shareholders’ interests, 
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because higher managerial ownership can allow managers to gain unrestricted access to 
important information about their firms, and thus managers may exploit this information to reap 
personal benefits at the expense of stakeholders/shareholders (McConnell & Servaes, 1990, p. 
609). Similarly, the negative moderating effect of block ownership suggests that block-holders 
may collude with management to extract private benefits, which can damage minority 
shareholders’ interests (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1042). In contrast, the positive influence of 
institutional ownership provide support to the prediction that institutional investors place more 
pressure on management to make decisions that improve the wealth of shareholders (Dong & 
Ozkan, 2008, p. 19; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, p. 465). 
9.1.5 Findings Related to Executive Pay (Composite-CG-Index Model) 
As discussed in Section 9.1, this study employs the composite-CG-index model and the 
individual-CG-variable model to investigate whether firm-level CG quality determines 
executive pay- EP (i.e., CEO pay, CFO pay and all executive directors’ pay). This subsection 
summarises the study’s results relating to the composite-CG-index model, while Subsection 
9.1.6 summarises the findings based on the individual-CG-variable model. To investigate 
whether firm-level CG quality, using the composite-CG index model, determines EP, a self-
constructed CG index (UKCGI) was developed in this study, whose 120 provisions were 
extracted mainly from the 2010 Combined Code. 
The results reveal that UKCGI is statistically negatively associated with CEOs’ pay (cash, 
non-cash and total pay), which lends support to the theoretical prediction that in companies 
with good CG systems, executive pay package is designed in a way that align management and 
shareholders’ interests (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009, p. 489; Jensen & Murphy, 1990, p. 226). 
Empirically, the statistically negative effect of firm-level CG quality does not offer support to  
Fahlenbrach (2009) and Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) who suggest that CEOs’ pay packages are 
positively influenced by CG quality among the US, France, Canada and the UK listed 
companies. 
Similar to the above findings, the association among the UKCGI, CFO and AED pay is 
found to be statistically negative, which is consistent with the results described in the above 
paragraph and optimal contracting theory’s prediction that in companies with good CG 
structures, opportunistic managers are not able to expropriate corporate resources, because they 
have less influence on their own pay (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009, p. 489; Jensen & Murphy, 1990, 
p. 226). Empirically, most prior studies mainly examine the association among firm-level CG 
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quality and CEO pay. These studies report that better-governed companies pay CEOs 
significantly less than poorly governed companies do (Brown & Lee, 2010; Newton, 2015). 
9.1.6 Findings Related to Executive Pay (Individual-CG-Variable Model) 
As discussed in the fifth and eighth chapters, this study also employs individual CG 
variables, in addition to the composite-CG-index, to examine whether individual CG 
mechanisms impact on CEO, CFO and all executives’ (AED) pay. Following existing CG 
literature (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Basu et al., 2007; Chalmers 
et al., 2006; Conyon, 2014; Duong & Evans, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a), this study examines the 
association among seven individual CG variables, CEO, CFO and AED pay. The individual 
CG mechanisms are: board gender and ethnic diversity (BD), frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings (RCMs), remuneration committee independence (RCI), board 
independence (IOE), separating CEO and chairperson positions (DSPLIT), CEO tenure (CEOT) 
and board size (BSE).  
First, regarding the association among RCMs, CEO, CFO and AED pay, the coefficients 
on RCMs in relation to CEO, CFO and AED cash pay is negative and statistically insignificant, 
whereas it is positive in relation to CEO, CFO and AED non-cash and total pay. These findings 
suggest that RCMs are not only effective in preventing opportunistic executive from awarding 
themselves overly cash pay, but is also effective in encouraging executives to enhance firms’ 
market valuation by improving the pay for performance (Kanapathipillai et al., 2015; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). This is consistent with Persons (2006) findings among US firms.  
Second, the coefficients on RCI are positive for cash, non-cash and total pay of CEOs, 
CFOs and AEDs. The positive coefficients on RCI suggest that external directors have no 
power/incentive to prevent management from expropriating the wealth of shareholders, as 
external directors may be appointed to endorse board’s decisions rather than monitoring it 
(Lambert et al., 1993, p. 441). This result further supports the findings of Anderson and Bizjak 
(2003), Chalmers et al. (2006) and Conyon and Peck (1998a). 
Third, the results indicate that BSE is statistically negatively linked with CEOs, CFOs and 
AEDs’ pay, which lends support to the  findings of Firth et al. (2007), Menozzi et al. (2014) 
and Ryan and Wiggins (2004). The statistically negative effect of BSE offers support to optimal 
contracting theory’s prediction that good governance is often associated with larger boards, 
because they tend to have more knowledge, experience and skills (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 
1038; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473). This may restrain the influence that executives may 
have over board decisions, including their own pay. 
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Fourth, and as discussed in the eighth chapter, the regression analyses reveal a statistically 
negative association among IOE and cash, non-cash and total pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs, 
which lend support to the existing CG literature, including Ding et al. (2014), Jian and Lee 
(2015) and Theeravanich (2013). Theoretically, the evidence of a negative and significant 
influence of IOE offers support to the prediction that external directors have more 
power/incentive to monitor and prevent opportunistic executives from expropriating corporate 
resources, so as to enhance their current and future labour market image/reputation (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983, p. 315). 
Fifth, the study reports a statistically negative relationship among BD and cash, non-cash 
and total pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs, which lend support to Adams and Ferreira (2009), 
Conyon (2014), Graham et al. (2012), Kim et al. (2015) and Peng et al. (2015) findings that 
executives’ pay packages are statistically negatively influenced by board diversity. The 
evidence of a negative and significant influence of board diversity offers support to the 
prediction (optimal contracting theory) that board diversity can enhance board independence 
through brining diverse ideas, experience, knowledge and perspectives into a boardroom 
(Carter et al., 2010, p. 398), and that can improve monitoring of management activities (Carter 
et al., 2003, p. 37; Ferreira, 2015, p. 108). 
Sixth, DSPLIT found to be positively linked with CEOs, CFOs and AEDs’ pay, which does 
not offer support to the optimal contracting theory’s prediction that separating CEO and 
chairperson positions may enhance board effectiveness, including preventing powerful 
executives from expropriating the wealth of shareholders, by increasing board independence 
from management (Boyd, 1994, p. 338; Jensen, 1993, p. 866). Empirically, positive coefficient 
on DSPLIT lends support to Benito and Conyon (1999) and Kabir and Minhat (2014) findings 
that separating CEO and chairperson positions increases EP among UK listed firms.  
Finally, the obtained results suggest a positive link among CEOT and cash, non-cash and 
total pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs, which empirically supports the prediction of the 
managerial power hypothesis that CEO tenure can increase CEOs’ power and influence over 
board decisions, including those relating to executive pay, by allowing CEOs to develop strong 
relationships with board members over time (Byrd et al., 2010, p. 89; Vafeas, 2003, p. 1044; 
Wong et al., 2015, p. 87). Empirically, the positive coefficients on CEOT lend further support 
to Bebchuk et al. (2010), Conyon and He (2012), Ntim et al. (2015a) and Sur et al. (2015) 
findings that EP is statistically positively influenced by CEOT.  
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9.1.7 Findings Related to the Interaction Role of Ownership Structure Variables on the 
UKCGI-EP Nexus  
As explained in eighth chapter, this study aims to extend and contribute to the current 
literature by investigating the moderating effect of managerial, institutional and block 
ownership on the association among the UKCGI, CEO, CFO and AED pay. For the interaction 
effect of ownership variables on the UKCGI-EP nexus, the results indicate that the link among 
the UKCGI, CEOP, CFOP and AEDP has become stronger.  Specifically, the coefficients on 
CEOP, CFOP and AEDP increased from -5.985, -6.752 and -3.534 to -10.980, -8.849 and -
13.815, respectively. This suggests that ownership structure variables moderate the UKCGI-EP 
nexus.  
Regarding the interaction variables, the results show that managerial ownership positively 
moderates the UKCGI-EP link. The positive coefficients on UKCGI*MANO provide empirical 
support to managerial power hypothesis’s prediction that managerial ownership may not help 
in aligning management and shareholders’ interests, because higher managerial ownership may 
decrease monitoring on executives’ activities, which can allow executives to award themselves 
overly generous pay packages (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988, p. 324; Lambert et al., 1993, p. 
441). 
 Similarly, the study reports that block ownership is statistically positively moderate the 
link among the UKCGI, CEOP, CFOP and AEDP. The positive interaction effect of block 
ownership supports the prediction that ownership concentration does not enhance the 
monitoring role of the board on executives because block shareholders may collaborate with 
management to enhance their personal benefits, and that can damage minority shareholders’ 
interests (Cheung et al., 2005, p. 513; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, p. 1042; Mallin et al., 2015, p. 
178). However, institutional ownership is found to negatively moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus, 
which lends support to the expectation that institutional shareholders have the ability (financial 
clout ,skills and expertise) which allow them to monitor management effectively (Dong & 
Ozkan, 2008, p. 19; Khan et al., 2005, p. 1079; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, p. 465), and can impact 
negatively on executive pay (Hartzell & Starks, 2003, p. 2352; Ntim et al., 2015a, p. 75).  
9.2 RECOMMENDATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The recommendations and policy implications of the study’s findings are outlined in this 
section. In particular, Subsection 9.2.1 addresses the implications of the findings related to CG 
compliance and disclosure. Subsection 9.2.2 presents the implications of the findings related to 
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corporate performance/valuation, and Subsection 9.2.3 summarises the implication of the 
findings related to executive pay.  
9.2.1 Implication and Recommendations: CG Compliance and Disclosure 
As discussed in sixth chapter, the CG compliance levels varied substantially among the 
sampled firms. Specifically, the findings show that firms either do not comply or have lower 
levels of compliance with 35 out of 120 provisions included in the UKCGI, and high compliance 
levels (i.e. 50% to 100%) with 85 out of the 120 provisions. For example, the results show that 
firms rarely comply with the recommendations related to the attendance of a company secretary 
to board meetings. In addition, the findings based on the five sub-indices reveal that the UK 
listed firms attach more importance to some CG provisions than others. For example, firms tend 
to comply less with CG provisions relating to accountability, effectiveness and relations with 
shareholders than provision relating to leadership and remuneration. This provides regulatory 
authorities (e.g., the Financial Reporting Council and the London Stock Exchange) with a 
strong motivation to find ways to strengthen enforcement further. One way to enhance such 
compliance is by establishing a compliance and enforcement committee. 
The findings also indicate that CG compliance levels vary according to firm size. 
Specifically, the findings suggest that small companies provide less CG information than large 
companies. This is theoretically expected because larger companies suffer from greater 
information asymmetry problems (Chung & Zhang, 2011), and are better able to afford the 
costs involved in complying with good CG practices (Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). This finding implies that governance needs appear to vary among UK listed 
firms based on their size. Therefore, in order to maintain a good balance among the benefits 
and costs of CG compliance, regulatory authorities should differentiate between small and large 
firms when proposing/revising CG codes. 
The findings related to the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure, have a number 
of implications for UK policy-makers. The findings reveal that companies with larger, 
independent and diverse boards have high CG compliance/disclosure levels. This lends support 
to the suggestions that larger boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Ozkan, 2007), more independent 
boards (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and more diverse boards (Carter et al., 2003) are associated 
with increased monitoring of management activities. Therefore, UK policy-makers and 
regulatory authorities may be encouraged to introduce CG legislation that motivates firms to 
have larger, more independent and more diverse boards in order to enhance their CG 
compliance/disclosure practices. 
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The results indicate that firm-level CG compliance and disclosure is insignificantly 
influenced by the existence of a separate of a CG committee. The evidence of an insignificant 
association does not lend support to the prediction that firms may improve their CG practices 
by establishing separate CG committees (Ntim et al., 2012b). Hence, UK policy-makers and 
regulatory authorities may be motivated to introduce CG legislation that encourages listed firms 
to establish separate CG committees to closely monitoring compliance with recommendations 
contained in the CG codes. 
Cross-listed companies have higher CG compliance/disclosure levels than those which are 
not cross-listed. This lends support to the theoretical prediction that cross-listed firms adhere to 
additional CG disclosure requirements (Coffee, 2002; Cooke, 1989; Eaton et al., 2007; Robb 
& Zarzeski, 2001). Therefore, the London Stock Exchange may need to further upgrade its 
listing rules to match those of other stock markets (e.g., those in the US) to improve CG 
compliance and disclosure among UK listed firms. 
The statistically positive relationship among audit firm size and CG compliance/disclosure 
levels suggests that external auditors have more incentive to monitor CG compliance and 
disclosure in order to avoid losing customers (DeAngelo, 1981b; Zhu & Sun, 2012). Unlike 
other countries in which external auditors’ roles may be restricted, UK provides a good example 
of how external auditor can improve CG compliance and disclosure. Therefore, other countries, 
such as Libya, may be motivated to introduce regulations that enhance the role of external 
auditors in monitoring CG compliance and disclosure.  
UK companies with managerial and block ownership have lower CG compliance and 
disclosure levels than those with no managerial and block ownership, suggesting that 
management and block shareholdings do not assist UK listed firms to provide additional 
information on CG compliance and disclosure. This offers support to the prediction that 
management and block shareholders have no incentive to enhance CG compliance and 
disclosure, since managers/block-holders tend to have unrestricted access to information 
(Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Eng & Mak, 2003). The negative findings may motivate UK policy-
makers to find ways to enforce compliance with the recommendations of CG codes among 
companies with managerial and block ownership. One way to ensure high CG compliance 
levels is that UK policy-makers and regulatory authorities may encourage the diffusion of 
ownership.  
Finally, the study found a statistically insignificant relationship among firm-level CG 
compliance/disclosure and institutional ownership. The insignificant effect of institutional 
shareholders indicates that “institutional investors in the UK are passive and inefficient in 
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monitoring” (Dong & Ozkan, 2008, p. 28). Therefore, UK policy-makers and regulatory 
authorities may be encouraged to introduce new legislation that increases shareholder activism, 
particularly by institutional shareholders, to require listed firms to provide additional 
information on CG compliance. 
9.2.2 Implications and Recommendations: Corporate Performance 
The results generally indicate that corporate performance/valuation32 (i.e., Q-ratio & ROA) 
is statistically positively influenced by CG quality. The positive finding lends support to the 
theoretical expectation that effective CG structures help in reducing agency costs, protecting 
shareholders’ interests and enhancing corporate reputation (Black et al., 2006c, p. 362; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976, p. 323; Klapper & Love, 2004, p. 718; Suchman, 1995, p. 587). Therefore, 
the finding implies that the efforts of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE), amongst other stakeholders, to enhance CG practices in UK listed firms 
may be seen as a positive thing. Additionally, the positive influence of CG quality suggests that 
UK listed companies may need to consider improving their CG practices so as to enhance their 
financial performance. 
With reference to the relationship among individual CG variables and corporate 
performance/valuation, the findings reveal a statistically positive association among board size 
(BSE), Q-ratio and ROA. The positive effect of BSE lends support to the view that larger boards 
are effective at monitoring management and that can increases stakeholder/shareholder 
confidence and facilitates access to critical resources (Goodstein et al., 1994, p. 242; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992, p. 412). However, the study finds an insignificant linked among BSE and SR. 
Overall, the positive effect of BSE may motivate UK policy makers and regulatory authorities 
to introduce additional CG legislation that motivates firms to have larger boards in order to 
improve corporate performance/valuation.  
 The study reports that corporate performance/valuation (Q-ratio, ROA & SR) is 
statistically positively influenced by board independence. The positive findings suggest that 
external directors are motivated to monitor management to improve their current and future 
labour market image/reputation (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315). The positive influence of board 
independence seems to indicate that the CG codes’ recommendations that UK boards should 
have mostly outside (unaffiliated) directors may be seen as a positive CG development. 
The statistically positive relationship among board gender diversity, Q-ratio and ROA 
indicates that having directors of different gender may enhance corporate 
                                               
32The study also found a positive, but weak, association between the UKCGI and shareholder return (SR). 
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performance/valuation through facilitating access to critical resources (Terjesen et al., 2015, p. 
6) and increasing stakeholders’ representation (Ntim, 2015, p. 173). The positive finding seems 
to suggest that the Davies Report recommendation for more women on UK boards (Davies-
Report, 2011) may be a positive thing. However, the study also finds that corporate 
performance/valuation is negatively influenced by board ethnic diversity, which does not lend 
support to the expectation that board diversity in general increases its independence and 
effectiveness (Walt & Ingley, 2003, p. 220). The negative influence of ethnic minorities on 
corporate performance/valuation may due to their extremely low representation, as many of the 
sampled firms have few non-white people on their boards. This may encourage UK policy-
makers and regulatory authorities to introduce new CG provisions which promote the 
participation of non-white directors in the UK boardrooms. 
The findings indicate that corporate performance/valuation is negatively influenced by the 
existence of board committees. This suggests that establishing board committees may be not 
seen as a good CG practices because it can increase agency and monitoring costs (Hearn, 2011, 
p. 133; Vafeas, 1999a, p. 116). The negative effect of board committees on corporate 
performance/valuation seems to suggest that the recommendations of CG codes to establish 
nomination, remuneration and audit committees may be inappropriate for some firms. As 
explained above, governance needs appear to vary among UK listed companies based on their 
size. For example, smaller companies with few directors (less than three) may not necessarily 
need to establish an independent audit committee. This implies that UK policy-makers and 
regulatory authorities should incorporate flexibility into their CG recommendations in order to 
allow firms, especially smaller ones, to make appropriate decisions on establishing independent 
committees. 
Findings are mixed regarding the influence of separating CEO and chairperson positions 
on corporate performance/valuation. The findings suggest that firms that split these positions 
are associated with significantly lower market valuation (Q-ratio). By contrast, the findings 
indicate corporate performance/valuation, proxied by ROA and SR, is not influenced by 
separating CEO and chairperson positions. This seems to imply that the recommendations of 
CG codes to separate CEO and chairperson positions may be inappropriate. In the UK, where 
the markets for corporate, capital, service, product and managerial control are fairly active, a 
dual leadership structure seems to encourage ambitious CEOs to act in the shareholders’ best 
interests to secure their position. 
The study finds mixed results regarding the association among the board meetings and 
corporate performance/valuation. The result suggests a statistically insignificant association 
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among board meetings and Q-ratio; however, the findings also indicate that the board meetings 
are negatively linked with both ROA and SR. This negative finding lends support to the 
theoretical expectation that frequent meetings may increase agency costs, including travelling 
and meeting costs (Vafeas, 1999a, p. 118). As companies may face various and different 
problems and challenges; this can differently influence the frequency of board meetings. For 
example, some boards may need to meet more frequently in times of crisis, and less frequently 
at other times. This implies that UK policy-makers and regulatory authorities should 
incorporate flexibility into their recommendations in order to allow corporate boards to meet 
based on their needs and challenges.  
Finally, with reference to the moderating influence of ownership variables on the UKCGI-
Performance nexus, the study generally finds that both managerial and block ownership 
negatively moderate the UKCGI-Performance link, whereas institutional ownership positively 
moderates the same association. The findings suggest that higher managerial and block 
ownership can lead to expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, whereas higher 
institutional ownership may increase monitoring on management activities and thus protect 
minority shareholders’ rights. This seems to suggest that the efforts of UK policy-makers and 
regulatory authorities to enhance the role of institutional investors and encourage the diffusion 
of ownership may be seen as a positive CG development. 
9.2.3 Implications and Recommendations: Executive Pay 
The results obtained from investigating whether firm-level CG quality impacts on 
executive pay (EP) have a number of implications. For the association among the UKCGI and 
EP, the results imply that better-governed UK listed firms tend to pay significantly low cash, 
non-cash and total remuneration to CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. This is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that strong CG systems help in aligning management and shareholders’ 
interests by preventing opportunistic executives from awarding themselves overly generous pay 
packages (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009, p. 489; Jensen & Murphy, 1990, p. 226). Unlike other 
countries in which CG practices are generally poor, UK provides an example of how strong CG 
systems can help in reducing a number of agency problems, including excessive EP. Hence, 
policy makers and regulatory authorities in countries with weak CG regulations (e.g., Libya) 
may be motivated to introduce CG provisions that encourage firms to have strong CG systems 
that protect stakeholders’/shareholders’ interests.  
With reference to the relationship among individual CG mechanisms and EP, the empirical 
evidence suggests that remuneration committee meetings are negatively linked with cash and 
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total pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs; whereas they are statistically positively linked with non-
cash pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. The results indicate that frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings is not only effective in decreasing CEOs’ cash pay, but is also effective in 
encouraging CEOs to enhance firms’ market valuation by improving the pay for performance. 
Therefore, UK policy makers are motivated to introduce CG recommendations requiring firms’ 
remuneration committees to meet more frequently to enhance board effectiveness, including 
preventing managers from awarding themselves overly generous pay packages. 
 The study finds that remuneration committee independence is positively and 
insignificantly linked with cash, non-cash and total pay for CEOs and CFOs, whereas it is 
statistically positively associated with cash, non-cash and total pay for AEDs. The positive 
finding lends support to the theoretical prediction of managerial power hypothesis that 
executives (e.g., CEOs) may select external directors who support their decisions rather than 
monitoring them (Lambert et al., 1993, p. 441). The implication of this finding is that CG code 
recommendations that not less than three members (two members in smaller companies) of a 
remuneration committee should be outside (unaffiliated) directors may be inappropriate for 
some companies. As discussed above, companies differ in size and agency problems; this can 
influence their governance needs. For instance, smaller companies with few directors (less than 
three) may not need to have two outside (unaffiliated) directors on their remuneration 
committees. This suggests that UK policy-makers and regulatory authorities may need to 
incorporate flexibility into their CG recommendations in order to allow companies, especially 
smaller ones, to decide how many unaffiliated directors to have on their remuneration 
committees. 
The findings indicate that companies with larger boards tend to pay significantly lower 
cash, non-cash and total remuneration to CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. This lends support to the 
optimal contracting theory’s prediction that larger boards are efficient at determining EP since 
they are difficult to be controlled by powerful CEOs compared with smaller boards (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006, p. 1038; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013b, p. 473). The implication of this result is 
that UK policy-makers and regulatory authorities may be encouraged to introduce a CG 
recommendation requiring firms to have larger boards in order to enhance monitoring of 
management activities.  
The statistically negative relationship among board independence, cash, non-cash and total 
remuneration of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs implies that companies with more external 
(unaffiliated) directors on their boards tend to pay significantly lower remuneration than firms 
with fewer external (unaffiliated) directors. The negative finding lends support to the prediction 
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that that external (unaffiliated) directors have more incentive/power to monitor the 
opportunistic behaviour of management, in the form of excessive EP, in order to secure their 
position (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 315). Therefore, this seems to suggest that CG code 
recommendations that UK boards should consist of mostly outside (unaffiliated) directors is a 
positive development. 
The findings suggest that board with greater gender and ethnic diversity tend to be 
associated with lower cash, non-cash and total pay for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. This offers 
support to the theoretical prediction that board gender and ethnic diversity can enhance board 
effectiveness through diverse ideas, experience, knowledge and perspectives (Carter et al., 
2010, p. 398), which can improve monitoring of management activities (Carter et al., 2003, p. 
37; Ferreira, 2015, p. 108). The findings imply that UK policy-makers and regulatory 
authorities may need to introduce CG recommendations which promote the participation of 
women and ethnic minorities in the UK boardrooms. 
The study found mixed results in terms of the association among separating CEO and 
chairperson positions and EP. The findings suggest that firms that split these positions are 
associated with significantly higher non-cash pay for CFOs and AEDs. Splitting the two 
positions is also found to be statistically positively associated with total pay for CEOs and 
CFOs, and insignificantly associated with total pay for AEDs. Additionally, separating CEO 
and chairperson positions is insignificantly and positively associated with the cash-based pay 
of CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. This seems to suggest that the recommendations of CG codes to 
split CEO and chairperson positions may be inappropriate. As explained above, the markets for 
corporate, capital, service, product and managerial control are fairly active in the UK; hence 
splitting CEO and chairperson positions seems to discourage ambitious CEOs from acting in 
the shareholders’ best interests. UK regulatory authorities should incorporate flexibility into 
their CG recommendations in order to allow companies to decide whether or not to separate 
CEO and chairperson positions. 
The findings indicate that CEO tenure impacts positively on cash, non-cash and total pay 
for CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. This finding lends support the prediction of managerial power 
hypothesis that CEO tenure can increase CEO’s power/influence over fundamental decision 
made by the board, including EP (Byrd et al., 2010, p. 89; Vafeas, 2003, p. 1044; Wong et al., 
2015, p. 87). Thus, the UK policy makers may suggest a CG provision that encourage UK listed 
firms to replace long-tenured CEOs with new directors. 
With reference to the interaction effect of managerial, institutional and block ownership on 
the UKCGI-EP link, overall the study finds that both managerial and block ownership positively 
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moderate the UKCGI-EP nexus. The findings suggest that higher managerial and block 
ownership can increase managers’ and block-holders’ incentive to maximise their own benefits, 
and that can damage other shareholders’ interests. Therefore, UK policy-makers and regulatory 
authorities may be encouraged to increase restriction on managerial and block ownership in 
order to protect other shareholders’ interests. 
Finally, the findings indicate that institutional ownership negatively moderates the UKCGI-
EP relationship. This lends support to the expectation that institutional ownership is an effective 
CG tool that can reduce agency problems and prevent managers from expropriating corporate 
resources (Dong & Ozkan, 2008, p. 19; Khan et al., 2005, p. 1079; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, p. 
465). The negative finding seems to suggest that the efforts of UK policy-makers and regulatory 
authorities to encourage institutional investors to exercise more influence on a number of firm 
decisions (e.g., determining EP) may be seen as a positive thing. 
9.3 STUDY’S CONTRIBUTIONS 
This section summarises the contributions of the study. Subsection 9.3.1 discusses the 
contributions related to CG compliance and disclosure. Subsection 9.3.2 presents the 
contributions related to corporate performance/valuation, and Subsection 9.3.3 summarises the 
contributions related to executive pay. 
9.3.1 Contributions: CG Compliance and Disclosure  
As discussed in the first and fourth chapters, few prior studies examine CG compliance and 
disclosure among UK companies (e.g., Arcot et al., 2010; Conyon, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 
1997; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Pass, 2006; Shrives & Brennan, 
2015). These few studies suffer from some limitations. For instance, Arcot et al. (2010) and 
Pass (2006) focus on a small number of CG provisions. Similarly, Hussainey and Al‐Najjar 
(2012) employ subjective analysts’ rankings to examine CG disclosure among UK firms. 
Additionally, Conyon (1994) and Shrives and Brennan (2015) use a survey to examine CG 
disclosure among UK firms. Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) only examine CG disclosure among 
small and medium sized UK listed firms on the alternative investment market (AIM). Hence, 
this study aims to contribute well as extend the previous CG studies in various ways. First, 
using one the most extensive hand-collected datasets on CG compliance and disclosure (600 
firm-year observations), the study offers new detailed evidence on the compliance levels with 
the 2010 Combined Code. Different from the extant literature, this study employs the most 
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comprehensive self-constructed CG index, comprising 120 CG provisions, as a measure for 
firm-level CG compliance and disclosure among UK listed firms. 
Second, unlike most prior UK studies that include either large or small firms in their 
sample, this study aims to balance between large and small firms by selecting the largest ten 
ranked firms and the smallest ten ranked firms in each industry using market capitalisation in 
order to reduce potential sample selection bias, as well as enhancing the generalisability of the 
findings. Similarly, unlike past studies that use either cross-sectional or time-series data, the 
current study uses balanced panel data because it provides greater freedom, informative data 
and efficiency, and alleviates multicollinearity problems. 
Third, distinct from several prior studies that focus on agency theory (e.g., Hussainey & 
Al‐Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Waweru, 2014), the current study contributes to 
existing literature by offering insights from agency, stakeholder, legitimacy, resource 
dependence and stewardship theoretical perspectives to understand CG disclosure behaviour in 
depth. Therefore, this study responds to recent calls to use a multi-theoretical framework in 
governance research to provide better understanding of CG disclosure behaviour (e.g., 
Christensen et al., 2015; Scholtz & Smit, 2015; Shrives & Brennan, 2015). 
Fourth, unlike several prior studies that limit their examination to a few CG variables, this 
study offers empirical evidence on whether nine CG variables (including board and ownership 
mechanisms) can explain observable cross-sectional differences in firm-level voluntary CG 
disclosure. Specifically, this fills a gap in CG research by offering evidence on the effect of CG 
committees and board gender and ethnic diversity on CG compliance and disclosure practices 
(which has not been extensively investigated in the existing literature) along with board size, 
board independence, cross-listing and audit firm size. Similarly, the study fills a gap in CG 
research by offering evidence on the effects of three types of ownership on CG compliance and 
disclosure. 
Finally, although there have been increasing suggestions that weak CG practices partially 
contributed to the 2007/08 global financial crisis (FRC, 2010; Walker-Review, 2009), there 
seems to be generally insufficient empirical evidence and serious academic reflections on the 
impact of the crisis on CG disclosure behaviour (Ntim et al., 2013; Shrives & Brennan, 2015). 
Therefore, the current study seeks to offer a timely new empirical insights relating to CG 
structures and disclosure practices following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. 
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9.3.2 Contributions: Corporate Performance  
Regarding the association among firm-level CG quality and corporate 
performance/valuation, this study aims to contribute as well as extend the previous CG studies 
in various ways. First, unlike several past studies that employ either the composite-CG-index 
or the individual-CG-variable models to examine the association among CG mechanisms and 
corporate performance/valuation, this study uses both models. This allows investigating the 
differences between the two approaches and their implications for future studies. Additionally, 
the Q-ratio is used as the main proxy for firms’ market valuation because it is extensively 
employed by past CG studies (e.g., Ammann et al., 2011; Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim, 2015; 
Pandey et al., 2015). This study also uses SR and ROA as additional market and accounting 
proxies of company performance/valuation. These two alternative proxies serve as a robustness 
check for the main findings. 
Second, as explained in the fourth chapter, most prior studies rely on analysts’ rating 
indices to investigate CG’s influence on corporate performance/valuation (e.g., Bauer et al., 
2010; Bauer et al., 2008; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
However, analysts’ CG ratings are considered to be subjective because they do not take into 
account the differences in culture, legal systems and governance structures among countries 
(Renders et al., 2010, p. 101). Hence, the study contributes to the previous work by employing 
the most comprehensive self-constructed CG index consisting 120 CG provisions drawn mainly 
from the 2010 Combined Code. The constructed index is divided into five broad categories 
(e.g., board leadership, board effectiveness, board accountability, executive pay and relations 
with shareholders), and that allows examining CG mechanisms from different governance 
aspects.  
Third, distinct from prior UK studies that include a small number of provisions in their CG 
indices when examining the relationship among firm-level CG quality and corporate 
performance/valuation (Arcot & Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al., 2008; Farag et al., 2014; Padgett 
& Shabbir, 2005), this study uses a broader proxy for CG quality, consisting of 120 CG 
provisions. This may help open up new avenues for further research. Fourth, this study adopts 
a multi-theoretical framework in formulating hypotheses and interpreting empirical findings 
related to the association among CG quality and corporate performance/valuation. Specifically, 
the study aims to benefit from insights provided by resource dependence, stewardship, 
stakeholder, legitimacy, agency theories. In doing so, the study contributes to attempts to arrive 
at a uniform theoretical framework that can be employed to explain CG’s effect on corporate 
performance/valuation. 
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Fifth, unlike prior studies that restrict their analyses to a few CG mechanisms, the current 
study offers empirical evidence on the extent to which six board mechanisms can explain 
observable cross-sectional differences in corporate performance/valuation. Specifically, this 
fills a gap in CG research by offering evidence on the effect of board gender and ethnic diversity 
on corporate performance/valuation (which has not been widely examined in the existing 
literature) along with other board characteristics. Sixth, distinct from most prior studies that 
only concentrate on examining the direct link among CG quality and corporate 
performance/valuation, the current study contributes to CG research by investigating the 
interaction role of ownership variables on the CG-Performance nexus. This helps in filling a 
gap in CG research by offering evidence on the moderating role of managerial, institutional and 
block ownership (which has not been extensively examined in the existing literature) on the 
UKCGI-Performance relationship. In line with theoretical predictions, the results suggest that 
managerial and block ownership negatively moderate the UKCGI-Performance nexus, whereas 
institutional ownership positively moderates the same association. 
Finally, although there have been increasing suggestions that weak CG practices partially 
contributed to the 2007/08 global financial crisis (FRC, 2010; Walker-Review, 2009), there 
seems to be insufficient empirical evidence and academic reflection on its influence on firms’ 
performance/valuation (Chang et al., 2015; Dharmadasa et al., 2014; Ntim, 2015). Therefore, 
the current study provides new insights relating to the effect of CG on corporate 
performance/valuation following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. 
9.3.3 Contributions: Executive Pay  
With respect to the association between CG quality and executive pay, this study aims to 
contribute as well as extend the previous work in various ways. First, as explained in the fourth 
chapter, studies examining the relationship among firm-level CG quality and executive pay are 
rare. The current study offers empirical evidence on the extent to which seven corporate board 
variables, in addition to a broad quality CG index, can explain differences in executive pay. 
This helps in filling a gap in CG research by providing evidence on the impact of remuneration 
committee independence, frequency of remuneration committee meetings and board gender and 
ethnic diversity on executive pay (which has not been widely investigated in the existing 
literature). The study also considers board size, board independence, splitting CEO and 
chairperson positions, and CEO tenure. 
Second, unlike most past studies that mainly focus on analysing the relationship among a 
few CG mechanisms and executive pay, the current study offers empirical evidence on the 
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extent to which firm-level CG quality, using a broad CG index, influences executive pay. 
Specifically, the current study offers evidence on the influence of CG quality on executive pay, 
using the most comprehensive self-constructed index, consisting of 120 CG provisions. 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the results suggest that well-governed firms tend to pay 
significantly low remuneration to CEOs, CFOs and AEDs. 
Third, despite increasing suggestions that the pay packages of executive directors other 
than CEOs are becoming equally important (Duong & Evans, 2015; Hoitash et al., 2012; Hsu 
& Liao, 2012; Ntim et al., 2015a; Victoravich et al., 2012), existing studies have mainly 
examined the antecedents of CEO pay (e.g., Boyd, 1994; Cheung et al., 2005; Conyon & He, 
2012; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Newton, 2015; Ozkan, 2007). This may 
limit existing knowledge about the antecedents of other executive directors’ pay, such as CFOs 
and AEDs. Therefore, the current study fills a gap in CG research by offering evidence on the 
effect of firm-level CG quality on CEOs’ and other executive directors’ pay (i.e., CFOs and 
AEDs). Overall, the results indicate that better-governed companies pay their executives less. 
Fourth, distinct from past CG studies that concentrate only on CEO total pay (e.g., Boyd, 
1994; Brick et al., 2006; Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009; Conyon, 2014; Conyon & Murphy, 
2000), the current study offers new empirical evidence on whether firm-level CG quality 
impacts on the annual cash (i.e., salary, cash-bonus and other reported cash remuneration), and 
non-cash (i.e., performance share plan and any other reported LTIPs) pay of CEOs, CFOs and 
AEDs. Therefore, and for the purpose of providing reliable and valid results, the current study 
offers an extensive analysis of the antecedents of the components of executive directors’ pay 
packages.  
Fifth, most past studies only investigate the direct relationship among firm-level CG quality 
and executive pay. The current study contributes as well as extends the previous work by 
investigating the interaction effect of ownership variables on the association among CG and 
executive pay. This fills a gap in CG research by offering new evidence on the moderating role 
of managerial, institutional and block ownership (which has not been extensively examined in 
the existing literature) on the UKCGI-EP relationship. Consistent with theoretical predictions, 
the results suggest that managerial and block ownership positively moderate the UKCGI-EP 
nexus, whereas institutional ownership negatively moderates the same association.  
 Finally, despite increasing suggestions that poor CG practices partially contributed to the 
2007/08 global financial crisis (FRC, 2010; Walker-Review, 2009), there seems to be 
insufficient empirical evidence and academic reflection on the effect of this crisis on executive 
directors’ pay (Gregory-Smith et al., 2014a; Ntim et al., 2015a; Wells, 2015). Thus, the current 
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study provides new insights relating to the influence of firm-level CG quality on executive pay 
after the 2007/08 financial crisis. 
9.4 STUDY’S LIMITATIONS 
Although this study makes several contributes to the previous work, it also has several 
weaknesses that should be acknowledged. First, in terms of sample size, this study restricts its 
analysis to 100 non-financial listed firms, which is relatively small. However, as discussed in 
the research design chapter, the 100-firm sample (600 firm years) is large compared with the 
samples of prior UK studies (e.g., Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Clacher et al., 2008; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). For example, the final usable sample for Clacher et al. 
(2008) is 63 listed companies during the period from 2003-2005 (189 firm-year observations). 
Additionally, this study restricts its sample to 100 listed firms because the CG, ownership, 
financial, and executive pay data was manually collected, which is costly to the researcher in 
respect of finance, time and effort (Beattie et al., 2004, pp. 232-233). As a result of time, 
funding and effort constraints, the study sample was reduced to 100 firms over six years, given 
600 firm-years (which is statistically large enough). This ensured the work was completed 
within the timeframe of a PhD. 
This study relies mainly on annual reports to collect CG, ownership, financial, and 
executive pay data. Other sources could have been used to collect financial and non-financial 
data, such as interim reports and face-to-face interviews. However, as discussed in the fifth 
chapter, annual reports are considered to be the most regular and reliable sources of information 
about CG (Botosan, 1997, p. 331). Additionally, the current study relies only on annual reports 
in order to be consistent and to facilitate comparison with the results of prior studies (e.g., Arcot 
& Bruno, 2007; Clacher et al., 2008; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Farag et al., 2014; Mallin et al., 
2015; Ntim, 2015; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). 
The study employs a self-constructed CG index (UKCGI) to examine CG compliance and 
disclosure and consequently the impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate 
performance/valuation and executive pay. However, the constructed index potentially has some 
reliability and validity problems. The index was coded by a single coder (the researcher), so 
coder subjectivity could perhaps have influenced the coding of the index. However, great efforts 
were made to assure the reliability, validity and consistency of the coding, such as selecting CG 
provisions mainly from the 2010 Combined Code and other UK legislation, including the 
Companies Act of 2006. Also, coding was done in two rounds, and in the first round only ten 
firms (two from each industry) were coded from 2008 to 2013. In this round, coding categories 
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and the coded material were critically discussed with supervisors. In the second round of coding 
any inconsistencies/mistakes identified in the first round were corrected. A further ten firms 
(two from each industry) were coded and discussed with supervisors, who did not identify any 
inconsistencies or errors in the coding procedure. The near-perfect correlation between the first 
and second stages of coding implies that a high level of validity, reliability and consistency was 
achieved. 
Further, this research used the binary coding scheme rather than the ordinal coding scheme 
to assign weight to different provisions included in the UKCGI. Unlike weighted scoring, binary 
coding assumes that every CG provision included in the index has equal importance (Barako et 
al., 2006, p. 115). Using binary coding in the current study is justified as follows: (i) the use of 
binary coding avoids subjectivity in assigning weights to the disclosed items (Barako & Brown, 
2008, p. 315; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012, p. 523); (ii) there is no agreed theoretical basis for 
assigning weights to different CG provisions (Bhagat et al., 2008, p. 1026); (iii) evidence from 
prior studies suggests that both weighted and un-weighted CG indices are similar in terms of 
results (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Ntim et al., 2012b; Robbins & 
Austin, 1986); and (iv) the binary scoring is adopted in the current study to facilitate comparison 
with the findings of past studies (e.g., Barako & Brown, 2008; Clacher et al., 2008; Mallin & 
Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b). 
The current study examines the association among CG mechanisms, CG compliance and 
disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay from a quantitative perspective 
only. A qualitative approach (e.g., surveys and/or interviews) could have been used to cross-
check the collected data from annual reports. Using a quantitative approach, however, is 
justified by the following reasons: (i) funding and time constraints did not allow for collecting 
qualitative data; and (ii) adopting a quantitative approach is in line with existing CG literature 
(e.g., Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mallin et al., 2015; Melis et al., 
2015; Newton, 2015; Ntim, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a). 
This study limits its analysis to internal CG mechanisms. However, there are external CG 
mechanisms, including the markets for corporate, capital, service, product and managerial 
control, which could influence CG compliance/disclosure, corporate performance/valuation 
and executive pay. As explained below, future studies can investigate the influence of both 
internal and external CG variables on CG compliance, corporate performance/valuation and 
executive directors’ pay. Finally, endogeneity problems cannot be completely eliminated. 
However, this study follows existing CG literature (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Core et al., 2015; 
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Gippel et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) by adopting 
different estimation methods to control for potential endogeneity problems. 
The above mentioned limitations should be taken into account when explaining the results. 
Additionally, these limitations open up avenues for further development and research. The next 
section identifies potential areas for future research. 
9.5 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
As discussed above, this study has several weaknesses, which offer opportunities for 
further development and research. First, since study’s sample is restricted to only non-financial 
UK listed companies; future studies can include both financial and non-financial firms to 
determine whether the findings are different between the two groups. Similarly, to enhance the 
generalisability of the findings, future studies can increase the sample size by including small, 
medium and large UK listed companies over a longer time period, rather than focusing only on 
small and large listed companies. This may help show whether the findings are robust/sensitive 
to different sample specifications.  
Second, this study mainly relies on annual reports to gather financial and non-financial 
data. To provide new insights relating to the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure, and 
the impact of firm-level CG quality on corporate performance/valuation and executive pay, 
future studies could collect data using a qualitative approach (e.g., face-to-face interviews, case 
studies and surveys). Third, the construction of a CG index may be improved by future studies 
in a number of ways: (i) by investigating whether the findings are robust/sensitive to different 
coding schemes (i.e., ordinal and binary coding) and different weighting (i.e., un-weighted and 
weighted); and (ii) by surveying professional organisations about the weight and importance 
attached to CG provisions. This can help improve the reliability and validity of the index. 
Fourth, following existing CG literature (e.g., Cambini et al., 2015; Conyon, 2014; Luo, 
2015; Ntim et al., 2015a; Sur et al., 2015; Van-Essen et al., 2015) the analysis of the association 
among firm-level CG quality and executive pay relied only on agency theoretical perspectives 
drawn from optimal contracting theory and the managerial power hypothesis. Future studies 
could rely on other theories, such as the Lake Wobegon Effect, Tournament Theory, the 
Managerial Talent Hypothesis and the Equity Fairness Hypothesis, when examining the link 
among firm-level CG quality and executive pay. This may offer better understanding about the 
influence of CG structures on executive pay. 
Fifth, the current study mainly investigates the association among internal CG mechanisms, 
CG compliance and disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay. As data 
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become available, future studies can investigate the influence of external CG mechanisms (e.g., 
the markets for corporate, capital, service, product and managerial control), on CG 
compliance/disclosure, corporate performance/valuation and executive pay. Future research 
can also investigate the influence of both internal and external CG variables on CG compliance, 
corporate performance/valuation and executive pay. Finally, the current study examines the 
relationship among internal CG mechanisms and executive pay without considering whether 
executive pay is linked to corporate performance. Future studies can examine the association 
between executive directors’ pay (i.e., CEO, CFO and AED) and corporate performance. Future 
studies can also investigate the moderating influence of internal CG mechanisms on the 
association among executive pay and corporate performance.  
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      APPENDICES 
         Appendix 1: A list of the names and industries of the 100 UK sampled firms 
No Full Firm Name LSE Code Sector 
1 Anglo Pacific Group Plc APF Basic materials/oil & gas 
2 Anglesey Mining Plc AYM Basic materials/oil & gas 
3 Bisichi Mining Plc BISI Basic materials/oil & gas 
4 BHP Billiton  BLT Basic materials/oil & gas 
5 British Petroleum Plc BP Basic materials/oil & gas 
6 Carclo Plc CAR Basic materials/oil & gas 
7 BASF Group Plc EBAS Basic materials/oil & gas 
8 Fortune Oil Plc FTO Basic materials/oil & gas 
9 International Ferro Metals Ltd IFL Basic materials/oil & gas 
10 Pjsc Lukoil Plc LKOH Basic materials/oil & gas 
11 ОАО Gazprom Plc OGZD Basic materials/oil & gas 
12 Porvair plc PRV Basic materials/oil & gas 
13 Royal Dutch Shell Plc RDSA Basic materials/oil & gas 
14 Rio Tinto Plc RIO Basic materials/oil & gas 
15 Rosneft Plc ROSN Basic materials/oil & gas 
16 Schlumberger Ltd SLB Basic materials/oil & gas 
17 Treatt plc TET Basic materials/oil & gas 
18 Total S.A. Plc TTA Basic materials/oil & gas 
19 Vimetco Plc VICO Basic materials/oil & gas 
20 Zotefoams Plc ZTF Basic materials/oil & gas 
21 Associated British Foods Plc ABF Consumer goods 
22 Anglo Eastern Plantations Plc AEP Consumer goods 
23 British American Tobacco Plc BATS Consumer goods 
24 Burberry Group Plc BRBY Consumer goods 
25 Creightons Plc CRL Consumer goods 
26 Carr's Milling Industries Plc CRM Consumer goods 
27 Diageo Plc DGE Consumer goods 
28 GKN Plc GKN Consumer goods 
29 MJ Gleeson Group Plc GLE Consumer goods 
30 Hilton Food Group Plc  HFG Consumer goods 
31 Hornby Plc HRN Consumer goods 
32 Imperial Tobacco Group Plc IMT Consumer goods 
33 Kerry Group Plc KYGA Consumer goods 
34 McBride Plc MCB Consumer goods 
35 The Narborough Plantations Plc NBP Consumer goods  
36 Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc RB Consumer goods 
37 R.E.A Holdings Plc RE Consumer goods  
38 Sabmiller Plc SAB Consumer goods 
39 Torotrak Plc TRK Consumer goods 
40 Unilever Plc ULVR Consumer goods 
41 Air Partner Plc AIP Consumer services/healthcare 
42 Ark Therapeutics Group Plc AKT Consumer services/healthcare 
43 AstraZeneca Plc AZN Consumer services/healthcare 
44 Bioquell Plc BQE Consumer services/healthcare 
45 British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc BSY Consumer services/healthcare 
46 Caffyns Plc CFYN Consumer services/healthcare 
47 Compass Group Plc CPG Consumer services/healthcare 
48 Creston Plc CRE Consumer services/healthcare 
49 GlaxoSmithKline Plc GSK Consumer services/healthcare 
50 ITV Plc ITV Consumer services/healthcare 
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Continuation: Appendix 1 LSE Code Sector 
51 Kingfisher Plc KGF Consumer services/healthcare 
52 Next Plc NXT Consumer services/healthcare 
53 Oxford Biomedical Plc OXB Consumer services/healthcare 
54 Pearson Plc PSON Consumer services/healthcare 
55 Puricore Plc PURI Consumer services/healthcare 
56 Quarto Group Inc QRT Consumer services/healthcare 
57 Reed Elsevier Plc REL Consumer services/healthcare 
58 Source Bioscience Plc SBS Consumer services/healthcare 
59 Skyepharma Plc  SKP Consumer services/healthcare 
60 Tesco Plc TSCO Consumer services/healthcare 
61 Alumasc Group Plc ALU Industrials  
62 BAE Systems Plc BA Industrials  
63 Babcock International Group PLC BAB Industrials  
64 Boeing Co. BOE Industrials  
65 Capita Plc  CPI Industries  
66 CRH Plc CRH Industrials  
67 Clarke (T.) Plc CTO Industrials  
68 Experian Plc EXPN Industrials  
69 Honeywell International Incorporated Co. HON Industrials  
70 Harvey Nash Group Plc HVN Industrials  
71 IMI Plc IMI Industrials  
72 Management Consulting Group Plc MMC Industrials  
73 Pochin’s Plc PCH Industrials  
74 Rolls-Royce Holdings Plc RR Industrials  
75 Smiths Group plc SMIN Industrials  
76 Styles & Wood Group Plc STY Industrials  
77 Titon Holdings Plc TON Industrials  
78 TEX Holdings Plc TXH Industrials  
79 Volex Plc  VLX Industrials  
80 Waterman Group Plc WTM Industrials 
81 Anite Plc AIE Technology/telecommunications 
82 ARM Holdings Plc ARM Technology/telecommunications 
83 AVEVA Group Plc AVV Technology/telecommunications 
84 BT Group Plc BT.A Technology/telecommunications 
85 CML Microsystems Plc CML Technology/telecommunications 
86 Colt Group S.A. COLT Technology/telecommunications 
87 CSR Plc CSR Technology/telecommunications 
88 DRS Data and Research Services Plc DRS Technology/telecommunications 
89 Electronic Data Processing Plc EDP Technology/telecommunications 
90 Filtronic Plc FTC Technology/telecommunications 
91 Inmarsat Plc ISAT Technology/telecommunications 
92 Microgen Plc MCGN Technology/telecommunications 
93 Pace Plc PIC Technology/telecommunications 
94 Phoenix IT Group Plc PNX Technology/telecommunications 
95 RM Plc RM Technology/telecommunications 
96 Sepura Plc SEPU Technology/telecommunications 
97 Telecity Group Plc TCY Technology/telecommunications 
98 Telecom Plus Plc TEP Technology/telecommunications 
99 Triad Group Plc TRD Technology/telecommunications 
100 Vodafone Group Plc VOD Technology/telecommunications 
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  Appendix 2: Definition of the UKCGI provisions and measurement 
Theme Acrony
m/Abbr
eviation 
Source Code Measurement 
A-Leadership 
 
Board Structure 
 
    
Disclosure of board 
membership 
DBM 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2; 
DTR 7.2.7 
1 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about at board membership of a 
firm in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
 
Role duality DUAL 2010 
Code, 
A.2.1 
2 A binary number of 1 if the  roles of 
chairperson and  CEO/MD are 
separated in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Frequency of board meetings FBMs 2010 
Code, 
A.2.1 
3 A binary number of 1 if the board 
meets regularly in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Disclosure of individual 
directors attendance 
DIDA 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
4 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about individual  directors 
attendance in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Attendance of  board’s 
meetings 
PABMs 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
5 A binary number of 1 if directors 
attend the majority of all board 
meetings in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Statement on the 
independence of the 
Chairman 
 
SICM 2010 
Code, 
A.3.1 
6 A binary number of 1 if statement on 
the independence of the chairman is 
disclosed in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Senior independent director 
appointment  
SID 2010 
Code, 
A.4.1 
7 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
senior independent non-executive 
director in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
 
The roles of the board and 
management 
RBM 2010 
Code, A.2 
8 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about the roles of the board and 
management in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
B- Effectiveness 
 
    
Board and Directors     
 
Board Chairman 
 
BCM 
 
 
 
2010 
Code, 
A.3.1 
9 
 
A binary number of 1 if the chairman 
of a firm is NED in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Chairman independence 
 
 
 
 
CMI 2010 
Code, 
A.3.1 
10 A binary number of 1 if the chairman 
of a firm is independent NED in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
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Board composition BCOM 2010 
Code, B.1 
11 A binary number of 1 if the majority of 
board members of a firm are 
independent NEDs in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
Disclosure of the 
classification of directors 
 
Board and Directors 
Evaluation 
 
DCDs 2010 
Code, B.1 12 
 
 
 
A binary number of 1 if clear 
disclosure of directors’ classification 
into directors, NEDs, and independent 
NEDs in a financial year is made, 0 
otherwise 
Disclosure of the process of 
evaluating board/executives 
 
 
 
DPBE 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
13 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the process of 
evaluating the board/directors of a firm 
in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of  the  board 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
EBPE 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
14 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of a 
firm’s board performance and 
effectiveness as group in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of individual 
directors’ performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
EIDs 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
15 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of a 
firm’s board individual members 
performance and effectiveness in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of board’s 
subcommittees performance 
and effectiveness 
 
 
EBSCP
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
16 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of 
board’s subcommittees performance 
and effectiveness in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Evaluation of CEO’s 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
ECEOP
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
17 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of 
CEO’s performance and effectiveness 
in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of chairperson’s 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
ECPPE 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
18 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of a 
firm’s chairperson’s  performance and 
effectiveness in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Externally facilitated 
evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EFE 2010 
Code, 
B.6.2 
19 A binary number of 1 if the evaluation 
of a firm’s  board, individual board 
members and board subcommittees 
performance and effectiveness is 
externally facilitated in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
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Re-election of Board’s 
Members 
    
Disclosure of the process of 
board/executives’ re-election 
DPBRE 2010 
Code, 
B.7.1 
20 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the process of a firm’s 
board/directors re-election in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of names of board 
members 
 
 
 
DNBMs 2010 
Code, 
B.7.1 
21 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the names of a firm’s 
board members in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Disclosure of directors’ 
biographical details 
 
 
 
 
DDBD 2010 
Code, 
B.7.1 
22 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s current and 
standing directors for re-election 
biographical details such as name, age, 
and official address in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
Disclosure of directors other 
details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DDODs 2010 
Code, 
B.7.1 
23 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s current and 
standing directors for re-election other 
relevant details such as education, 
qualifications, and subject background 
(e.g., business, engineering, medicine, 
accountancy, law, etc) in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of directors’ 
experience 
DDEx 2010 
Code, 
B.7.1 
24 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s current and 
standing directors for re-election 
experience, previous appointment, 
other current board appointments and 
any other relevant details  in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Induction and Training 
Programmes 
    
 
Disclosure of induction and 
training programmes 
 
 
 
 
DITP 
 
2010 
Code, B.4 
25 
 
 
 
 
A binary number of 1 if details of a 
firm’s induction and training 
programmes provided to all directors 
are disclosed in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Disclosure of details on 
training programmes 
DDTP 2010 
Code, B.4 
26 A binary number of 1 if details of a 
firm’s training programmes provided 
to all directors such as the number of 
directors and place of training are 
disclosed in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Free Legal Advice 
 
    
Directors/subcommittees 
access to free independent 
legal advice 
DAFIL
A 
2010 
Code, B.5 
27 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
narrative on the existence of a formal 
procedure, which allows 
directors/subcommittees to have free 
  
321 
 
access to independent advice, at the 
expense of the firm is disclosed in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Insider Trading/Dealing 
 
    
Directors/officers dealings 
and securities 
 
 
 
DDS Criminal 
Justice 
Act 1993, 
Part V 
28 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
narrative on the existence of a policy 
or regulation, which ban directors from 
insider trading, is disclosed in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Directors/officers share 
dealings 
 
 
DSDs DTRs,3.1.
2R 
29 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about directors’ share dealings in 
a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Nomination Committee 
 
    
Existence  
 
 
 
NCOM
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.2.1 
30 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
nomination committee in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Terms of reference RCOM
TR 
2010 
Code, 
B.2.1 
31 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the terms of reference 
of a firm’s nomination committee in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
 
Membership 
 
 
 
DNCO
MM 
2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
32 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the membership of this 
committee of a firm in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
Composition  
 
 
 
 
NCOM
C 
2010 
Code, 
B.2.1 
33 A binary number of 1 if the majority of 
a firm’s nomination committee 
members are independent NEDs in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise  
Chairperson  
 
 
 
NCOM
CP 
2010 
Code, 
B.2.1 
34 A binary number of 1 if the 
chairperson of a firm’s nomination 
committee is independent NEDs in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Frequency of meeting 
 
 
 
NCOM
FM 
2010 
Code, 
A.2.1 
35 A binary number of 1 if the a firm’s 
nomination committee meet regularly 
in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Individual members’ 
attendance 
 
 
 
NCOMI
MA 
2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
36 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding individual members 
attendance of committee’s meetings in  
a firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Attendance of meetings 
 
 
 
NCOM
AMs 
2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
37 A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
nomination committee members attend 
the majority of the committee’s in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of the committee 
as a group 
 
 
ENCO
MPE 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
38 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of a 
firm’s nomination committee 
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performance and effectiveness as 
group in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of chairperson   
 
 
 
 
ENCO
MCP 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
39 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
chairperson’s performance and 
effectiveness in a firm’s nomination 
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Evaluation of individual 
members 
 
 
 
 
ENCO
MIMs 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
40 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
individual members’ performance and 
effectiveness in a firm’s nomination 
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Office of A Company 
Secretary 
 
    
Existence  
 
 
OCSE 2010 
Code, B.5 
41 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
position of company secretary in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Identity  
 
 
 
OCSI DTR 
7.1.5; 
DTR 7.2.7 
42 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the identity of a firm’s 
secretary office holder in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Terms of reference 
 
 
 
OCSTR 2010 
Code, B.5 
43 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding terms of reference of a 
firm’s secretary office in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Attendance of  board’s 
meetings 
 
 
 
OCSBM 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2; 
DTR 
7.1.5; 
DTR 7.2.7 
44 A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
secretary office attend a board 
meetings in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Disclosure of meetings 
attendance record 
OCSM
AR 
2010 
Code, 
A.1.2; 
DTR 
7.1.5; 
DTR 7.2.7 
45 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s secretary 
meetings attendance record in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
C- Accountability  
 
    
Board Accountability 
 
    
Preparing annual report and 
accounts 
 
 
 
PARA 2010 
Code, 
C.1.1 
46 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about a firm’s directors 
responsibility for preparing annual 
report and accounts in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
Board statement on the status 
of a firm’s going concern 
BSSFG
C 
2010 
Code, 
C.1.3 
47 A binary number of 1 if a clear 
narrative by a firm’s directors on the 
possibility of the firm operating as a 
going-concern is disclosed in its 
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annual report in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Audit Committee 
 
    
Existence  
 
 
ACE 2010 
Code, 
C.3.1 
  48 A binary number of 1 if a firm has an 
audit committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Conducting the roles of risk 
management committee 
 
CRRM
C 
Smith 
Report 
2003, 2.1 
49 A binary number of 1 if the role of 
reviewing risk management systems in 
a firm is handled to the audit 
committee in companies which do not 
have separate risk management 
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise  
Terms of reference  
 
 
 
 
ACTR 2010 
Code, 
C.3.3 
50 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the terms of reference 
of a firm’s audit committee in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Membership 
 
 
 
ACM Smith 
Report 
2003, 5.2 
51 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the membership of this 
committee of a firm in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
Composition  
 
 
 
 
ACCO
M 
2010 
Code, 
C.3.1 
52 A binary number of 1 if a firm audit 
committee is composed of at least 
three NEDs of whom majority are 
independent with relevant and recent 
financial experience 
Chairperson  
 
 
 
ACCP 2010 
Code, 
C.3.1 
53 A binary number of 1 if a firm audit 
committee chairperson is an 
independent NED in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Frequency of meetings 
 
 
  
ACFM Smith 
Report 
2003, 3.5 
54 A binary number of 1 if the a firm’s 
audit committee meet at least four 
times in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Individual members’ 
attendance  
 
 
 
ACIMA 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
55 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding individual members 
attendance of committee’s meetings in  
a firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Attendance of meetings  
 
 
 
ACAMs Smith 
Report 
2003, 3.5 
56 A binary number of 1 if a firm’s audit 
committee members attend the 
majority of the committee’s meetings 
in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
External auditor’s scope and 
responsibility  
 
EASR 2010 
Code, 
C.1.1 
57 A binary number of 1 if the scope and 
responsibility of a firm’s external 
auditor is disclosed in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
External audit meetings 
 
 
 
EAM Smith 
Report 
2003, 3.8 
58 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s audit 
committee annual meeting with 
external auditor in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
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External audit private 
meetings 
 
 
 
 
EAPMs Smith 
Report 
2003, 3.8 
59 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s audit 
committee private meeting with 
external auditor without the presence 
of the firm management in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of audit fees 
 
 
DAFs 2010 
Code, 
C.3.2 
60 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about a firm’s audit fees in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of the committee 
as a group 
 
 
 
ACPEE 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
61 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of a 
firm’s audit committee performance 
and effectiveness as group in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of chairperson  
 
 
 
 
ACCPP
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
62 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
chairperson’s performance and 
effectiveness of a firm’s audit  
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Evaluation of individual 
members 
ACIME 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
63 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
individual members’ performance and 
effectiveness of a firm’s audit 
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Risk Management  
 
    
Disclosure of firm’s risks 
 
 
 
DFR Turnbull 
Report 
1999, p. 6 
64 A binary number of 1 if a firm provide 
a narrative on both actual and potential 
risks that it is facing in its annual 
report in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of risk evaluation 
 
 
DRE Turnbull 
Report 
1999, p. 6 
65 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluation of 
identified risks with management plan 
Disclosure of policy on risk 
management 
 
 
 
DPRM Turnbull 
Report 
1999, p. 6 
66 A binary number of 1 if a firm provide 
a narrative on how to manage both 
current and potential risks in its annual 
report in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Risk management committee  
 
 
RMC Smith 
Report 
2003, 2.1 
67 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
risk management committee in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Terms of reference  
 
 
 
 
RMCTR Smith 
Report 
2003, 2.1 
68 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the terms of reference 
of a firm’s risk management 
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Membership  
 
 
 
RMCM 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
69 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the membership of this 
committee of a firm in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
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Frequency of meetings 
 
 
 
RMCF
M 
Smith 
Report, 
3.5 
70 A binary number of 1 if the a firm’s 
risk management committee meet at 
least four times in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Individual members 
attendance  
RMCIM
A 
2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
71 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding individual members’ 
attendance of committee’s meetings in 
a firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
 
Attendance of meetings  RMCA
Ms 
Smith 
Report 
2003, 3.5 
72 A binary number of 1 if a firm’s risk 
management committee members 
attend the majority of the committee’s 
meetings in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Evaluation of the committee 
as a group 
 
 
 
 
RMCPE
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
73 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of a 
firm’s risk management committee 
performance and effectiveness as 
group in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of chairperson  
 
 
 
 
 
RMCCP
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
74 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
chairperson’s performance and 
effectiveness of a firm’s risk 
management  committee in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of individual 
members 
 
 
 
 
RMCIM
E 
2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
75 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
individual members’ performance and 
effectiveness of a firm’s risk 
management committee in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Composition  RMCC
OMP 
Smith 
Report 
2003, 3.1 
76 A binary number of 1 if a firm risk 
management committee is composed 
of majority independent NEDs in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Internal Audit and 
Control 
 
    
Disclosure of internal control 
policy and procedure 
 
 
DICPP
A 
2010 
Code, 
C.2.1 
77 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s internal 
control policies and procedures in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Existence of internal audit 
unit 
 
 
EIAU 2010 
Code, 
C.3.5 
78 A binary number of 1 if a firm has an 
internal audit operation established as 
a separate unit in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Annual meeting with audit 
committee 
 
 
 
 
AMWA
C 
Smith 
Report, 
3.8 
79 A binary number of 1 if a firm audit 
committee  annual meetings with 
internal audit is disclosed in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
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Private meeting with audit 
committee 
 
 
 
PMWA
C 
Smith 
Report, 
3.8 
80 A binary number of 1 if a firm audit 
committee annual private meetings 
with internal audit without the 
presence of management is disclosed 
in a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Review of risk management 
and internal control systems 
effectiveness 
RRMIC
SE 
2010 
Code, 
C.2.1 
81 A binary number of 1 if the annual 
review a firm risk management and 
internal control systems is disclosed in 
its annual report in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
D- Remuneration  
 
Remuneration Committee 
 
    
Existence 
 
 
 
RCE 2010 
Code, 
D.2.1 
82 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
remuneration committee in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Membership 
 
 
 
RCM Greenbury 
Report 
1995, A.5 
83 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the membership of this 
committee of a firm in a financial year, 
0 otherwise 
Composition  
 
 
 
RCCO
MP 
2010 
Code, 
D.2.1 
84 A binary number of 1 if a firm 
remuneration committee is composed 
of at least two independent NEDs in a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Chairperson  
 
 
 
RCCP 2010 
Code, 
D.2.1 
85 A binary number of 1 if a firm 
remuneration committee chairperson is 
an independent NED in a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Frequency of meetings 
 
 
 
RCFM 2010 
Code, 
A.2.1 
86 A binary number of 1 if the a firm’s 
remuneration committee meet more 
frequent in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Individual members 
attendance 
RCIMA 2010 
Code, 
A.1.2 
87 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding individual members 
attendance of committee’s meetings in  
a firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Evaluation of chairperson  
 
 
 
 
 
RCCE 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
88 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
chairperson’s performance and 
effectiveness of a firm’s remuneration  
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Evaluation of individual 
members 
 
 
 
 
RCIME 2010 
Code, 
B.6.1 
89 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the evaluating of the 
individual members’ performance and 
effectiveness of a firm’s remuneration 
committee in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
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Attendance of meetings  RCAMs Smith 
Report, 
3.8 
90 A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
remuneration committee members 
attend the majority of the committee’s 
meetings in a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
 
Terms of reference  
 
 
 
 
RCTR Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 4.4; 
2010 
Code, 
D.2.1 
91 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the terms of reference 
of a firm’s remuneration committee in 
a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of CEO’s 
remuneration 
 
 
 
DCEOR Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.8-
5.10 
92 A binary number of 1 if CEO’s 
remuneration consisting cash and non-
cash remuneration is disclosed in a 
firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of other executive 
directors’ remuneration 
 
 
DEDR Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.8-
5.10 
93 A binary number of 1 if executive 
directors’ remuneration consisting cash 
and non-cash remuneration is 
disclosed in a firm’s annual report for 
a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of all directors’ 
cash remuneration 
 
 
 
 
DDCR Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.8-
5.10 
94 A binary number of 1if disclosure is 
made regarding all directors’ cash 
remuneration clearly classified into 
based salary, bonus and any other cash 
remuneration in a firm’s annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of NEDs’ 
remuneration 
 
 
 
DNEDR 2010 
Code, 
D.1.3 
95 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding fees paid to all NEDs 
and independent NEDs in a firm’s 
annual report for a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Disclosure of all directors’ 
non-cash remuneration 
 
 
 
DDNCR Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.8-
5.10 
96 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding all directors’ non-cash 
remuneration clearly classified into in-
kind benefits, pension, share options, 
exercised options and LTIPs, amongst 
others in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise  
Disclosure of “say on 
executive pay” policy 
 
 
 
 
DSEPP Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 
5.32-5.33; 
2010 
Code, 
D.2.4 
97 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s policy relating 
to shareholders rights to approve  
executive remuneration for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of directors’ 
ownership interests 
 
 
 
 
DDOI Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.24 
98 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding directors’ ownership 
interests in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
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Composition of NEDs’ 
remuneration 
 
 
 
CNEDR 2010 
Code, 
D.1.3 
99 A binary number of 1 if disclosed 
NEDs’ remuneration does not include 
share options or performance-related 
elements in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Remuneration consultants  
 
 
 
RCONS Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 
4.14; 2010 
Code, 
D.2.1 
100 A binary number of 1 if a firm has a 
remuneration consultant for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise  
Disclosure of all directors’ 
remuneration by name 
 
 
 
DADR
N 
Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.8-
5.10 
101 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding remuneration of each 
director by name in a firm’s annual 
report for a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Executive directors LTIP 
 
 
 
DLTIP 2010 
Code, D.1 
102 A binary number of 1 if executive 
remuneration of executive directors’ 
include LTIPs, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration philosophy  
DDRP Greenbury 
Report 
1995, 5.5-
5.7 
103 A binary number of 1 if a narrative on 
core philosophy and rational 
underlying executive remuneration is 
disclosed and also if the elements of 
performance-linked remuneration of 
executive directors (e.g., share options, 
bonus) constitute substantial amount 
the total package in order to align their 
interests with shareholders 
E- Relations with 
Shareholders 
    
 
Obligations to shareholders 
 
 
 
 
 
OSHOL
D 
 
2010 
Code, 
E.1.1; 
E.1.2 
 
104 
 
A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding a firm’s obligations to 
shareholders in its annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Notice on AGMs 
 
 
 
NAGMs 2010 
Code, 
E.2.4 
105 A binary number of 1 if a firm’s 
shareholders informed about AGM at 
least 20 working days before the 
meeting, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of shareholders’ 
rights 
 
 
 
 
DSHOL
DR 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.1-
E.2.3 
106 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about other rights of 
shareholders such as voting, attending 
meeting, and appointing proxies in a 
firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Names of board member 
attend AGM 
 
 
 
NBMA
AGM 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.3 
107 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding the name of board 
members attending AGM in a firm’s 
annual report for a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Board chairman attendance 
of AGM 
 
BCAAG
M 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.3 
108 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding board chairman 
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 attendance of AGM in a firm’s annual 
report for a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Nomination committee 
chairman attendance of 
AGM 
 
 
NCCAA
GM 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.3 
109 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding nomination committee 
chairman attendance of AGM in a 
firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Remuneration committee 
chairman attendance of 
AGM 
 
 
RCCAA
GM 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.3 
110 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding remuneration 
committee chairman attendance of 
AGM in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Audit committee chairman 
attendance of AGM 
 
 
ACCAA
GM 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.3 
111 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding audit committee 
chairman attendance of AGM in a 
firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise 
Risk management committee 
chairman attendance of 
AGM 
 
 
RCCAA
GM 
2010 
Code, 
E.2.3 
112 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made regarding risk management 
committee chairman attendance of 
AGM in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of shareholder 
activism  
 
 
 
 
DSHOL
DA 
Myners 
Report 
2001; 
Stewardsh
ip code 
2010&12 
113 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about shareholder activism in a 
firm’s annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise  
Disclosure of policy about 
proxy voting  
 
 
 
DPPV DTR 6.1.5 
R; 2010 
Code, 
E.2.1 & 
E.2.2 
114 A binary number of 1 if disclosure is 
made about the policy relating to the 
existence and permission of proxy 
voting in a firm’s annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure about obligations 
to society/community 
 
 
DOS CA 2006, 
section 
417 
115 A binary number of 1 if a firm disclose 
its obligations to the society and 
community in its annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Disclosure of environmental 
issues 
 
 
DENVE CA 2006, 
section 
417 
116 A binary number of 1 if a firm 
explicitly disclose environmental 
issues in its annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise  
Social disclosures 
 
 
 
 
SOCD CA 2006, 
section 
417 
117 A binary number of 1 if a firm 
explicitly make social (e.g., education, 
housing, water) disclosures in its 
annual report for a financial year, 0 
otherwise 
Employee training and 
education programmes 
 
 
 
ETEP CA 2006, 
section 
417 
118 A binary number of 1 if employees’ 
training and education programmes 
details are disclosed in a firm’s annual 
report for a financial year, 0 otherwise 
Health and safety disclosures 
 
 
 
HSD CA 2006, 
section 
417 
119 A binary number of 1 if a firm 
explicitly make health and safety (e.g., 
accidents, cancer, HIV/AIDS) 
disclosures in its annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
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Code of ethics CETHI
C 
IBE 2007 120 A binary number of 1 if a firm disclose 
its code of ethics in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix 3: Compliance with CG Provisions that Constitute the UKCGI – Firm Size (%) 
Individual Internal CG Provisions of the UKCGI 
Yearly Average of the level of Compliance (%) 
All 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Large  Small Large small Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  
A. Leadership:        
1 Disclosure of board membership (DBM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 Role duality (DUAL) 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
3 Frequency of board meetings (FBMs) 99 96 98 96 98 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 
4 Disclosure of individual director attendance (DIDA) 88 81 86 78 86 80 88 82 88 82 90 82 92 84 
5 Attendance of board’s meetings (PABMs) 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 
6 Statement on the independence of the chairperson (SICM) 50 20 50 20 50 30 50 20 50 20 60 30 50 30 
7 Senior independent director appointment (SID) 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 90 90 90 90 
8 The roles of the board and management (RBM) 80 20 70 20 80 20 80 20 80 20 80 20 80 20 
B. Effectiveness:        
9 Board chairperson (BCM)  90 80 80 70 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 
10 Chairperson independence (CMI) 60 40 50 30 60 40 50 40 50 40 60 40 60 40 
11 Board composition (BCOM) 90 35 90 30 92 34 88 32 88 42 88 36 92 38 
12 Disclosure of the classification of directors (DCDs) 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 
13 Disclosure of the process of evaluating board/executives (DPBE) 88 61 86 56 86 58 88 60 90 64 90 64 90 66 
14 Evaluation of board performance (EBPE) 89 60 86 58 88 60 90 58 90 60 90 60 90 64 
15 Evaluation of individual director performance (EIDs) 84 54 82 50 82 54 84 56 86 56 86 54 86 56 
16 Evaluation of board’s subcommittees performance (EBSCPE) 84 57 82 54 84 56 86 58 86 58 84 56 84 60 
17 Evaluation of CEO’s performance (ECEOPE) 70 30 70 30 70 30 60 30 60 30 70 30 70 30 
18 Evaluation of chairperson’s performance (ECPPE) 40 10 40 10 40 10 40 10 40 10 40 10 40 10 
19 Externally facilitated evaluation (EFE) 23 01 12 0 14 0 24 0 24 06 28 02 38 0 
20 Disclosure of the process of board/executives’ re-election (DPBRE) 92 81 92 78 92 78 92 80 92 80 92 86 92 86 
21 Disclosure of board members’ names (DNBMs) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
22 Disclosure of directors’ biographical details (DDBD) 99.7 96 98 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 
23 Disclosure of directors’ other details (DDODs) 62 70 58 66 62 68 66 68 66 72 60 74 60 74 
24 Disclosure of directors’ experience (DDEx) 99 90 96 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 
25 Disclosure about induction and training programmes (DITP) 86 30 84 24 86 26 86 28 86 32 86 34 86 34 
26 Detailed disclosure about training programmes (DDTP) 44.7 06.3 34 04 36 02 38 04 48 08 54 08 58 12 
27 Directors/subcommittees access to free independent legal advice (DAFILA) 76.3 86.7 76 84 76 84 76 88 76 86 76 88 78 90 
28 Directors/officers dealings and securities (DDS) 26 15.3 26 12 26 12 24 16 24 16 28 18 28 18 
29 Directors/officers share dealings (DSDs) 32 13.3 32 12 32 14 32 14 32 14 32 14 32 12 
30 Existence of nomination committee (NCOME) 94 82.7 94 80 94 80 94 80 94 84 94 86 94 86 
31 Terms of reference of nomination committee (NCOMTR) 91 58.7 90 54 90 56 90 56 92 58 92 64 92 64 
32 Disclosure of nomination committee membership (DNCOMM) 94 81 94 78 94 78 94 80 94 82 94 84 94 84 
33 Composition of nomination committee (NCOMC) 92 69.7 92 68 92 70 92 72 92 70 92 68 92 70 
34 Independence of chairperson of nomination committee (NCOMCP) 59 48 60 46 60 48 58 46 58 48 60 48 60 50 
35 Frequency of nomination committee meetings (NCOMFM) 48 07 36 04 46 04 38 08 52 06 56 08 60 12 
36 Individual members attendance of nomination committee’s meetings (NCOMIMA) 78 57 76 56 78 56 82 06 80 54 76 58 78 60 
37 Attendance of majority of nomination committee’s meetings (NCOMAMs) 78 59 76 58 78 58 82 62 80 56 76 60 78 58 
38 Evaluation of nomination committee as a group (ENCOMPE) 83.3 53 82 50 84 52 86 54 84 54 82 54 82 54 
39 Evaluation of nomination committee’s chairperson (ENCOMCP) 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 
40 Evaluation of performance of individual nomination committee members (ENCOMIMs) 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 
41 Existence of a company secretary (OCSE) 94.3 98 92 98 94 98 94 98 94 98 96 98 96 98 
42 Disclosure of the identity of a company’s secretary office holder (OCSI) 82 86 80 84 82 86 80 86 82 86 84 86 84 86 
43 Terms of reference of a company secretary (OCSTR) 77.7 51 76 48 78 48 78 50 76 52 78 54 80 54 
44 Attendance of board meetings by a company secretary (OCSBM) 02 0 0 0 0 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 04 0 
45 Disclosure of a company secretary meetings attendance record (OCSMAR) 01 0 0 0 0 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 
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Continuation: Appendix 3 
Yearly Average of the level of Compliance (%) 
All 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Large  Small Large small Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  
C. Accountability: 
46 Preparing annual reports and accounts (PARA) 90 96 90 96 90 96 90 96 90 96 92 96 90 96 
47 Board statement on the status of a company’s going concern (BSSFGC) 80 100 80 100 80 100 80 100 80 100 80 100 90 100 
48 Existence of audit committee (ACE) 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 
49 Conducting the roles of risk management committee (CRRMC) 87.7 65.3 92 64 90 64 86 64 86 66 86 66 86 68 
50 Terms of reference of audit committee (ACTR) 99 89 98 86 98 88 98 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 
51 Disclosure of audit committee membership (ACM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
52 Composition of audit committee (ACCOM) 88 51 84 44 84 44 86 52 88 54 92 52 92 60 
53 Independence of chairperson of audit committee (ACCP) 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 100 90 
54 Frequency of audit committee meetings (ACFM) 83.7 33 82 22 80 32 78 34 86 36 88 38 88 36 
55 Individual members attendance of audit committee’s meetings (ACIMA) 90 80 80 70 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 
56 Attendance of majority of audit committee’s meetings (ACAMs) 84 79 82 74 84 78 84 80 84 80 84 82 84 80 
57 External auditor’s scope and responsibility (EASR) 92 78 90 74 92 76 92 76 92 80 94 80 92 82 
58 External auditor’s attendance of audit committee meetings (EAM) 87 63 86 58 88 58 90 60 86 60 86 66 88 78 
59 External auditor’s private meetings with audit committee (EAPMs) 67 37 64 34 66 32 66 36 68 36 68 38 70 46 
60 Disclosure of audit fees (DAFs) 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 
61 Evaluation of audit committee as a group (ACPEE) 83.3 59 82 58 84 58 86 60 84 60 82 58 82 60 
62 Evaluation of audit committee’s chairperson (ACCPPE) 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 
63 Evaluation of performance of individual audit committee members (ACIME) 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 
64 Disclosure of a company’s risks (DFR) 100 89 100 84 100 86 100 88 100 92 100 90 100 92 
65 Disclosure of risk evaluation (DRE) 81.7 54.3 68 38 78 40 82 50 84 62 88 64 90 72 
66 Disclosure of policy on risk management (DPRM) 83 80 74 74 82 78 84 78 86 82 86 82 86 84 
67 Existence of risk management committee (RMC) 08.3 08 04 08 06 08 10 08 10 08 10 08 10 08 
68 Terms of reference of risk management committee (RMCTR) 07 06 04 06 06 06 10 06 08 06 08 06 08 06 
69 Disclosure of risk management committee membership (RMCM) 05 06 02 06 04 06 08 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 
70 Frequency of risk management committee meetings (RMCFM) 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 
71 Individual members attendance of risk management committee’s meetings (RMCIMA) 05 0 02 0 04 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 
72 Attendance of majority of risk management committee’s meetings (RMCAMs) 05 0 02 0 04 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 
73 Evaluation of risk management committee as a group (RMCPEE) 05 0 02 0 04 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 06 0 
74 Evaluation of risk management committee’s chairperson (RMCCPE) 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 
75 Evaluation of performance of individual risk management committee members (RMCIME) 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 
76 Composition of risk management committee (RMCCOMP) 03.7 0 02 0 04 0 04 0 04 0 04 0 04 0 
77 Disclosure of internal control policy and procedure (DICPPA) 95.7 96 94 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
78 Existence of internal audit unit (EIAU) 89.3 23 88 22 88 22 90 22 90 22 90 24 90 26 
79 Internal auditor’s attendance of audit committee meetings (AMWAC) 62.3 11 62 10 64 10 64 10 60 10 62 12 62 14 
80 Internal auditor’s private meetings with audit committee (PMWAC) 41.7 02 40 02 42 02 40 02 42 02 42 02 44 02 
81 Review of risk management and internal control systems (RRMICSE) 90 96 90 96 90 96 90 96 90 96 90 96 90 96 
D. Remuneration: 
82 Existence of remuneration committee (RCE) 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 
83 Disclosure of remuneration committee membership (RCM) 97.7 100 96 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 98 100 
84 Composition of remuneration committee (RCCOMP) 97.7 83.7 98 84 98 82 98 84 98 84 96 84 98 84 
85 Independence of chairperson of remuneration committee (RCCP) 98 89 96 88 98 90 98 88 98 88 98 90 98 92 
86 Frequency of remuneration committee meetings (RCFM) 83.3 37.3 86 36 82 40 84 40 76 28 88 36 84 44 
87 Individual members attendance of remuneration committee meetings (RCIMA) 83 76 80 72 82 74 84 78 82 78 86 78 86 78 
88 Evaluation of remuneration committee’s chairperson (RCCE) 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 
89 Evaluation of performance of individual remuneration committee members (RCIME) 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 08 0 
90 Attendance of majority of remuneration committee’s meetings (RCAMs) 81.7 77.7 80 74 82 76 82 80 80 80 82 80 84 76 
  
333 
 
 
Continuation: Appendix 3 
Yearly Average of the level of Compliance (%) 
All 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Large  Small Large small Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  
91 Terms of reference of remuneration committee (RCTR) 97 76.3 96 74 96 74 98 76 98 78 98 78 96 78 
92 Disclosure of CEO’s remuneration (DCEOR) 92.7 87.3 92 90 92 86 92 86 92 88 94 86 94 88 
93 Disclosure of other executive directors’ remuneration (DEDR) 92.7 88.3 92 90 92 88 92 88 92 88 94 88 94 88 
94 Disclosure of all directors’ cash remuneration (DDCR) 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 
95 Disclosure of NEDs’ remuneration (DNEDR) 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 94 100 
96 Disclosure of all directors’ non-cash remuneration (DDNCR) 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 90 80 
97 Disclosure of “say on executive pay” policy (DSEPP) 40 20 40 10 40 20 40 20 40 20 50 20 50 40 
98 Disclosure of directors’ ownership interests (DDOI) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
99 Composition of NEDs’ remuneration (CNEDR) 88 86 86 86 88 86 88 86 88 86 88 86 88 88 
100 Remuneration consultants (RCONS) 79 31 76 28 78 28 78 28 82 30 82 32 80 38 
101 Disclosure of all directors’ remuneration by name (DADRN) 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 
102 Disclosure of executive directors long term incentive plan (DLTIP) 94.7 62.3 94 64 94 62 94 58 94 60 96 64 96 66 
103 Disclosure of directors’ remuneration policy (DDRP) 96 99.7 96 98 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 96 100 
E. Relations with Shareholders  
104 Obligations to shareholders (OSHOLD) 96.3 96 94 96 94 96 96 96 98 96 98 96 98 96 
105 Notice on AGMs (NAGMs) 92 54 92 52 92 52 92 52 92 54 92 56 92 56 
106 Disclosure of shareholders’ rights (DSHOLDR) 96.3 66 94 64 94 66 96 66 98 66 98 66 98 68 
107 Disclosure of names of board member attend AGMs (NBMAAGMs) 49.3 18.7 50 18 48 18 48 18 48 18 50 20 52 20 
108 Board chairperson attendance of AGMs (BCAAGMs) 40 08.7 38 08 38 08 38 08 40 08 42 10 44 10 
109 Nomination committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (NCCAAGMs) 35.3 10.7 36 10 36 10 36 10 34 10 34 12 36 12 
110 Remuneration committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (RCCAAGMs) 44 16 42 16 42 16 44 16 44 16 44 16 46 14 
111 Audit committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (ACCAAGMs) 41 16 42 16 42 16 42 14 40 14 40 16 42 18 
112 Risk management committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (RCCAAGMs) 05 02 06 02 06 02 06 02 04 02 04 02 06 02 
113 Disclosure of shareholder activism (DSHOLDA)  80 65.7 78 64 78 66 78 66 82 66 82 66 82 66 
114 Disclosure of policy about proxy voting (DPPV) 88.7 77.7 84 76 88 76 90 78 90 78 90 78 90 80 
115 Disclosure about obligations to society/community (DOS) 92 64 90 52 88 64 92 66 94 68 94 68 94 66 
116 Disclosure of environmental issues (DENVE) 99 74.7 98 66 98 70 98 68 100 76 100 78 100 90 
117 Social disclosure (SOCD) 80.3 42 78 34 78 40 80 42 82 46 82 48 82 48 
118 Disclosure about employee training and education programmes (ETEP) 77.7 44.7 72 38 74 42 76 42 80 48 82 48 82 50 
119 Health and safety disclosure (HSD) 75.3 66.3 74 62 74 64 74 62 74 70 78 70 78 70 
120 Disclosure of code of ethics (CETHICs) 100 39 100 34 100 38 100 40 100 40 100 40 100 44 
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     Appendix 4: Compliance with CG Provisions that Constitute the UKCGI – Industrial groups (%) 
 
  
 Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) 
Individual Internal CG Provisions of the UKCGI All Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Material 
Con. 
Goods 
Con. 
Services 
Industrial Technology 
A. Leadership:       
1 Disclosure of board membership (DBM) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 Role duality (DUAL) 90.8 89.2 93.3 93.3 88.3 90 
3 Frequency of board meetings (FBMs) 98 93 100 100 100 95 
4 Disclosure of individual director attendance (DIDA) 84.8 75 90 87.5 81.7 90 
5 Attendance of board’s meetings (PABMs) 86.5 80 90 87.5 85 90 
6 Statement on the independence of the chairperson (SICM) 38.2 38.3 37.5 22.5 41.7 50.8 
7 Senior independent director appointment (SID) 87 65 96.7 95 90 88.3 
8 The roles of the board and management (RBM) 50 50 60 70 20 50 
B. Effectiveness        
9 Board chairperson (BCM)  81 63 93 89 83 78 
10 Chairperson independence (CMI) 50 40 40 50 50 60 
11 Board composition (BCOM) 63 60 62 65 58 68 
12 Disclosure of the classification of directors (DCDs) 95 80 100 100 100 95 
13 Disclosure of the process of evaluating board/executives (DPBE) 75 47 81 80 84 83 
14 Evaluation of board performance (EBPE) 75 49 81 85 84 73 
15 Evaluation of individual director performance (EIDs) 69 43 76 83 67 79 
16 Evaluation of board’s subcommittees performance (EBSCPE) 71 48 75 81 70 80 
17 Evaluation of CEO’s performance (ECEOPE) 50 40 60 60 30 50 
18 Evaluation of chairperson’s performance (ECPPE) 23 30 28 31 24 03 
19 Externally facilitated evaluation (EFE) 12 13 14 13 12 10 
20 Disclosure of the process of board/executives’ re-election (DPBRE) 87 75 92 92 80 95 
21 Disclosure of board members’ names (DNBMs) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
22 Disclosure of directors’ biographical details (DDBD) 97.8 100 95 99.2 95 100 
23 Disclosure of directors’ other details (DDODs) 66.2 79.2 45 61.7 65.8 79.2 
24 Disclosure of directors’ experience (DDEx) 94.7 94.2 95 94.2 95 95 
25 Disclosure about induction and training programmes (DITP) 57.7 55 64.2 59.2 48.3 61.7 
26 Detailed disclosure about training programmes (DDTP) 25.5 36.7 30 21.7 21.7 17.5 
27 Directors/subcommittees access to free independent legal advice (DAFILA) 81.5 60 87.5 90.8 75 94.2 
28 Directors/officers dealings and securities (DDS) 20.7 30 06.7 21.7 28.3 16.7 
29 Directors/officers share dealings (DSDs) 22.7 30 25 30 10 18.3 
30 Existence of nomination committee (NCOME) 88.3 75 95 94.2 90 87.5 
31 Terms of reference of nomination committee (NCOMTR) 74.8 65 79.2 80 75 75 
32 Disclosure of nomination committee membership (DNCOMM) 87.5 73.3 92.5 94.2 90 87.5 
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 Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) 
Continuation: Appendix 4 All Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Material 
Con. 
Goods 
Con. 
Services 
Industrial Technology 
33 Composition of nomination committee (NCOMC) 80.8 75 80.8 86.7 79.2 82.5 
34 Independence of chairperson of nomination committee (NCOMCP) 54 45 46 55 60 62 
35 Frequency of nomination committee meetings (NCOMFM) 27.5 30.8 25.8 25 34.2 21.7 
36 Individual members attendance of nomination committee’s meetings (NCOMIMA) 68 49 73 72 68 78 
37 Attendance of majority of nomination committee’s meetings (NCOMAMs) 69 49 73 72 71 78 
38 Evaluation of nomination committee as a group (ENCOMPE) 68.2 40 74.2 80.8 70 75.8 
39 Evaluation of nomination committee’s chairperson (ENCOMCP) 04 20 0 0 0 0 
40 Evaluation of performance of individual nomination committee members (ENCOMIMs) 04 20 0 0 0 0 
41 Existence of a company secretary (OCSE) 96.2 80.8 100 100 100 100 
42 Disclosure of the identity of a company’s secretary office holder (OCSI) 84 66 100 95 88 71 
43 Terms of reference of a company secretary (OCSTR) 64.3 53.3 81.7 70.8 55.8 60 
44 Attendance of board meetings by a company secretary (OCSBM) 01 0 0 0 01 03 
45 Disclosure of a company secretary meetings attendance record (OCSMAR) 01 0 0 0 0 03 
C. Accountability        
46 Preparing annual reports and accounts (PARA) 93 71 100 100 95 100 
47 Board statement on the status of a company’s going concern (BSSFGC) 92 71 100 100 90 100 
48 Existence of audit committee (ACE) 99 100 100 100 100 95 
49 Conducting the roles of risk management committee (CRRMC) 76.5 66.7 75 87.5 82.5 70.8 
50 Terms of reference of audit committee (ACTR) 94 100 99 96 100 75 
51 Disclosure of audit committee membership (ACM) 99 100 100 100 100 95 
52 Composition of audit committee (ACCOM) 69 58 74 68 72 76 
53 Independence of chairperson of audit committee (ACCP) 90 100 100 100 90 90 
54 Frequency of audit committee meetings (ACFM) 58.3 47.5 56.7 68.3 64.2 55 
55 Individual members attendance of audit committee’s meetings (ACIMA) 82 81 84 73 81 89 
56 Attendance of majority of audit committee’s meetings (ACAMs) 81 76 84 73 85 89 
57 External auditor’s scope and responsibility (EASR) 85 79 90 95 90 71 
58 External auditor’s attendance of audit committee meetings (EAM) 75.3 54.2 78.3 82.5 79.2 82.5 
59 External auditor’s private meetings with audit committee (EAPMs) 52 25 56.7 60.8 46.7 70.8 
60 Disclosure of audit fees (DAFs) 97 85 100 100 100 100 
61 Evaluation of audit committee as a group (ACPEE) 71.2 45 79.2 81.7 70 80 
62 Evaluation of audit committee’s chairperson (ACCPPE) 04 20 0 0 0 0 
63 Evaluation of performance of individual audit committee members (ACIME) 03 15 0 0 0 0 
64 Disclosure of a company’s risks (DFR) 94.3 95 100 94.2 82.5 100 
65 Disclosure of risk evaluation (DRE) 68 42.5 76.7 80.8 70 70 
  
336 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) 
Continuation: Appendix 4 All Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Material 
Con. 
Goods 
Con. 
Services 
Industrial Technology 
66 Disclosure of policy on risk management (DPRM) 81.3 74.2 80 95 86.7 70.8 
67 Existence of risk management committee (RMC) 08.2 18.3 15 0 03.3 04.2 
68 Terms of reference of risk management committee (RMCTR) 07 16 10 0 03 04 
69 Disclosure of risk management committee membership (RMCM) 06 11 10 0 03 04 
70 Frequency of risk management committee meetings (RMCFM) 02 05 05 0 0 0 
71 Individual members attendance of risk management committee’s meetings (RMCIMA) 03 05 0 0 03 04 
72 Attendance of majority of risk management committee’s meetings (RMCAMs) 02.5 05 0 0 03.3 04.2 
73 Evaluation of risk management committee as a group (RMCPEE) 02.5 05 0 0 03.3 04.2 
74 Evaluation of risk management committee’s chairperson (RMCCPE) 01 05 0 0 0 0 
75 Evaluation of performance of individual risk management committee members (RMCIME) 01 05 0 0 0 0 
76 Composition of risk management committee (RMCCOMP) 01.8 05 0 0 0 04.2 
77 Disclosure of internal control policy and procedure (DICPPA) 95.8 89.2 100 95 100 95 
78 Existence of internal audit unit (EIAU) 56.2 63.3 55 57.5 50 55 
79 Internal auditor’s attendance of audit committee meetings (AMWAC) 36.7 26.7 45 50 33.3 28.3 
80 Internal auditor’s private meetings with audit committee (PMWAC) 21.8 10.8 25.8 30 27.5 15 
81 Review of risk management and internal control systems (RRMICSE) 93 75 95 100 100 95 
D. Remuneration       
82 Existence of remuneration committee (RCE) 99 95 100 100 100 100 
83 Disclosure of remuneration committee membership (RCM) 98.8 95 100 99.2 100 100 
84 Composition of remuneration committee (RCCOMP) 90.7 84.2 100 95.8 83.3 90 
85 Independence of chairperson of remuneration committee (RCCP) 94 92 99 99 87 91 
86 Frequency of remuneration committee meetings (RCFM) 60.3 54.2 58.3 66.7 61.7 60.8 
87 Individual members attendance of remuneration committee meetings (RCIMA) 80 73 84 71 82 89 
88 Evaluation of remuneration committee’s chairperson (RCCE) 04 20 0 0 0 0 
89 Evaluation of performance of individual remuneration committee members (RCIME) 04 20 0 0 0 0 
90 Attendance of majority of remuneration committee’s meetings (RCAMs) 79.7 67.5 84.2 72.5 85 89.2 
91 Terms of reference of remuneration committee (RCTR) 86.7 87.5 95 93.3 82.5 75 
92 Disclosure of CEO’s remuneration (DCEOR) 90 70.8 81.7 100 98.3 99.2 
93 Disclosure of other executive directors’ remuneration (DEDR) 90.5 70.8 81.7 100 100 100 
94 Disclosure of all directors’ cash remuneration (DDCR) 97 85 100 100 100 100 
95 Disclosure of NEDs’ remuneration (DNEDR) 97 85 100 100 100 100 
96 Disclosure of all directors’ non-cash remuneration (DDNCR) 87.5 60.8 81.7 100 95 100 
97 Disclosure of “say on executive pay” policy (DSEPP) 32 38 24 28 29 41 
98 Disclosure of directors’ ownership interests (DDOI) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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 Compliance Levels Among Firms (%) 
Continuation: Appendix 4 All Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Material 
Con. 
Goods 
Con. 
Services 
Industrial Technology 
99 Composition of NEDs’ remuneration (CNEDR) 87 65 91 92 88 100 
100 Remuneration consultants (RCONS) 55 33 48 52 75 68 
101 Disclosure of all directors’ remuneration by name (DADRN) 98 90 100 100 100 100 
102 Disclosure of executive directors long term incentive plan (DLTIP) 78.5 75.8 75 89.2 77.5 75 
103 Disclosure of directors’ remuneration policy (DDRP) 97.8 89.2 100 100 100 100 
E. Relations with Shareholders        
104 Obligations to shareholders (OSHOLD) 96.2 83.3 100 100 97.5 100 
105 Notice on AGMs (NAGMs) 73 65 75 75 67 83 
106 Disclosure of shareholders’ rights (DSHOLDR) 81.2 83.3 90 95 67.5 70 
107 Disclosure of names of board member attend AGMs (NBMAAGMs) 34 18.3 55 28.3 31.7 36.7 
108 Board chairperson attendance of AGMs (BCAAGMs) 24.3 10 44.2 13.3 29.2 25 
109 Nomination committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (NCCAAGMs) 23 10 44.2 15.8 26.7 18.3 
110 Remuneration committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (RCCAAGMs) 29.7 19.2 52.5 25 26.7 25 
111 Audit committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (ACCAAGMs) 28.5 13.3 49.2 23.3 26.7 30 
112 Risk management committee’s chairperson attendance of AGMs (RCCAAGMs) 04 03 15 0 0 0 
113 Disclosure of shareholder activism (DSHOLDA)  72.8 60 77.5 90 81.7 55 
114 Disclosure of policy about proxy voting (DPPV) 83.2 78.3 85 83.3 95 74.2 
115 Disclosure about obligations to society/community (DOS) 78 84.2 87.5 68.3 80.8 69.2 
116 Disclosure of environmental issues (DENVE) 86.8 91.7 90 81.7 86.7 84.2 
117 Social disclosure (SOCD) 61.7 69.2 80 48.3 50 60.8 
118 Disclosure about employee training and education programmes (ETEP) 61.2 74.2 53.3 53.3 63.3 61.7 
119 Health and safety disclosure (HSD) 70.8 88.3 66.7 69.2 75.8 54.2 
120 Disclosure of code of ethics (CETHICs) 69.7 95 65 68.3 60.8 59.2 
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Appendix 5: Composite-CG-Index (CEOs, CFOs and AEDs’ Pay)  
Independent Variable  All Firm Years       ______________________     ______________Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
     (Model) Predicted sign         (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Panel A: UKCGI_CEOP      
  UKCGI - -5.985(.000)***  -6.291(.000)*** -5.806(.000)*** -5.813(.000)*** -5.946(.000)***         -6.797(.000)*** -5.307 (.001)*** 
Control Variables:       
  PCGC  - -0.934(.000)***  -1.127(.051)* -0.774(.154) -1.223(.042)** -0.949(.071)* -0.600(.289) -0.363(.481) 
  CL + -1.096(.000)***  -0.968(.014)** -1.234(.001)*** -0.881(.034)** -1.146(.002)*** -1.040(.008)*** -1.403(.001)*** 
  AFS  + 0.385(.011)**  0.414(.278) 0.100(.791) 0.442(.286) 0.322(.379) 0.461(.253) 0.291(.491) 
  FMs + 0.085(.000)***  0.092(.110) 0.102(.036)** 0.082(.103) 0.060(.243) 0.103(.058)* 0.122(.030)** 
  AGE  + -0.424(.000)***  -0.352(.027)** -0.377(.022)** -0.386(.046)** -0.458(.006)*** -0.517(.006)*** -0.384(.044)** 
  CEX - 1.079(.462)  2.532(.501) 0.634(.872) 1.758(.705) 0.469(.890) -0.689(.864) -0.306(.932) 
  SG + 0.239(.487)  -0.992(.187) 1.914(.034)** -0.800(.488) 0.059(.950) 2.089(.105) 0.679(.554) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  -1.117***  -1.952* -1.487 -1.791 -0.881 -0.718 -1.751 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.513  2.285 2.609 2.548 2.529 2.496 2.384 
F- value  32.691***  7.578*** 7.745*** 5.957*** 8.299*** 7.894*** 6.971*** 
Adj. R2  49.9%  47.3% 47.4% 39.8% 49.3% 48.5% 44.3% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Panel B: UKCGI_CFOP          
  UKCGI - -6.752(.000)***  -6.916(.000)*** -6.308(.000)*** -7.037(.000)*** -6.757(.000)*** -7.183(.000)*** -6.350(.000)*** 
Control Variables:          
  PCGC  - -0.934(.000)***  -1.127(.051)* -0.774(.154) -1.223(.042)** -0.949(.071)* -0.600(.289) -0.363(.481) 
  CL + -1.096(.000)***  -0.968(.014)** -1.234(.001)*** -0.881(.034)** -1.146(.002)*** -1.040(.008)*** -1.403(.001)*** 
  AFS  + 0.385(.011)**  0.414(.278) 0.100(.791) 0.442(.286) 0.322(.379) 0.461(.253) 0.291(.491) 
  FMs + 0.085(.000)***  0.092(.110) 0.102(.036)** 0.082(.103) 0.060(.243) 0.103(.058)* 0.122(.030)** 
  AGE  + -0.424(.000)***  -0.352(.027)** -0.377(.022)** -0.386(.046)** -0.458(.006)*** -0.517(.006)*** -0.384(.044)** 
  CEX - 1.079(.462)  2.532(.501) 0.634(.872) 1.758(.705) 0.469(.890) -0.689(.864) -0.306(.932) 
  SG + 0.239(.487)  -0.992(.187) 1.914(.034)** -0.800(.488) 0.059(.950) 2.089(.105) 0.679(.554) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  -1.117***  -1.952* -1.487 -1.791 -0.881 -0.718 -1.751 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.513  2.285 2.609 2.548 2.529 2.496 2.384 
F- value  32.691***  7.578*** 7.745*** 5.957*** 8.299*** 7.894*** 6.971*** 
Adj. R2  49.9%  47.3% 47.4% 39.8% 49.3% 48.5% 44.3% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS 
denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies; YDU denotes year dummies; and FDU denotes firm dummies. 
P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Appendix 5 (Continued): Composite-CG-Index (CEOs, CFOs and AEDs’ Pay)  
Independent Variable  All Firm Years        ___________________          Yearly estimations________________________________________________ 
     (Model) 
Predicted 
sign                         (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Panel C: UKCGI_AEDP     
  UKCGI - -3.534(.000)***  -3.939(.006)*** -3.922(.009)*** -2.999(.053)* -3.617(.015)** -3.983(.015)** -3.294(.046)** 
Control Variables:          
  PCGC  - -1.160(.000)***  -0.814(.178) -0.906(.132) -1.244(.061)* -1.428(.019)** -0.983(.123) -0.959(.102) 
  CL + -1.437(.000)***  -1.303(.001)*** -1.501(.000)*** -1.309(.004)*** -1.335(.001)*** -1.423(.001)*** -1.705(.000)*** 
  AFS  + 0.505(.003)***  0.163(.683) 0.261(.527) 0.558(.225) 0.587(.166) 0.693(.130) 0.561(.232) 
  FMs + -0.010(.578)  0.090(.132) 0.050(.327) 0.004(.929) -0.036(.409) -0.034(.424) -0.017(.710) 
  AGE  + -0.301(.000)***  -0.272(.097)* -0.274(.126) -0.200(.341) -0.312(.103) -0.357(.087)* -0.306(.151) 
  CEX - -2.474(.129)  -0.891(.822) -2.209(.611) -1.953(.703) -4.032(.309) -3.878(.378) -2.880(.470) 
  SG + -0.197(.601)  -0.998(.206) 1.803(.070)* -1.415(.267) -1.080(.320) 1.834(.196) -0.730(.563) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  -1.257***  -2.077* -1.520 -2.353* -1.027 -0.662 -1.035 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.263  2.328 2.345 2.166 2.171 2.210 2.208 
F- value  24.822***  6.280*** 5.514*** 4.654*** 
Adj. R2  42.0%  41.3% 37.1% 32.0% 40.4% 38.3% 37.8% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: CEOP denotes total pay of CEOs; CFOP denotes total pay of CFOs; UKCGI denotes the UK corporate governance index; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; 
AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies; YDU denotes year dummies; and FDU denotes 
firm dummies. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Appendix 6:   Individual-CG-Variables (CEOs’ Pay) 
 
Independent Variable 
     (Model) 
 All Firm Years        __________________________________     Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
Predicted 
sign                  (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Independent variables:      
  RCMs - 0.016(.536)  0.036(.639) 0.061(.322) -0.071(.354) -0.010(.887)      0.011(.880) 0.059(.395) 
  RCI - 0.050(.860)  0.348(.694) -0.644(.467) -0.153(.855) 0.237(.692)     0.041(.954) -0.337(.695) 
  BSE - -2.699(.000)***  -2.756(.000)*** -2.866(.000)*** -2.577(.000)*** -2.974(.000)***     -2.847(.000)*** -2.682(.000)*** 
  IOE - -2.107(.000)***  -2.920(.005)*** -2.439(.016)** -1.816(.096)* -1.485(.109)     -1.899(.084)* -0.666(.595) 
  BD - -1.733(.000)***  -2.283(.118) -1.467(.256) -2.296(.127) 0.001(.999) -1.685(.192) -2.714(.025)** 
  DSPLIT - 0.275(.087)*  -0.246(.598) -0.280(.528) 0.718(.137) 0.582(.122) 0.101(.831) 0.659(.150) 
  CEOT + 0.035(.000)***  -0.004(.869) 0.010(.705) 0.032(.200) 0.047(.017)** 0.060(.024)** 0.040(.194) 
Control Variables:          
  PCGC - -0.422(.015)**  -0.628(.210) -0.472(.310) -0.905(.081)* -0.556(.156) -0.142(.764) 0.079(.866) 
  CL + -0.133(.320)  -0.148(.680) -0.120(.733) 0.413(.296) -0.258(.369) 0.015(.967) -0.599(.127) 
  AFS  + -0.061(.635)                       0.101(.771)         -0.160(.627) -0.135(.736) -0.077(.794) -0.185(.578) -0.344(.345) 
  FMs + -0.001(.949)  -0.056(.315) -0.009(.840) 0.010(.830) -0.041(.329) 0.025(.597) 0.026(.654) 
  AGE  + -0.174(.002)***  -0.040(.782) -0.152(.271) -0.197(.241) -0.191(.133) -0.250(.108) -0.180(.306) 
  CEX - 2.183(.070)*  2.557(.427) 0.362(.912) -0.098(.980) 3.052(.243) 2.202(.528) 1.504(.637) 
  SG + 0.161(.559)  -0.546(.419) 0.999(.195) -0.563(.559) 0.618(.392) 0.867(.415) 0.569(.571) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  1.313***  1.555 2.756** 1.011 1.450 1.590 0.826 
Durbin-W. Stat  1.853  1.712 1.895 1.709 1.810 1.734 1.914 
F- value  50.046***  9.723*** 10.675*** 8.191*** 14.364*** 10.784*** 8.165*** 
Adj. R2  68.1%  64.6% 66.4% 59.5% 73.2% 67.2% 59.4% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: RCMs denotes the frequency of remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; BD 
denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG committee; CL 
denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry dummies and YDU 
denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and *  indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Appendix 6 (Continued): Individual-CG-Variables (CFOs’ Pay) 
 
Independent Variable 
     (Model) 
 All Firm Years       ______________________________     Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
Predicted 
sign                        (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Independent variables:      
  RCMs - 0.003(.903)  -0.021(.788) 0.058(.347) -0.044(.545) -0.030(.708) -0.007(.919) 0.024(.716) 
  RCI - 0.124(.693)  0.184(.860) 0.809(.408) 0.525(.563) 0.004(.996) 0.576(.517) -0.933(.322) 
  BSE - -2.885(.000)***  -2.711(.000)*** -2.704(.000)*** -2.863(.000)*** -2.989(.000)*** -3.310(.000)*** -2.981(.000)*** 
  IOE - -2.233(.000)***  -2.721(.012)** -3.425(.002)*** -2.946(.006)*** -1.588(.122) -2.131(.044)** -0.592(.620) 
  BD - -1.846(.000)***  -2.022(.163) -1.847(.174) -1.798(.230) -0.048(.967) -2.458(.044)** -2.821(.018)** 
  DSPLIT - 0.315(.059)*  0.158(.749) 0.341(.459) 0.481(.337) 0.115(.803) 0.433(.412) 0.821(.088)* 
  CEOT + 0.029(.001)***  -0.008(.755) 0.024(.352) 0.016(.510) 0.040(.067)* 0.049(.051)* 0.038(.194) 
Control Variables:          
  PCGC - -0.263(.123)  -0.401(.424) -0.435(.351) -0.284(.579) -0.414(.337) 0.100(.819) -0.279(.527) 
  CL + 0.018(.892)  -0.044(.904) 0.006(.986) 0.349(.362) -0.132(.688) 0.419(.252) -0.394(.288) 
  AFS  + -0.203(.111)                          -0.130(.712)         -0.201(.548)          -0.219(.569) -0.140(.681) -0.427(.210) -0.459(.217) 
  FMs + 0.008(.656)  -0.022(.708) -0.021(.666) -0.010(.825) 0.028(.553) 0.010(.841) 0.039(.547) 
  AGE  + -0.199(.000)***  -0.189(.186) -0.212(.140) -0.199(.212) -0.142(.317) -0.127(.409) -0.248(.141) 
  CEX - 0.672(.576)  2.223(.491) -0.382(.907) -0.075(.984) 0.161(.959) 0.705(.834) 0.656(.835) 
  SG + -0.025(.927)  -0.368(.607) 0.413(.608) -0.506(.593) 0.069(.938) 0.032(.977) -0.145(.895) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  1.284***  1.273 0.751 1.423 0.791 1.262 1.557 
Durbin-W. Stat  1.945  2.112 1.777 1.711 2.125 1.961 1.915 
F- value  58.191***  10.098*** 11.087*** 10.267*** 11.338*** 12.711*** 10.697*** 
Adj. R2  72.6%  67.5% 69.2% 66.5% 69.2% 72.2% 67.8% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: RCMs denotes the frequency of remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board 
independence; BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; PCGC denotes existence of a 
separate CG committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU 
denotes industry dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and *  indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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Appendix 6 (Continued): Individual-CG-Variables (AEDs’ Pay) 
 
Independent Variable 
(Model) 
 All Firm Years        __________________________________     Yearly estimations________________________________________ 
Predicted 
sign                         (2008)  (2009)   (2010)    (2011)   (2012)   (2013) 
Independent variables:      
  RCMs - 0.013(.628)  0.027(.718) 0.035(.550) -0.052(.499) -0.013(.869) -0.018(.800) 0.069(.322) 
  RCI - 1.194(.000)***  1.198 (.142) 1.114(.143) 1.060(.195) 1.351(.030)** 1.325(.033)** 0.857(.296) 
  BSE - -2.291(.000)***  -2.012(.000)*** -2.165(.000)*** -2.230(.000)*** -2.589(.000)*** -2.546(.000)*** -2.397(.000)*** 
  IOE - -4.905(.000)***  -5.139(.000)*** -5.381(.000)*** -4.932(.000)*** -4.647(.000)*** -4.886(.000)*** -4.232(.000)*** 
  BD - -0.986(.030)**  -1.605(.245) -1.088(.373) -0.592(.682) 0.692(.514) -0.896(.457) -1.972(.095)* 
  DSPLIT - 0.035(.818)  -0.086(.846) -0.186(.660) 0.421(.370) 0.143(.720) -0.437(.288) 0.258(.561) 
  CEOT + 0.013(.138)  -0.011(.650) 0.000(.994) 0.017(.482) 0.015(.440) 0.028(.254) 0.002(.953) 
Control Variables:       
  PCGC - -0.315(.064)*  -0.429(.364) -0.415(.348) -0.634(.218) -0.488(.248) 0.099(.823) -0.001 (.998) 
  CL + 0.019(.883)  -0.014(.966) 0.024(.944) 0.479(.225) -0.074(.811) 0.136(.698) -0.320(.409) 
  AFS  + 0.169(.155)  -0.121(.707) 0.052(.863) 0.213(.570) 0.265(.374) 0.194(.515) 0.079(.812) 
  FMs + -0.047(.001)***  -0.010(.849) -0.039(.339) -0.039(.361) -0.066(.050)** -0.044(.171) -0.072(.073)* 
  AGE  + -0.036(.512)  -0.029(.827) -0.040(.756) 0.028(.864) -0.035(.798) -0.058(.691) -0.068(.697) 
  CEX - 0.204(.861)  0.369(.903) -0.295(.924) -1.283(.747) -0.235(.933) 0.657(.835) -0.074(.981) 
  SG + 0.001(.998)  -0.307(.631) 0.785(.284) -1.024(.287) 0.245(.753) 0.873(.378) -0.474(.625) 
IDU  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YDU  YES  - - - - - - 
Constant  1.694***  0.886 1.767 1.083 1.924* 2.520** 2.424 
Durbin-W. Stat  2.063  1.912 1.955 1.836 2.154 2.132 2.375 
F- value  57.985***  10.867*** 11.924*** 9.006*** 13.733*** 13.271*** 9.690*** 
Adj. R2  70.8%  67.1% 68.8% 61.6% 71.8% 71.1% 63.5% 
Number of observations  600  100 100 100 100  100 100 
Notes: RCMs denotes the frequency of remuneration committee meetings; RCI denotes remuneration committee independence; BSE denotes board size; IOE denotes board independence; 
BD denotes board gender and ethnic diversity; DSPLIT denotes separating CEO and chairperson positions; CEOT denotes CEO tenure; PCGC denotes existence of a separate CG 
committee; CL denotes cross-listing; AFS denotes audit firm size; FMs denotes the frequency of board meetings; AGE denotes firm age; SG denotes sales growth; IDU denotes industry 
dummies and YDU denotes year dummies.  P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05 level and 0.10 level, respectively. 
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